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Abstract 
This thesis addresses both theories and practices of subjectivity in Anglo-American societies into 
the twenty-first century. The central argument is that one dominant subjectivity that has emerged 
in these societies centres on a deep-seated, almost irreconcilable tension. On the one hand, 
persons experience relatively heightened desires for unbounded lifestyles amidst relatively high 
levels of affluence and consumption. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the education, skills, and 
dispositions that persons assume in social worlds make desiring problematic. For example, high-
level consumption or workplace flexibility are not necessarily seen as desirable things, yet appear 
to envelop contemporary lifestyles. Individuated desires form key aspects of an Anglo-American 
‘way-of-life’, but a liberal individualism that emphasizes personal capacities and responsibilities, 
‘self-improvement’ and ‘well-being’ has arisen, and this makes resolving ethical and existential 
dilemmas difficult. That is, many worldly dilemmas — concerns with material security, social 
justice, the environment, or nutrition, for example — seem irreconcilable to the liberal 
individualism that is ‘lived’ as subjectivity ‘on the ground’. The thesis synthesizes social 
anthropology and social theory to ground its claims about the empirical world that sees 
subjectivity as ‘being’ human for particular social worlds. The approach is designed to look at 
situations that call upon self-orienting individuals, in order to explain how these represent the 
form of life that an ‘immediate’ self-projecting and orienting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ dominant 
subjectivity takes in Anglo-American societies. The argument develops a number of examples in 
the context of a theory-based approach in two registers: normative and ontological. Inquiry over 
an ontological register discusses the social formation of subjectivity in relation to the ‘categories’ 
of spatiality, temporality, embodiment, and institutionality, and the social constitution of 
subjectivity over coeval somatic, practical-ethological, and reflexive ‘layers of affect’. Inquiry over a 
normative register discusses practical and discursive conditions, and relates the overall argument to 
a critique of normativity based in the claim that ‘being’ requires that norm-based and relational 
contexts can affectively ‘legitimate’ ongoing sociality. In summary, the thesis has two dimensions. 
It argues that this dominant subjectivity moves between sovereign desires for satisfactions and 
their atomized dissatisfactions, and turns on a sustained deferral of worldly dilemmas 
irreconcilable to the liberal individualism that is seen to both anchor and impel ongoing sociality. 
Secondly, it suggests that we need to rethink theories of subjectivity in order to understand better 
this new dominant form of life. 
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I: Introduction 
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1 Prologue 
 
 
 
 
 
The central argument of this thesis is that conditions in Anglo-American societies1 enframe a 
dominant contemporary subjectivity that turns on an almost irreconcilable tension to sustain a 
deferral of worldly dilemmas raised by engagements within sociality. The thesis argues that this 
subjectivity moves between sovereign desires’ satisfactions and their atomized dissatisfactions, 
such that many ethical and existential dilemmas that social worlds raise for subject-agents — 
notably, concerns with material security, social justice, environmental, nutritional, or self-care, 
amongst other things — appear irreconcilable to the liberal individualism central to the Anglo-
American ‘way of-life’. Put more plainly, problems arise in the contemporary world, and one of 
the developments of Anglo-American late-modernity has been the emergence of a subjectivity that 
turns upon deferring the impact of those problems upon the self, and how selves should respond 
to them as life ‘goes on’ on the ground. 
Contemporary Anglo-American social conditions are often described as risky or precarious 
and affluent or merely ‘wealthy’. Yet, as well as stressful and emotionally demanding, many 
occupations seen as precarious are also said to be exciting, engrossing, or creative. A strange kind 
of tension seems to link these as social conditions. Meanwhile, the mass-media circulate relatively 
complex and abstract, often ‘scientific’, information tying environmental problems to high levels 
                                                 
 
1 Discussing Anglo-American societies emphasizes contemporary social and cultural similarities across predominately Anglophone 
liberal-democracies, which include the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, and, New Zealand. Arguably, processes of 
individualization appear relatively similar across these societies as a condition of the many common social, cultural, political 
and economic practices and societal, communal and personal-life relations that are, in part, products of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century British colonization and imperialism. In contemporary contexts, such a relatively common historicity 
implies shared cultural discourses that seem to frame widely varying yet recognizably similar Anglo-American formations of 
individualism. These commonalities seem influences on the relatively similar liberal-democratic institutions and, to a lesser 
extent, juridico-legal and administrative apparatus that several commentators find these nation-states have in common. While 
as a republic, the United States may stand apart from the Commonwealth societies taken together these share a long history of 
cross-cultural exchanges. Numerous commentators discuss the decline of the British Empire and the rise of the United States 
after 1918 as a transfer of political-economic power and socio-cultural hegemony between “Anglophone” nation-states. 
Moreover, for numerous commentators, this shift from British to United States leadership in international affairs since the 
1920s and, more markedly, since the 1940s is cast as an aspect of globalizing or hegemonic ‘Americanization’. While my 
argument emphasizes similarities between the Anglo-American societies that may include aspects of Americanization, the 
thesis is not a critique of Americanization as such. See, for example, D. Reynolds, "American Globalism: Mass, Motion and 
the Multiplier Effect," in Globalization in World History, ed. A.G. Hopking (London: Pimlico Press, 2002), 243-60. G. Ritzer, 
Expressing America: A Critique of the Global Credit Card Society (London: Pine Forge Press, 1995), 1-21. 
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of personal-use commodity consumption amidst largely well-educated and articulate milieux. 
Economic information is broadcast that suggests dependence upon such consumption is necessary 
for everyday existence. In these conditions, the vocabulary of private voluntarism is widely used to 
frame debates over an environmental crisis that is also seen as the collective achievement of 
several generations. Again, an odd sort of tension seems to lie beneath such representations. 
Where such issues can be said to raise dilemmas for ‘us’ — the socialized subjects and creative 
agents of a contemporary Anglo-American ‘way-of-life’ — the present thesis aims to bring into 
question some of the conditions that make this the case, in order to say something about the form 
of life that we currently live-out.  
The ethical or existential dilemmas that might present themselves in, or be re-presented as 
information about, social or environmental conditions resonate with the cultural histories, forms 
of political power, and economic value criteria that, amongst other things, make them issues for 
people. Beginning to look at the problem, then, might involve bringing into question ways that 
such issues enter and circulate within sociality — seen as the ongoing job of creating and 
reproducing the conditions that frame societal and relational engagements — as actions, meanings, 
and things. Many issues that gain expression as public concerns and, as such, can be seen as raising 
ethical or existential dilemmas for persons seem (re-)presented in and through practices and 
discourses that, when considered from the abstract position afforded the social inquirer, appear 
the products of a perspective upon states of affairs that is simultaneously in-common and 
embodied-personal. It seems that, however, while the in-common aspect of this perspective 
assumes the mantle of humans’ common experiences as ‘beings’, its embodied-personal aspect, in 
effect, proceeds from the generalization of a presumption about personal perspectives.  
While similar claims about such conditions have long been associated with ‘ideology’ 
critique, or a conservatism bewailing lost support for generalized presumptions, the ‘Third Way’ 
debates once seen by some as offering a way out of the tense atmosphere that Anglo-America’s 
liberal individualism creates appear to have faltered. Where precarity coincides with affluence, 
collectively-created problems with individuated solutions, or where an articulate culture coexists 
with deep marginalization, corporate sustainability with gross exploitation, and a new ‘spirituality’ 
with heightened material consumption, for example, conditions emerge that seem to engender a 
velveteen kind of envelopment of Anglo-American social life. Indeed, partial motivation for the 
present thesis arises from recognition that the Third Way’s theories and practices have, at least in 
some ways, contributed to the emergence of a sovereign ‘enlightened stakeholder’ liberal 
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individualism that seems bound-over to sustain a tense kind of deferral of many worldly dilemmas 
that contemporary sociality raises.  
 
… … … 
 
The present thesis uses the term ‘subjectivity’ to mean the form of life that humans create and act-
out in social worlds — “the empirical subject, [the] indivisible sample of the human species” — it 
is the socialized condition that being human takes (in Anglo-American societies) in contemporary 
globalizing modernity. The terms ‘human-being’ and ‘being’ human, refer to the norm-based and 
relational condition that it is to ‘be’ embodied, in space, over time, and amongst others. The term 
‘subject-agents’ signals a shift in focus, and is used to discuss the tasks for humans of creating and 
reproducing social-historical conditions and material-physical contexts as social worlds. The term 
‘individualism’ is used to mean the situation-specific aspect(s) of a dominant subjectivity; that is, 
the ‘ideological’, or doxic form(s) that subjectivity takes amidst particular practical and discursive 
‘normative’ conditions and material-physical ‘ontic’ contexts.2  
On these terms, the thesis discusses theory and method to develop a framework for 
analyses for inquiring into how particular practices and discourses, in certain material-physical 
contexts, may sustain a dominant form of life that is both subject and agent of a social world. My 
argument that conditions enframe a dominant subjectivity, one that turns on a sustained deferral 
of the consequences of worldly dilemmas irreconcilable to such a form of life, is a claim about 
how such a form of life can be said to predominate in the job of creating and reproducing of 
contemporary Anglo-American sociality. That is, the present thesis develops an approach to 
explaining how intertwining practical and discursive conditions and material-physical contexts 
enframe human-being in particular ways. The argument sees social-historical conditions in 
contemporary Anglo-American liberal-democracies as affecting possibilities for self-realization and 
relative freedom, for example, while in the same movement, circumscribing these in ways that 
make self-assertion and emending the self almost compulsory conditions for stakeholder-
citizenship. Whether in occupations with socially responsible corporations, or in a polity shaped by 
                                                 
 
2 See, L. Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, English ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1986 [1983]), 16, 279. Italics omitted. N. Abercrombie, S. Hill, and B. S. Turner, Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 3. 
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Third Way politics, conditions have arisen that impel freedom and ‘self-creativity’, such that failure 
to be a ‘pro-active player’ can attract sanction and reprobation.  
Therefore, where the present thesis argues that a dominant subjectivity ‘goes on’ under 
coeval orders of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, it describes affective conditions, rather than 
necessarily, states of self-consciousness. In this sense, references to heightened satisfactions and 
later in the thesis, to ‘jouissance’, imply conditions that impel the achieving of desire through active 
deployments of capacities for enjoyment; the ostensive satisfactions that personal-use 
commodities may call upon, or that ‘passionate’ workplaces may engender, for example. Use of the 
term jouissance draws on its French ‘dictionary’ meaning, and not that which it attains in Roland 
Barthes’ work, or Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory.3 For the present thesis, it describes an 
activation of planned, pre-emptive desiring as implied in the secondary meaning of the French 
word, the right of an owner, or holder of capital, to interest compounding the original account. 
Similarly, references to enervated dissatisfactions and later, to lassitude, imply a particular world-
weariness, which draws on its Latin root lassus: weary. It points to the specious disinterest that 
seems central to ‘compassionate’ management practices, or the discourses of consumer 
‘sovereignty’, for example. Enervated dissatisfaction points to conditions that frame a particular 
languor or jadedness. It entails the obverse of multiple ‘offers’ to satisfy. In contemporary Anglo-
American conditions, sovereign desires’ satisfactions and dissatisfactions seem the key registers for 
contributing to sociality.  
Throughout a series of illustrative examples, the present thesis looks at how structured and 
institutionalized conditions frame relatively unbounded and autonomous lifestyles yet also seem, 
simultaneously, to give rise to existential and ethical dilemmas. The examples help to suggest that, 
in the same conditions, a de-legitimating of possibilities has arisen for resolving such dilemmas on 
terms not conducive to sovereign ‘choices’ and atomistic desiring. The argument does not assert a 
claim to recognize or theorize the psychic impossibility of reconciling such dilemmas. Hence, it 
does not involve arguing that contemporary subject-agents ‘deny’ the actuality of particular 
phenomenal conditions.4 This aspect of the thesis’ argument requires twofold explanation. On the 
one hand, it involves theoretical claims that amount to recognizing the impossibility of interceding 
upon reality, which is described as the ‘immediacy’ of ‘being’ human in modernizing conditions. 
                                                 
 
3 See, R. Barthes, "From Work to Text," in Image - Music - Text (London: Fontana Books, 1979), 157, J. Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, 
trans. A. Sheridan (London: Routledge Classics, 1977 [1966]), xiii. 
4 Throughout the thesis, the terms ‘phenomena’ and ‘phenomenon’ are used in the everyday ‘dictionary’ sense and denote worldly 
things, cognizable by the (socialized) senses and perceptions. 
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For the argument of the present thesis, reality can only be such for single humans in the act of 
being. On the other hand, it involves methodological claims that facilitate inquiry into the shared 
and communicative, norm-based and relational condition that human-being always and already ‘is’. 
Hence, the thesis aims to contribute new knowledge to the fields of critical social theory, 
consumption studies, and globalization studies, insofar as these focus on social and cultural life in 
contemporary Anglo-American societies. 
 
… … …  
 
The thesis is divided into four main parts, and a fifth containing appendices. The chapters in Part I 
contextualize the overall thesis as a research project. Part II uses these contextualizing chapters to 
frame a series of discussions that focus upon relatively recent social conditions and public affairs 
in relation to social theories of subjectivity. Part III sets out the research problem and raising a 
number of theoretical and methodological issues, develops an analytic framework for the inquiry. 
The chapters in Part IV operationalize this framework through a series of illustrative examples. 
The examples help to explain what happens in practice, using the framework set out in Part III. 
Part V contains a series of appendices that offer primary and secondary sources to support Part 
IV’s claims.  
Immediately following this Prologue, Chapter 2 sets out a contextualizing background for 
the thesis. The chapter discusses social and historical formation in modernizing Western 
conditions,5 with particular emphases upon modern materialism and Western individualism. The 
concern in Chapter 2 is not to develop a comprehensive picture of the matrix of modern 
subjectivities, but only to draw attention to conditions for a generalized transformation of 
conditions for Western human-being. Engaging with anthropological history and political theory, 
the discussion focuses upon how changing practices and discourses and altered material-physical 
contexts might have displaced conditions for a confessional and obeisant, past-oriented and 
traditional form of life. The chapter suggests that, with modernization, human-being became 
bound ‘here and now’ within a world of immediate experiences and ramifications. What might 
                                                 
 
5 Throughout the thesis, and especially in the early chapters, the somewhat problematic terms ‘the West’ and ‘Western’ are used as 
authors like Mukerji and Dumont use them. Elsewhere, the terms are used as an empirical reference that draws attention to 
social-historical and, as such, cultural conditions most often but not exclusively linked to the particular geographic spaces of 
Western Europe, North America, and the Oceanic ‘settler societies’.    
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once have been ‘given’ as the Natural order of things, becomes in modernizing conditions an 
untenable scenario.  
Chapter 2 describes how looking at how expanding markets for material goods intertwined 
with Occidental Judaeo-Christian cosmology might point, not only to the emergence of Western 
individualism, but also to a peculiar ‘modern artificialism’. The present thesis brings in this concept 
from Louis Dumont’s work, which describes how modernization can be seen to effect a 
generalization of the application, by persons, to worldly affairs of personal will-objectives that are, 
in effect, the concentration within an individual’s will of ‘objectively true’ reality.6 In the absence of 
a traditional cosmological sense of truth, modern persons act in the world in such ways that the 
world subjectively corresponds with and, as such, responds to individual’s wills. Discussing things 
in this way directs inquiry towards situations wherein humans might be seen to create and 
reproduce a worldly order that is effectively an abstract order of “misplaced concreteness” that, 
because enduring in space and over time, ‘passes’ as ‘objectively true’.7  
That is, the modern social universe is at once ‘objective’; it is the material-physical 
contextual reality that encompasses individual and collective ‘going on’.8 Yet, inasmuch as reality is 
manifest for humans, it is ‘subjective’; a ‘real’ world that resides in person’s bodies as they ‘go on’ 
in space, time, and amongst others as socialized subjects and creative agents. In this sense, reality 
subjectively becomes an artifice of ‘human-being’; it requires material-physical bodies, in space, 
and over time, all that philosophers call ontology and epistemology, as well as inter-relational 
institutionality and normativity. The concept of ‘modern artificialism’ helps the inquiry to grapple 
with the methodological problem raised by recognizing that the (social) world can be seen as an 
always and already material-physical contextuality; a reality that encompasses human-being, and in 
terms of the job of ‘being’ human in reality. The relation of subject-agents with and within reality 
requires socialized and embodied artifice: ‘being’ human in modernity is the art of making reality 
‘real’.  
Materialism and individualism, modern artificialism and subjectivity imply an unstable and 
risky (always and already social) world, which ‘is’ what humans create it to be. Around these 
                                                 
 
6 See, Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, 56. 
7 A. N. Whitehead, Science & the Modern World (London: Pelican Books, 1926), 55. 
8 The concept of ‘going on’, or to ‘go on’ is taken from Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Throughout the thesis, to ‘go on’ or ‘going on’ 
are used when the discussion looks at sociality in practice. Following Wittgenstein, to discuss the job of ‘being’ human is to look 
at bodies amongst others, in space and time, which implies sensing, “empirically feeling”, perceiving, “having language”, and 
imagining, using ‘these’ as the tools and techniques for or of ‘going on’. See, L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. 
G.E.N. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (London: Blackwell Books, 2001 [1953]), 160c, 78c, 92c, §99, §397. 
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engagements, the chapter develops a provisional concept of a self-orienting and projecting, self-
asserting and ‘creative’ dominant subjectivity. This move frames the political dimension of the 
argument. It helps to suggest that the secularization associated with the emergence of materialism 
prompted relatively new patterns of access to and monopoly over materials, practices, and 
discourses, as well as new ways of engaging within and interpreting the material-physical world. It 
allows an approach to societal and relational dynamics that recognizes these as always being at risk 
of working to legitimate forms of authority or value criteria that arise as consequences of the social 
ordaining of an ‘objective’ order of things. The discussion uses Jürgen Habermas’ early work on 
the ‘the public sphere’ and Nicholas Abercrombie, Bryan Turner, and Stephen Hill’s discussion of 
‘sovereign individuals’ and ‘dominant ideologies’. These two theses are linked to suggest an 
approach that sees sociality in terms of situations for the formation of liberal individualism, in and 
through which subject-agents can be said to create and reproduce conditions for a dominant 
subjectivity.  
Chapter 3 takes up this discussion and looks briefly at early-modern reflections upon 
human-being in Western philosophy and Marxist theory. Discussing the provisional account of a 
dominant subjectivity alongside aspects of early-modern philosophy helps to clarify the thesis’ 
overall trajectory, while discussing Marxist theory allows the link between theory and practice to 
be developed. The early-modern Western philosophers are said to reflect upon modernizing 
conditions in ways that meant human-being was seen to be lived ‘here and now’, yet with the 
benefit of hindsight, in relation to immaterial, transcendental, or metaphysical concepts. This said, 
the chapter uses recent interpretations of two parts in Kant’s Critique of Judgment and Hegel’s 
Encyclopeadia that suggest both philosopher’s ‘systems’ leave open an alternate route for thinking 
about modernization and subjectivity.  
The chapter then discusses Karl Marx’s approach to human-being as the secular historical 
‘subject’ of material productive forces. My concerns here are the relationship between Marx’s 
theory of the social and material world — that is, of an industrializing and capitalistic modernity 
that unleashes a potentially emancipatory species-being — and the way it opens to critique of its 
own relationship to modernity. By rejecting cosmology and beliefs as ‘false’ — that is, as ideology 
perpetuated in practice by milieux monopolizing political power and economic wealth — Marx de-
legitimated the hitherto unquestionable authority of religion, and undermined idealism and 
positivism. However, as the chapter moves to look at Marxism in the light of social-historical 
conditions, it becomes clear that while materialism remains an important theoretical move, the 
conceptual motif of emancipatory species-being central to Marxism does not fare so well. That is, 
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problems arise when theory reaches into metaphysics for critical and explanatory force. Arguably, 
on the one hand, Marxists recognize human-being in Western modernity as an immediate self-
orienting condition. Yet, on the other hand, Marxism reaches beyond the immediacy of material-
physical reality for explanatory force. By stretching beyond the world it aims to critique as a 
nonetheless over-arching totality, Marxist theory seems bound to totalize the concept of species-
being before ‘hitting the ground’ as a way of dealing with actions, meanings, and things.  
Chapter 4 discusses aspects of Emile Durkheim’s and Max Weber’s sociology. My aim 
here is not to develop a Durkheimian or a Weberian approach to subjectivity, but to link 
discussion of materialism, Western individualism, and modern artificialism to distinctly modern 
sociological concepts. Durkheim’s work on individuation and individualism are used to describe 
how the relative societal complexity of modernization across the West might include structured 
and institutionalized conditions that mean a self-orienting and projecting subjectivity engages 
within sociality on idiosyncratic terms. The interest in Weber centres on his analyses of ‘vocation’. 
Weber helps to describe how modernizing conditions said to enframe subjectivity — that include, 
amongst other things, large-scale bureaucratically administered capitalistic and nation-state 
institutions, as well as requirements for relatively high levels of formal education, and detached 
‘vocational’ competencies — can be seen to involve situations where liberal individualism ‘goes 
on’ in practice.  
 
… … … 
 
The chapters in Part II discuss recent Anglo-American social conditions directly, and relate these 
to theories and practices of subjectivity in the second half of the twentieth century. These chapters 
discuss important currents in social theory as responses to contemporaneous social conditions, 
which are seen as offering both social explanations and frameworks for understanding subjectivity. 
Chapter 5 discusses how, with the ending of the so-called Long Upturn and decline of 
welfare statism in the very late 1960s and early 1970s, a flush of ‘countercultural’ sensibilities 
spread across Anglo-America. These were accompanied by relatively high but unevenly distributed 
affluence, access to higher education, and occupational and cultural domains that, through high 
technologies, mass-communications, and personal-use commodities, favoured the articulate 
dispositions of what has more recently been called ‘cultural capital’. In such conditions, it is 
arguably the case that French post-structuralism — through the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
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Guattari, and Jean Baudrillard, amongst others — became important for thinking about 
subjectivity, especially in the United States.  
Chapter 6 looks at how social, cultural, political, and economic scandals, or ‘crises’, seemed 
to continue throughout the 1970s and early 1980s as partial consequences of wide-reaching 
changes in globalizing structured institutional conditions. Such conditions are seen as bringing 
issues concerning nation-state’s governance and custodianship over the economic sphere to the 
fore. This chapter discusses Daniel Bell’s arguments concerning the ‘cultural contradictions of 
capitalism’, as well as Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter’s ‘rational actor’ theory-based analysis of 
the countercultural individualism. Although their work is retrospective, developed in the early 
2000s as a comment on the counterculture’s role in the genesis of what they label ‘consumer 
society’, the subsequent influence exerted by so-called ‘rational actor’ theories — notably its 
‘neoliberal’ variants — in many areas of Anglo-American societies means that their work is a 
prescient example for the argument of this thesis.  
Chapter 7 then addresses some of the practices and discourses of subjectivity that seem to 
surround the ascendancy of what several commentators describe as neoliberalization. This said, 
Chapter 7 discusses how the rhetoric of Anglo-American polity seems to take on a distinct tone 
amidst ongoing high inflation and unemployment, the ‘energy crises’, worldwide ‘recession’ and 
financialization. This becomes apparent when considering commentary surrounding the election 
of conservative governments in the United States and Britain that had appealed to an ill-defined 
‘moral majority’ based on somewhat nebulous calls for a ‘return to values’. This chapter focuses 
primarily on governmentality theories of subjectivity in the work of Peter Miller, Nikolas Rose, 
and Mitchell Dean. Although such theory may be largely associated with the work of Michel 
Foucault in the 1960s and 1970s, it becomes relevant to my argument through these authors’ more 
recent analyses using Giorgio Agamben’s philosophy.  
As such, Chapter 8 links so-called neoliberalization and financialization to conditions for 
stock market, real-estate property price, and consumer ‘booms’, and the erstwhile ‘high-tech 
bubble’ of the 1990s and early 2000s. It discusses commentary that recognizes how such 
structured and institutionalized conditions seemed to enframe the entrenching of a marginalized 
underclass in these decades. This chapter links large-scale ‘downsizing’, ‘off-shoring’, and the 
expansion of service and information-intensive industries with the embrace of so-called 
‘neoliberalism’ by social- and liberal-democratic as well as conservative parties. Chapter 8 suggests 
a notion of ‘core arenas for sociality’ that focuses upon actions, meanings, and things that can be 
seen as central to the job of creating and reproducing Anglo-American societies amidst widespread 
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de-industrialization and de-/re-regulation of ‘the economy’. The chapter concludes Part II by 
concentrating on how Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, taking relatively similar approaches, 
discuss a post-materialistic ‘politics of self-identity’ in these decades.  
 
… … …  
 
These discussions of social conditions and reviews of current theory mean the present thesis 
partially and very critically springs from the ‘Third Way’ debates that arose in Anglo-American and 
European social theory in the late 1980s and 1990s. In Part III, focus is upon the problem of 
developing a theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis’ overall argument. Hence, 
Chapter 9 summarizes concepts developed in discussion so far and uses engagements with current 
theory to develop a general research problem that takes into account four key points. In brief, 
Chapter 9 suggests that theory may be ‘too deep’ or ‘too shallow’, and sublime or trivialize inquiry. 
The chapter suggests that theory might open social power to analysis, but in doing so; appear to 
eschew the inquiry’s normative groundings. Fourth, theory might so neatly imbricate itself and the 
subjectivity it explains into the modernity that is its topic, such that the inquiry’s critical position 
seems to dissolve in a froth of only-ostensibly realized potentialities.  
In order to account for these problems, Chapter 9 sets out the approach around a 
requirement that the inquiry avoid ‘strong’ empirical claims. These four points allow a suggestion 
that, where used wholesale, or uncritically framing inquiry into conditions for subjectivity, such 
theories appear to culminate in unsustainable claims, which are in some ways similar to cosmology 
or metaphysics-based modes of inquiry. The approach is designed in this way because it seems that 
inquiry based in ‘strong’ empirical claims elides, rather than accounts for an important condition 
imparted to inquiry by modernization’s secularity, or worldliness. ‘Strong’ empirical claims about 
the world might succumb to positivist realism, and assert the perspective or interest of an 
ultimately personal will-objective over inquiry and the world, or asocial relativism, and claim that 
‘being’ human is an ethereal moment amidst contingent series’ of ‘presents’. Arguably, both 
approaches ‘forget’ that material-physical reality, as well as ‘being’ human ‘within’ it are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for explanations of worldly phenomena. The concept of ‘modern 
artificialism’ becomes important again here. Where the modern social world is said to be at once 
‘objective’, the material-physical contextual reality that encompasses individual and collective ‘going 
on’, yet inasmuch as it is reality for humans, it is ‘subjective’, a ‘real’ world that resides in person’s 
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bodies, in space, over time, and amongst others, inquiry that ultimately addresses itself ‘strongly’ to 
‘immediate’ being risks solipsism.  
The framework for inquiry is based in recognition that strong ‘empiricism’ is a problem for 
inquiry, a series of ‘weak’ empirical claims are indispensable for the argument. The approach 
developed is based around a claim that human-being is a socialized embodied norm-based and 
relational condition that ‘goes on’ in particular worldly settings. This means that the thesis 
approaches inquiry through theory that recognizes an ‘immediate’ self-orienting and projecting 
subjectivity both frames and is enframed by social worlds. Therefore, the approach to discussing 
the formation of subjectivity is, in the sparest way, seen as the job of explaining a spatial, temporal, 
embodied, and shared condition. Around this proposition, the approach aims to avoid ‘going too 
deep’ by accounting for the inter-subjective ‘material-physicality’ of subjectivity. The approach 
aims to avoid being ‘too shallow’ by accounting for how subjectivity is at once the creation of and 
creator of the social world. And the approach aims to avoid transposing ‘means’ into ‘ends’ by 
recognizing that in social worlds, humans create and reproduce actions, meanings, and things, and 
in doing so, give them orders and values that serve as criteria for assessing differences and 
similarities, and legitimate the social power that frames the granting or rescinding of authority. In 
addition, the approach aims to avoid imbricating subjectivity within sociality, such that it appears 
as if a functioning unit in a system-like complex by maintaining a commitment to embodiment 
that remains linked to norm-based and relational contextuality ‘all the way down’. 
In order to develop a workable framework for inquiry that takes into account these 
theoretical and methodological issues, Chapter 10 shifts focus to recent social anthropology and 
philosophy. These engagements develop an approach to societal and relational dynamics in 
contemporary conditions. Using Maurice Godelier’s and Annette Weiner’s current anthropology 
helps to conceptualize sociality in terms of “twin spheres of exchange and transmission …” in a 
world where “both ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ tend to fall apart, to alter, and change”. The chapter 
connects Godelier’s and Weiner’s work to approach human societies in terms of the 
commonalities and continuities that socialized subject-agents share and communicate in and 
through the job of creating and reproducing social worlds. That is, it sets up an approach that sees 
‘being’ human as ‘going on’ because subject-agents can be said to imagine ‘real’ worlds, and to 
‘materialize’ them as part of the job of creating and reproducing societies in space, over time, and 
amongst others through institutions. On the one hand, that sociality ‘goes on’ means that the 
inquiry sees the job of creating and reproducing it as one of “legitimizing the order of the universe”. 
In space, over time, and through institutions, embodied subject-agents share an in-common and 
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enduring reality. Yet, on the other hand, because socialized embodied subject-agents are seen to 
imagine ‘real’ worlds, and ‘materialize’ them as ongoing sociality, the inquiry recognizes that 
subject-agents can also be seen to create and reproduce particular possibilities for ‘legitimating’ 
and challenging the forms of authority and value criteria that frame actions, meanings, and things.9 
Chapter 10 creates room for ‘weak’ empirical claims by suggesting that particular practices 
and discourses ‘go on’ within a social universe that is created and reproduced along particular lines: 
the near-ineffable totality of an ‘immediate’ reality ‘conceived as material forces’. What subject-
agents ‘materialize’ are all those actions, meanings, and things that go into creating and 
reproducing a form of life. Discussing Godelier’s and Weiner’s work means suggesting that 
contemporary Anglo-American conditions — what are ‘materialized’ as subject-agents imagine 
‘real’ worlds — work to privilege, to ‘normalize’ a particular liberal individualism. Taken to be the 
form of life that a dominant subjectivity manifests in particular conditions, liberal individualism is 
said to work as the ‘inalienable’ motor and anchor point for the job of creating and reproducing 
contemporary Anglo-American social worlds.  
These engagements situate the overall thesis within the field of critical social theory in a 
particular way. The approach raises an issue that, on the one hand, requires attention but, on the 
other hand, is beyond the ambit of this project. This centres on big debates about the role of the 
symbolic order in theory and method. Adapting Godelier’s and Weiner’s anthropology helps to 
account for ‘weak’ empirical claims, but does so at the cost of raising this issue. The key 
implication here is that where socialized subject-agents are said to imagine ‘real’ worlds, to 
‘materialize’ them and, thus, create and reproduce a reality that is inter-subjectively ‘off-limits’, what 
goes on at the intra-personal level, the imagining of ‘real’ worlds, is cordoned-off from inquiry and 
its analyses. Chapter 10 digresses briefly to suggest that granting primacy to the symbolic order in 
the inquiry might be to base it around claims that signs or symbols can have an order that exists 
for other than a single socialized embodied ‘being’. Arguably, such an approach would require 
speculating about intra-personal states, or implying that subject-agents inhabit the same reality 
because pre-socially ‘grasping’ a univocal symbolic logic. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy here 
helps to clarify the approach, which takes signs and the symbolic order as merely ‘pointing the 
way’.10  
                                                 
 
9 M. Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, trans. N. Scott (London: Polity/University of Chicago Press, 1999 [1996]), 27. A. B. Weiner, 
Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping While Giving (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 149. 
10 See, for example, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §65, 87, 105, 98, 432. 
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Chapter 11 links this anthropology of societal and relational dynamics to contemporary 
philosophical debates and social theory. It uses Jan Westerhoff’s argument that “ontological 
categories cannot provide us with information about the essential properties of things” but, rather, 
are limited to providing “a unified account of how objects in this world can fit together into states 
of affairs”.11 Westerhoff’s argument is used to develop a basis for ‘weak’ empirical claims because 
it helps to explain and delimit inquiry’s ‘ontological commitments’. Westerhoff helps to define the 
ontic field as a totality of binding yet variable material-physical contexts that enframe states of 
affairs; that is, ‘normative’ societal and relational conditions. Westerhoff’s work provides a means 
for discussing a socially formative, yet arbitrary and contingent ontic field as an enframing context 
for the social form(-ation)s of life that ‘go on’ in social worlds. Chapter 11 then takes this claim 
from philosophical debate, and develops it into a means for discussing the social formation of 
subjectivity over an ‘ontological register’ through engagement with aspects of Paul James’ social 
theory. The chapter takes up James’ suggestions that theory might develop links between claims 
about the ways that “ontological categories” frame social conditions by discussing these in relation 
to normatively grounded modes of inquiry. The chapter takes up, directly, James’ categories of 
‘spatiality’, ‘temporality’, and ‘embodiment’, but also moves away from his concept of 
‘epistemology’.12 Using aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy as an explanatory aid, the chapter 
develops an ontological category of ‘institutionality’, which is set up to explain an enframing 
category that means human-being is, in practice, always and already a shared and communicative 
norm-based and relational condition.  
Chapter 12 uses this discussion to set out an approach to the social constitution of 
subjectivity over an ontological register. Bourdieu’s concepts of the bodily hexis, and the nexus he 
sets up between the habitus and the social field, are used to set out an approach to subjectivity as 
the condition human-being can be said to take in modernizing (Western) conditions. However, the 
chapter avoids taking up Bourdieu’s account of societal and relational dynamics as based around 
“collective misrecognition”, and brings in Carol Gould’s social-philosophical claim that society can 
be seen as an “ethical totality”.13 The discussion uses Gould’s insights as a way of avoiding ‘strong’ 
claims about sociality. Instead, it takes up the ‘weak’ claim that human-being is a norm-based and 
                                                 
 
11 J. Westerhoff, "The Construction of Ontological Categories," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 4 (2004): 617-18. 
12 P. James, Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In (London: Sage Publications, 2006), 80. 
13 C. C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 128. P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, ed. E. Gellner, et al., trans. R. Nice, vol. 16, Cambridge Studies in 
Social and Cultural Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977 [1972]), 77, P. Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 
trans. R. Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000 [1997]), 139. 
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relational condition, which involves subject-agents imagining ‘real’ worlds in a reality where social, 
cultural, political, and economic, as well as material-physical conditions, change and so raise 
problems. Seen in the light of Gould’s work, Bourdieu’s schema opens to inquiry the patterns of 
access to and monopolies over materials, practices, and discourses, that can be said to ‘go on’ 
because humans create and reproduce particular social worlds amidst arbitrary and contingent ontic 
contexts. Again using sections from Wittgenstein’s work, the chapter sees Bourdieu as offering a 
way into inquiry that takes embodied ‘being’ as a socially constituted — embodied, in space and 
time, and amongst others — form-of-life. Bourdieu’s social agents embody ‘their’ practical sense 
because seen as ‘living’ socialized dispositions-of-the-body in the social field.  
Chapter 12 develops an expanded definition of subjectivity as the ‘immediacy’ of ‘being’ 
amidst the in-common and enduring reality that humans ‘materialize’ as (Western) modernity. This 
means setting out a tripartite schema that, again aided by Wittgenstein, sees sensing, perceiving, 
and imagining ‘being’ as what can be said to ‘go on’ at the nexus of habitus and social field. 
Bringing back the notion of the imaginary-‘real’ nexus, therefore, means setting out to discuss 
subjectivity as the reflexive practicing of an embodied ethology; subjectivity as ‘being’ normatively 
so-disposed amidst the arbitrariness and contingencies of a binding ontic field. Based in these 
discussions, Chapter 12 develops an approach to inquiry over an ontological register into the social 
constitution of subjectivity that is based around three coeval layers of affect: the somatic, practical-
ethological, and reflexive. The chapter brings together two levels of analysis for inquiry over an 
ontological register — those of ‘categories’ and ‘layers of affect’ — in order to discuss the (socially 
created) material-physical ‘universe’ as the enframing context for a dominant form of life.  
Chapter 12 operationalizes the claim that ‘ontology’ always involves epistemology and, so, 
can ground normative claims. Chapter 12 brings back Giddens and Habermas. Giddens’ theory of 
‘the reflexivity of modernity’ is important, because it allows the secular dynamic central to the job 
of creating and reproducing modernizing, indeed, globalizing sociality to be seen as ‘pervasive’ in 
scope. Habermas’ work on the relatively complex structured and institutionalized conditions of 
(Western) modernization allows discussion of the ways practical and discursive conditions might 
be said to privilege particular forms of individualism. That is, contemporary globalizing 
modernization involves the creating and reproducing of normative conditions that, between 
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deeply individuating conditions and, on the other hand, a self-orienting and projecting subjectivity 
mean, “the paths of legitimation grow longer”.14  
The chapter links inquiry over an ontological register that is based in two analytic levels, 
with inquiry over a normative register also based in two levels. The first focuses inquiry upon 
normative conditions that can be seen ‘as’ the job of creating and reproducing social and cultural 
practices and discourses. At a second level, discussion works to relate the overall thesis’ inquiry — 
over ontological and normative registers — to a ‘critique of normativity’ based in the claim that 
human-being is a norm-based and relational condition. The chapters in Part IV operationalize the 
inquiry by bringing the approach to a series of illustrative examples drawn from the polity, 
economic, occupational, civil, and cultural domains in contemporary Anglo-American societies, 
and are chosen to look at what happens in practice in relation to the theory and method discussed 
in Part III.  
 
… … … 
… … 
                                                 
 
14 J. Habermas, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. T. McCarthy, The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol.2 
(Boston Beacon Press, 1987 [1985]), 178. 
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2 Modernity: subjectivity and liberal individualism  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses Western modernization in order to develop a provisional account of 
conditions for ‘subjectivity’. The chapter does not aim to set out a definitive account of modern 
Western subjectivity but, rather, to provide a background for theoretical and methodological 
discussions taken up later. Initially, the chapter uses Chandra Mukerji’s empirical-historical 
research to look at how the proliferating material ‘objects’ that spread across Western societies 
from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries fostered wide-reaching social change. It then brings 
in aspects of Louis Dumont’s work on the ‘genesis’ of a distinctive Western individualism and the 
peculiar ‘modern artificialism’ that arose with it. These engagements are used to link 
modernization with social and cultural ‘materialism’ and suggest how the emerging conditions 
might enframe an ‘immediate’, self-orienting and projecting subjectivity. 
The chapter then discusses Habermas’ account of the ‘bourgeois private citizens’ that 
acted to form a ‘public sphere’ and contributed to the establishing of market-oriented Western 
liberal-democracies from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries on. In the light of 
Mukerji’s and Dumont’s work, Habermas’ thesis helps to focus upon how conditions that meant 
such milieux of ‘bourgeois private citizens’ could accrue wealth and control over power affected 
the individualism that arose in the modernizing West. Also important is Habermas’ discussion of a 
‘bourgeois culture of arts and letters’ that arose in partial opposition to the predominance of 
‘bourgeois private citizens’. This aspect of Habermas’ work allows the chapter to discuss different 
forms of individualism as situation-specific aspects of a dominant subjectivity. Habermas’ work 
helps the discussion to focus upon subjectivity and modernization in a way that allows changing 
social-historical and material-physical conditions to be seen in terms of shifting dynamics of power 
and authority.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion of Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and 
Bryan S. Turner’s ‘dominant ideology thesis’ and study of ‘sovereign individualism’, which helps 
clarify some of the methodological issues raised by discussion so far. These authors’ suggestion 
that analyses should focus upon the intertwining of an ‘economic subject’ and a ‘way of being in 
the world’ helps further to suggest an approach that looks at the formation of individualism in 
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terms of situations in and through which a dominant subjectivity is enframed. These discussions 
set out a provisional concept of ‘subjectivity’, which the next chapter takes up and uses as a 
background to briefly considering early-modern Western philosophical reflections upon human-
being as ‘subjectivity’.  
 
… … … 
 
Mukerji describes the emergence of a “modern materialist culture” across the West from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward. Mukerji paraphrases Karl Polanyi and Marshall 
Sahlins to define the ‘materialism’ that arose — amidst widening inter- and intra-continental trade 
and expanding markets for goods and services fuelled, in part, by colonization — as a social and 
cultural “system in which material interests are not made subservient to other social goals”: 
 
Where the sheer number of objects available to people and the increasing manufacture of goods for 
practical use — such as clocks, books, maps, and guns — also began to affect practical activities … 
they became less dependent either on other persons or on nature [or cosmology]. Once [material 
culture] is produced, it is part of the world in which people must function (at least, until it is 
destroyed or replaced with other goods) and to which they must adapt their behaviour. [T]he 
expansion of trade and increased appearance of objects on the market [and across society] were the 
occasion for the establishment of new and elaborate systems of thought, ones that advocated 
careful measurement and study of relationships among variables, conceived of as material forces.15  
 
Mukerji suggests that the plethora of objects arriving or produced in the West, as well as 
the “systems of thought” that people developed to make sense of them, contributed to the 
emergence of relatively complex, abstract, and extended societal and relational conditions. Mukerji 
describes how, in and around this ‘plethora of objects’, communities expanded to encompass 
larger areas; involved more people, created new institutions, different knowledges, and ways of 
inter-relating, as well as relating as a society and as individuals to the material-physical world. For 
Mukerji, as sociality became increasingly created and construed in and around such ‘objects’ and 
                                                 
 
15 C. Mukerji, From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern Materialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 8, 10-11, 15, 21. 
Richard Wilkinson and, later, Jared Diamond use ‘ecological’ and ‘biological’ science to argue that modernization arose as a 
contingent condition of human engagement in certain material-ecological environment; and has nothing to do with any innate 
biological or ‘natural qualities’ of European persons. See, J. Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the 
Last 13 000 Years. (London: Vintage Books, 1998), R. G. Wilkinson, Poverty and Progress: An Ecological Model of Economic 
Development (London: Methuen Books, 1973). 
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the meanings associated with their use and exchange, new organizational domains arose, and 
hitherto unimportant ones became relatively more important. As land came to be used for 
relatively large-scale agriculture and industry, factories, and urban areas expanded. Similarly, as 
mercantile exchanges and industrial production grew in volume and importance, the ongoing 
creating and reproducing of sociality called for relatively specific data and precise measurements. 
Mukerji describes how the human world itself impacted upon human-being in historically ‘new’ 
ways. For example, as clocks and the relatively precise way of reckoning ‘time’, and map’ and the 
relatively precise ways of measuring ‘space’, these facilitated became important, it might be said 
that being human became something different than had been the case without these.16  
Mukerji’s work implies that relatively direct inter-relations between persons were 
subsumed by relatively complex, abstract, and extended forms of inter-relating; such as through 
books and maps, or capitalistic markets mediatized by an abstract ‘medium’ for exchange. On the 
one hand, modernization displaced relatively direct relations between humans as almost the only 
settings for societal and relational engagements. As humans related amidst the ‘plethora of objects’ 
they created and reproduced, and insofar as relatively exacting measurement, reckoning, and 
control became important, the social structuring of institutions that framed human inter-relations 
became somewhat concretized. On the other hand, in and around such proliferating objects, and 
the knowledges and techniques associated with their uses, the material-physical environments for 
sociality was shaped and altered, giving rise to different and relatively volatile forms of authority 
and value criteria.17 
While Mukerji’s detailed research is invaluable, the chapter pauses briefly here to take issue 
with her approach. This is allows discussion to raise some methodological concerns. Mukerji 
responds to Weberian sociology as an approach to modernity. Mukerji’s critique of Weber’s 
methodological “social idealism” forms the basis for the materialist framework she uses to inquire 
into the production of modern culture. For Mukerji, Weber uses a methodologically one-
dimensional approach that incorrectly “treats ideas as social forces”:  
 
                                                 
 
16 Mukerji, From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern Materialism, 12, 15. 
17 See, also, B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006 [1983]), 66-83. 
In making this point, I want to stress a perspective on ‘objects’, or ‘things’, as mediating, abstracting, extending, or otherwise 
altering the ways that humans relate with each other. Because humans act, create meanings, and modalize ‘objects’, it is the 
ways that relations between persons change when these proliferate that is important to my discussion. A similar point is made 
by Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping While Giving, 28-33. 
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Objects are the carriers of ideas and, as such, often act as the social forces that [Weberian] 
analysts have identified with ideology-as-words. Objects can help make autonomous forces out of 
ideas … [but] material culture is not located in the human mind, although it shows the stamp of 
its creators and is known to people through their senses. [For Mukerji] material culture … does 
not gain its autonomy through free will or the spontaneity of subjective processes [but objects] 
can create a setting for human behaviour (including intellectual activity) that simultaneously 
encourages people to behave in ways that take advantage of that environment.18 
 
Mukerji’s suggestions, however, seem to discount the intertwining of material practices with 
discourses; which may, for instance, arise in an environment independent or external to that 
discussed. For Mukerji, discourses seem either determined by material ‘objects’, or conditions of 
“taking advantage of [an] environment”. This interpretation of Mukerji’s thesis is based on the way 
that she sets up her argument, around claims that in societies “it can be both a physical and 
symbolic constraint [that] gives material culture a particular power over human action”. In this 
sense, casting “material culture” as holding “power over human action” seems to imply that the 
power of objects — and, moreover, the always social and cultural prioritizing of the power of 
objects — is produced somewhere outside or beyond the social worlds which humans create. 
Mukerji seems to hypostatize the always socially created power of objects. Social power enters 
discussion as if ‘hanging over’, rather than being continually produced and construed by humans 
in ongoing sociality. I am suggesting that this problem arises because Mukerji envisages societal 
dynamism in terms of “physical and symbolic constraint”. This seems to locate power in the 
objects themselves, not in the interstices of human-created worlds, the suggestion is that 
‘constraint’ is a material and cultural condition, and that symbols can only represent things within 
social conditions.19  
 
… … … 
 
Alongside these engagements with Mukerji’s work, the discussion now turns to Dumont’s account 
of the ‘genesis’ of “Western individualism” and a peculiar “modern artificialism”. Dumont’s 
historical anthropological perspective helps to link discussion of conditions in and around 
proliferating objects, techniques, and knowledges, to the influence upon the job of ‘being’ human 
                                                 
 
18 Mukerji, From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern Materialism, 12-13, 15. 
19 Italics in original. Ibid., 15. 
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amidst the predominance of Occidental Judaeo-Christianity in modernizing conditions. Dumont’s 
work allows discussion of conditions as these affected the position and status of ‘individuals’ in 
relation to the world and predominant ways of reflecting upon it from within Western societies. 
For Dumont, expanding capitalistic markets and industrial production made possible, amongst 
other things, the wide-reaching dissemination of information linking Rome to pan-European 
clerical corruption and venality. In the face of knowledge that Church corruption extended ‘all the 
way up’, persons began to entertain a relatively direct union with the Divine. Dogma pertaining to 
religious observance and, subsequently, feudal authority came to be seen as ‘constraints’ upon 
personal and “peculiar subjection to God’s will”. For Dumont, the flourishing of Lutheran and 
Calvinist ‘protest’ against the Roman Church altered the Judaeo-Christianity that pervaded 
Western society and culture. The belief-system that once offered “refuge from this imperfect 
world in another [transcendent] one” underwent a metamorphosis that framed a distinct “Western 
ideology of individualism” and the “modern artificialism” peculiar to it.20  
For Dumont, Occidental Judaeo-Christianity influenced the formation of a monadic and 
atomized Western individualism that emphasized personal autonomy in the world and idiosyncrasy 
in relation to others, and the Divine. It might be said that Dumont describes a shift in the locus 
for (cosmologically grounded ‘metaphysical’) Truth that coincided and intertwined with the “new 
and elaborate systems of thought” which “conceived of [the world] as material forces”. 
Concomitant with the proliferation of objects, knowledges, and techniques — such as 
commoditized labour and other markets mediated in abstraction through ‘money’, or the print-
technologies that helped spread ‘news’ of ecclesiastic malfeasance — were conditions that required 
individuals to apply personal will-objectives to ‘worldly’ affairs. That is, conditions emerged that 
impelled embodied self-orientation towards, and projection within, an unstable Earthly realm of 
external ‘forces’. For Dumont, Earthly human endeavours became ‘expressions’ of a universal 
humanity, or ‘bare’ Human Nature. 21  
In this sense, individual exemplarity became the universal point of determination for a 
private Soul’s relationship to the Cosmos; oriented towards a Heavenly future, ‘right’ beliefs 
valorized ‘true’ achievements, and motivated ‘good’ acts ‘here and now’. Dumont links Judaeo-
Christianity’s insistence on equalitarianism between human Souls to the liberal individual exemplarity 
                                                 
 
20 Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, 55-56. 
21 Ibid., 76-77, L. Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1977), 3, Mukerji, From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern Materialism, 14, 15. 
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that, in practice, framed modern democratic emphases on liberty, equality, and common unity. 
Dumont’s concept of “modern artificialism” comes in here, and helps to explain the displacement 
of traditional, ancestry-based social hierarchies that depend upon how a person seems in relation to 
“myth and history” by somewhat less definitive “class divisions” that depend upon what a person 
is in relation to the present. The concept helps to suggest that changing practical and discursive 
normative conditions, as well as material-physical contexts, emerged to enframe private ‘choices’ 
— based on (appeals to a transcendent) moral authority — as ‘self-evidently’ representing an 
individual’s efforts to position a ‘self’ in relation to the ‘Natural order of things’. Person’s ‘bad’ 
choices led to degradation and impoverishment, while ‘good’ choices elevated status and led to 
‘solid means’ in a world of definitive material-physical and moral proportions.22 
What had hitherto been Truth in the cosmological sense became “concentrated in the 
individual’s will”, a metamorphosis described by Dumont “as the model of modern artificialism at 
large”: 
 
[T]he systematic application to the things of this world of an extrinsic, imposed value. Not a 
value derived from our [i.e. humanity’s] belonging in this world, such as its harmony or our 
harmony within it, but a value rooted in our heterogeneity in relation to it: the identification of 
our will with the will of God. The will applied to the world, the end sought after, the motive and 
inner spring of the will are extraneous; they are to say, the same thing, essentially outworldly. 
Outworldliness is now [with the generalization of conditions for modern artificialism] 
concentrated in the individual’s will.23 
 
 The present thesis takes Dumont’s definition to imply cosmologically ordained Truth 
morphed into an ‘objective’ order of things; in which modern persons could be seen as subjects 
and agents, ‘actors’ in a world that corresponded and responded to individual’s wills. Anchored in 
an immaterial Soul, Western individualism became tied to material-physical Nature through 
embodiment-in-the-world ‘here and now’. Modern artificialism is the generalized application by 
subject-agents to worldly affairs of personal will-objectives that are, in effect, the concentration 
within individual’s wills of ‘objectively’ true reality: as a concept, it explains ‘being’ human as the art 
of making reality ‘real’.  
                                                 
 
22 Dumont argues that such a disposition towards the world might also underlie sociological consptualizations, such as Ferdinand 
Tönnies’ distinction between “spontaneous will” and “arbitrary will”, and what Max Weber calls “modern instrumental 
rationality”. Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, 56, 64, 75, 90.  
23 Ibid., 56.  
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The concept helps to set in relief subjectivity amidst the conditions that Mukerji describes. 
The emergence of materialist culture meant that persons themselves, along with their institutions 
— such as those based around production and exchange, knowledges and techniques, as well as 
power and authority — ‘conceived of the world as material forces’. Mukerji accounts for 
conditions wherein the reckoning of space, time, and information about the world became 
relatively more specific, intensive, and extensive: where ongoing sociality itself came to imbricate 
less that was seen as immeasurable and unquantifiable within it. The increasing array of objects 
and the forces unleashed by humans through them altered material-physical contexts for sociality 
per se: the consequences of applying “careful measurement and [the] study of relationships between 
variables” within the world altered the contextuality of the world for ‘being’ human.  
In “a world conceived of as material forces”, space, time, institutions, and embodied 
human-being itself became, historically, different from what was ‘lived’ in non-modern conditions. 
Socialized embodied subject-agents were called-upon as self-orienting individuals verily to ‘make-
up’ an ‘objectively true’ reality. In relation to sociality as a whole, subject-agents were called-upon 
to self-project into a (social) world that ‘required’ good choices and right actions. While in relation 
to proximate others, subject-agents appear called-upon to self-assert as authentic individuals in 
relation to ‘the present moment’. Hence, Dumont’s distinction between non-modern cultures 
emphasizing position in relation to hereditary Right, and modern cultures wherein personal merit, 
individual effort, and setting-of-the-self ‘against’ the world came to be valued. In this sense, 
socialized embodied subject-agents were also called-upon to be ‘creative’: to utilize the embodied 
self as the abode, or ‘housing’ for the tools and techniques required for ‘going on’ in modernizing 
conditions.   
 
… … … 
 
The chapter now focuses upon Habermas’ inquiry into the influence of a “public of private 
citizens” in the early-modern West. Habermas’ focus upon conditions that meant “public 
opinion”, as the “public will of private citizens” became important as the social ‘legitimation’ of 
worldly authority, helps to put Dumont’s claims in less abstract terms. Habermas’ thesis, also 
allows discussion to conceptualize the formation of Western ‘individualism’ in terms of situation-
specific aspects of a dominant subjectivity, which is taken up in more detail through Abercrombie, 
Hill, and Turner’s work.  
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Like Dumont, Habermas describes the modernizing conditions in and thorough which 
persons came to engage as autonomous ‘moral’ individuals. Both authors help to explain how 
traditional backward looking, confessional, and obeisant forms of life became unsuited to societal 
and relational engagements amidst modernization’s increasingly important capitalistic markets for 
goods and services, and relatively complex, abstract, and extended structural and institutional 
conditions. Amongst other things, both see the proliferation of contract-style agreements for 
exchanging goods and services, and abstract decision-making in creative, and political domains as 
contributing to conditions where personal autonomy, duty, and ‘calling’ displaced the ‘traditional’ 
forms of life. Seen in the light cast by Mukerji’s work, Habermas and Dumont explain the 
situations in and through which a particular formation of individualism arose to create and 
reproduce conditions for an ‘immediate’, self-orienting and projecting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ 
subjectivity.  
As material objects became important, the dispositions and capabilities conducive to ‘going 
on’ in and around them — such as, effort and industriousness, techno-scientific knowledges, and 
entrepreneurial or ‘creative’ talents’, for example — became means for attaining the moveable 
wealth created through them. The source of power that was control over landed property, based in 
inherited Right and for Dumont, sanctified by myth and history, became something that 
accompanied effort and achievement based on ‘good’ and ‘proper’ choices. The possession and 
accumulation of moveable wealth worked as one indicator of success in worldly actions, while 
attention to personal duty and moral calling also lifted personal status that was seen as 
confirmation of the alignment of individuals with the transcendently ordained Natural order of 
things. Decisions taken ‘here and now’ altered the position of individual persons in relations to 
others and the world.24  
Habermas describes modernization as undermining the hitherto near-total legitimacy of 
religious dogma and hereditary aristocratic authority. As a particular social fraction came to hold 
access to and monopoly over practices and discourses associated with control over ‘objects’, the 
locus of power within sociality shifted. Habermas describes how “private citizens” — adult, 
                                                 
 
24 Dumont’s thesis on this point evokes Marx’s argument that a Judaeo-Christian worldview based around a universal but unique 
personal Soul and the quest for transcendence meant that Western modernity became politicized in a historically specific way. 
Where “the link between immoveable wealth [or, property,] and power over men was broken, and moveable wealth became … 
an autonomous and relatively unified category of wealth”, social conditions unleashed the possibility, if not the Right to wealth 
for Westerners of any social strata. (Italics removed) Also, from a perspective critical of Marx, Hannah Arendt discusses the 
socio-cultural implications of the dissipation of power centred on immovable landed property, and the emergence of a 
universal and moveable wealth in Western modernity. Ibid., 56, 77-78, 107. Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and 
Triumph of Economic Ideology, 61-62. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 61-
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literate, male individuals, buffeted by wealth, and an industriousness that reinforced reflections 
upon the Rationality, or Naturalness of actions — sought political power based on a “public 
opinion” that “aimed at rationalizing politics in the name of [the] morality” of a “private people 
engaged in rational-critical public debate … [which] interpreted itself as unpolitical”.25 The milieux 
that asserted political will and the Natural morality of “public opinion” did so against aristocratic 
domination and, indirectly, clerical value-criteria based in exclusive access to the Divine: 
 
[There arose] a sphere of public authority [that] was now casting itself loose as a forum in which the 
private people, come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public authority to 
legitimate itself before public opinion. The publicum developed into the public, the subjectum into the 
(reasoning) subject, the receiver of regulations from above into the ruling authorities’ adversary.26  
 
The social fraction that controlled objects and created systems of measurement of material 
forces also exerted control through the materials, practices, and discourses that modernizing 
conditions unleashed. Habermas argues that particular milieux were able call for “public authority 
to legitimate itself” based in the shared experiences of a Nature each had mastered by making 
Right choices and forming Rational opinions. Bringing the elements of Dumont’s and Habermas’ 
work together, it might be said that political conditions for the emergence of this “bourgeois 
public sphere” and the nascent Western liberal-democracies that arose in and through them, 
centred on the increasing wealthy and power of such a fraction. By virtue of self-orienting moral 
decisions projected within an immediately present reality, a politically ascendant ‘public’ effectively 
naturalized the Natural order of things that had been created and produced as (Western) 
Modernity. In this sense, discussing their theories allows the present thesis to see Western 
modernization in terms of a shift away from the ‘total’ Truth of ancestry and the past, which 
enframes ‘being’ as ‘going on’ amidst the near-ineffable ‘totality’ of an ‘immediate’ reality.  
For Habermas, where particular cultural milieux of “self-interested, property owning 
private … [male, educated, literate, and] autonomous individuals” acted to establish the political 
means for ensuring liberty from arbitrary domination and institutions for a secular ‘worldly’ law:  
 
The fiction of a justice immanent in free commerce was what rendered plausible the conflation of 
bourgeois and homme, of self-interested, property-owning private people and autonomous 
                                                 
 
25 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. T. Burger and F. 
Lawrence (Boston Polity Press/Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989 [1962]), 102. 
26 Ibid., 25-26. Italics and parentheses in original. 
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individuals per se. Under the social conditions that translated private vices into public virtues, a 
state of cosmopolitan citizenship and, hence, the subsumption of politics under morality was 
empirically conceivable. It could, in the same world of experience, unite two heterogeneous 
legislations without one being likely to encroach upon the other: the legislations of private people 
propelled by their drives as owners of commodities and simultaneously that of spiritually free 
human beings.27  
 
Habermas sees in Immanuel Kant’s liberal cosmopolitanism explanation of and 
justification for conditions in and through which ‘the public’, exerting power sufficient to force 
authority to ‘legitimate’ itself, altered predominant forms of authority and value criteria. At once, 
power was something ‘out there’ in Nature, and something ‘internal’, within individual persons, 
albeit, subsumed to atomized moral ‘judgements’. The modernizing conditions that privileged 
control of ‘objects’ through wealth, over inherited entitlement and gnosis of the Supreme order, 
opened politics to claims of a relationship with the Natural order of things through control over 
Human Nature. Modernity’s subject-agents became bound to comply with an order that 
transcended them, by virtue of an inner ‘fortitude’ that a transcendent Nature, of itself, would 
‘reward’ or ‘punish’ in public view. Hence, Habermas’ milieux of bourgeois private citizens, 
propelled by their drives as free men amidst a Natural order of things, verily forced a particular 
form of life that measured value in relation to that Nature, into the centre of sociality.  
Habermas also describes a counter-mandatory “bourgeois culture of arts and letters” that 
coincided with the ascent of this “bourgeois public sphere”. This ‘alternative’ form of life claimed 
rights to self-expression and critical liberty that contradicted the property rights and ‘rule of law’ 
claimed by bourgeois private citizens. While ‘bourgeois public’ individualism employed norms as if 
justified by Nature, this counter-individualism employed an ‘objective’ position that justified Nature 
in relation to social norms. As bourgeois private citizens acted to force political stasis based in the 
Natural order of things, a non-conformist alternative arose to hold property in disregard and 
pursue disorder through immediate experiences and sensory gratification. Such a form of life 
asserted an ‘inner-worldly’ sensuality opposed to the rough and tumble of the public sphere, and 
an aestheticism that diverted moral autonomy into judgements about ‘taste’. However, as social 
structures and institutions became concretized under the force of milieux holding moveable 
wealth, and seeking government based in Natural Law, the “critical freedom”28 manifest in 
                                                 
 
27 Ibid., 111-12. 
28 Ibid., 28-33, 134-35. 
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counter-mandatory individualism — that for Perry Anderson was “once the preserve of a … 
leisured nobility”29 — became marginalized as countercultural Romanticism, or ossified into 
parochial and domestic Mannerism.  
 
… … … 
 
These engagements allow an approach that delineates analytically between individualism and 
subjectivity. That is, discussion proceeds by looking at individualism in terms of the situations that 
subject-agents create and reproduce as aspects of conditions for an ‘immediate’ self-orienting and 
projecting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ modern Western subjectivity. Engaging Nicholas 
Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S. Turner’s “dominant ideology thesis” and account of 
“sovereign individualism” allows discussion to be set up in a more schematized way. The authors 
conceptually disentangle social structure — the economy in practice — from discourse — as 
socially organized connotations of particular meanings. I want to take up the authors’ perspective 
in order to recognize intertwining yet relatively autonomous and historically particular formations 
of ‘practice’ and ‘discourse’ as combining to specify socially valid forms of agency and, as such, 
valorize the affectivity of agency. The authors suggest how different formations of the individual, 
through “socially organized” discourses and the “social groups with which they are associated 
conflict in the struggle for dominance” in industrializing and capitalistic modernization. Their 
point is that “classes rising to dominance are more likely both to control property and to be closest 
to the mechanisms by which discourses are transmitted in society”. Hence, the authors describe 
conditions at the interstices of an ascendant “capitalist social organization” and the “discursive 
dominance of individualism”.30  
Taken together, Habermas’ bourgeois private citizen and Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner’s 
sovereign individualism might be said to represent the situation-specific manifestation of an 
ascendant dominant subjectivity in early Western modernity. These authors’ work implies that, 
while a particular formation of individualism became central to modernizing Western, more so, in 
the co-authors’ work, Anglo-American societies a specific formation of individualism is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient ‘outcome’ of modernization. Using these authors’ work, the present 
                                                 
 
29 P. Anderson, "The Figures of Descent," New Left Review I, no. 161 (1987): 25. 
30 Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism, 177-78, 83-84. Italics in original. 
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thesis suggests inquiry approach individualism as a situation-specific aspect of a dominant 
subjectivity. The conditions for modernizing subjectivity imply patterns of access to and 
monopoly over normative practices and discourses that are also consequential upon but 
contingent amidst certain material-physical contexts: such as the altered spatial, temporal, 
institutional, and even embodied ‘ways of conceiving the world’ that Mukerji describes. This is 
where the concept of ‘modern artificialism’ becomes important. In conditions where forms of 
authority and value criteria are no longer anchored in the ‘past and tradition’, concept of ‘modern 
artificialism’ makes it possible to look at the individualism that creates and reproduces patterns of 
access to and monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses within sociality, and at 
subjectivity as ‘being’ in modernity’s ‘Natural’ reality. This concept is used to suggest how looking 
at subjectivity as the self-orienting and projecting, asserting and ‘creative’ immediacy of human-
being implies that reality becomes an artifice of ‘being’ human. 
Discussing things from this perspective allows development of an approach that, in 
subsequent chapters, focuses upon particular social-historical conditions amidst material-physical 
contexts as a wholly contingent totality of binding variables. For the present thesis, the 
‘subjectivity’ that Western modernization enframes implies that inquiry’s focus is upon human-
being as both the creation of and creator of social worlds that encompass in sum total. The 
emergence of conditions for subjectivity as immediately ‘being’ amidst a total reality means that 
inquiry is bound to base its claims upon what can be said to ‘go on’ within social worlds, as 
opposed to references in cosmology. Yet, this, the secular immanence that accompanies 
modernization’s (Western) subjectivity — as the ‘immediate’, self-orienting and projecting 
condition of ‘being’ in reality — also implies that what is in theory ‘positive empiricism’ and 
‘methodological individualism’ become, in practice problematic and contestable Natural states of 
affairs.  
 
 
… … … 
… … 
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3 Subjectivity: ‘Being’ human in modernizing conditions  
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter uses a brief overview of early modern Western philosophy to develop the argument 
one more step. The chapter’s intention is not to comprehensively review early modern Western 
philosophy, but to background a series of more detailed discussions of subjectivity in theory and 
practice in subsequent chapters. While the philosophy of the subject is beyond the present thesis’ 
scope, discussing it here helps orient the developing approach. The focus here is upon Kantian 
and Hegelian philosophies as “systems of thought”. In particular historical and social conditions, 
these took-up questions of human-being that, while recognizing a world subject to material 
forces,31 with hindsight, can be seen to refer to a transcendent ‘pure’ Reason or metaphysical 
Absolute. Discussion in this chapter frames later engagements with theories of subjectivity that 
might explicitly recognize the ‘immediacy’ of human-being in modernizing (Western) conditions, 
yet in doing so draw this reality up into an explanatory method. The second half of the chapter 
combines these concerns with the provisional concept of subjectivity set out in Chapter 2 in order 
to discuss Marxist theories and practices of subjectivity, especially, as these relate to the 
commodity form.  
 
… … … 
 
In René Descartes’ early-modern philosophical refelxtions, the essence of human-being is seen as 
the reasoning mind: the cogito. Genevieve Lloyd suggests that Cartesian philosophy reconstituted 
the pre-modern notion of a Soul “divided into higher (intellectual) and lower (sensitive) parts” as a 
“dichotomy between mind and body”.32 As an innately human “faculty of Reason”, the cogito aims 
to understand the self in the world as a means to comporting an Earthly body. Cartesian mind-
                                                 
 
31 Mukerji, From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern Materialism, 15. Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological 
Perspective, 56. 
32 G. Lloyd, The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, ed. J. Ree, Ideas (London: Methuen, 1984), 45 (Parentheses in 
original). 
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body dualism accounts for human-being as a present state in immediate reality: the cogito ‘knows’ 
the self and reality because its capacity to reason facilitates an understanding of reality, as created by 
a perfect God. However, the Cartesian ‘body’, notably, its sensuality, distracts the cogito from 
reasoning about reality. While created by “some other more perfect [and transcendent] Being”, it is 
only through “clear and distinct” reason(ing) — right and good choices — that humans 
understand a “divinely guaranteed” Nature.33  
The Cartesian “emphasis on the [a priori] privacy of the mind’s operations” becomes 
expressed as a normative claim in David Hume’s “positivist empiricism”. However, as Lloyd 
argues, Hume’s radicalized doubt can be sustained only by asserting that the world ‘is’ as it ‘is’: that 
reality accords with what the self takes as the Natural order of things.34 In this sense, Hume’s 
“inductive skepticism”35 accounts for human-being ‘here and now’, yet denies the actuality of what 
lay beyond the individual self. It is said that, for Hume, to ‘reason’ is not so much to understand 
the Nature’s Rationality, but to act in accord with “custom and habit”, which is necessary for 
existing in a reality where the self alone is True. In abstraction, Hume authorizes a multiplicity of 
versions of what the world ‘is’ and ‘ought to be’. However, in practice, his inductive skepticism 
seems merely to justify the ‘naturalness’ of a particular social-historical order.36 
Terry Eagleton suggests that Kant responds to both Descartes and Hume to develop a 
methodologically, if not explicitly, secular philosophy. Kant posits human-being in a Natural world 
that is created for human ends, as the work of a rational and just God. Eagleton suggests that 
Kant ‘humbles’ the Cartesian cogito, because Kantian Pure Reason lay in Nature itself and is not 
directly accessible to human reasoning or introspection. In this sense, Kantian human-being is 
bound to a mundane world where Nature is the reality: the True order of things. Nature is 
knowable, only insofar as it constitutes a world where human actions manifest in practice. The 
Natural world is a reality that humankind and individual humans must work at and communicate 
within, in order to ‘be’ morally Right. Kant elevates Nature’s Rationality to the position of 
                                                 
 
33 Descartes reflected upon a state of being that was created by “a Nature more perfect than mine could be [as a human person,] 
… some other more perfect Being on which I [as a self] depended, or from which I acquired all that I had”. R. Descartes, 
"Discourse on the Method/Rules for the Direction of the Mind," in The Essential Descartes, ed. M. D. Wilson (New York: 
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34 Lloyd, The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, 45. 
35 S. Blackburn, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 179-80. 
36 Terry Eagleton describes Hume’s thesis as a solution to the growing “aestheticization of social life”. Where subjective feelings 
increasingly affected the form and content of the social world, Hume offers “a carefully cultivated false consciousness” that 
gives credence to the dispositions of ostensibly ‘autonomous’, adult, male, literate, and wealthy middle-class persons. See, T. 
Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1990), 44, 48.  
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universal arbiter, binding human-being ‘here and now’ to a project of autonomous self-legislation, 
to a moral duty to understand, and the need for strength of will to act in accordance with reality.37  
In one sense, insofar as rational dictates are open to humans through critical reflection 
upon Nature, Kant opens the relation between human-being, as a social condition, and a worldly 
reality that is always ‘artificial’. Yet, in another sense, by evoking a ‘scale’ that descends from Pure 
Reason, through practical maxims, on to aesthetic judgements, Kant situates the justification for 
human action beyond the empirical world of human-being. Kantian philosophy recognizes the 
immediacy of normative practices and discourses and the material-physical world, but casts reality 
as an ineluctable Truth ‘of itself’ in order to justify critique. Indeed, the Kantian notion of 
subjective intuition, which facilitates aesthetic judgements and, so, ‘connects’ persons to each 
other as ‘consensual’ individual monads, is a material-physical embodied condition. However, 
inasmuch as Kant recognizes this aesthetic sublimity as embodied, he finds it a threat to Nature’s 
Pure Reason, and the practical maxims it emanates: and, as such, offers to the moral and right 
individual. It seems that for Kant, fulfillment, satisfaction, creativity, and sensuality threaten to 
impede duty, and weaken the will to abide by Nature’s requirements. Arguably, Kant places 
human-being under the yoke of a didactic moralism that, in retrospect, justifies the enforcing of 
contingent norms by those holding power because they do so.38  
Habermas, like Eagleton, also suggests that in retrospect, it may be said that Hegel’s 
philosophy was motivated by this implication of Kant’s argument. Habermas and Eagleton suggest 
that Hegel saw Kantian philosophy as “expressing the modern world”, but not conceptualizing it. 
Hegel sees the Kantian morally autonomous monad — duty-bound to act reasonably — as 
consistently ‘becoming’ self-conscious: the created subject and re-producing agent of world 
history. These authors suggest that, for Hegel, modern subjectivity is both the taking on of the 
world, and the ‘principle’ for creating a meaningful human world. In these respects, Hegelian 
philosophy is important for two reasons. First, Hegel suggests an ‘immediate’ self-orienting 
subjectivity that disavows the legitimating force of what Dumont calls “myth and history”. 
Second, Hegel finds fault with the Romanticism that took Kant’s relegation of aesthetic judgement 
— below practical maxims and objective Truth — merely to anchor subjectivity in an unbounded 
immediacy of atomized sensory experience and aesthetic gratification. Hegelian philosophy ‘sets 
                                                 
 
37 Ibid., 18, J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, ed. T. McCarthy, trans. F. Lawrence, Studies in Contemporary German 
Social Thought (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990 [1985]). 
38 See, Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 102-03, Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 18-19. 
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free’ human-being from “historical obligations”, and anchors it in immediate self-conscious 
reflection upon the conditions of its ‘becoming’: that is, upon identity in-the-world. Hegelian 
subjectivity is self-conscious ‘recognition’ of subjective ‘identity’ and of ‘difference’ from that 
which is other, or ‘objective’. For Hegel, subjectivity takes a dialectic trajectory towards absolute 
unity in the Idea, the Spirit, or Essence. The principle of subjectivity unleashed is ‘becoming’ self-
conscious in the absence of ‘past and tradition’. Yet, in attempting to overcome both Kant’s 
‘didacticism’ and Romantic ‘egocentrism’, Hegelian subjectivity seems to tempt a universalizing 
metaphysical rationale.39 
 
… … … 
  
To clarify the direction taken from here, the chapter concludes by looking at two suggestions from 
different commentators, who argue that both Kant’s, and Hegel’s ‘systems’ leave open an alternate 
route for developing theory and method for inquiry into the formation of Western subjectivity. 
Gerard Delanty suggests that Kant’s use of the concept of sensus communis to “explain the 
universality of aesthetic taste” points to the possibility of conceiving of “community as a process 
of communication, as opposed to a symbolic, institutional, or purely normative ideal”: 
 
By the name of sensus communis is to be understood the idea of public sense, i.e. a critical faculty 
which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in 
order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with the collective judgement of mankind, and thereby avoid 
the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for 
objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgement.40 
  
Delanty’s suggestions concerning Kant’s Earthly and social criteria for ‘aesthetic 
judgement’ help to highlight the kinds of problems that subjectivity raises, and to suggest that 
beginning from a concept like that of ‘modern artificialism’ might be to move towards a way out 
that does not revert to transcendence or methodological individualism. In a similar sense, Robert 
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Pippin, like Eagleton and Habermas, recognizes that Hegel does not ‘succeed’ in settling the key 
problem that Kant raises. Pippin suggests that Hegel fails to maintain rational justification for 
“normative authority”. Instead, Pippin suggests that Hegel issues “a great existential power to the 
force of reason in human life”, such that the Absolute ‘assumes’ metaphysical proportion. 
However, Pippin sees in Hegel a ‘gesture’ toward the possibility of reflecting upon subjectivity 
from within ‘consciousness’ that is anchored in sociality: 
  
Philosophy, then, owes its development to the empirical sciences. In return, it gives their contents what is so 
vital to them, the freedom of thought — gives them in short an a priori character. These contents 
are now warranted necessary, and no longer depend on the evidence of the facts merely, that they 
were so found and so experienced. The fact as experienced thus becomes an illustration and a copy 
of the original and completely self-supporting activity of thought.41 
  
Pippin’s claim that Hegel “gestures in … a [different] direction” allows me to raise a 
problem for my developing claims about contemporary subjectivity. I suggest this here, because, 
insofar as the present thesis looks at subjectivity in terms of immediate reality, ‘all there is’ or, 
rather, all that is taken to be within dominant ideologies, it stresses that the world can only ‘be’ 
reality for a single human in the ‘act’ of ‘being’. For the purposes of this thesis, the early-modern 
Western philosophers imply that human-being — ambiguously cut loose from ‘past and tradition’ 
by socio-cultural change and ‘urged on’ by shifts in concepts of material-physicality — on the one 
hand, came to engage from within a reality that was ‘everything’ and, on the other hand, became 
open to a risky and unstable world. Modern subjectivity might be seen as ‘being’ in reality in its 
stark ‘totality’. Put another way, the discussion so far implies that subject-hood or intra-personal 
states become the final arbiter of reality — the Hegelian ‘fact as experienced’ — in modernizing 
Western conditions. Iterated as such, the concept of ‘modern artificialism’ allows a methodological 
problem concerning the ‘starting-point’ for critical social theory inquiry to be rasied. Recognizing a 
‘secular’ subjectivity precludes analyses based in ‘strong’ empirical claims; the condition of modern 
Western subjectivity that Hegel points up as the ‘fact as experienced’. In this sense, Delanty’s 
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suggestions concerning Kant and Pippin’s reflections on Hegel offer are a way into discussing 
subjectivity that is based in a ‘weak’ empiricism.42  
These commentators suggest that both Kant and Hegel make explicit how, because ‘going 
on’ in time and space, human-being can be said to ‘be’ sharing normative conditions and enduring 
as such amidst material-physical contexts. These are irreducible to ‘strong’ empirical claims 
because ‘facts as experienced’ by embodied humans — as they ‘be’ — rest in the shared and 
communicative conditions of which they are part. Arguably, for Hegel, human-being as 
experienced is ‘an illustration and a copy of the original and completely self-supporting act of 
thought’ because this ‘original and completely self-supporting act of thought’ is the radicalized 
modern condition itself. On this point, Victoria Burke, for example, suggests that Hegelian theory 
needs to assume that each and any subjectivity has ‘recognition’, not so much of ‘the other’, but of 
others’ idea of the Idea. Burke argues that Hegel falls back upon a universal absolute principle for 
recognition, binding subjectivity to a dynamic of reciprocity between subjects that must be always-
already conscious of the form and content of each other’s consciousness, lest claiming that the 
Absolute permeate consciousness. Burke’s argument that ‘difference’ and ‘identity’ lay not 
primarily in the ‘thinking of being’ helps me to make some tentative suggestions that will become 
more important later. Burke’s suggestions help me to focus upon subjectivity as a norm-based and 
relational condition because making reality ‘real’.43  
This is to point out that subjectivity has ‘difference’ that, at one level, precedes 
‘understanding’. Because to ‘be’ is, of necessity, to ‘be’ material-physically embodied yet, also that 
such ‘difference’ can only be iterated because subjectivity is ‘embodied’ in space and in time and, 
so, amongst ‘others’:– in ways that inquiry might see as constituting the situations of a form of life. 
This points to possibilities for analytic recognition of a somatic quality of subjectivity, as an affect 
of the material-physicality of human-being in space, over time, and collection. These engagements 
also imply an ‘in practice’ quality of subjectivity, a socialized ethological ‘consciousness’ that takes 
on the practical terms of a world made up in space and time, and amongst others. Therefore, it 
creates possibilities for recognizing practical-ethological affect of ‘being’ in a social world of 
temporal, spatial, and institutional dimensions. This means treating ‘institutions’ as enduring social 
                                                 
 
42 Gianni Vattimo’s notion of pensere debole, that is, weak thought, also informs this point. See, G. Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference: 
Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger, trans. C. Blamires and T. Harrison (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993 [1980]), App. 2, 97-111. 
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43 V. Burke, "Hegel's Conception of Mutual Recognition: The Limits of Self-Determination," The Philosophical Forum XXXVI, 
no. 2 (2005): 219-20. 
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constructions that humans create and reproduce because they share and communicate amidst and as 
parts of a material-physical context. Furthermore, these engagements also imply analyses recognize 
another ‘layer’ constituting subjectivity. In this sense, Hegel’s reflections upon the conditions of 
subjectivity’s ‘becoming’ might be said to imply reflexive ‘creative’ self-orienting and projecting 
assertion of an identity in-the-world, amongst others, and under the ‘weight’ of social institutions 
collectively created and reproduced. 
  
… … … 
 
Discussion now moves consider Karl Marx’s materialist approach to modern subjectivity, and his 
discussion of commodity fetishism. Marx ties theory to practice and, in so doing, responds to both 
Western idealist philosophy and rationalist positivism. This becomes important later, insofar as 
theory of the nexus between production and consumption of commoditized goods and services 
seems to take on several guises in twentieth century social theory. The discussion takes up the 
well-covered issue of Marx’s dialectical Materialism — theorizing critical subjectivity that is both 
subject and the agent of ‘productive forces’ — in order to suggest how the Marxist concept of 
‘alienation from species-being’ might simultaneously explain and operationalize what Dumont calls 
“modern artificialism”. Discussion then looks at commentary on Marxist analyses of relatively 
recent Anglo-American affairs. In particular, it looks at ‘rational actor’ reviews of Marxist analyses 
as a way of shining a critical light upon the concept of ‘alienation from species-being’. This 
juxtaposition allows a suggestion that, as theoretical frameworks, both Marxist and liberal ‘rational 
action’ theory might be seen to obtain explanatory force by reaching beyond the world they 
otherwise recognize as an over-arching totality. The chapter concludes by making some tentative 
suggestions about the nature of commodities, and by linking Marxist theory to the earlier 
discussion of an ‘immediate’ self-orienting and projecting subjectivity.44  
In the mid-nineteenth century West, amidst expanding industrial production and 
capitalistic markets, the ascent of bourgeois political institutions, and ongoing de-legitimation of 
cosmology and tradition, Marx criticized both mainstream political-economics and Hegelian 
philosophy. Marx recognized that Western social institutions had become secular — that is, 
created and reproduced in accord with the ‘worldly’ environment and human actions in it — and 
                                                 
 
44 Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, 56. Mukerji, From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern 
Materialism, 15. 
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set out to ‘measure’ the human condition in terms of these profane material forces. As norms once 
based in religious doxa and cultural taboo, which had enforced sabbatical on holy days, constrained 
the passions, or governed contract, for example, gave way to market relations and ever-increasing 
productive ‘necessities’, Marx argued that “relations between men” became objectified as 
“relations between things”.45  
Marx also argued that political-economists, such as David Ricardo and Adam Smith 
obscured from genuine appraisal the worldly conditions that rapidly spreading urbanization, 
industrialism, and commodity markets were creating.46 For Marx, mainstream political-economy 
speciously naturalized the individuated inter-relations that were central to markets, as if these were 
atypical human relations. He argued that political-economy was ahistorical and falsely offered 
‘scientific’ analyses of ‘material forces’ when, in fact, it merely advanced the interests of a particular 
class fraction. Through these observations, Marx disavowed Hegel’s subjectivity, arguing that 
philosophical idealism was inadequate for thinking about human-being amidst the normalizing of 
large-scale ‘institutionalized’ impoverishment and widespread despoiling of the environment.47 
Marx took up Ludwig Feuerbach’s materialist philosophy to review Hegel’s theses on subjectivity. 
As the God of religion, the authority of Kings, kinship and, even human affections, morphed to 
accommodate ever-expanding production and accumulation, Marx combined Feuerbach’s and 
Hegel’s insights to argue that alienation was not the condition of distractedness from the essence 
of the Absolute, but the historical ‘material’ condition of detachment from a definitive human 
state of ‘species-being’.48  
As does Hegel, Marx finds in contemporaneous conditions the unleashing of a radical 
future-creating subjectivity: a historical ‘principle’ that unfolds over time and in space to create ‘the 
future out of the present’. It might be said that Marx unites (Western philosophical) theory and 
practice to ‘claim’ subjectivity as critical self-awareness in a world that is, in sum total, the product 
                                                 
 
45 T. B. Bottomore and M. Rubel, eds., Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 
1974), 183. For secondary comment upon these aspects of Marx work, see, A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An 
Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 12-13, 19-22.  
46 See, for example, Bottomore and Rubel, eds., Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, 27, 165-66, 79, 98-200. R. 
Freedman, ed., Marx on Economics (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 94-95, 205-21, 18-26. 
47 Richard Wilkinson, for example, describes the “institutionalization of poverty” in ‘early’ modernity as “a kind of accumulating 
debt” that was a condition of the loss of local self-sufficiency networks in the wake of industrial development, market 
expansion and techno-scientifically enhanced technique. See, Wilkinson, Poverty and Progress: An Ecological Model of Economic 
Development, 174-76. 
48 In retrospect, Marx seems to accuse ‘the political-economists’ of using the secular perspective they, and himself, had availed 
themselves of as ‘modern’ thinkers in order to express and justify the functional principles of ‘capitalism’, rather than to 
explain society in secular terms, as it affected human life.  
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of human action upon it.49 Marx charges subjectivity with the task of modernizing social 
conditions in order to realize species-being. For Marx, the class divisions and ways of interrelating 
wrought by ‘capitalism’ motivated subject-agents to create conditions for alienation-free relations. 
Thus, Marx could argue that all classes in the modernizing West were alienated from species-being, 
including the industrialists despite ostensibly benefiting from ‘capitalism’: “money dominated 
[their] own existence”, it caused “the pleasure-loving individual [to be] subordinated to the 
accumulating individual”.50  
Yet, Marx argued that the extremes of alienation suffered by an impoverished proletariat 
were the wellspring of agency that would universalize conditions through which humanity could 
realize species-being: 
 
[The proletariat is] a sphere of society which claims no traditional status but only a human status … a 
sphere finally which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all the other spheres 
of society, without therefore emancipating all these other spheres, [the proletariat is a sphere] which 
is, in short a total loss of humanity and which can only redeem itself by a total redemption of humanity.51 
 
In these respects, the notion of alienation from species-being seems to reach beyond the 
society that Marxist theory otherwise subjects to analysis as a totality determined by material 
productive forces. The concept of ‘species-being’ works as a mooring point, which tethers Marx’s 
analysis of subjectivity to an a priori claim. Arguably, to attain explanatory force, Marx’s thesis on 
alienation evokes a metaphysical motif. Species-being serves as a ‘universal constant’ in Marxist 
theory: it seems to form an arbiter that hangs over and binds inquiry to findings that imply 
subjectivity is either on a trajectory towards or away from achieving species-being. Marxist theory 
thus seems to unify analysis around a pre-theoretical claim that obscures what materialist analysis 
otherwise uncovers as the ‘total’ enframing of human-being in modernizing conditions. 
                                                 
 
49 See, H. Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx, trans. N. Guterman (London: Penguin Books, 1972 [1966]), Esp. Ch 2, 25-58. And, 
Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber, 20. 
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What is of interest for the present thesis here is how the concept of ‘alienation from 
species-being’ appears to play itself out in Marx’s theory of “commodity fetishism”. It is with 
some trepidation that I move to destabilize the concept of commodity fetishism here. My aim is to 
move away from the connotations that seem attached to concept of ‘species-being’, but to 
maintain a commitment to critical materialism. For Marx, commodities ‘mystify’ and, so, obscure 
the alienating quality of the capitalistic social relations central to their production, distribution, and 
exchange: 
 
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the 
commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s [sic] own labour as objective characteristics of 
the products of labour themselves, as socio-natural properties of these things. Hence, [the 
commodity-form] also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labour as a 
social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers. 
Through this substitution, the products of labour become commodities, sensuous things which are 
at the same time supra-sensible or social … [T]he commodity-form … is nothing but the definite 
social relation between men themselves, which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a 
relation between things. [T]his is the fetishism that attaches itself to the products of labour as soon 
as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of 
commodities.52  
 
Arguably, this aspect of Marx’s work has often been the focus of critical scrutiny by both 
sympathetic and antagonistic authors, notably from within the West in the late-twentieth century. 
At an ‘empirical’ level, such engagements with Marx may draw on perceptions that the job of 
producing, distributing, exchanging, and consuming commodities is more significant within 
contemporary sociality than was the case in the nineteenth century. Alternately, sustained criticism 
of Marx’s thesis on commodity fetishism arises in classical and neoclassical economics-based 
theory, which argues that to conceive of commodity fetishism as obscuring ‘truly’ alienated 
relations is merely to privilege an objective observer, or to maintain a total ideology. Arguably, 
such criticisms of Marx’s thesis on commodity relations are important, because this mode of 
critique seems central to both the classical economics directly addressed by Marx, as well as to the 
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‘neoclassical’ economics theory said to be the main influence upon contemporary political 
neoliberalism.53  
Discussion now turns to look at rational action theory-based criticisms of Marxist analyses 
of alienation and commodity fetishism in late-twentieth century North American societies through 
one example. However, I first reiterate my recognition of Marx’s injunction against such liberal 
economics-based theory as expressing the functional principles of modernization, rather than 
offering a framework for explaining modernity as a social condition. Joseph Heath and Andrew 
Potter’s work is instructive here, and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Heath and Potter 
argue that Marxist and ‘post’ Marxist analyses of ‘capitalism’ in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s began 
to be organized around recognition that the “the public at large might actually like capitalism, that 
they might genuinely want consumer goods … because the people have no deeper needs”. Heath and 
Potter suggest such reflections by Marxists led to an ever-deepening critique, which culminated in 
the “total ideology” of countercultural New Leftism that aimed to “attack oppression at a deeper 
level”.54  
Here, there is a strange conceptual meeting point between certain strands of Marxism and 
rational action theory. As suggested, Marxist theory, moreover, the concept of alienation from 
species-being, might be said to reach beyond the social world it otherwise opens to analysis as a 
‘material’ totality to attain explanatory force: it appears to unify explanation from ‘outside’. As 
such, Marxist theory vaults the critique of commoditization ‘away’ from the world, and towards 
transcendent metaphysics. Rational action theory seems to make a similar move, albeit negatively. 
Rational action theory seems to appeal to ‘common sense’ to establish a presupposition that is 
recycled into ‘fact’, only because it so clearly explains itself. Such analyses merely ignore any 
empirical information incommensurate with rational action so-defined. Hence, Heath and Potter 
suggest an Anglo-American “public at large” did not oppose capitalism in the late-twentieth 
century, not because it could not ‘see’ or ‘feel’ its own alienation or repression, but because 
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commodities are not fetishized. They merely deliver ‘maximal utility’ to ‘rational actors’ in given 
situations.55  
If this is a fair representation, the notion of alienation from species-being effectively 
sublimes analyses of the social creating of commodities and of the forms of life that weave in and 
around commodity-relations, while rational action theory trivializes them. Arguably, the concepts 
of ‘species-being’ or of ‘rational action’ presume the inaccessible perspective of an immediate 
reality. It is as if the world ‘is’ for other than a single human in the act of ‘being’. A pre-theoretical 
‘universal constant’ such as species-being or rational action unifies analyses because interceding 
upon what both approaches otherwise recognize to be the secular radicalization of human-being as 
a self-orienting and projecting, embodied ‘immediacy’ in modernizing (Western) conditions. In 
these respects, I suggest that Marxist and rational action theory might be said to comment upon, 
while operationalizing, what Dumont calls “modern artificialism”.56  
Therefore, in conclusion, I want to link Marxist theory to my discussion of an ‘immediate’ 
self-orienting subjectivity. Marx’s materialism remains important because it opens to analysis the 
social-historical enframing of an ‘immediate’ self-orienting human-being as ‘subjectivity’ in 
Western modernity. Rational action theory, on the other hand, is unsuited to the present thesis’ 
argument because it tends towards ahistorical ascription of a given subjectivity: self-interest. Marx 
links social power and its justification to a secular dialectic: humans create and reproduce the 
world and, so, ‘themselves’. Marx redefines reflection upon the human condition as a secular 
endeavour because bringing into question the authoritative force of religion and tradition in a way 
that also makes it possible to question the authority of milieux that might draw upon these for 
authority or the structures and institutions that would sustain value criteria within society. By 
rejecting cosmology and belief as ‘false’, Marxist materialism might provide a lens that, alongside 
the notion of ‘modern artificialism’, undermines ‘idealism’ and ‘positivism’ as conceptual schema 
because revealing how, in social worlds, these come down to ‘innerworldly’ assertions of personal 
will-objectives and work to perpetuate existing patterns of monopoly over and access to wealth 
and power.  
In these respects, moving away from the grounding that a notion of ‘species-being’ might 
provide for theory allows inquiry to shift from a focus upon commodities, and back to commodity 
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relations. Commodities are things that humans create and reproduce — both as ‘material’ goods 
and ‘immaterial’ services, which through economic exchange, take on ‘material-like’ qualities — 
and, so, might be said to reveal something about patterns of access to and monopoly over 
materials, practices, and discourses ‘going on’ amidst a material-physical context that encompasses 
in sum total. Rather than looking at commodities as “products of human labour in the abstract”,57 
I want to approach them as material and ‘material-like’ things set within a matrix of social relations 
that can be seen as mobilizing, propagating, and perpetuating a dominant subjectivity.  
 
… … … 
… … 
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4 Individuation: mobilizing, perpetuating, and propagating subjectivity 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter brings the earlier discussion of materialism, individualism, modern artificialism, and 
subjectivity into limited engagement with aspects of Emile Durkheim’s and Max Weber’s 
sociology. The chapter does not aim at a comprehensive Durkheimian or Weberian theory of 
subjectivity but, rather, draws together the social-historical and more abstract methodological 
discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 in order to frame discussion in Part III of social conditions and 
theories of subjectivity. Initially, the chapter discusses Durkheim’s account of ‘individuation’ as a 
structured and institutionalized atomizing of subject-agents’ engagements in modernizing 
conditions. The chapter then discusses Weber’s suggestion that occupational domains in Western 
modernity seem to require relatively high levels of education and articulate dispositions, notably, in 
specialized technical or scientific ‘vocations’. Weber’s account of the political and cultural links 
between large-scale and complex organizational domains, capitalistic economies, and mass-
democracy, is used here to discuss ‘vocation’ in terms of a particular formation of liberal 
individualism. Discussion links ‘individuation’ as a social condition to occupational vocation, in 
order to begin to describe how a self-orienting and projecting dominant subjectivity might be seen 
as affected by and, also, as affecting the formation of modernizing Western sociality.  
 
… … … 
 
Chapter 2 discussed Mukerji’s suggestion that subject-agents ‘could turn more frequently to 
things’, to describe how particular orders of skill, dispositions, techniques, and knowledges became 
increasingly important to social engagements across arenas central to modernization. Similarly, 
Mukerji’s research was used to focus upon how, amidst proliferating objects, ‘careful measurement 
and study’ of the world in more incremental and exacting terms also became important within 
modernizing social worlds. Mukerji’s claim that persons ‘became less dependent, either on other 
persons or on nature’ is here taken as a ‘phenomenological’ point. The emergence of modern 
‘materialism’ meant that subject-agents needed to ‘reckon’ temporality in relatively precise 
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increments; ‘know’ materials as finite resources; ‘hold’ labour as a quantifiable thing; and, 
‘recognize’ space as property or territory, for example, in order to engage within mediated 
‘capitalistic’ markets, and with relatively de-personalized ‘government’ authorities. ‘Human-being’, 
in this argument, becomes enframed by a consistent impulsion to ‘orient’ and ‘create’ the self; to 
acquire skills, and dispositions; to ‘project’ and ‘assert’ the self, and assume techniques, or 
knowledges for social engagements that anchor ‘being’ human ‘here and now’.  
Durkheim’s concept of ‘individuation’ helps to take up these issues in more detail. 
Durkheim is used here to emphasize how the secularizing qualities of Western modernization can 
be said to ‘go on’, regardless of whether or not secularism, or secularist political claims, may 
manifest, or whether religion or religious observance is important to sociality. Durkheim contrasts 
non-modern societies, said to ‘go on’ under the aegis of “some [cosmological] force 
communicated to it from without”, with structurally differentiated and institutionally segmented 
modern societies. As complex web-like interdependencies spring up, dissolving cosmological 
ordinance and localized self-sufficiency networks, modernization links together hitherto relatively 
independent productive domains. Such relative societal complexity means that diverse and 
‘functionally’ differentiated societal and relational domains can, of themselves, be seen as “co-
ordinated and subordinated one to another … there is no longer anything about [modernity] that 
is not temporal and human”. For the present thesis, this means that the “web-like 
interdependencies” described by Durkheim constitute an encompassing and pervasive totalization 
of modernizing conditions.58  
Central to this account of the wide-reaching specialization of tasks arising across the 
occupational domain as a condition of the “complex division of labour”59 is Durkheim’s thesis that 
sees modernity based around an all-pervasive “cult of individualism”. For Durkheim, this “cult of 
individualism” is manifest because modernization tends to individuate societal and relational 
engagements across almost all of society. Durkheim argues that the rise of an “individualist 
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morality” accompanies a decline in the “collective conscience”. As such an ‘organic’ individualism 
emerges, it breaks down the ‘mechanical’ bonds that, through “collective conscience”, had hitherto 
worked to bind morality and ethical norms together. It might be said that the individuation and 
individualism identified by Durkheim combine to push moral decisions into a privatistic realm of 
autonomous subjective orientations-to-the-world: 
 
[The collective conscience is displaced by] the human person, whose definition serves as the 
touchstone according to which good must be distinguished from evil … which is considered as 
sacred, in what one might call the ritual sense of the word. [I]ndividualism has something of that 
transcendental majesty which the churches of all times have given to their Gods [and] is a religion 
of which man is, at the same time, both believer and God. [I]ndividualism thus understood is the 
glorification not of the self, [which is no more than ‘natural’ egoism,] but of the individual in 
general. This cult of man [sic] has for its first dogma the autonomy of reason and for its first rite 
freedom of thought.60  
 
Here, Durkheim seems to attribute the decline of social bonds held in place by the 
“collective conscience” to increasing individuation and individualism. However, by seeing the “cult 
of individualism” as the source of justification for reason and freedom, Durkheim might be seen 
to suggest that a ‘new’ quasi-religious motif manifests ‘from above’. Reason and freedom seem to 
go beyond individual’s ‘belief’ in them, and manifest as if these are an ineffable, pre-subjective, 
modern orthodoxy. As such, the present thesis leaves aside Durkheim’s social philosophical 
arguments and restricts discussion to the sociological, arguably, even demographic aspects of his 
work.  
The concept of ‘individuation’ is discussed here in terms of the spread of intricate 
structural interdependencies and wide dispersal of segmentally differentiated production, 
distribution, and exchange activities that might be said to enframe a self-orienting and projecting 
subjectivity. The concept allows discussion of a particular autonomous and autarchic form of life, 
not only within occupational domains, but also beyond them, within the structured and 
institutionalized commodity markets so important to modernizing societies. A concept of 
‘individuation-in-practice’ might make it possible to discuss the so-called ‘universal’ medium for 
exchange central to capitalistic relations as occluding historically ‘taken-as-natural’ differences and 
value criteria, and thrusting ‘responsibility’ for sustaining and defining these onto subjectivity itself. 
                                                 
 
60 E. Durkheim, "Individualism and the Intellectuals," Political Studies XVII, no. 1 (1969 [1898]): 21-22, 24.  
 46 
It makes it possible to look at capitalistic relations based around money exchanges as if these allow 
for potential equivalences between vast arrays of different commodities to be valued because 
relations of this order shift the onus for exchanges from transcendent ‘principles’ to the matrices 
of idiosyncratic individual desires. In part, as a condition of their increasing importance to ongoing 
social formation, criteria for value in market exchanges — hitherto, largely dependent upon Divine 
Providence or aristocratic Right or, merely, less important to the job of creating and reproducing 
sociality — can be discussed in terms of unique and exemplary desires-in-action, brought to 
increasingly predominant markets by autonomous subject-agents.  
To look at things in this way implies a nexus between value, effort, and a particular form 
of life. In this sense, subject-agents might be said to exert effort or, indeed, perform desires, 
before markets or — moreover, as market-based practices and discourses are seen to become 
more important — society-as-audience. Where money becomes a near ‘universal’ medium for 
exchange, markets effectively ‘guarantee’ the equal individuality of subject-agents, who might be 
said to ‘demonstrate’ exemplarity, through autonomous ‘projections’ of choice or effort. This is to 
suggest that, insofar as a universal medium for exchange facilitates value criteria, valuation itself 
might be seen to move from things-in-themselves to more permanently unstable criteria as things-
in-society. Discussing the institutionalization of markets along these lines means, first, moving 
away from conceiving of production, distribution, and exchange solely in terms of labour-power: 
subject-agents might use effort and choice in consuming things, creating them, or disseminating 
them as information in ‘services’.  
Where markets are seen in terms of self-orientation and self-projection, through 
idiosyncratic actions and ‘displays’ of individual exemplarity, they can appear premised upon an 
equalitarian ‘right’ to participate as a liberal individual. This approach brings into question how the 
increased importance of capitalistic markets to sociality could be seen in terms of commodities 
that mobilize, propagate, and perpetuate normative conditions that ordain effort and choice on 
individuated terms. Durkheim’s concept of ‘individuation’ helps to focus upon subjectivity in ways 
that emphasize how structured and institutionalized conditions might be seen in terms of patterns 
of access to and monopoly over normative practices and discourses amidst broader material-
physical contexts that arise because subject-agents create and reproduce societies in particular 
ways.  
 
… … …  
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I now want to move to discuss Weber’s theses on the intertwining of ‘equality’ and the “abstract 
regularity … of authority” in Western modernity, structured and institutionalized around 
capitalistic markets and ‘bureaucratic’ government administrations.61 I use Weber’s discussion of 
‘vocation’ in modernizing conditions as a way into making some suggestions for a perspective 
upon the dynamics of social power that will allow me to recap my discussion so far and suggest 
the direction I want to take in Part II.  
Weber describes ‘vocation’ as a form of labour, a specialization within specific 
occupational domains that requires relatively high levels of education and articulate dispositions 
and, so, is deeply individuated. For Weber, “personal experience [and] inner devotion to the task” 
are necessary for the “virtuoso-like mastery of single yet methodically integrated functions” of 
occupational vocation. Weber argues that vocation involves personal training with an aim. It 
involves a self-creating and asserting disposition, and is self-oriented action, projected into the 
world. Weber’s work helps to suggest how large-scale organizational practices and discourses 
frame a self-creating and asserting subjectivity, insofar as autonomous individual subject-agents 
‘choose’ vocation in a specific ‘field’ of expertise.62 
For Weber, ‘vocation’ is the historical form that labour takes in within the commercially 
managed enterprises and bureaucratically administered governments that become central to the 
ongoing reproduction of structurally complex and institutionally differentiated modernizing 
societies. For Weber, vocation encompasses endeavours in science, technology, art, or law, and 
academic inquiry, as well as commercial, industrial, financial enterprise, and nation-state ‘public 
office’. Essential to the practice of vocation is the opening of subject-agents to continual 
assessment; by formal examination, informal peer review or, merely, in relation to ‘substantive’ 
organizational ends, such as profitability, or efficiency.63 In this sense, Weber’s account of 
                                                 
 
61 M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958 
[1946]), 137, 96, 224. 
62 Weber discusses ‘bureaucracy’ as a phenomenon in many historical contexts, but makes clear that it takes on certain distinctive 
characteristics in modernizing ‘Occidental’ settings. See, Ibid., 204. 
63 Of course, topical for Weber were the relatively well-educated and articulate ‘middle-class’ of intellectually and technically 
trained professionals of the 1910s and 1920, and who were numerically less well-represented in United States’ (and German) 
societies than is arguably the case in the 1990s and 2000s. I am suggesting that, in recent decades, the form and level of 
educational attainment and articulateness that Weber describes are important, and relatively commonplace, across Anglo-
America, and that his insights offer a bridge between my dealings so far and current theory. Arguably, this is so when 
considering several decades of declining employment in unskilled occupations, the proliferation of semi-skilled service and 
highly skilled ‘new economy’ work requiring at least minimal education and articulateness, and high retention rates in senior 
high school, technical, and university level education courses. Similarly, when we consider contemporary geographical 
mobility, wide-reaching dissemination of information from ‘across the globe’ by communications media, and relatively 
 48 
‘vocation’ offers a way into discussing how the “methodical ordering” of materials and methods 
within large and complex modern organizational domains might be said to enframe a self-asserting 
and creating, self-orienting and projecting ‘immediate’ subjectivity. 
Most important for Weber is the way that ‘vocation’ is also tied intimately to the “abstract 
regularity of the execution of authority”. He describes how, amidst the scale and complexity of 
modern organizational domains, decision-making ‘flows’ along path-like channels, where at myriad 
junctures the holders of vocational ‘expertise’ apply specialist knowledges or skills in order to 
realize these decisions and, as such, express an abstract and remote authority. Weber argues that 
the key characteristic of commercial ‘management’ and government ‘bureaucracy’ is 
comprehensive ends-oriented formal and regularized authority: 
 
Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict 
subordination, reduction of friction, and of material and personal costs … are raised to the 
optimum point. The ‘objective’ discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business [and 
governance] according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for persons’.64 
  
Weber links the primacy of “the abstract regularity of the execution of authority” in 
modern commercial management and nation-state administration to historical shifts in the 
structural and institutional conditions within Western societies. For Weber, “bureaucratic structure 
goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material means of management … in the 
development of the big capitalist enterprise, [while] a corresponding process occurs in public 
organizations”, and emerges as a result of intertwining political and cultural change.65  
For Weber, a necessary “but by no means decisive” condition, prompting the creation of 
large-scale bureaucratically administered modernity, is the universalizing of capitalistic “money-
economies”. For Weber, a structural condition of the expansion of such ‘market’ economies is the 
displacement of corruption-prone and irregular ‘tithe’ or ‘in-kind’ levies by ‘taxation revenue’. This 
implies a broad-based structural shift toward the regularizing, formalizing, and abstracting of 
authority, which is removed from local patricians (as embodied persons) and concentrated in (the 
arbitrary institutions of) a taxing government. However, Weber argues the “sufficient condition” 
for such formalization and regularization — such ‘rationalization’ — is that “[b]ureaucracy 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
‘multicultural’ urban and suburban cultural environment, for example, it may be the case that Weber’s account of vocation 
remains relevant to contemporary inquiry. Ibid., 136, 44-45, 53, 229. 
64 Ibid., 214-15, Italics in original. 
65 Ibid., 206, 21, 24-25. 
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inevitably accompanies mass democracy”. Weber calls attention to how political and sub-political 
agitation for mass democracy, notably, for “equality before the law … makes a clean sweep of the 
feudal, patrimonial, and – at least in intent – the plutocratic privileges [of irregular] 
administration”.66  
To conclude, the chapter links ‘vocation’ as a key occupational form in modernizing 
Western societies to the impact of ‘mass-democracy’ upon the structured and institutionalized 
development of large-scale bureaucratically administered and formally organized capitalistic 
markets and nation-state governments. In these respects, Weber’s account of ‘vocation’ is used to 
open to discussion the kinds of conditions that subjectivity — seen as the form that human-being 
takes in modernizing (Western) conditions — might be said to create and reproduce as 
modernization. I am suggesting that the qualities that Weber attributes to ‘vocation’ — self-
assertion, creativity, achieving ‘formal’ education, and maintaining articulate dispositions, for 
example — can be discussed in terms of subject-agents creating and reproducing a particular from 
of life, because deeply ‘individuated’ amidst relatively complex, extended, and abstracted social 
conditions and a peculiar cultural history.  
Weber describes conditions for the emergence of bureaucratically administered nation-
states and large-scale industrial-commercial enterprises and the vocational form of life central to 
them as concomitant with the wide-reaching social-historical desiccation of possibilities for 
religiously determined ways-of-life.67 For Weber, modernization is both ‘unstable’ and ‘risky’. On 
the one hand, the ordination of structured and institutional conditions around ‘instrumental 
rationality’ occludes possibilities that sociality — ‘brotherliness’ or ‘religious existence’, for 
example — predominates as an ‘ends-in-itself’. On the other hand, at a more intimate level, 
modern vocation evokes subjective crises of ‘meaninglessness’ or ‘disenchantment’. For Weber, 
‘vocation’ calls for knowledges-about-the-world that rest in unquestioned assumptions which 
modern organizational ends encompass human effort within are ‘worthwhile’. It seems that, for 
Weber, the ‘intellectualization’ which complex, industrialized, abstractly administered, and ‘mass-
democratic’ societies brings to subject-agents’ existences make ‘enchantment’ problematic:  
 
[I]ncreasing intellectualization [through vocation] and rationalization [through organizational 
practices] do not, therefore, indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions 
                                                 
 
66 Ibid., 196, 204, 24, 98. Italics in original. 
67 Ibid., 352-53. 
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under which one lives. It means something else, namely, the knowledge or belief that if one 
but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, 
master all things by calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted. One need no 
longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did [those 
non-moderns] … for whom such mysterious powers existed. Technical means and 
calculations perform the service. This is above all what intellectualization means.68 
 
Arguably, Weber’s suggestion that ‘disenchantment’ is a condition of the way that 
modernity truncates ‘big’ questions as to the grounding of modern social worlds. This is because 
opening human-being to the universe as a material-physical ‘knowable’ totality implies that 
modernity ‘is’ reality; sociality ‘goes on’ because ‘what is’ is what it ‘ought’ to be. Weber helps to 
describe modernizing conditions in terms of an ‘immediate’ subjectivity, implying the world is all 
there is, but also opening possibilities that the world ‘is’ in particular ways, because humans create it 
as such. Modernization may, or may not be ‘meaningless’ in relation to subject-agents’ lived 
experiences of it, but for it to be seen analytically as creating ‘meaningless’ would, it is argued, 
require a position that sees meaning in reality. Arguably, it is in the direction of increasing 
‘meaninglessness’ in this sense that the Frankfurt School theorists have been said to take Weber.69  
Such a perspective might be said to take it that ‘meaninglessness’ manifests over only one 
analytic register: that anchored in conceiving of reality as an order independent of human-being. In 
another register, modernization renders reality a total ontic field of arbitrary and contingent 
possible states of affairs, while remaining wedded to the inescapable condition that is human-
being: embodied in space, over time, and amongst others. Taking subjectivity to be the 
‘immediacy’ of ‘being’ in reality, for the present thesis, means that situation-specific and only ever 
ostensibly ‘true’ claims gain traction, which they do by virtue of particular patterns of access to and 
monopoly over materials, practices and discourses. Hence, it might be fruitful to take Weber in a 
slightly different direction. It might be possible that the conditions which Weber identifies with 
modernization militate against the shared and communicative — norm-based and relational 
condition — that human-being arguably ‘is’. This means approaching subjectivity, not so much as 
a condition of ‘disenchantment’ — a consequence of totalitarian domination by ‘instrumental 
rationality’ — but as a largely incoherent and messy pervasive ‘wholism’. Hence, the present thesis 
                                                 
 
68 Ibid., 339. Italics in original. 
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discusses subjectivity, not so much as “disenchanted and denuded of its mystical but inwardly 
genuine plasticity”,70 but as a condition that means inquiry requires two simultaneous perspectives. 
On the one hand, as subjectivity per se; the generalized condition that human-being takes in 
modernizing conditions. That is, where a generalized modern artificialism, amongst other things, 
means that individuals are seen as socialized embodied subject-agents that are called upon to self-
orient amidst particular normative conditions and material-physical contextuality. And, on the 
other hand, a perspective that combines these two registers of inquiry in relation to the claim that 
human-being ‘is’ a norm-based and relational condition. 
In Part II, discussion focuses upon the Anglo-American societies over recent decades, and 
engages with current social theory approaches to subjectivity in such conditions. Part III develops 
a framework for inquiry through engagements with current social anthropology and social theory, 
and develops an approach to test conditions within contemporary Anglo-American societies 
through a series of examples that are discussed in Part IV. 
 
… … … 
… … 
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II: Theory & Practice 
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5 Affluence: schizoanalysis and simulacra 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at theories and practices of subjectivity, amidst sustained economic growth and 
Cold War, and an Anglo-American realpolitik conducted around calls for social welfare and civil 
rights in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The chapter discusses theories of social homogeneity and 
cultural conformity as explanations of subjectivity in such conditions, and evaluates these in 
relation to the present thesis’ aims. This chapter discusses theories and practices of subjectivity, 
especially, focusing upon the post-structuralism Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and Jean 
Baudrillard. Deleuze and Guattari are important because they make explicit links between their 
work and the ‘countercultural movements’ which became widespread in these decades. The 
chapter then considers Baudrillard’s theses, in the light of Gerry Gill’s critique of his work. Gill 
helps me to emphasize similarities between Deleuze and Guattari, and Baudrillard, and to suggest 
how such theory may ‘go too deep’. Discussion in this chapter informs a focal shift, in the next 
chapter, towards social conditions in the 1980s and 1990s and theories of postindustrialization, 
post-materialism, and counterculture.  
 
… … … 
 
Several commentators describe Anglo-American conditions across the 1950s, 1960s, and early 
1970s in terms of a Long Upturn. These link Cold War geopolitics to strong nation-building and 
economic growth. Robert Brenner, for instance, describes how successive United States 
administrations and major corporate interests supported West European and North Asian 
reconstruction programs that stimulated global commodity and financial markets. Although used 
primarily in reference to economic conditions, the Long Upturn also provides a metaphor for 
public affairs in these decades. Organized around three major institutions — nation-state 
government, commercial enterprise, and labour movement-civil organizations — these concerns 
for national security and economic growth were parlayed into large-scale infrastructural 
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developments and the raising of loosely defined ‘living-standards’: the “Keynesian/welfare state 
compromise”. Hence, the motif of the Long Upturn also implies the proliferation of relatively 
available commoditized goods and services, ‘nuclear-familial’ housing, ‘full’ employment and a 
‘living wage’, or ‘social security’, for example. Keynesian policy and welfare-statism were manifest 
amidst what Leslie Sklair, for example, suggests was a “qualitatively new globalizing phase in the 
1960s … [where] for the first time in human history, the dominant economic system, capitalism, 
was sufficiently productive to provide a basic package of material possessions and services to 
almost everyone in the First World”.71  
While many influential political or labour movements and civil organizations may have 
sought to destabilize and, so, re-create sociality along collectivist lines,72 it seems that conditions in 
these decades centred on the establishing of basic material and civil rights within market-oriented 
liberal-democracies. Arguably, at the level of the polity, programs such as United States’ 
government commitments to “ending poverty and providing a social safety net for the 
disadvantaged” and “state-mandated expansion of civil rights in affirmative action programs in 
employment and education”73 seem peculiar to particular structural and institutional conditions. I 
am suggesting that conditions were such that economic-distributive claims, for a ‘living wage’, and 
cultural-recognition claims, for minority rights, could both gain purchase in the arena of the polity 
because the bearers of such claims were more or less important to ongoing sociality. Where 
Jackson Lears discusses a United States “organized to satisfy human desires … a picture of 
                                                 
 
71 In social theory terms, Giddens, for example, argues that “there is always a tension between state and economy; the separation 
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labour unions, social democratic, and left-liberal political parties, which undermined efforts to universalise social justice and 
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progressive taxation, macroeconomic policies aimed at creating full employment, a large non-market public sector, and 
significant public and/or collective ownership”. However, to claim that these concurred on whterh or not “full reform would 
shift the balance of power from capital to labour and encourage transformation in the long term [would be] arguable, to be 
sure”. See, A. Blunden, "Subjectivity," in Hegel Summer School (Melbourne: 2005), 11-13. N. Fraser and A. Honneth, 
Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, trans. J. Golb, J. Ingram, and C. Wilke (London: Verso Books, 
2003), 80, 106. Fraser refers to a similar point, made by G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990).  
73 President Johnson cited in, E. Townsley, "'the Sixties' Trope," Theory, Culture & Society 18, no. 6 (2001): 104. 
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abundance based around a surfeit of mass-produced, disposable commodities”,74 I make two 
points. On the one hand, such commentary implies an extension of the potential to access an array 
of commoditized goods and services to formerly excluded subject-agents and, on the other hand, 
it implies an expansion of core arenas for those societal and relational engagements of key 
importance to social creation and reproduction, to encompass what are effectively ‘more’ subject-
agents.  
Gerhardt Schulze’s account of ‘affluence’ allows discussion of changing societal conditions 
in these decades. Schulze argues that affluence is not limited to personal wealth or to commodity 
consumption per se. Moreover; it implies conditions where almost “unlimited contingency of 
choice” becomes central to a range of societal and relational engagements. Schulze argues that the 
job of ‘selecting’ amidst a range of contingent possibilities displaces that of ‘influencing’ the world 
in conditions of affluence. As such, “the stresses of getting through life” require “situation 
management” and mean that “self-reflection, as a consequence of choosing between many 
alternatives [becomes] a permanent and ubiquitous condition”.75  
What is interesting for this thesis’ argument is that Schulze describes such wide-reaching 
structural and institutional conditions in terms of a shift from “situation-centred” to “subject-
centred” norms. However, he makes clear that “this development is often misunderstood as a shift 
towards extreme selfishness”. Schulze’s discussion of conditions in and around which “uncertainty 
[over] not knowing the ends” displaces “the traditional uncertainty of not knowing the means”,76 
allows me to bring back the concept of a dominant subjectivity. It suggests how — amidst Cold 
War and globalizing commodity and finance markets, domestic economic growth and political 
stability combined amidst norms based in liberal-democratic nationalist patriotism, freedom, and 
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liberty — core arenas for sociality came to privilege atomized ‘personal’ autonomy and 
individuated sovereign ‘choice’. Arguably, looking at Anglo-American conditions in the late 1960s 
and into the 1970s allows suggestions about how self-realization through experiential desiring 
became central to an ‘immediate’ self-orienting and projecting, self-creating and asserting 
subjectivity.  
 
… … … 
 
The chapter now turns to look at Anglo-American conditions of relative affluence in terms of 
‘suburbanization’ and ‘automobilization’.77 Such motifs may call to mind ‘the critique of mass-
society’ writings. This critique focused upon relatively available personal-use commodities, large-
scale ‘full-time’ employment in ‘big’ organizations, and expanded access to mass-education, 
‘planned’ housing, and mass-entertainments. They were seen as products of Cold War geopolitics, 
Fordist mass-production, Taylorist standardization, and mass-communications techniques as 
conditioning widespread social homogeneity and cultural conformity.  
                                                 
 
77 In these decades, almost full employment and economic growth prompted relatively large domestic migration and international 
immigration. Primarily, Americans moved from the South to cities like Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia, while Caribbeans 
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commercially viable ‘postindustrial’ spaces. Interestingly, in the United States, “by 1972 the Federal Housing Authority had 
helped eleven million families to buy their homes and another twenty-two million to improve theirs”, which for David 
Reynolds implies that “the suburbanization of America … owed much to federal policy – state socialism, if you like, for the 
middle classes”. Also important to note is that the Australian experience here differs markedly from that of the United States 
and Britain. Much public housing development on the fringes of Australian cities accommodated disenfranchised groups, in 
contrast with the markedly ‘deserving’ character of British New Towns and American commuter belts. Hence, the ‘ghetto-
ization’ of an underclass in inner-city districts, such as Harlem or Brixton, for instance, took on a different character in the 
Australian setting, where ‘outer’ suburbs became the preserve of disenfranchised groups, while inner-cities were relatively 
quickly ‘gentrified’ by the late 1970s. Reynolds also makes explicit the link between suburbanization and automobilization. 
Mike Featherstone and John Urry present detailed critical analyses of conditions of ‘automobilization’, which they describe as a 
“self-organising autopoeitic, non-linear system, which links together cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies … in an 
expanding relatively stable system which generates unintended consequences”. M. Peel, The Lowest Rung: Voices of Australia's 
Poverty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). D. Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945, 2nd ed. 
(London: Penguin Books, 2001), 154-57. R. Sennett, Respect in a World of Inequality (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2003). Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945, 156-7. See, also, Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 206-12. and, D. 
Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell Books, 1990), 83. See, M. 
Featherstone, "Automobilities an Introduction," Theory, Culture & Society 21, no. 4/5 (204): 1-24, J. Urry, "The 'System' of 
Automobility," Theory, Culture & Society 21, no. 4/5 (2004): 25-39. 
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However, as Chapter 4 suggests, analyses based in Left-Hegelian iterations of Weberian 
sociology are unsuited to my argument. Theorizing homogeneity and conformity as conditions of 
‘false consciousness’ and ‘totalitarian domination’ excludes analysis itself from the sociality of 
which it is part. Arguably, such an approach totalizes its own critical ideal, and then objectifies 
sociality and social conditions in this image. Theories of ‘false consciousness’ seem to insulate 
analyses from self-reflection as part of the social field they discuss. Construing subjectivity as a 
condition of ‘totalitarian domination’ offers an extremely important critical perspective upon 
modernizing Western sociality, yet by attributing what is unjust or inhumane, for example, to an 
out-of-control ‘instrumental rationality’ may imply that theory and practice, the alternative to such 
oppression, arises from ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ sociality. Such an ‘alternative’ position seems to risks 
appealing from within the ‘immediacy’ of reality. It is anchored in an ideal, transcendent, or 
metaphysical claim that lies beyond the social world under discussion or practical action. As such, 
in practice, this approach may collapse back in upon itself. The world becomes a total affront to 
an atomized subjectivity that, because facing consistent threats of ‘false consciousness’, must 
constantly pursue a specious ‘authenticity’. Such theory seems to elude practical applicability 
because consistent need for comparison with a transcendent critical ideal licenses a subjectivity 
that overruns shared normative sociality in pursuit of ‘itself’.  
As such, I want to focus upon suburbanization and automobilization as conditions for the 
formation of a dominant subjectivity that turns on self-realization and experiential desire-
opportunities. The ‘green fields’ development of stand-alone ‘nuclear’ households, for example, 
loosen the bindedness to extended family, community, and place in these decades. At the same 
time, merit-based ‘full-time’ employment for cash-wages within formally administered and, often, 
large governmental or commercial organizations, and commuting by public transport or in mass-
produced but ‘private’ vehicles, for example, appear to bring relative liberation from class or status 
group strictures, and responsibilities to extended kin or community groups. Expanded access to 
secondary, technical, and tertiary education, basic primary health-care and material welfare, for 
example, based on citizen ‘rights’, seemed to weaken the purchase of gender or ethnic bias.  
Where Mike Featherstone and David Harvey find that a generation of “baby boomers”, 
unfamiliar with depression or wartime shortages, took on paid employment and “entered higher 
education in numbers higher than ever before” amidst a plethora of commoditized goods and 
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services,78 a relatively sustainable ‘youth’ culture emerged. Distance from local community and 
extended family, relative economic and personal independence, and expanded access to higher 
education also meant to some extent that the authority wielded by ‘moral custodians’ and the 
‘village rumour mill’ became an anachronistic irrelevance for relatively many. In this sense, youth, 
women, and ethnic minority claims, as well as those of a generalized countercultural movement, 
may have manifest within conditions for a dominant subjectivity as the present thesis describes it. 
Numerous commentators discuss the proliferation and spread of such countercultural movements, 
beyond an extant bohemian fringe of artists and intellectuals, as beginning in the late 1960s and 
into the 1970s.79 The suggestion here is that the counterculture, as such, manifests through a 
Western individualism that is a situation-specific formation under the order of an ‘immediate’, self-
orienting and projecting, self-creating and asserting subjectivity. 
 
… … … 
 
It is here that Deleuze and Guattari’s, and Baudrillard’s, work becomes relevant. Their work helps 
to highlight an epistemological division between Left-Hegelian critique and hermeneutics, and in 
the next chapter, uncritical ‘conservative’ and ‘rational action’ theories of subjectivity. In addition, 
their work expressly contributes to social practice in these decades and remains, in certain respects, 
influential upon Anglo-American social theory and cultural studies. Deleuze and Guattari describe 
the “task of schizoanalysis in relation to the revolutionary movements” of the Anglo-American 
counterculture and of Third World anti-colonialists.80 Looking at Deleuze and Guattari’s, and 
Baudrillard’s post-structuralism allows me to suggest how their theory may ‘go too deep’, and 
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seemingly psychologize analyses by conflating the social-historical enframing of the Western 
hermeneutic canon with a situation-specific formation of a dominant subjectivity.  
Deleuze and Guattari argue that “capital, meaning, value”, and human-being itself, are 
made inconsistent and dependent upon, while subjected to, constant re-evaluation amidst the 
processes and systemic forces of West-centric modernization. They describe modernization as an 
“Oedipal configuration” of global proportions. For them, “[t]he hour of Oedipus draws nigh” as a 
globalizing “Oedipal machine without organs” creates evermore “desire-production”, all the while 
“presupposing a fantastic repression of desiring-machines”. Modernization is an “amorphous 
continuum” where flows of “schizophrenic indifference” are in constant tension with a “paranoiac 
axiomatic” that “exorcises and repels” fluidity by constantly asserting “a unit of code”: “the flows 
are decoded and axiomatized [as code] by capitalism at the same time. Hence, schizophrenia is not 
the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death”.81  
It seems that Deleuze and Guattari base their theory and method in the comprehension 
that the creating and reproducing of sociality itself is the unstable and contingent, yet sole plane of 
significance for the human condition in modernity. Western society and culture, along with its 
epistemological premises, are merely contingent ‘plays’ within this globalizing “capitalistic 
machine”. It turns on “desire-production” following a Western template. Desires created in 
Western settings, and anchored in the ‘nuclear family’ — “the Daddy, Mommy, Me triangle” — 
are set loose upon the world in all their incipient contradictions by the “globalizing capitalist 
machine”. The ‘battle’ between a nascent subject, a ‘Me’ the desirer of ‘Mommy’, and an 
omniscient ‘Daddy’, the jealous oppressor of such desire, is always torn between achieving desires, 
or, becoming a replica of ‘Daddy’. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari recognize theory that would 
‘code’ the world in relation to a practical or ideal Truth would merely re-affirm ‘Oedipus’.82  
Extrapolating this schema into an account of globalizing, modernizing social relations 
creates serious empirical difficulties, which Deleuze and Guattari avoid in a specific way: 
 
[T]he elements of production and antiproduction are not reproduced in the same way as humans 
themselves, but find in them a simple material that the form of economic reproduction 
preorganizes in a mode that is entirely distinct from the form this material has as human 
reproduction. Precisely because it is privatized, placed outside the field, the form of the material or 
the form of human reproduction begets people whom one can readily assume to be all equal to one 
                                                 
 
81 Ibid., 3, 33, 240, 45-46, 51. 
82 Ibid., 51-56. 
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another; but inside the field itself, the form of social economic reproduction has already preformed 
the form of the material so as to engender … the capitalist … and the worker … etc.83  
 
The Freudian-Lacanian Oedipus complex, as social explanation, seems to become a pre-
theoretical, ‘pre-organizing’, ‘pre-forming’ force. It seems that, in order to overcome the empirical 
difficulties of explaining sociality in terms of ‘Oedipus’, the authors naturalize the Freudian-
Lacanian psychological motif. Yet, naturalizing the Oedipus complex in this way risks the kind of 
essentialism that confronts Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism. In these respects, Deleuze and Guattari 
seem to explain how the “Oedipal configuration” that “creates desiring-machines” does so such 
that the “individual persons” pre-formed within it become immaterial simulacra: 
 
[S]ocial persons are first of all, i.e., functions derived from the abstract quantities. They are nothing 
more nor less than configurations or images produced by the … breaks-flows … of capitalism. 
Private persons are therefore images of the second order, images of images — that is, simulacra that 
are thus endowed with an aptitude for representing the first-order images of social-persons. Private 
persons are an illusion, images of images or derivatives of derivatives.84 
 
In these respects, Deleuze and Guattari’s argument closely resembles Baudrillard’s theory 
of the “procession of the simulacra”. Baudrillard suggests that, in ‘late’ modernity, ‘simulation’ 
displaces domination through 'false' representation as the condition of ‘false’ consciousness: 
 
Simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation itself over four successive phases of the 
image: 
it is the reflection of a profound reality: 
it masks and denatures a profound reality: 
it masks the absence of a profound reality:  
it has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure simulacrum.85 
 
Gerry Gill enters here to argue that the device of “the Code” in Baudrillard’s schema 
seems to be at once a social creation, and “implies the existence of a pre-existing fixed hierarchical 
structure”. At this point, similarities with Deleuze and Guattari’s work become explicit. Where 
                                                 
 
83 Ibid., 263. Italics in original. 
84 Ibid., 264. Italics in original. 
85 J. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, trans. S.F. Glaser, The Body, in Theory: Histories of Cultural Materialism (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994 [1981]), 6, Italics in original. 
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Gill, along with John Hinkson and Geoff Sharp, for example, suggest that where “self-forming 
(identity-seeking) and self-integrating persons break out of parochial settings of the formation of 
individuals”, analyses must account for the framing of subjectivity in terms of a “society 
transformed by its products”. Both Deleuze and Guattari seem to insert a pre-theoretical claim 
into analyses. Following Gill, I suggest that this may be “a consequence of the inability to account 
for the way in which the determining code or structuring logic are themselves constituted by 
historical social processes”.86  
 
… … … 
 
Following Gill’s critique of Baudrillard’s work here, to the chapter concludes by suggesting how it 
may be that such post-structuralism may lose sight of subjectivity by basing analyses in a formation 
of Western individualism. Gill suggests that Baudrillard’s theory implies method that “celebrates 
the joy of the moment of release from fixed or externally imposed meaning”, yet only does so by 
“naturalizing and celebrating … an abstract relation to an increasingly abstract society”. Gill 
criticizes Roland Barthes’ notion of the “writerly reader” and Jacques Derrida’s concept of “active 
interpretation” on the same bases. Gill allows it to be suggested that such post-structuralism 
naturalizes an individualism that is an aspect of a self-creating and asserting subjectivity in 
conditions of relative affluence, high levels of education, and articulate dispositions necessary for 
engagement in core areas of Anglo-American sociality in these decades. Springing from a “mode 
of subjectivity constituted in specifiable social and cultural forms”, such theory seems to take leave 
of material-physical and social-historical context to revel in an abstracted and only ostensible ‘de-
centredness’.87  
Here, it becomes important to note that Deleuze and Guattari, and Baudrillard speak to 
groups beyond social theorists, psychologists, and associated intellectual practitioners in the early 
1970s. For example, Foucault prefaces Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, declaring it “a book of 
                                                 
 
86 Influencing this discussion is Phillip Bell’s claim that semiotic analyses often entertain a slippage between the three concepts 
‘subjectivity’, ‘the subject’, and “subject-hood or subject-ness-in-general”, which can result in reductive, reified, or circular 
argument. Bell argues that this slippage is a product of the inappropriate embrace by semioticians of abstract linguistic-centred 
psychology and psychoanalytic theory. See, P. Bell, "Subjectivity and Identity: Semiotics as Psychological Explanation," Social 
Semiotics 12, no. 2 (2002): 201-17. G. Gill, "Post-Structuralism as Ideology," Arena I, no. 69 (1984): 93-94, J. Hinkson, 
"Subjectivity and Neo-Liberal Economy," Arena 11, no. New series (1998): 142-44, G. Sharp, "Extended Forms of the Social," 
Arena New series, no. 1 (1993): 224.  
 
87 Gill, "Post-Structuralism as Ideology," 72, 93. 
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ethics. [It] can best be read as an ‘art’ … the strategic adversary is … not only the fascism of Hitler 
and Mussolini … but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the 
fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us”. 
Similarly, Baudrillard closely associates his work with the “events of May ’68”, and with criticism 
of participation in ‘popular culture’ into the 1990s. Another soixante-huitard, Regis Debray suggests 
of the general countercultural ambiance that arose in the late 1960s that “this urban mobilization 
of the upwardly socially mobile” helped to transform mannerist Western bourgeois culture and 
subjectivity into an “agile, splintered civil society” made up of “entrepreneurs of the spirit”. For 
Debray, “many thought that … they were discovering China … , when in fact they were landing in 
California”.88  
It may be helpful to look at Deleuze and Guattari as representatives of a self-
understanding exercised by Western hermeneutics at a particular social-historical conjuncture. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s extension of Jacques Lacan’s reading of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic 
concept of the Oedipal syndrome might also be said to follow Marx, in criticizing social 
conditions, and Friedrich Nietzsche, in criticizing Western hermeneutics as the epistemological 
support for globally hegemonic Western culture and society. Deleuze and Guattari appear to 
collapse Hegel’s idealist dialectic of subjectivity, in the form of an ‘anti-truth’ that is the product of 
this epistemological-historical trajectory, into Marx’s so-called inversion of the idealist dialectic, by 
casting the unfolding of this anti-truth as the consequence of practical-historical actions. However, 
by grafting Freud and Lacan onto their thesis, the co-authors seem bound to re-stage at a 
‘psychologizing’ level the methodological problem that Godelier and Edmund Leach, in different 
ways, identify with Claude Levi-Strauss’ structuralism.89 That is, to expose something innate to 
‘humanity’ or ‘human consciousness’ that would reveal the form and content of sociality is to 
expose ‘consciousness’ as ‘common’ in a way that human embodiment implies is a material-
physical impossibility: it requires insight into a consciousness that Deleuze and Guattari, at least, 
argue is ‘unconscious’.  
                                                 
 
88 Gill criticises Baudrillard for over-identifying his emancipatory project with the events of Paris ’68. Baudrillard concerns himself 
with film, such as commentary on Apocalypse Now and The China Syndrome, and popular science fiction, amongst other 
things. See, M. Foucault, "Preface," in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, ed. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari (London: 
Athlone Press, 1972 [1977]), xi-xiv. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, 53-79, 121-30, Debray, "A Modest Contribution to 
the Rites and Ceremonies of the Tenth Anniversary," 48, 50, 58, Gill, "Post-Structuralism as Ideology," 76. 
89 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 22-23, 273,76-82, Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, 23-25, E. 
Leach, Lévi-Strauss, ed. F. Kermode, Rev. ed., Fontana Modern Masters (London: Fontana/Collins, 1974), 112-16. 
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What is suggested here is that Deleuze and Guattari super-ordinate the historical and 
epistemological enframing of their theory, such that they make Western hermeneutic endeavour 
itself the psychological profile and, effectively, the template for the subjectivity they describe. 
Against this, the ways that Gill, Hinkson, Sharp, and Eagleton link countercultural individualism 
based in “liberation of the imagination from the restrictive structures of bourgeois life” to such 
post-structuralism are helpful. These allow me to raise certain problems that arise where theory 
springs from an immaterial Nietzschean fantasia of ‘de-centredness’ where “the notion of truth no 
longer functions.”90 Arguably, such theory ‘goes too deep’ because the move to theorize ‘persons 
as illusions’ or, as Baudrillard does, ‘simulacra’ makes Western hermeneutics itself — the social-
historical task of understanding the world through textual interpretation — a heuristic device that 
pervades analyses of the social world and subjectivity. 
 
… … … 
… … 
                                                 
 
90 See, for example, Vattimo, who suggests Nietzsche argues that “since the notion of truth no longer exists, and foundation no 
longer functions … there can be no way out of modernity through a critical overcoming”, but that such conditions require a 
“nihilistic conclusion”. G. Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-Modern Culture, trans. J. R. Snyder 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988 [1985]), 167. 
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6  Postindustrialization: rational action and consumerism 
  
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the ‘postindustrialization’ and so-called ‘crises’ that arose in the 1970s and 
1980s as conditions framing theories and practices of subjectivity. It first discusses how Daniel 
Bell approaches the “contradictions of capitalism”, and focuses upon his division between 
‘puritanical’ and ‘hedonistic’ individualisms. It then revisits Heath and Potter’s retrospective 
analyses of Anglo-American culture and society since these decades. As Chapter 3 suggests, Heath 
and Potter use ‘rational actor’ theory to frame their analyses. My suggestion here is that Bell’s 
‘traditional’ conservatism and Heath and Potter’s ‘rational actor’ theory raise similar 
methodological issues. That is, because based in appeals to ‘common sense’, these approaches 
seem ‘too shallow’ and endorse the assertion of personal will-objectives in aid of existing forms of 
authority and power structures.  
 
… … … 
 
 Several commentators discuss societal ‘crises’ that continued throughout the 1970s and into the 
1980s across Anglo-America. These include international Currency Crises and Oil Crises, the 
wage-price spiral, mass-sackings, stagflation, recession, and global banking collapses. In addition, 
the fall of Saigon, Watergate, and the crisis of confidence arose in the United States and 
reverberated across the West. In Britain, the winter of discontent, three-day week, miner’s strike, 
and increasing homelessness, and in Australia, the Khemlani affair, the Dismissal, uranium 
exports, and collapse of commodity prices, for example, all seemingly contributed to such ‘crises’. 
Social theorists and philosophers also described conditions in these decades in terms of ‘crises’. 
Habermas and Irving Kristol theorized a “legitimation crisis” from two very different perspectives, 
while Hannah Arendt described ‘crises’ in terms of the modern nation-state republic.91  
                                                 
 
91 Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945, 404-27, 52-71, Spero and Hart, The Politics of International Economic 
Relations, 21. See, H. Arendt, Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 
trans. T. McCarthy (Boston Beacon Press, 1975 [1973]), D. Horowitz, The Anxieties of Affluence: Critiques of American Consumer 
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Amidst such conditions, Daniel Bell linked ongoing ‘crises’ to social-historical 
‘postindustrialization’. Bell argued that ‘postindustrialization’ began in the 1960s, as the locus for 
Western sociality shifted, away from producing goods by transforming the material of the world 
through heavy industry, and towards developing, transferring, storing, processing, and applying 
information by managing knowledge about the world through a “service sector”. For Bell, the 
most important social and cultural condition of postindustrialization is the emergence of a 
technocratic or “knowledge class”. He argues that information-intensive “knowledge industries”, 
based on “technical and professional services, and on human services”, require relatively well-
educated and articulate, technical, professional or, at least, semi-skilled, and skilled personnel and, 
consequently, less unskilled manual labour.92  
On the one hand, Bell argues that this knowledge class displaces industrial labourers as the 
group most important to ongoing Western sociality. On the other hand, he also argues that this 
relatively well-educated and articulate class undermines, but does not displace the “Establishment 
… the major political elite” as the group that he holds responsible to “temper policy … provide a 
source of judgment” and “create political authority” in Western liberal-democracies. Bell argues 
that the “primary institution” of postindustrial societies is the university, “where theoretical 
knowledge is codified and tested”, training is conducted, and “policy advice” developed. Bell 
makes clear that postindustrialization is predicated upon knowledge-based control and prediction 
of social processes, such as economic growth. As Giddens suggests, where “the multiplying 
complexities of modern social and economic organization [mean that] all forms of decision-
making take on a technical character”, Bell argues that “the formation of policies concerning 
industry and the economy devolves into the hands of technical specialists”.93  
Importantly, Bell finds that knowledge workers are antipathetic to the “axial principle of 
economizing” around which such knowledge-based control and prediction is oriented. Bell seems 
to argue that, like industrialization, postindustrialization is “propelled by the dynamo of 
technology” and the “trajectory of the economic impulse”. He argues that the advent of 
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93 Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, 201-02. 
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postindustrialization marks a caesura as the groups central to it embrace “a hedonistic way of life 
whose promise is the voluptuous gratification of the lineaments of desire”. Bell seems to argue 
that the skills and dispositions for “knowledge work” facilitate understanding and action in the 
face of “failures of knowledge”, and a kind of ‘hubris’ that unleashes a “self-infinitizing [sic] spirit of the 
radical self”.94 This aspect of Bell’s thesis is interesting, because it allows me to take issue with his 
overall theoretical approach.  
Bell synthesizes theses on asceticism and acquisitiveness in the work of Weber and Werner 
Sombart to describe the cultural orientations central to modern Western “capitalistic, bureaucratic, 
and technological industrialization”. “[A]sceticism … the principle of the economic realm … 
discipline, delayed gratification in order to save and invest, and commitment to work” constantly 
opposes “acquisitiveness … hedonism, pleasure as a way of life”, the principle of “the cultural 
realm”. For Bell, as the knowledge class proliferates, hedonism displaces “self-control and delayed 
gratification, purposeful behaviour in the pursuit of well-defined goals”, bringing “every individual 
… increasingly into conflict with the role requirements of the technocratic order”. In 
postindustrial conditions of mounting “cultural contradictions” overload mediation effected in a 
“political realm, which regulates conflict, and is governed by the axial principle of equality” in an 
orderly and regularized manner “tensions between bureaucracy and equality frame the social 
conflicts of the day”. For Bell, “modernity is individualism”, but postindustrialization unleashes a 
rapacious, amoral, vain, and self-obsessed individualism from social, religious, and cultural 
‘ideologies’ that once sustained the industrial order. In postindustrial society, a deeply individuated 
‘self’ renders such constraining ‘ideologies’ meaningless as the “unrestrained self” becomes “the 
sole point of reference for action”.95  
                                                 
 
94 In these respects, it may be said that Bell negatively echoes Durkheim’s claims for the progressive potential for justice that is 
unleashed by individuation and the Western “cult of individualism” amidst industrialization. Where Durkheim saw such 
potential realized in intellectual support for the Dreyfusard movement, Bell argues that the dominant groups in postindustrial 
society undermine social stability and are a regressive force. Ibid., xvi, xxix, 198-99, Durkheim, "Individualism and the 
Intellectuals," 14-16, Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, 257. 
95 Bell argues that such conditions bring “ideological exhaustion”. At one level, this “end of ideology” arises as ‘technocratic’ elites 
achieve relative personal wealth, attain knowledge and articulateness, and liberate themselves from mannerist Victorian cultural 
tropes. For Bell, academia, the fine arts, and an exceedingly liberal polity constitute arenas in which these elite reformulate the 
radical avant-gardism and ideology-critique central to Western industrial Modernism. The result is a generalised anti-ideological 
resistance to constraint and hedonistic obsession with “the inner emotions rather than the external world”, which tends to 
spread beyond these circles. At the other level, this “end of ideology” manifests as welfare statism, widespread affluence, and 
decreased working hours affect ‘popular’ allegiance to existentialist and humanist ethics, and encourage the eschewing of work, 
in favour of consumption, leisure, and pleasure. For Bell, postindustrial elites and a new bourgeoisie elevate bohemian 
posturing, self-indulgence, and artistic navel-gazing to the apogee of Western culture, while the masses descend into banausic 
avarice and pathetic obsession with the minutiae of personal emotions and private desires. In this sense, Bell’s thesis arguably 
resembles Kristol’s claim that a “legitimation crisis” begins to emerge in these decades as a “left-liberal intelligentsia” comes to 
exert undue influence over mass-media and social research. Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, xxviii, xxiv, xxi-xxvii. 
See, for example, Bell, The End of Ideology, Esp. Ch. 13. and Kristol, "Keeping up with Ourselves."  
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Bell bases his thesis in pre-analytic bias towards the techno-economic efficiency criteria 
that he perceives to be intrinsic to the bureaucratic order, self-discipline, and delayed gratification 
which supported industrialization. It seems that Bell’s overall argument telescopes back, from the 
‘crises’ he uncovers, through such arbitrarily naturalized ‘criteria’, to an a priori base in Judeo-
Christian assumptions of fallen humanity. In a way, Bell negatively reposes the Hegelian motif of 
‘diremption’ by re-presenting modernization as the descent of humanity towards universalized 
proletarianism. For him, in a civilization built by virtue of disciplined human effort within the 
Natural order, hedonistic pleasure-seeking and atomistic selfishness overtakes with the advent of 
postindustrialization, to render all that is worthwhile dysfunctional and meaningless.96  
This brief discussion helps to suggest that Bell’s explanation appeals to a ‘past and 
tradition’ that can only ‘be’ for a single human in the act of ‘being’. Bell seems to suggest that the 
antinomian libertarianism and consumerist hedonism that he saw as enveloping sociality in these 
decades undermines technologically complex market-oriented liberal-democracies. Arguably, his 
approach implies the asserting of personal will-objectives over an ‘objectively’ true reality, such that 
these seek to reinforce historical-archetypal monopolies over practices and discourses. Here, the 
concept of ‘modern artificialism’ allows me to suggest that Bell seeks to coalesce ‘personal-will-
objectives’ around appeals to an extant but decaying order of things. Bell’s method may imply 
justification for, but not explain how an ‘immediate’, self-orienting and projecting dominant 
subjectivity may manifest in situation-specific ways. 
 
… … … 
  
The chapter now uses this discussion to turn and briefly look at Thomas Frank’s account of 
Anglo-American cultural ‘coolness’ and “market populism”, and then look in more detail at Heath 
and Potter’s more theory-based work on cultural formation in late-twentieth-century Anglo-
America. Frank discusses the cultural ramifications of nominally postindustrial conditions since 
the ‘end’ of the Long Upturn in the mid-1970s. Frank’s polemical current affairs commentary links 
a ‘coolness’ within North American marginal culture in the 1950s, and a more emphatic and 
                                                 
 
96 Indeed, in the Preface to the 1978 edition of The Cultural Contradictions, Bell writes, “religion … is the fulcrum of the book”, 
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widespread ‘countercultural’ rejection of ‘mainstream’ society in the 1970s to the flourishing of 
‘consumerism’ across Anglo-American societies since then.97  
The aim here is to link the cultural shifts that Frank describes as the emergence of a 
hedonistic and aesthetic consumer sovereign individualism to structural and institutional shifts 
within Anglo-American sociality. A number of economic commentators suggest that nation-state 
and globalizing market actions amidst the “major international economic crises” of the mid-1970s 
— such as President Nixon’s 1971 decision to end ‘convertibility’98 — “unarguably favoured 
international finance”, and affected a lasting “financialization of the international economy”. 
These also connect institutional actions over subsequent decades to the ongoing proliferation of 
Anglo-American “private consumption” and “personal indebtedness”. For example, Galbraith, 
Brenner, Gerard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan suggest 
that decisions like the “Nixon shock”, while possibly “a combination of wishful thought and sheer 
recklessness”, effectively forced the “collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed international 
exchange rates”, and entrenched conditions inappropriate for Keynesian policy in ways that 
undermined the welfare statist ‘compromise’.99  
Frank argues that such conditions framed a major shift in Anglo-American realpolitik, from 
‘Great Society’ welfare statism to “stock market boosterism” and civility based in personal-use 
commodity consumption. Although Frank avoids theoretical discussion, I want to underline his 
point that the ‘culture wars’ are based in an inherently conservative elision that seeks to base 
                                                 
 
97 See, T. Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1997). 
98 On August 15 of 1971, via live national television broadcast United States’ President Richard Nixon addressed “the American 
people”:  
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Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 16-18. See, also, Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History since 1945, 405, Spero and Hart, The 
Politics of International Economic Relations, 17-18.  
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appeals to the polity in calls to ‘common sense’ amidst a ‘soft’ labour market, especially affecting 
manual and unskilled workers.100 In these respects, Frank helps me to reiterate my concern with 
theoretical and methodological issues that arise where analyses seem ‘too shallow’. Because based 
in appeals to ‘common sense’, they re-present extant forms of authority and power structures. 
What Frank describes as the awakening of major market-based organizations, especially, 
mass-media and advertising-promotional enterprises, to a more ‘full appreciation’ of hitherto 
derided or ignored groups means considering ‘secularization’ alongside a suggestion that a 
dominant subjectivity in Anglo-American settings seems ‘overblown’ or ‘puffed-up’.101 In this 
sense, what Frank describes as the array of consumption, leisure, marketing, and advertising 
organizations that became important to sociality since the 1960s may be the conditions of a 
relatively expanded societal materialism.  
Before moving on, I digress briefly here to revisit Chapter 4’s suggestion that partial 
impetus for exchanges, and the evaluation criteria within them, can be seen to manifest around the 
idiosyncratic and exemplary desire and taste complexes that subject-agents create by ‘being’ within 
them as particular market-oriented social worlds. Arguably, where ostensibly ‘free and equal’ 
subject-agents make autonomous ‘choices’ and, in doing so ‘create’ markets, they also give them 
content. That is, they contribute what is or can be exchanged, and ‘value’ these through exchanges. 
In this sense, the market-based organizations that emerge might be said to link subject-agents’ 
idiosyncratic desires, as self-projecting ‘performances’, to markets-as-audiences, which ‘respond’ 
with ever-further ‘offers’. As commoditized exchanges come to encompass almost all aspects of 
the job of creating and reproducing Anglo-American societies, personal autonomous choices and 
individuated autarchic desires become increasingly central to the creating and reproducing of 
sociality itself. It might be said that, in the late-twentieth century, under the rubric of liberal-
democratic cultures emphasizing personal freedom and sovereignty, claims for social justice and 
civil equality could gain purchase within sociality — as welfare-state programs and civil rights — 
but because also readily recognizable as personal desires, were readily and frequently translated 
into market(able) private choices.  
                                                 
 
100 Importantly, unlike Heath and Potter, who set out to follow and expand upon his work, Frank avoids organizing his argument 
around the motif of ‘culture wars’ between ‘redneck’ parochial and ‘creative’ urbane individualisms. Rather, he argues that 
“market populism” effectively disguises the “brutal usual”, and bases his critique on a call for “egalitarian ‘economic 
democracy’”. See, T. Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy 
(London: Vintage Books, 2000), xiv-xvii, 276-307, 78. Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, Preface. 
101 This is the central theme in Frank, The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism. 
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On the one hand, amidst the practices of individuation described in terms of 
suburbanization, the formation of culture and subjectivity was to some extent cut loose from 
mores and mannerisms once ordained by relatively proximate and influential predominant milieux. 
On the other hand, the remoteness and diffusion of milieux able to monopolize and access 
materials, practices, and discourses implies that more subject-agents became increasingly involved 
in acting, creating meanings, and modalizing things of importance to ongoing sociality: albeit, in 
abstraction or in mediated terms. Therefore, the present approach is, in some respects, venturing 
to broaden and take a different direction on Arjun Appadurai’s claim that the “critical cultural 
move of advanced capitalism” has been to condition “the fetishism of the consumer rather than of 
the commodity”.102 
 
… … … 
 
The chapter now moves to discuss Heath and Potter’s work in more detail. Chapter 3 pointed to 
these co-authors’ claim that Anglo-American workers did not oppose ‘capitalism’ in the late-
twentieth century, not because they could not recognize their own alienation, but because 
commodities are not fetishized. For Heath and Potter, commodities deliver maximal utility to 
‘rational actors’ in a given situation.103 Like Frank, and the economists, Heath and Potter suggest 
that decades of economic growth, raised productivity, workplace flexibility, and techno-scientific 
advances have failed to sustain the levels of economic distribution characterizing the decades 
immediataley before the mid-1970s. The “the money is being spent on private consumption 
goods”. The authors’ key argument is that which Frank discusses: ‘coolness’ and “countercultural 
rebellion” as central to the expansion of ‘consumerism’. For Heath and Potter, far from subverting 
‘the system’, Western countercultures and the “countercultural ideal” are intrinsic to ‘capitalism’ 
and market-oriented liberal-democracy.104  
                                                 
 
102 A. Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in a Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 55-56. 
103 Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, 32-35, 199-200.  
104 Heath and Potter use Canadian statistics to argue that “GDP … has doubled since the ‘70s, [yet] the level of ‘basic needs’ 
poverty remains unchanged” into the 2000s. However, Duménil and Lévy, Pusey, and Hay, for example, discuss similar 
conditions in United States’, British, and Australian societies. These authors suggest that such mal-distribution has arisen, at 
least, as a partial consequence of shifts from policies aimed at macroeconomic stimuli, such as military development, nation-
building projects, and welfare statism, to those aimed directly at ‘growing’ GDP (Gross Domestic Product) through ‘supply-
side’ microeconomics and consumer spending across Anglo-America. See, for instance, Duménil and Lévy, Capital Resurgent: 
Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution, 44-50, C. Hay, "The Normalising Role of Rationalist Assumptions in the Institutional 
Embedding of Neoliberalism," Economy and Society 33, no. 4 (2004): 524-27, Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be 
 71 
The authors suggest that counterculture and, countercultural movements, together with 
“the idea of counterculture”, the “countercultural ideal”, and “countercultural thinking” spread 
across Anglo-America since the 1960s because shifts “in the popular imagination” have led to a 
normalization of Freudian theory, which is “for us like water to the fishes. It is barely regarded as a 
theory — something that could be proved right or wrong. It has become the lens through which 
we perceive all of reality. This is especially obvious in the United States”. They argue that, while 
the “idea of counterculture would probably never have taken hold had it not been for Freud”, 
what is more important is that Freudianism helped “the Marxian critique of mass society” to 
become “wildly popular”. The authors suggest that a lack of “revolutionary fervour” amongst the 
Western ‘masses’ meant that “leftist intellectuals” had to accept that “the workers might actually 
like capitalism” and, so, rethink ‘traditional’ Marxism in these decades.105  
For the authors, Freudian theory combined with Marxist concepts of ‘alienation’ and 
‘commodity fetishism’ contribute to normalizing a critical cultural orientation, whereby the 
“critique of mass society” and notion of consumerism, “a kind of conformist group think 
transmitted through the mass media” entered the popular imagination. They suggest that most 
Westerners accept the social norms necessary for oppressing the “animal instincts” that would 
otherwise run amok as “rampant desires”. However, counterculturalists buck this trend, and reject 
“any form of rule or regulation” because they believe that any social norms imply “creeping 
totalitarianism”. For the authors, the ‘normalization’ of Freudian and neo-Marxian concepts in 
countercultural thinking means that countercultural movements aim to “attack oppression at a 
deeper level”, while ‘counterculturalists aim to “liberate consciousness”. For the authors, 
“countercultural thinking” links personal authenticity to abandoning self-repression, and leads to 
an ever-receding series of rejections and contrarian oppositions; it means, “[p]erpetual cycles of 
obsolescence can be blamed on the system rather than be seen as a consequence of competition 
for a positional goods”.106  
                                                                                                                                                          
 
Jammed, 99-101, M. Pusey, The Experience of Middle Australia: The Dark Side of Economic Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 147-54. 
105 The authors argue that, in the 1960s, it was “widely understood” that a “culture of conformity” had been central to the rise of 
Nazism in Germany. They argue that widely publicised information, such as Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem and Stanley 
Milgram’s Obedience and Individual Responsibility, “lent considerable plausibility to the parallels many people were drawing 
between fascism and the ‘mass society’”. Furthermore, the authors argue that, not only the “intellectual Left” but within the 
“popular imagination”, the “the net effect of anticommunist hysteria was to make people … anxious about creeping 
totalitarianism”. Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, 28-35, 199-200. 
106 For the authors, this Freudian ‘lens’ implies a ‘popular imagination’ such that, humans have deep animal instincts that 
consistently seek satiation, regardless of others and the social world. Nevertheless, persons repress such egotistic desiring by 
force of Reason, manifest as self-control. The source of this control is internalization of social rules and cultural norms. Self-
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It is here that I want to take issue with the authors’ method. While Heath and Potter 
develop a stinging rebuttal to New Left and postmodern theory that has, since the 1960s and 
1970s, jettisoned commitments to material and social justice in favour of “liberating 
consciousness”, their overall case tends to blur an important analytic distinction between claims 
about social and cultural phenomena and speculations about intra-personal states. On the one 
hand, it seems that the authors identify “countercultural critique” with what Habermas or 
Eagleton, for example, explain as the impasse reached by Left-Hegelian philosophy in the 
twentieth century.107 Yet, on the other hand, while this aspect of the authors’ argument holds at the 
level of theory, their ‘critique of the critique of mass-society’ creates a methodological problem 
when transposed into claims about an idea or ideal that subject-agents may hold, or a belief or way 
of thinking that would inform actions.  
The authors reduce the counterculture and countercultural thinking to the same thing. 
Heath and Potter’s method does not seem to distinguish between a socially enframed 
countercultural individualism and speculations about the intra-personal psychological states that 
so-designated counterculturalists may hold. Furthermore, an explanatory tension emerges where 
the authors transpose this methodological framework onto claims about countercultural 
individualism. The authors describe counterculture as the preserve of a particular group, yet also as 
something so generalized that it is “one of the most powerful forces driving consumerism for the 
past forty years”. On the one hand, the authors suggest that countercultural ideals are held by 
affluent, educated, and articulate, yet misguided elitists — student radicals, the acolytes of various 
popular subcultures, inner-city intellectuals, and the creative class, for example — that have 
“simply mistaken their own class interests for the general interest”.108 Yet, on the other hand: 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
control takes persons out of the animal kingdom and into the human world; but, sociability and ‘culture’ come at a price. This 
price is ‘repression’, which for Heath and Potter means that, it is “widely understood” in the “popular imagination” that the 
“human mind in society is like a pressure cooker after the lid has been clamped on”. The authors describe fads, such as 
beatniks, hippies, Rastafarians, punks, rap’ music, and skateboarding, yet, oddly, also include urban ‘creative types’, SUV 
(Sports Utility Vehicle) drivers, IKEA shoppers, technology ‘geeks’, and the ‘Unabomber’ as examples of countercultures. 
Ibid., 22, 27, 34-35, 37, 41, 61-63, 96, 238.  
107 Hence, the authors draw an epistemic thread that links the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Romantics, Marx and Freud, 
Gyorgy Lukács, Antonio Gramsci and “ideology critique” in the Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse, Theodore Adorno, and 
Max Horkheimer, populist works by Theodore Roszak and Charles A. Reich, and the environmentalism of Murray Bookchin 
and Buckminster Fuller, for example, to more recent work by Naomi Klein, Noam Chomsky, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri, and agent provocateur Michael Moore, as well as anti-corporate globalization theory, and the ‘slow food movement’. 
Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, 366-417, Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Esp. Lectures I & XII, Heath 
and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, 9, 22, 28, 49-51, 62, 98, 104-08, 205-08, 50, 93-94, 328-31. 
108 The authors argue that “it is hard to avoid the impression that the so-called critique of consumerism is just thinly veiled 
snobbery, or worse, puritanism”. Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, 105.  
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There seems to be something pathological about consumption habits in our society. We are 
obsessed with acquiring more and more consumer goods, even though this leads us to make 
unreasonable sacrifices in other areas of life. It is this compulsion that critics refer to as 
‘consumerism’.109 
 
The authors seem to argue that ‘consumerism’ is a universal condition. This implies that 
counterculture is merely a pathological expression of this compulsion, which “has for decades 
been the driving force of the marketplace … it’s the nonconformists, not the conformists, who are 
driving consumer spending”.110  
Suggesting that ‘consumerism’ is a natural tendency makes the task of analysis a matter of 
delineating between aberrant pathological and acceptable ‘common sense’ forms of this 
‘compulsion’. Arguably, the authors make this the objective of their inquiry. Based in what I 
suggest is a model of the critique of Left-Hegelianism, the authors recognize that countercultural 
“psychologically deep explanations are not better by virtue of their depth” and move to develop a 
“far more simple explanation” of countercultural individualism based in ‘rational action’ theory. 
The authors combine Thomas Hobbes’ concept of “rational egoism” and John Rawls’ theory of 
“cosmopolitan pluralism” to argue that, “It is simply a lack of trust” that causes “undesirable 
outcomes” in society, such as rampant consumerism, because these are “produced through a 
rational [individual, small-group, or nation-state] response to a situation characterized by distrust 
and insecurity”.111  
Heath and Potter operationalize their approach through Thorstein Veblen’s theory of 
“conspicuous consumption” and Bourdieu’s concept of ‘distinction’. This is important because 
Bourdieu’s work is discussed in detail later. What Heath and Potter describe as ‘distinction’, 
however — “it involves separating out that which is superior from that which is inferior” — does 
                                                 
 
109 The authors argue that this is so because, “Cool has essentially replaced class as the central determinant of social prestige. 
Unlike so-called bourgeois values, which are basically an imitation of feudal social norms, hip [countercultural] values are a 
direct expression of the spirit of capitalism”, and cite Richard Florida’s claim that counterculture “is a misnomer, since all it 
refers to is pop culture”. However, while stretching the content that counterculture as a definition encompasses, suggesting 
that ‘we are obsessed’ pathological consumers adopting cool or countercultural values seems to undermine the essential formal 
point that what is subject to critique as counterculture is ‘counter’ to something. Ibid., 101, 03, 99-202. 
110 Colin Campbell has suggested a theory of the Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Consumerism, which makes some similar claims. S. 
Boden and S.J. Williams, "Consumption and Emotion: The Romantic Ethic Revisited," Sociology 36, no. 3 (2002), C. Campbell, 
The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Consumerism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), R. Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002), 200-01, Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, 103.  
111 Heath and Potter suggest that, “Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar”. Hence, they argue that explanations and ‘solutions’ to 
‘consumerism’ do “not need to transform human consciousness … all we need to do is realign people’s incentives … the 
problem and the solution arise at a strictly institutional level. [It] simply requires the application of enough force to align 
individual incentives with the common good”. Italics in original. Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, 
83, 84, 87-89. 
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not seem compatible with Bourdieu’s overall argument. Heath and Potter argue that “Bourdieu’s 
analysis of aesthetic judgement shows how naïve it is to think we can opt out of consumerism, and 
avoid the problems that Veblen diagnosed, simply by avoiding status-seeking and envy”, because, 
like the (Left-Hegelian) “countercultural critique” that implies ‘opting out’, much social theory is 
also based in similar and unnecessarily ‘deep’ explanation.112  
For Bourdieu, the concept of ‘distinction’ works as a boundary condition that enframes 
human-being; it implies that embodied subject-agents pre-reflexively take on and enact a ‘feel for 
the game’ within a contingent social field that is of a particular social-historical order. Therefore, in 
contrast with Heath and Potter’s claim for it, Bourdieu’s ‘distinction’ does not ‘simply’ imply that 
status seeking, envy, or competitive consumption are ‘human nature’, but that “the ideology of 
natural taste” is a condition of particular situations that may or may not manifest. For Bourdieu, 
‘distinction’ is an affective, situation-specific ‘rationality’ that occludes “the arbitrariness of 
rationalized force”. It is not reducible to ‘taste’; more so, ‘distinction’ frames the aestheticized 
ideologies of ‘natural taste’. Further, Bourdieu categorically rejects as “fallacies … the rational 
action theory, [which] holds that the agent acts freely, consciously and … ‘with full understanding’, 
the action being a calculation of chances and profits”. Contra Heath and Potter, Bourdieu wants to 
challenge conditions that mean channeling an omnipresent ‘arbitrariness’ in specific ways. That is, 
ways that make the ostensible ‘rationality’ that underlies ‘judgements of taste’ almost the only 
alternative for subject-agents bound to engage within sociality of a particular order.113 
How can it be that Heath and Potter’s approach to societal and relational dynamics based 
rational action theory naturalizes an arbitrary and ideal situation-specific individualism? I am 
suggesting that a naturalized ideal constitutes the point from which the authors delineate between 
aberrant pathological and acceptable ‘common sense’ forms of the ‘compulsion to consume’. In 
this sense, the authors appear to presuppose a psychological profile, and explain from it. The 
authors put forward a logical presupposition — all persons are rational actors — and allow this to 
bleed into their analyses as if it were an empirical claim. This means that the authors’ analyses 
                                                 
 
112 Heath and Potter go further here, and argue that critical social theory and “the left” refuse to accept what they present as 
Veblen’s thesis that “social hierarchies are actively maintained by competitive consumption among all classes in society.” Ibid., 
116-17, 23-26, Italics in original. 
113 Heath and Potter cite Bourdieu’s Distinction, p.56, which incidentally also contains the subheading ‘The Aesthetic Sense as the 
Sense of Distinction’. P. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge Harvard 
University Press, 1984 [1979]), 56, Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, 124. Bourdieu makes clear his 
antipathy to ‘rational action’ theory in, Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 83, 138-40, 51, 59-63.  
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become a speculative account of the degree to which an ‘alternative’ countercultural pathology 
digresses from a naturalized ‘mainstream’ and, so, rational state. 
It begins to become clear that Heath and Potter’s method implies that the spread of 
counterculture undermines the standards of distributive justice upheld until the mid-1970s; not 
because it bolsters consumerism, but because such faux ‘alternatives’ contravene the nature-like 
rationality of an idealized market-oriented liberal-democracy. Hence, the authors’ ‘more simple 
explanation’ seems to reiterate the functional principles of market-oriented liberal-democracies 
based in the abstract perspective of an idealized beneficiary of sociality in this form. Arguably, the 
authors’ substantive definition of counterculture, as heightened or amplified consumerism, rests in 
a transcendent concept of rational action. Yet, in order to rescue claims about the social world 
from the transcendent realm, Heath and Potter re-insert rationality into their argument by 
concretizing it: it becomes an over-arching psychological principle and the ‘common sense’ 
template for assessing ‘the order of things’. Hence, in their next move, Heath and Potter call for 
the “application of enough force to align individual incentives with the common good”, while 
defining ‘alignment with the common good’ as action to “perfect the market”.114  
Heath and Potter radicalize what I describe as Bell’s ‘traditional’ conservatism; the iterating 
or asserting of a historical-archetypal ‘past and tradition’ that, only ever anchored in a single 
personal will-objective, is limited to the reinforcing of particular monopolies over practice and 
discourse. Heath and Potter’s thesis, thus, seems to constitute a ‘neo’ conservative idealization of a 
utilitarian ‘future-possible’. Calling upon the concept of ‘modern artificialism’ here allows me to 
suggest that their approach is based in an appeal to the concentrating in personal will-objectives of 
an extant order of things, such that asserting individual ‘being’ over the world is justifiable because 
supporting the ‘rationality’ of extant monopolies over materials, practices and discourses. Calls for 
“the application of force to align incentives” as a necessary measure to “perfect markets” might 
also be said to imply demands for ‘the survival of the fittest’ under the ‘rule of the strong’.115 
Chapter 5 focused upon theories of subjectivity that may be said to ‘go too deep’. This 
chapter has focused upon theories that end up being ‘too shallow’. On the one hand, theory and 
                                                 
 
114 Indeed, the authors argue that, “One need only glance at an introductory economics textbook to see what an ideal market 
would look like”. Heath and Potter, Rebel Sell: Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, 84, 334. 
115 Indeed, the authors argue that the problem of achieving and sustaining social justice does “not need to transform human 
consciousness … all we need to do is realign people’s incentives … the problem and the solution arise at a strictly institutional 
level. [It] simply requires the application of enough force to align individual incentives with the common good”. Heath and 
Potter seem to be suggesting that critical inquiry must accept that received liberal concepts of ‘freedom and liberty’ represent 
an apotheosis, and demand not critical reflection upon their manifestations, but simply more “informed choices”. Ibid., 83, 84, 
87-89. 
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method that would ‘go too deep’ might support an ‘alternative’ to totalitarian domination. 
However, because such alternatives seem based in pre-theoretical claims to situation-specific 
notions of what an emancipated subjectivity would look like, they appear bound to ongoing 
threats of ‘false consciousness’: these set subjectivity off in pursuit of an always-already 
unattainable ‘authenticity’. Otherwise, such ‘deep’ approaches may super-ordinate the historical 
and epistemological enframing of theory itself, to a point where subjectivity becomes a similarly 
elusive condition. In this case, theory loses critical perspective because it anchors subjectivity in an 
unsustainable ‘dream of flying’ that is the expression of a contingent situation-specific form of life: 
cast between nihilistic self-destruction and ‘shameful’ inability to self-destruct. On the other hand, 
this chapter discusses theory may be seen as ‘too shallow’; resting in ‘common sense’ assurances 
that the world is of a Natural order. Such ‘shallow’ theory springs from an arbitrary pre-
supposition — based in the ‘rational action’ of an archetypal ‘past-heroic’, or a future-creating 
‘strong-and-virtuous’ ideal — yet transforms this into an empirical condition. The analyses that 
result seem bound to delineate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ subjectivities based in such pre-
suppositions. It implies that such approaches ultimately and indiscriminately reinforce existing 
social orders.  
The next two chapters focus upon governmentality and posttraditional theories and 
practices of subjectivity in conditions that arose in the 1980s and 1990s, and conclude Part II. The 
chapters in Part III summarize the discussion so far, and set out research problems that allow 
development of a framework for the inquiry.  
 
… … … 
… … 
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7 New Economy: governmentality and ‘entrepreneurial selves’ 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses social conditions in the 1980s and 1990s and ‘governmentality’ approaches 
to the theory and practice of subjectivity in the light of these. Initially, the chapter engages public 
affairs commentary and political-economics research that describe wide-reaching structural and 
institutional change in these decades as processes of ‘financialization’ and ‘neo-liberalization’. 
These engagements suggest how a concept of ‘core arenas for sociality’ may delineate some of the 
social, cultural, political, or economic practices and discourses important to the ongoing job of 
creating and reproducing contemporary Anglo-American societies. It helps in focusing upon 
conditions where ‘market-building statism’, expanded service, info-tech, and personal-use 
commodities industries, as well as micro-credit coincide to engender an ostensibly ‘new’ or 
‘creative economy’. Setting out a notion of ‘core arenas for sociality’ also frames the approach in 
Part III to societal and relational dynamics by providing a basis for linking theories of social power 
and a dominant subjectivity.  
Governmentality theory offered a range of critical insights into such conditions in the 
Anglo-American societies in the 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, governmentality theory offers 
a valuable critical perspective upon contemporary ‘entrepreneurial’ or ‘consumer’ subjectivity. 
Analyses using governmentality theory also offer a platform for a critique of the ways that partial 
withdrawal of nation-state support for welfare and techno-scientific research, in favour of market-
driven ‘solutions’ may work to strip-back subjectivity to a condition of ‘bare life’. On the other 
hand, however, I want to highlight a deep-seated methodological issue in governmentality theory. 
In the light of Dumont’s indirect, and Nancy Fraser’s direct critical commentary on 
governmentality theory, this chapter suggests how such theory seems to imbricate into analyses a 
subjectivity bound to ‘overcome’ the increasingly complex, diffuse, insidious, or abstract power 
formations it identifies as created by globalizing modernity. Arguably, the subjectivity that emerges 
is bound to seek mastery over reality through the assertion of personal will-objectives, in a way that 
seems to disqualify arguments that human-being is a shared and communicative condition. 
Several commentators describe Anglo-American nation-state and market policy shifts as 
bringing an end to the welfare state ‘compromise’ amidst the global financial ‘crises’ and domestic 
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economic ‘stagnation’ of the 1970s and 1980s. These commentators argue that such institutional 
responses to a range of ‘crises’ were of a specific order. Such authors include Galbraith, who 
denigrates United States policymakers in the 1970s and early 1980s for adopting ‘monetarism’ and, 
later, using the “Laffer Curve”, accompanied by rhetoric in the realms of the polity, to justify 
large-scale tax cuts on upper incomes as boosting private consumption and provoking a “trickle-
down economy”. Similarly, Colin Hay suggests how an array of policy recommendations, media 
releases, and research papers — linking stagflation to market-disequilibrium, low incentives, and a 
generalized unwillingness to ‘maximize utility’ through individual effort and entrepreneurialism — 
worked to “normalize neo-liberal discourses” of a similar order in Britain. In addition, Michael 
Pusey and Steve Keen argue that near pan-institutional acceptance of “neoclassical economics 
theory” in Australian government, public services, and universities conditioned moves away from 
nation-building welfare-statism and towards market-building statism.116  
These writers link globalizing structural conditions to ‘neo-liberal’ policy in particular ways. 
They explain such shifts as the combined effects of wide-reaching and long-term ‘financialization’ 
and a “neo-liberalization of the economy”. They describe how major business advocacy groups, 
think-tanks, and university faculties, acted upon such ‘crises’ using a specific set of claims-to-
knowledge. Such organizations entered the discourses of domestic realpolitik amidst conditions of 
high inflation and unemployment, as well as a broad cultural shifts away from experimental, 
‘alternative’, marginal, or critical radicalism and towards ‘conservatism’. Making recommendations 
to Anglo-American political parties, social movements, and the general public, such organizations 
are said to have called for “economically responsible government”, “economic rationalism”, 
marketization, or privatization, arguing There is No Alternative!. 117  
                                                 
 
116 Susan George, Adriana Vlachou and George Christou link reduced social spending and market-oriented re-regulation across 
Anglo-America, and across the “Washington Consensus” sphere-of-influence, to ‘neo-liberal’ policy. They define neo-liberal 
policy as institutional decision-making based in explanations of economic ‘crises’ as problems of excessive governmental 
intervention, which ‘distorts incentives’ and ‘obscures market signals’ and, therefore, undermines the capacity for ‘informed 
agents’ to make ‘rational choices’ that would otherwise create ‘market equilibrium’. J. K. Galbraith, The Culture of Contentment 
(London: Sinclair-Stevenson Ltd, 1992), Ch. 8, S. George, "A Short History of Neo-Liberalism: Twenty Years of Elite 
Economics and Emerging Opportunities for Structural Change," Conference on Economic Sovereignty in a Globalising World (1999), 
Hay, "The Normalising Role of Rationalist Assumptions in the Institutional Embedding of Neoliberalism," 500-27, S. Keen, 
Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences (Sydney: Pluto Press, 2001), Intro. & Ch. 1, M. Pusey, Economic 
Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation Building State Changes Its Mind, 1992 reprint, with corrections ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), Ch. 1, A. Vlachou and G. Christou, "Contemporary Economic Theory; Some Critical Issues," in 
Contemporary Economic Issues; Radical Critiques of Neoliberalism, ed. A. Vlachou (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 1-37. 
117 Stephen Hill describes how, in Britain, ‘Thatcherism’ turned on “the easing of many restrictions on the use and transfer of 
property; the freeing-up of markets by the withdrawal of the state from the economy and the use of state power to weaken 
producer cartels, especially trades unions, in the labour market; the transfer of public property into private ownership; the 
endorsement of greater material inequality as reflecting the different market capacities of individuals; the end of [nation-state] 
commitment to full employment as the major goal of economic management; and the reduced scope of public welfare … 
[often involving] liberal market freedoms in economic life and illiberal restrictions on personal and civic freedoms in the social 
 79 
Authors describing public affairs in these decades may point to the ‘fallout’ from United 
States’ President James Carter’s 1979 ‘Crisis of Confidence’ speech. Arguably, these offer a 
prescient motif for Anglo-American realpolitik in conditions of neo-liberalization. Carter used 
national television to “blame the despair into which he believed the nation had fallen into … [on] 
a sense of national malaise due to crushing materialism … American excess consumption and self-
absorption”. However, as Lears and James Gilbert suggest, amidst “high interest rates, inflation, 
and high unemployment – plus the Iranian hostage drama”, Carter’s call for “ecologically 
grounded sacrifice” was readily assimilated to “an un-American respect for limits” by “a disparate 
combination of Reaganite boosters, social-cultural historians, and postmodern critics”. Eleanor 
Townsley describes how, in a similar manner, reaction to ‘crises’ of increasing poverty and welfare 
dependency came to be expressed as problems of “diminished responsibility” and “morally 
misguided welfare policies”. She cites subsequent President Ronald Reagan’s 1988 State of the 
Union Address. In that address, he argued that welfarist “government created a poverty trap that 
wreaks havoc on the very support system the poor need to lift themselves out of poverty — the 
family”. Townsley and others suggest there is a shift in the rhetoric of the polity here, away from 
support for nation-building, welfare statism, and collective action, and toward claims that “human 
ingenuity would render energy sources and other natural resources literally inexhaustible” and 
“assert[ions] of the moral superiority of the independence of individuals from reliance on 
others”.118  
Such commentary on Anglo-American public affairs is congruent with more theory-based 
discussions by Habermas, Foucault, Wendy Brown, or Susan George, for example. These theorists 
situate such rhetoric within the orbit of a co-habitation between neo-liberals and neo-
conservatives. Habermas, for example, argues that groups advocating ‘personal responsibility’ and 
a ‘return to morals’ refused or elided links between material and social relations and ongoing 
structural and institutional ‘crises’. That is, as “economic and administrative imperatives … which 
monetarize and bureaucratize growing dimensions of life, and increasingly transform relationships 
into commodities and objects of administration”, the ‘moral crusaders’ of the 1980s and 1990s 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
and political realms”. Arguably, Hill’s broad definition helps to clarify some of the key conditions associated with ‘neo-
liberalization’ across the Anglo-American nation-states. S. Hill, "Britain: The Dominant Ideology Thesis after a Decade," in 
Dominant Ideologies, ed. N. Abercrombie, S. Hill, and B. S. Turner (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 20-21. 
118 J. Carter, "Transcript: The 'Crisis of Confidence Speech'," (www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/filmmore/ps_crisis.html: Public 
Broadcasting Service, 1979). J. B. Gilbert, "Review: 'the Anxieties of Affluence'," Enterprise & Society 5, no. 4 (2004): 729-31, 
Horowitz, Jimmy Carter and the Energy Crisis of the 1970s: The 'Crisis of Confidence' Speech of July 15, 1979. Lears, 
"Reconsidering Abundance: A Plea for Ambiguity," 460, Townsley, "'the Sixties' Trope," 111-12. 
 80 
blamed an expansive and spectral culture of ‘subversion’; and irresponsible, decadent, and amoral 
people.119  
 “Populist conservatism”, these theorists suggest, became a pervasive theme in the the 
polity of the 1980s, and presages what Frank terms “market populism”. Frank’s metaphor points 
to how, amidst generally buoyant financial markets and asset of ‘new’ autonomy-in-the-workforce 
principles, a combination of ultra-liberal ‘entrepreneurialism’ and moralistic calls for ‘individual 
self-reliance’ entered the social field, often via mass-communications media, corporate and 
investment institutions, and intellectuals enthusiastically “celebrating the New Economy”. 
However, while Frank’s term offers an intuitively plausible metaphor for Anglo-American 
domestic realpolitik in these decades, I want to pause and consider structural and institutional 
conditions in more detail. This allow clarification of the concept of ‘core societal arenas’ and to 
describe conditions in which governmentality theories approached subjectivity in these decades.120 
 As such, these authors’ work suggests how neo-liberalization, as an institutional 
formation, and financialization, as a structural condition, seem to intertwine to affect the kinds of 
acts, meanings, and things of central importance to ongoing sociality in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Political-economists Brenner, Duménil and Lévy, and Greta Krippner, for example, link declining 
profitability in manufacturing and non-financial industries to a “large-scale move into finance and 
speculation” amidst the ‘crises’ of the 1970s and early 1980s. These authors seem to extend David 
Harvey’s suggestion that, in part, such global ‘crises’ were a condition of “the large-scale re-
orientation of whole organizational domains” as multinational corporations sought to realign and 
integrate financial transactions across and between nation-states using relatively complex 
technologies, especially, communications and information-data processing tools and techniques.121  
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Duménil and Lévy, Brenner, and Krippner argue that such techno-informatic 
developments worked to stimulate a process of ‘financialization’, whereby “activities relating to the 
provision (or transfer) of liquid capital in expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital gains” 
arose. They describe how financialization in the ‘global economy’ undermined the Bretton Woods 
Treaty and “the welfare state compromise” in Anglo-American contexts. In addition, they argue 
financialization lends itself to neoclassical economic management systems and — because turning 
on the ‘fluidity’ and ‘instantaneity’ afforded by techno-informatic and communicative development 
— augurs against activities that rely on plant, material, and labour assets or geographical fixity. 
However, Krippner stresses that financialization does not “represent an entirely novel phase of 
capitalism”, but rather a series of major structural changes combined with institutional responses 
of a particular order.122  
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, and Ewald Engelen, for example, describe how since the 1970s 
“financial deregulation of the American economy” continues to be based in “an idealized … 
model of shareholder activism and liquid equity markets”, which began “as part and parcel of the 
Reaganite and Thatcherite ‘revolutions’”. Such arguments imply that globalizing processes of 
financialization and Anglo-American reform-centred neo-liberalization combined to foster wide-
reaching shifts in the organizational practices of market institutions. “Retain and reinvest 
strategies” — based in training and retaining highly skilled employees, improving and upgrading 
plant and equipment while funding research and development — fell out of favour with major 
market-based organizations. In place of these, especially in the United States and Britain, 
corporations began to deploy “downsize and distribute” practices. These aim to reduce 
workforces, outsource production, research, and development, carry out “asset stripping” to 
“enhance market capitalization” and involve frequent borrowing for speculative investments to 
“maximize shareholder value”:  
 
Under the new regime top managers downsize the corporations they control, with a particular 
emphasize on cutting the size of the labour forces they employ, in an attempt to increase … market 
capitalization … [and] return on equity. [The contention is] that when the corporate enterprise 
maximizes shareholder value, everyone — workers, consumers, suppliers, and distributors — will, 
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as a result, be better off [because] the performance of the economy as a whole, not just the interest 
of shareholders, can be enhanced.123  
 
What concerns my argument here is Krippner’s claim that, because “accumulation is now 
occurring increasingly through financial channels”, the combination of financialization and policy 
oriented to “maximizing shareholder value” continue to condition a broad “dissemination of 
control” over financial instruments across Anglo-American societies. However, Krippner also 
makes clear such ‘dissemination’ is restricted. This is supported by Duménil and Lévy, who 
describe a generalized movement of personal incomes and assets held by “upper salaried classes 
… the ‘working rich’, ‘share-owning workers’ [and] high-income households” into “the orbit of 
the financial sector”. They argue that where ownership or control over financial assets is 
‘disseminated’ as such, it brings a re-distributing of wealth to upper and high middle-income 
groups and away from low middle and low-income groups, and the tax-base in general. These 
authors argue that this represents a new “top-level compromise” which has arisen in place of the 
“welfare-state compromise”.124  
Duménil and Lévy’s, Krippner’s, and Lazonick and O’Sullivan’s political-economic 
commentary provides a bridge into more social-theoretical analyses. To take a step further, I bring 
in economic sociology by Robert Manning and Robin Blackburn. Manning argues that the nation-
state, corporate, and private ‘indebtedness’ which intertwining financialization and 
neoliberalization foster implies, especially in the United States, “national economic growth has 
become inextricably linked with household spending … produc[ing] increasingly sophisticated 
mass marketing campaigns for consumer products as well as personal credit”. For Blackburn, such 
structural and institutional conditions mean, in recent decades, “Finance houses have teamed up 
with retailers to shower so-called gold and platinum cards on all and sundry with the hope of 
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ratcheting up consumer debt — running at 110 per cent in 2002 [and] rising to 130 per cent of 
personal annual disposable incomes at the end of 2005”.125 
In these ways, the conditions that underpin financialization and neo-liberalization might 
help mark out ‘core societal arenas’. Such conditions may include the large-scale movement of 
manufacturing industries out of Anglo-American nation-states; the emergence of financial, 
knowledge, and service industries based in relatively complex technologies that require relatively 
high levels of skill and education; and the broad-based transfer of upper and middle-incomes into 
financial assets, for example. Similarly, neo-liberalization, where policymaking may include reduced 
taxation in place of welfare spending; large-scale privatization programs and “restructur[ing] … of 
social institutions … along the lines of the commercial business organization”; deregulating of 
labour markets; flexible employment regimes; workforce downsizing, and casualization; and 
relaxed consumer credit to foster consumption, also partially delineate core arenas for sociality in 
contemporary Anglo-American settings.126  
In macroscopic terms, the “large scale re-orientation of whole organizational domains” 
around processes such as financing, distribution, promotions, marketing, and publicity, the 
creation of artificial scarcity, the law, involving licensing and protecting of intellectual property 
become, in many ways, fragmented but, also, tightly planned by “larger companies … through 
[the] vertical integration” that Harvey calls “flexible accumulation”.127 On a lesser scale, a notion of 
‘core arenas for sociality’ allows suggestion that ways in which the conditions of neoliberalization 
and financialization deliver considerable impetus to what David Hesmondhalgh calls “core cultural 
industries”. Hesmondhalgh’s focus upon the situatedness of cultural industries within sociality is 
helpful for my argument. Hesmondhalgh critically extends Frankfurt School theses on the 
“industrialization of culture” in the mid- to late-twentieth century West while aiming to avoid its 
extreme pessimism. He argues that “the industrialization of culture” creates “complex, ambivalent, 
and contested” conditions that do not necessarily mean cultural forms are “subsumed by capital 
and by an abstract system of ‘instrumental reason’”.128  
Taking up Hesmondhalgh’s approach here allows the discussion to clarify further the 
notion of ‘core societal arenas’. It focuses attention upon social and cultural practices and 
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discourses that might be said to, in part, arise in, and around the organizational domains, which 
Harvey describes. That is, the industrialization of culture may constitute a key aspect of the overall 
job of creating and reproducing relatively technologically ‘advanced’, market-oriented, and liberal-
democratic sociality. Where so-called financialization and neoliberalization intertwine with what 
Harvey or Castells describe as increasingly important service and personal-use commodity 
industries requiring high skills, education, and articulateness, these might be said to bring into 
Anglo-American sociality practices not amenable to ‘top-down’, bureaucratized or “retain and 
reinvest” practices. These practices imply subjectivities that involve “autonomy within the 
processes of production” and “freedom to ‘create’”. In other words, certain themes that Harvey 
and Castells raise, imply that, as partial consequences of ‘globalizing’ structured and 
institutionalized conditions, aspects of what Hesmondhalgh calls “core creative industries” may 
‘spill over’ into wider contemporary organizational practices and cultural discourses.129  
The chapter now moves to distance this argument from claims that such conditions imply 
the emergence of a Knowledge Economy or Creative Age. Business-management theorists and 
liberal sociologists regularly make such claims, often by drawing on Bell’s ‘postindustrialization’ 
thesis. For example, management theorist Peter Drucker describes the ascent of “knowledge 
workers” in a Post-Capitalist Society dominated by large-scale financial investment firms and 
multinational mega-corporations. For Drucker, such conditions centre on “knowledge people as 
specialists … ‘technicians’ with a high level of skill, a high degree of formal knowledge, and above 
all a high capacity to learn and to acquire additional knowledge”. However, Drucker also suggests, 
“Plenty of people will always be needed [in the future post-capitalistic order] who can bring only 
muscle to the job. With our present knowledge of training, they can quickly be made productive in 
traditional jobs”.130  
While Drucker recognizes the globalizing structural changes and institutional shifts 
described here, using the terms ‘financialization’ and ‘neoliberalization’, the ‘post-capitalist’ order 
he describes seems bereft of social power. Drucker seems to account for conditions where 
Western industries requiring manual labour ‘off-shore’ such jobs to the global South, because 
“employees become a liability”, while the “knowledge jobs” that remain favour short-term 
contracts and outsourcing by focusing on individual capacities to become “universally educated 
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persons”. For Drucker, the “leading social groups of the knowledge society will be ‘knowledge 
workers’ — knowledge executives who know how to allocate knowledge to productive use”. 
Drucker seems to be arguing that the provision of a “universal education” for individual 
knowledge workers will make these “intellectuals and managers” the moral custodians of 
“responsibility-based organizations”. For Drucker, it seems the solution to the kinds of problems 
that increasing technological complexity, information-processing capabilities, systemic 
institutionalization, and infrastructural developments raise lay in “the universally educated person 
who needs to take responsibility [because] he or she embodies society’s values, beliefs, 
commitments”.131  
Liberal sociologist Richard Florida extends Bell’s postindustrialization thesis in a similar 
way. For Florida, conditions emerging across the West since the 1970s and 1980s mean that 
contemporary cities and, indeed, nation-states must attract “cultural creatives”:  
 
We live in a time of great promise. We have evolved economic and social systems that tap human 
creativity and make use of it as never before. This in turn creates an unparalleled opportunity to 
raise our living standards, build a more humane and sustainable economy, and make our lives more 
complete … Human creativity is the ultimate economic resource … the current [social 
transformation] … is based fundamentally on human intelligence, knowledge and creativity.132 
 
For Florida, the proliferating hypermobility, freelancing, “horizontal labour markets”, and 
“economic individualism” that the present thesis describes using the concepts of ‘financialization’ 
and ‘neoliberalization’ seem almost unconditional sources of personal freedom, autonomy, and 
creativity: 
 
Now people are free to direct their loyalties to more meaningful aspects of their life: their own 
personal development, their families and friends, their communities and the things that truly 
interest and matter to them.133 
 
However, a number of critical sociologists also identify in these conditions a creeping 
precariousness that transcends class divisions, and springs from a pervasive lack of security 
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wrought in large part by ongoing financialization in the economy and “marketization, 
privatization, and market-oriented re-regulation”.134 Florida seems either to elide the coincidence of 
such conditions, or to address any ’downsides’ with calls for ‘more of the same’. Florida expresses 
heartfelt concern for those unable to “tap into the Creative Economy”, yet argues that “only by 
ensuring that the creativity of the many is tapped into and that the benefits of the Creative Age are 
extended to everyone” will social harmony emerge:  
  
Creative centers provide the integrated ecosystem or habitat where all forms of creativity — artistic, 
cultural, technological and economic — can take root and flourish [amidst] abundant high-quality 
amenities and experiences, an openness to diversity of all kinds, and above all else the opportunity 
to validate … identities as creative people.135  
 
Like Drucker, Florida does not seem to recognize ways that structural changes and 
institutional shifts can alter the dynamics of societal conditions. By contrast, Eileen Appelbaum, 
for example, recognizes “the development and deployment of information technology” (IT) has 
been important to productivity growth in the late 1990s but, like Hesmondhalgh, does not see 
these as conditions for a new Knowledge Economy based in “culture, information, and symbols”: 
 
The division of the economy into an ‘old economy’ and a ‘new economy’ presents a false 
dichotomy and is very misleading. IT has had dramatic impacts on manufacturing and on wholesale 
and retail trade, as well as on such IT-intensive activities as communications and financial services. 
[Yet, many] companies have introduced more participatory workplace practices that involve front-
line workers in decisions and that take full advantage of the potential of IT. Between 1989 and 1999 
labour productivity increased 20.5%. However, this rise did not translate into a comparable growth 
in wages … [which] was slightly less in 1999 than in 1989.136 
 
Appelbaum also concurs with sociologists such as Sennett, Pusey, and economists 
Duménil and Lévy, for example, in suggesting that, accompanying an erstwhile Creative Age are 
lower levels of job security, decreased incomes, longer average hours, and rising personal-debt 
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levels, as well as increased workplace responsibility for decision-making.137 While decreasing full-
time employment and an increase in non-standard jobs may be a laudable development — insofar 
as these may point to increasing ‘free-time’, family-time, ‘cultural’, sports, or educational 
participation, for example — the kinds of self-assertion, self-creation, autonomy, and 
articulateness that seem central to contemporary Anglo-American sociality seem to involve 
something different.  
Where processes of neoliberalization and financialization that, in part, raise the importance 
of information ‘about’ industrial processes, knowledge jobs, industrialized culture, and relatively 
sophisticated strategies for promoting personal-use commodities and micro-credit, for example, 
core societal arenas might be said to impel forms of self-realization and ‘self-creativity’ that are 
bound up with particular social and cultural histories. Terry Flew’s suggestion that the “danger of 
conflating growth in these creative ‘sectors’ with greater individual autonomy and cultural 
openness, because creativity as a social practice has historically been associated with individuality 
and non-conformist behaviour, is one of the potential problems of [the] ‘creative class’ thesis” 
becomes important here. Flew’s point helps to clarify ways that core arenas for sociality may 
imbricate a particular formation of individualism because these privilege patterns of access to and 
monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses in certain material-physical contexts.138  
Arguably, theories of a Creative Age or Post-Capitalist Society conflate and neutralize 
possibilities for discussing the kinds of societal dynamics that contemporary ‘globalizing’ sociality 
might create and reproduce in particular settings. By stressing a truism — that social 
transformation is based on human intelligence, knowledge, and creativity and extending it across 
analyses of Creative Economies without accounting for the different modalities of power such 
‘transformation’ may bring — these make the ‘individual creativity’ of erstwhile ‘knowledge 
workers’ both explanans and explanandum. The result is that such claims elide or ignore the 
dynamics of power that globalizing structured and institutionalized modernization brings into 
sociality. Societal or relational problems become a matter of personal moral ‘failure’ or ‘success’ or, 
alternately, of extending claims about particular situations that facilitate opportunities to ‘tap 
creativity’ out into generalized claims about sociality as a whole. 
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Hence, the concept of ‘core arenas for sociality’ allows me to set economics research and 
claims about political affairs alongside commentary on social and cultural affairs. The notion of 
‘core societal arenas’ helps to focus analysis on structured and institutionalized conditions that 
enframe a dominant subjectivity. Moreover, the notion of ‘core societal arenas’ offers an analytic 
abstraction. It allows discussion to focus upon relatively open and porous social fields where 
humans act, create meanings, and modalize things under particular social-historical orders, and 
amidst certain material-physical contingencies. Analytic focus on core arenas for sociality helps 
suggest that certain social practices, cultural discourses, and phenomena, such as goods, services, 
and information, may be relatively more important to ongoing social reproduction than are others. 
As this discussion suggests, however, the argument is not that ‘heavy’ industries and their interests, 
for example, are no longer economically important, or sources of political power. Rather, the 
suggestion is that contemporary sociality may encompass ‘marginal’ subjectivities, but that these 
are ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ core societal arenas. I am suggesting that, while Anglo-American market-
oriented liberal-democracies do not exclude subject-agents ‘for themselves’, they may exclude 
particular subjectivities. 
Part III takes up the concept, and links it to suggestions that the present inquiry should be 
based around ‘weak’ empirical claims. As such, the concept helps to link theories of a dominant 
subjectivity to a means for theorizing social power. I conceptualize core arenas for sociality by 
focusing upon how changing structural and institutional conditions might be seen to coincide with 
and privilege particular patterns of monopolies over or access to materials, practices, and 
discourses. On the one hand, structural financialization appears conducive to measurement, 
qualification, and prediction using particular ‘tools’: those of neo-liberal or neoclassical economics. 
On the other hand, where nation-state and market institutions deploy these particular ‘tools’, they 
seem to contribute to sociality that — for Alain Supiot, engendering “a caricature of self-oblivious 
normativity” — privileges particular actions, meanings, and things over others.139  
 
… … … 
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The chapter now turns to discussions of the formation of subjectivity that draw on 
‘governmentality’ theory. The governmentality theories discussed here draw upon Foucault and 
Agamben’s social philosophy to focus upon subjectivity in terms of a particularly modern and, 
arguably, Western, dynamics of power. While Foucault relates modern power — as ‘biopolitics’ — 
to the displacement of overtly violent forms of control by “knowledge-based discipline” and 
“regimes of self-control”, Agamben extends the concept of ‘biopolitics’ to explain its workings. 
He argues that ‘biopolitics’ works to define ‘norm’ and ‘exception’ and, so, in the case of 
subjectivity, to ‘dehumanize’ oppositional ‘forms-of-life’ while commanding sovereignty over ‘bare 
life itself’. However, because Foucault’s and Agamben’s work is largely abstract and philosophical, 
I focus here upon work by authors applying their theories in analyses of consumption, biomedical 
technologies, neo-liberalism, welfare statism, and Third Way politics in the 1980s and 1990s.140  
Engagements here draw upon Dumont and Fraser’s criticisms of governmentality theory and 
method. On the one hand, Dumont offers oblique criticism of realism and Foucault’s work. He 
suggests the “reduction of politics to the raw notion of power” springs from a “modern tendency 
to confuse hierarchy with power” and is a condition of “Western individualism and modern 
artificialism”. Dumont argues that, where secularization destabilizes the (cosmologically ordained) 
True order of things, power itself emerges as the means by which hierarchies, value, or forms of 
authority are instantiated in modernity. Hence, for Dumont, the central issue is not to dwell on 
power itself, but to uncover how humans in social contexts may qualify or disqualify “practical 
limitations” on its deployments. On the other hand, Fraser takes issue with Foucault directly. She 
argues that, while Foucauldian methods may uncover practical affects that arise from the ‘uses’ of 
discourse, his overall approach is methodologically ambiguous. Fraser contends that, while 
construing modern power as “‘productive’ rather than prohibitive”, “‘capillary’ … and ‘everyday’ 
rather than exclusive” and “touch[ing] people’s lives more fundamentally through social practices 
than through their beliefs”, therefore, “rul[ing] out … orientations aimed primarily at 
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demystification of ideologically distorted belief systems”, Foucault’s theory lacks “an adequate 
normative perspective”.141  
Nonetheless, governmentality theory may offer insights into practical and discursive 
conditions for a dominant subjectivity. For example, Miller and Rose suggest that neo-liberalizing 
institutional reforms encourage “entrepreneurial selves” in societal arenas hitherto organized on 
social or collective principles. Similarly, Paul du Gay links a “new wave” of corporate practices and 
consumer-centred cultural discourses to “neo-liberal reformism”, and describes how these 
constitute a web of institutional efforts to revitalize “liberal-democracy ‘in-action’” after the ‘crises’ 
of the 1970s. For these authors, “the new forms of work-based identity new wave [management 
theory] tries to forge among all members of an organization” represent a shift from “reactive to 
proactive postures” and “from bureaucratic to entrepreneurial styles” affective across Anglo-
American sociality. In fact, Du Gay suggests that new-wave management theory aims to transform 
labour itself, “from a painful obligation … [or] an activity undertaken to meet instrumental needs”, 
into “a means to self- responsibility and hence self-optimization”.142  
Governmentality approaches suggest structural and institutional changes in these decades 
that, at least partially, worked to augment a self-creating and asserting idiosyncratic and self-
projecting subjectivity. In another way, emphasizing how practical and discursive shifts enframed 
‘entrepreneurial selves’ — that simultaneously enact immediate desire-objectives and self-orienting 
‘proactive postures’ — helps to disqualify idealist demarcations, which as Chapter 6 suggests, seem 
to re-present either ‘mainstream’ or ‘alternative’ individualisms as a subjectivity-in-dominance.  
Miller and Rose also discuss how commodity promotions and advertising work to 
“assemble the subject of consumption”. They describe how commodity industries use “political 
techniques for the government of conduct”. They argue that, as “human technologies [these] 
should be understood as one element in the complex construction of our contemporary ‘passional 
economy’, connecting human being and its corporeality into a regime of needs, desires, pleasures, 
and terrors”. For Miller and Rose, the “economy of consumption … is less a matter of dominating 
or manipulating consumers than of ‘mobilizing’ them”, because “individuals play their own part in 
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the games of civilization that shape a style of life through participation in the world of goods”. 
They describe how such ‘human technologies’ have been used in state-sponsored programs with 
“more virtuous resonances”, such as the use of market-oriented “focus group techniques 
developed to sell ice cream” or, in “Ministry of Transport campaigns to limit drink-driving”.143  
However, Miller and Rose seem to formalize the ‘passions’ under the order of ‘power’ 
here, in such a way that it is difficult to discern virtuous from specious deployments of ‘human 
technologies’. Arguably, a similar problem arises when Rose, in a separate discussion, deals with 
ethical issues raised by “biomedical technologies”. Rose begins from Foucault’s thesis that 
“political power [is] no longer … exercised through the stark choice of allowing life or death”, as 
in pre-modernity. Foucault theorizes how, in modernity, “political authorities, in alliance with 
many others, have taken on the task of the management of life in the name of the well-being of 
the population as a vital order and of each of its living subjects”. Rose uses Agamben’s theory of 
“sovereignty over ‘bare life’” to extend Foucault’s concept of “biopolitics … [as] inextricably 
bound up with the rise of the life sciences, the human sciences, clinical medicine [that] have given 
birth to techniques, technologies, experts, and apparatuses for the care and administration of the 
life of each and all”. Hence, for Rose, “biomedical technique has extended choice to the very 
fabric of vital existence”. In contemporary settings, “the tasks of deliberating about the worth of 
different human lives” is “not one in which authorities claim — or are given — the power to 
make such judgments”. Rather, “a kind of politics of life itself … enfuse the everyday judgements 
of all those professionals of vitality: doctors, genetic counselors, research scientists, and drug 
companies”, and “poses these [ethical] questions to each of us”. 144  
From beginnings anchored in Foucault’s theses on spectral ‘biopolitics’, Rose’s move to 
use Agamben’s notion of sovereignty over ‘bare life’ leads to a subtle inversion of critical intent in 
his argument. Rose concludes that contemporary ‘biomedical techniques’ are the progenitors of 
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this new “vital politics of life itself”, where “the power to make judgements in the name of the 
quality of the population or the health of the gene pool” is no longer held by ‘authorities’. 
Biomedical technologies make it “possible for human beings to demand the protection of the lives 
of themselves and others in no other name than that of their biological existence and the rights 
and claims it confers”. What seems to be the historical extension, abstraction, and intensification 
of the ‘human sciences’ — which Foucault saw as sources of ‘governmentality’ through 
‘biopolitics’ — ‘biomedical technologies’ now appear a source of what seem to be progressive and 
critically desirable conditions of ‘vital politics’. The alternative is that Rose is condemning the 
dissemination across sociality of power in ways that mean “we have become the kinds of people 
who think of our present and our future in terms of the quality of our individual biological lives 
and of those with whom we identify”.145  
Arguably, a similar methodological issue arises in Dean’s work. He also uses Agamben to 
extend Foucauldian analyses of biotechnologies, and of liberalism, neo-liberalism, and welfare 
statism and Third Way politics. This is because Dean finds Foucauldian governmentality analyses 
“are always in danger of acceding … to the normative content of liberalism and neo-liberalism 
themselves”. For Dean, “Whether we consider the welfare of the poor, the rights of refugees or 
indigenes, biomedical interventions, or environmental catastrophe, we are not simply faced with 
the enhancement of the life of the population”. He argues that: 
 
a diagram of possible forms of contemporary liberal government emerges when contemporary 
transformations of the government of the state are located in multiple zones of power … [as 
Agamben suggests] in relation to the powers of life and death. At the heart of certain contemporary 
transformations of government is not simply the economic concern, in which the production of a 
certain form of economic citizenship is necessary for economic security in a global economy: it is 
also a political one in which the diagnoses of disorder and pathology require the reimposition of 
authority and the re-inscription of the poor within a hierarchy. The problem of new forms of 
productive, efficient, and entrepreneurial economic citizenship and rights here meets new forms of 
moral discipline, restraint and, above all, obligation. The ethos of welfare is a potent admixture of 
rights and obligations, freedom and coercion, liberty and life … [it] includes the use of deductive and 
coercive powers of taxation, of systems of punishment, detention, expulsion and disqualification, 
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and of compulsion to drug rehabilitation, child support, immunization and workfare programs, etc., 
for the achievement of various goals of national government.146  
 
Patricia Harris and Yvonne Hartman also use governmentality theory to inquire into neo-
liberalism and welfare statism. Harris follows Foucault’s suggestion, that “resistance emerges in the 
cracks and fissures of power, in the implausibilities and disjunctures of governance”, to describe 
how “social security, unemployment, the provision of free or subsidized health facilities, child 
protection, and aged care [that] claim to be directed … to the ‘welfare’ of the people” constitute 
“welfare rationality/ies”. Meanwhile, Hartman argues that the “welfare state can be understood in 
its broadest definition as the transfer of resources by the state, the underlying rationale was the 
prevention of exploitation of the weakest members of an unequal society”. However, she also 
argues that contemporary “neo-liberal rationalities have in fact pursued a strategy of reshaping but 
not abolishing welfare regimes, which … form an integral component of neo-liberal 
governmentality”.147 
Dean does not discuss what are arguably key phenomenal differences between, on the one 
hand, redistributive ‘child support’ or ‘immunization’ programs and, on the other hand, ‘expulsion’ 
or the Orwellian-titled “workfare schemes” of neo-liberalism and the Third Way, for example. 
Similarly, he seems to consider ‘taxation’ and ‘punishment’ on parallel terms. While this may be 
visible as a normative claim — that is, differentiating between taxation and punishment requires 
assertion of a normative position — I argue that uncovering the various configurations of power 
in this way works to obscure possibilities for comment upon the social or historical enframing of 
social conditions in relation to the ‘forms-of-life’ associated with them almost totally. This 
problem is also noticeable in Harris’ history of Australian ‘welfare rationalities’. Harris applies the 
Foucauldian notion of ‘resistance emerging in cracks and fissures’ of government to describes how 
“Keynesian planning” and the ‘welfare state compromise’ arose as depression, then warfare, 
opened up such ‘cracks’ or ‘fissures’. However, Harris also argues that, in the 1970s, “the 
Keynesian economic-social partnership gave way to the neo-classical synthesis” through the same 
‘cracks’ and ‘fissures’. Therefore, Harris seems to imply that neo-liberalism is also a mode of 
‘resistance’: in this case filling the lacuna caused by international financial ‘crises’. Hartman seems 
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to argue a similar point. She suggests that, “Though neo-liberalism may exacerbate inequality on a 
massive scale, welfare provision in wealthy countries is integral to its continued success … neo-
liberal and welfare rationalities are bedfellows nonetheless”.148  
My main point here is not to relate Keynesianism or the politics of welfare statism and shifts 
to neo-liberalism to norms of, for instance, social justice or equality. These questions lay beyond 
the ambit of this thesis. Rather, I reiterate discussion of commentary on the shift from Keynesian 
welfare statism to neo-liberalism in order to point to a seeming elision in these analyses’ method. 
The discussion implies that the so-called ‘welfare state compromise’ came to be construed, in 
practice and discourse, as an affront to the ‘natural tendency towards equilibrium’ inherent in ‘free-
markets’. This was not only in the neo-liberal rhetoric prompting institutional shifts but as a 
condition of structural change extending across markets, techno-scientific, and communicative 
fields-of-action. It seems that, regardless of normative claims, the move from welfare statism to 
neo-liberalism involved changes in the dynamics of power and its paradigmatic modern composite, 
economic wealth.149 
In conclusion, I want to suggest that, because based in a misapprehending of ‘means for 
ends’, analyses such as these remain silent on much that would be of interest to this thesis’ overall 
argument. Arguably, these governmentality analyses ‘can’t see the trees for the forest’ and, so, not 
only lack an ‘adequate normative perspective’, but inject into subjectivity normativity of a 
particular order. The resulting analyses seem based in ‘strong’ empirical claims that the world is of 
a Natural order, and that human-being is a task of ‘overcoming’. These governmentality 
approaches have relatively little to say about patterns of access to or monopolies over materials, 
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practices, and discourses that would allow analyses to discern how or ‘on what grounds’ a 
formation of subjectivity predominates within a particular social order and, as such, eclipses or 
marginalizes other subjectivities. 
The result is that such theory seems to result in the actualizing of a pseudo-normative 
perspective that, in effect, ordains an untenable solipsism. The concept of ‘modern artificialism’ is 
helpful here. Governmentality theory, as an analytic framework, seems to implicitly justify the 
concentrating within an individual’s will of ‘objectively true’ reality: it diminishes the importance of 
socially created conditions, and the others who would create and construe it, in favour of the 
assertion of personal will-objectives over the world. The generalized observations of ‘power’ in 
governmentality theory pass quietly over the material-physical and social-historical contexts that 
enframe subjectivity as a spatial, temporal, embodied, and institutional human condition. Elision of 
a sustainable normative ‘perspective’ means that governmentality theory constructs ‘power’ in such 
a way that it eclipses possibilities for analyses of human-being as a shared and communicative 
condition. Undue focus upon ‘power’ subsumes the terms by which it is deployed within in 
sociality, and by which humans may ‘legitimate’ hierarchies, values, and forms of authority.  
Hence, governmentality theory frames a kind of analytic ‘relativism’ that may begin with 
condemnation but end with celebration of individual-centred agency. This mode of relativism is 
not so much absolute but contingent: it seems anchored in the ‘will-to-power’ of a secular, 
atomized, and unhindered self-suzerainty. While governmentality analyses may discuss 
‘mainstream’ and ‘alternative’ individualisms in ways that disqualify idealist representations of 
either one in place of a dominant subjectivity, they seem to ‘overshoot the mark’. Such theory 
seems based on the positive projection of a subjectivity that turns upon some of the aspects of the 
very concept of ‘entrepreneurial selfhood’ it otherwise so acutely and critically brings to light.  
 
… … … 
… … 
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8  Post-materialism: ‘creativity’ and the underclass 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter focuses upon social conditions and theories of subjectivity into the 1980s and 1990s. 
Initially, it expands the concept of ‘core arenas for sociality’, first introduced in Chapter 7, through 
work addressing conditions for the entrenching of an ‘underclass’. The chapter suggests how 
structural changes, from manufacturing to service and ‘info-tech’ industries, and institutional 
shifts, towards ‘neoliberalism’, might be seen in terms of conditions that superordinate a form of 
life. Giddens’ theses on ‘self-identity’, the ‘sequestration of experience in late-modernity’, and a 
post-materialistic ‘life politics’ are brought into contention here. Engaging Giddens on these issues 
means raising concepts of subjective ‘embodiment’, the ‘practical consciousness’, and ‘reflexivity’. 
The chapter also raises theoretical and methodological issues in relation to his concept of 
‘ontological security’. It suggests that Giddens’ ‘stratification model’ for explaining subjectivity 
might be too psychologizing and, so, require ‘strong’ empirical claims that reality is for more than a 
single subject-agent in the act of ‘being’ human. The chapter concludes by looking at Ulrich Beck’s 
work on post-materialist subpolitics. Similarities are drawn between Beck’s and Giddens’ work, 
suggesting that both identify the subjectivity they describe so closely with high-modernity itself 
that their analyses move towards reductive closure. Discussing their work is important because it 
provides a point-of-entry into the next chapter, which sets out a series of research problems that 
serve as guidelines for discussing methodological issues in relation to developing a framework for 
analyses.  
 
… … … 
 
Chapter 7 suggests that, since the mid-1970s, relatively wide-reaching structural changes and 
institutional shifts — processes of financialization and neoliberalization — seem to affect 
conditions central to the ongoing creating and reproducing of Anglo-American sociality. It 
suggests that a concept of ‘core arenas for sociality’, ‘core societal arenas’, or, ‘core arenas’, might 
help open to inquiry the patterns of monopoly over and access to materials, practices, and 
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discourses that ‘go on’ in such conditions, and allow analyses to link these to theory of the 
dynamics of social power in contemporary Anglo-American social worlds.  
On the one hand, the concept of ‘core arenas’ implies that there exist arenas of 
contemporary Anglo-American sociality, which involve relatively middle or high-income groups 
that act, create meanings, and modalize things in particular spaces and ways and that these are of 
relative importance to the job of creating and reproducing social conditions. In this sense, the 
concept might help focus analyses upon social and cultural practices and discourses manifest in 
gentrified inner-cities and aspirational suburbs, the so-called Latte Belts and Sea Change ‘exurbs’,150 
and in situations where occupations require relative education and articulate dispositions, for 
example. On the other hand, the concept of ‘core arenas’ also implies the encompassing, not of 
subject-agents as a ‘class’ per se, but of a lifestyle, in a way a ‘form of life’, which milieux of subject-
agents can be said to bring to, to ‘animate’, in engagements of key importance to the job of 
creating and reproducing of sociality. To discuss a dominant subjectivity amidst core societal 
arenas is to discuss the form of life that is brought before analysis when relating particular 
structured and institutionalized conditions to social and cultural practices and discourses amidst 
certain material-physical contexts.  
Several commentators describe the entrenching of a “paradigm of exclusion” since the 
1970s in terms of a disadvantaged underclass becoming ‘normalized’ within the Anglo-American 
societies. They attribute this underclass to declining requirements for unskilled labour and mass-
consumption based on relatively low-cost homogenous goods and services, combined with shifts 
to non-manufacturing service and heterogeneous consumer industries. Thus, we see re-regulation 
“favour[ing] large, private corporations and their shareholders”, and the “marketization of publicly 
held assets”.151  
As the ‘heavy’ industries once employing low-skill labour moved ‘off-shore’, occupations 
once important to Anglo-American economic growth became scattered across largely low-wage 
and ‘casual’ service sector and the informal economy. These conditions are said to undermine the 
political power and economic advantage of organizations representing such groups, 
simultaneously, the support-base for welfare statism and ‘living wage’ claims. In the mid-1970s, 
Giddens argues that such conditions created a distinction “between primary and secondary 
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employment”, encouraging market-institutions to seek alliances with the state against a mainstream 
organized labour movement corralled into ‘economistic’ claims by inflationary conditions.152 
Similarly, Habermas argues such conditions prepared the way for the entrenching of an underclass:  
 
[Because] underprivileged groups are not social classes, nor do they ever even potentially represent 
the mass of the population. Their disenfranchisement and pauperization no longer coincide with 
exploitation, because the system does not live off their labour. They can represent at most a past 
phase of exploitation. But they cannot through the withdrawal of cooperation attain the demands 
that they legitimately put forward.153  
 
Arguably, the backdrop for the emergence of an ‘underclass’ includes a shift from largely 
unionized mass-manufacturing work to low-paid intermittent casual service work — those ‘cash-
jobs’ existing in a liminal ‘black economy’ — as well as government policies to ‘cut back’ ‘social 
welfare’ in conditions where ‘big labour’ offered little or no resistance. Hitherto, organized to 
maintain wage levels and intervene in structural and institutional formation by pressing demands 
for ‘social security’, such commentary implies many such organizations became ‘irrelevant’. Others 
— such as, New Zealand Labour under David Lange, the Australian Labor Party under Bob 
Hawke and Paul Keating, British New Labour under Tony Blair, and the United States’ 
Democratic Party under Bill Clinton — are seen as adopting ‘neoliberal’ policy.154 
Commentary on conditions for the creating of such an underclass might be said to imply 
an effective ‘loss’ of power to assert demands ‘legitimately put forward’; notably, in relation to the 
economic and political sphere, and ‘material’ claims for ‘distributive’ justice. Habermas, and Peter 
Bachrach, at least implicitly, seem to recognize how decreases in the power of those institutions 
hitherto able to disrupt ‘heavy’ industry might extend beyond the political-economic ‘distributive’ 
arena, and manifest more generally in liberal-democratic societies. Elsewhere, citing Bachrach, 
Habermas extends these claims to suggest that Western liberal-democracies undergo something of 
a transformation amidst the unfolding of the ‘crises’ that began in the 1970s:  
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[Liberal-] democracy … is no longer determined by the content of a form of life that takes into 
account the generalizable interests of all individuals. It is now only a key for the distribution of 
rewards conforming to the system, that is, a regulator for the satisfaction of private interests. This 
democracy makes possible democracy without freedom. [It] makes possible only compromises between 
ruling elites. No longer all politically consequential decisions, but only those decisions of 
government still defined as political are … subject to the precepts of democratic will-formation.155 
 
The emergent nexus between markets and the state that is said to have arisen in the 
decades following the kinds of institutionalized “legitimation crisis” Habermas describes worked 
to marginalize or dissolve many of the grounds for ‘claims’ that, like Giddens, he sees as a 
‘compromise’. Raising things in this way allows the suggestion that structured and institutionalized 
changes emerging over recent decades frame qualitative changes in how the engagements of 
subject-agents may or may not be seen to affect ongoing sociality. At once, the sociality that 
emerges seems to incorporate potentially all subject-agents within it, as practices and discourses 
that privilege a particular liberal sovereign individualism come to characterize core societal arenas. 
Meanwhile, at another level, sociality excludes, as some forms of societal and relational 
engagements become marginalized. For the present thesis, as sociality seems increasingly to ‘go on’ 
under the order of a superordinated sovereign liberal individualism, the situations created and 
reproduced in and through these new conditions can be seen to enframe a kind of hypostatized 
dominant subjectivity.  
While a number of market-oriented and critical social theorists extend Bell’s 
‘postindustrialization theses’ in various ways to address such conditions, the present thesis aims to 
bring in a different approach. This approach links the marginalizing of an underclass to what 
Harvey and Manuel Castells, for example, describe as the spread of service and ‘consumption’ 
industries requiring relatively highly skilled, educated, and articulate workforces, and atomized and 
individuated forms of labour.156 This means, again, bringing in Hesmondhalgh, and discussing his 
suggestions that so-called ‘creative’ and ‘cultural’ labour differs from large-scale heavy-industrial 
manual labour in several ways. I use Hesmondhalgh’s account of conditions within “the cultural 
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industries” to suggest how particular conditions might be said to extend across Anglo-American 
societies in these decades.  
For example, Hesmondhalgh argues that labour in ‘creative’ or ‘cultural’ industries, even 
that which attracts higher wages pro rata, is often infrequent and unreliable. While it may be 
relatively diverse, “interesting, and fulfilling”, work in information intensive conditions might also 
be “isolating and contradictory”. Examples might include the computerization of cash registers in 
retail industries, or, importantly, the proliferation of market-based mannerisms that compel service 
employees to exhort customers to Have A Nice Day! Hesmondhalgh argues that, because closely 
intertwined with long-standing Western cultural forms, an erstwhile division between “artistic 
creativity and economic gain” enframes labour in and around contemporary creative, cultural, and 
service industries. For Hesmondhalgh, labour in such conditions accompanies a decline in 
collective power that binds whole occupational domains to ‘one-sided’ contractual relations 
favouring large market-based organizations.157  
The chapter moves to extend Hesmondhalgh’s theses, and suggest that the uptake across 
almost all contemporary workplaces of relatively complex technologies and information-
processing equipment might be seen as a partial condition of such social and cultural history. 
Where, it seems, even relatively low-wage and low-skill ‘service sector’ labour involves basic 
literacy, numeracy and, frequently, articulate dispositions, these seem to ‘go on’ as if the workforce 
in sum were relatively highly skilled, educated, and articulate. Extending suggestions made in 
Chapter 7, conditions in the 1980s, 1990s, and into the 2000s, seem to go on as if almost all 
subject-agents in the Anglo-American societies were well-educated and worldly, autonomous and 
autarchic ‘knowledge workers’. Arguably, suggestions that Western cultural historical emphases on 
‘self-creativity’, aesthetic sensibilities, and ‘immaterial’ or ‘intangible’ aspects of life-experience, for 
example, have exerted deep influence in the formation of key contemporary industries in such 
conditions seem to imply a delimiting of possibilities that alternate, critical, or marginal cultures 
can offer a counterpoint to labour on these terms.  
Conditions for an excluded underclass might also include debt-laden low, middle, and even 
high-income earning subject-agents that are said to be central to the ‘New Economy’. Sociologist 
Richard Sennett’s account of a “new capitalism” that demands “a pliant self, a collage of fragments 
unceasing in its becoming, ever open to new experience … suited to short-term work experience, 
flexible institutions, and constant risk-taking” in some ways help me to focus upon such 
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conditions. Further, Barbara Ehrenreich’s ‘1st person’ sociology might help me to describe the 
scope of “increasing poverty and despair” affecting the “white-collar workforce” in the United 
States in the 1990s and into the 2000s. In this sense, the stock market ‘boom’ for ‘private 
investors’ and property market ‘bubble’ in the housing sector in the 1990s may also include 
increased working hours, especially as wage and salary earners seem increasingly called upon to act 
as ‘entrepreneurial selves’ or ‘passionate employees’.158  
Economist Robert Frank’s claim that the commoditization of heterogeneity not only 
decreases access to mass-produced homogenous but ‘low price’ goods and services but also 
minimizes the prevalence of ‘budget’ in favour of ‘luxury’ commodities is relevant here. For Frank, 
this rising demand for luxury goods implies “greater consumption by some people imposes costs 
on others”. Frank argues it tends to drag-up the commitment to private consumption across 
society — “The things that [persons] need so often depend on what others have”. Necessities 
become less prevalent and attain a kind of cultural stigma, as more and relatively more complex 
‘value-added’ commodities enter the social field. Frank’s claims, when taken alongside rising real-
estate property prices and increased ‘labour market flexibility’ — that is, as housing becomes 
increasingly expensive and always-on communication provides for ‘24-7 connect-ability’ — might 
be said to imply longer periods spent commuting and decreasing ‘free-time’. For Frank, 
suburbanization without public transport infrastructure makes private vehicles a necessity, while 
Sports Utility Vehicles make small ‘compact’ vehicles dangerous, just as ‘professional’ curriculum 
vitae advice and expensive work-wear fashions draw other employees into the fold.159  
Here, Zygmunt Bauman’s descriptions of consumption-dominated spaces, such as 
“shopping malls so constructed as to keep people moving, looking around, diverted and 
entertained by endless attractions” are also helpful. For Bauman, where privatized spaces displace 
common ‘public’ spaces, the promoting of “desire — a volatile and ephemeral, evasive and 
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capricious, and essentially non-referential phenomenon; a self-begotten and self-perpetuating 
motive [without] an objective or a cause — the consuming desire of consuming”, point to what I am 
suggesting are core discursive environments of contemporary Anglo-America.160  
In these respects, such sociology helps to link social to cultural practices and discourses in 
core arenas, and to suggest how these may intertwine with structured and institutionalized 
conditions. While contemporary Anglo-American sociality sidelines ‘legitimate’ demands issuing 
from an excluded underclass, I am suggesting that in many respects it might be seen as 
overshooting its normative premises. Contemporary conditions pass, as if quietly, over almost all 
forms-of-life not conducive to personal autonomy and sovereign choice as these very modes of 
being become increasingly central to the job of creating and reproducing Anglo-American social 
worlds.  
 
… … … 
 
These suggestions that core arenas for sociality provide the settings for the emergence of a 
dominant subjectivity provide background for engaging with Giddens’ work on “modernity and 
self-identity”. This said, the chapter leaves-off discussing Giddens’ theory of late-modernity until 
later. Here, the focus is upon Giddens’ theories of individuality, self-identity, and “the reflexive 
project of the self”. The main suggestion here is that Giddens’ stratification model for explaining 
subjectivity is too ‘psychologizing’ and, so, requires ‘strong’ empirical claims that imbricate 
subjectivity within sociality as if a seamless functional unity.161  
Giddens describes how intertwining secularization and institutionalization displace 
primarily localized and face-to-face contexts with complex “abstract systems” that, it seems, 
mediatize human inter-relations by utilizing formalized symbols and tokens. These “abstract 
systems affect a ‘disembedding’ of sociality; “a ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts 
and [facilitate] their rearticulation across indefinite tracts of time-space”. For Giddens, sociality in 
modernity is endlessly contingent. This implies “institutional reflexivity” such that “social practices 
are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very 
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practices, thus constitutively altering their character”. Giddens extends ‘down’ this reflexivity, into 
the mundane contexts of ‘everyday life’, arguing that “an account of self-identity [in modernity] 
has to be developed in terms of an overall picture of the psychological make-up of the individual”: 
 
The social conventions produced and reproduced in our day-to-day activities are reflexively 
monitored by the [individual] agent as part of ‘going on’ in the variegated settings of our lives. 
Reflexive awareness in this sense is characteristic of all human action, and is the specific condition 
of [the] institutional reflexivity [that is] an intrinsic component of modernity.162  
 
In fact, for Giddens “the construction of the self becomes a reflexive project”. He suggests 
that “reflexivity … should be understood not merely as ‘self-consciousness’ but as the monitored 
character of the ongoing flow of social life. To be a human being is to be a purposive agent”. 
However, Giddens makes clear that ‘purposive’ here implies neither “methodological 
individualism”, nor “hermeneutical voluntarism”. The purposive agency that reflexivity implies 
here is a “process rather than a state”; it is “inherently involved in the competence of agents [and 
an] ontology of time-space as constitutive of social practices”. Thus, his schema emphasizes 
reflexive agency as embedded in the body: “Action then, occurs in the spatiality of the present”. 
His “stratification model of the acting self involves treating the reflexive monitoring, rationalization, 
and motivation of action as embedded sets of processes”. Alternately, Giddens’ describes a 
schema of “basic security system, practical, and discursive consciousness” that are embedded in 
space-time and, therefore, in agents’ bodies.163 
For Giddens, “practical consciousness is integral to the reflexive monitoring of action, but 
it is ‘non-conscious’”. However, unlike Freudian theory, “there are no cognitive barriers separating 
discursive and practical consciousness, as there are divisions between the unconscious and 
consciousness taken generically”:  
 
Most forms of practical consciousness could not be held in mind during the course of social 
activities … Practical consciousness is the cognitive and emotive anchor of the feelings of ontological 
security characteristic of large segments of human activity in all cultures. The notion of ontological 
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security ties in closely to the tacit character of practical consciousness — or, in phenomenological 
terms, to the ‘bracketings’ presumed by the ‘natural attitude’ in everyday life.164  
 
Giddens relates these concepts to ‘trust’. He suggests that the modern basis for the 
emotional anchor of “ontological security” is ‘trust’, which supersedes the ‘faith’ in Divine 
Providence or Fortuna that characterize pre-modern life. Giddens defines modern trust as 
“confidence in the reliability of a person or abstract system … in the context of (a) the general 
awareness that human activity … is socially created; [and] … (b) the vastly increased 
transformative scope of human action” and as “faith in the probity or love of another, or in the 
correctness of abstract principles”: 
 
The term [ontological security] refers to the confidence that most human beings have in the 
continuity of their self-identity and the constancy of the surrounding social and material 
environments of action. A sense of the reliability of persons and things, so central to the notion of 
trust, is basic to feelings of ontological security: hence, the two are psychologically closely related. 
Ontological security has to do with ‘being’ or, … phenomenolog[ical] ‘being-in-the-world’. But it is 
an emotional, rather than a cognitive, phenomenon, and it is rooted in the unconscious.165 
 
Arguably, it is here that Giddens begins to jettison his theoretical commitment to the 
embodied ‘spatiality of the present’. I suggest that the way he describes ‘ontological security’ and 
through the natural attitude, relates it as an emotional phenomenon to trust implies that his 
schema moves toward a kind of Cartesian dualism. His stratification model effectively implies a 
permanent ‘always-already’ cognition that overrides embodiment. To describe ‘trust’ as he does is 
to ascribe a more or less philosophical and abstract definition to emotion, which sits front-and-
centre in subjectivity. That is, I am suggesting that Giddens’ use of emotion here implies aesthetic 
sensibility or judgement, and not the material-physical ‘bindendess’ of embodiment that I want to 
argue is essential for theorizing subjectivity.  
My concerns with Giddens’ schema stem from his assertion that “it is of central 
importance … to see that the anchoring aspects of such ‘answers’ [to ontological insecurities] are 
emotional rather than simply cognitive. How far different cultural settings allow a ‘faith’ in the 
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coherence of everyday life to be achieved through providing symbolic interpretations of existential 
questions is … very important”.166  
Although setting out to avoid methodological individualism, using trust and emotion in 
these ways seems to mean that Giddens’ schema becomes a claim to knowledge about the 
hermetic qualities of subjectivity. Insofar as ‘practical consciousness is the cognitive and emotive 
anchor of the feelings of ontological security’, and the ‘sense of the reliability of persons and things, so 
central to the notion of trust’, what Giddens seems to be claiming for emotion appears to precede 
what he elsewhere makes clear are the ‘spatiality of the present’ and ‘embedded sets of practices’. 
His schema is, arguably, casuistic. Representing ‘cultural settings’ as if these allow a ‘faith’ in the 
coherence of everyday life to be achieved through providing symbolic interpretations of existential 
questions seems to imply that interpretation and questioning precede physical presence: 
situatedness in the world. Giddens’ schema seems to imply a subjectivity that ‘believes itself to be 
in the world’ before ‘being in the world’.  
My suggestion is that what Giddens calls continuity, constancy, coherence and reliability 
do not require feelings of ontological security. These are, I argue, historically bound to human-being 
that has been, and continues to be, a socialized, always-already embodied condition. In Part III, I 
want to approach the constancy and continuity of surroundings as affective conditions of material-
physical embodiment in the world. The discussion will conceptualize embodiment as ‘somatic’, as 
physiognomic sensitivity, and discuss this as an analytically separate aspect or ‘layer of affect’ that 
combines with ‘practical’ consciousness, and reflexive subjectivity. Furthermore, I want to suggest 
a ‘knock-on effect’ of Giddens’ conceptual schema. Arguably, it reduces the ontic — for the 
present argument, a totality of binding variables that, in analysis, enframes human-being in the 
world — to a psychologizing typology. Hence, it makes ontology — for the present argument 
‘what can be said about’ such a totality of binding variables — an intra-personal state that is open, 
not merely to ‘existential reflection’, but to qualitative analytic observation.  
Looking at Giddens’ schema leads me to suggest that it effectively makes the reflexivity 
that he identifies with institutions in late-modernity stand-in for subjectivity. His schema seems to 
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subsume subjectivity under the radical-critical potential of Western “late-modernity”. This 
becomes apparent as Giddens moves to discuss “life politics” and its source in “the sequestration 
of experience”: 
  
[T]he sequestration of experience serves to contain many forms of anxiety which might otherwise 
threaten ontological security — but at considerable cost. [T]he ontological security which 
modernity has purchased, on the level of day-to-day routines, [because ongoing in and through 
abstract systems] depends on an institutional exclusion of social life from fundamental existential 
issues which raise central moral dilemmas for human beings. The agenda of life politics derives 
from the extension of the internally referential systems of modernity to cover several distinct areas 
… repressed existential issues, related not just to nature but to the moral parameters of existence as 
such, press themselves back on to the agenda.167 
 
It seems that, for Giddens, life politics is a reaction to the sequestration of experience. 
Giddens argues that such life politics manifests when conditions for “emancipatory politics” are 
more or less satisfied: “Life politics presumes (a certain level of) emancipation … from the fixities 
of tradition and from hierarchical domination … it is a politics of choice”. Because abstract 
systems work to codify, regularize, standardize, administer, institutionalize, define, or “table rules” 
for sociality, they tend to make moral issues meaningless, expunge ‘existential’ problems, and make 
human relatedness difficult on all but the most individualistic terms. Life politics ‘kicks against’ the 
bureaucratizing, ordering, and regularizing influences that abstract systems are said to exert upon 
‘everyday life’ in late-modern conditions.168  
Interestingly, Giddens derives his approach to the sequestration of experience from the 
way he describes how positivistic thought works in modernity: “Positivism seeks to expunge moral 
judgements and aesthetic criteria from the transformative processes it helps to set in motion and 
of which it also provides interpretation and analysis”. For Giddens, sequestration is the 
“institutional correlate” of positivism.169 I want to suggest that the concept of modern artificialism 
may allow discussion of how positivism works in modernity, but also allows me to move away 
from Giddens’ ‘psychologizing’ theorization. The concept of ‘modern artificialism’ implies that 
subject-agents, in Western modernity, bring to the world personal will-objectives that are, in 
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analysis, the concentration, within subject-agents’ individual wills, of ‘objectively’ true reality. That 
is, where the self-orienting immediacy of ‘being’ affected in modernity implies that, in analysis, 
reality is the instance of ‘being’ for a single subject-agent, the order of things becomes what socially 
created patterns of access to and monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses cause it to be. 
Further, it seems that ‘positivist’ claims about the world, and discussion of it in theory, coincide in 
secularizing modern conditions.  
Arguably, relating positivism and modern artificialism here allows me to maintain a 
theoretical distinction between, on the one hand, the theory of the formation of subjectivity and 
on the other hand, speculation about the intra-personal psychological states that subject-agents 
may or may not bring to sociality. It seems that the ostensible generalizing of ‘modern artificialism’ 
has, as its tangent, the formation of such patterns of monopoly over and access to materials, 
practices, and discourses. These imply the social creating of ‘support’ for a high positivism, in and 
around Natural Law, science, and the art-world, or, engendered less directly, that is, ideologically, 
in and around capitalistic markets and nation-state institutions, for example. Giddens’ approach 
tends to blur what I am suggesting is an important distinction between a positivism that ‘upholds’ 
and is ‘upheld’ in and around socially created but largely ‘abstract’ systems, and a positivism that 
manifests where conditions seem to enframe the concentrating in a subject-agents’ will of 
‘objectively’ true reality.  
In these respects, I briefly draw some parallels between Giddens’ work and Habermas’ 
theses on the “uncoupling of system and life-world”. I then move from Giddens’ work to look at 
Beck’s somewhat similar discussion of ‘subpolitics’. Arguably, Giddens’ suggestion that abstract 
systems emasculate self-identity and empty-out ‘existential questions’ — by sequestering the 
“routines of everyday life from … madness, criminality, sickness and death, sexuality, and nature” 
— resembles Habermas’ conceptualization of how “amoral spheres of action” characterize 
ongoing “systemic integration” in complex modern societies. For Habermas, the instrumental 
imperatives set by “systemic domains of action” consistently undermine efforts to reformulate 
social inter-relations along the lines of “ideal speech situations”. Based on a social-historical claim 
that inter-relations ‘go on’ unhindered by past and tradition in secularizing modernity, Habermas 
argues that these ideal speech situations constitute the normative basis for reformulating sociality 
in ways that mean ‘steering’ inter-relational situations away from the instrumentalizing affects of 
systematized imperatives.170  
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It is here that an important point of difference between Giddens’ and Habermas’ theses 
appears. On the one hand, Giddens’ account of the almost pan-societal standardization and 
administration wrought by abstract systems resembles Habermas’ claim that the instrumental logic 
of systematized social relations “encroach upon the life-world”. However, on the other hand, what 
Habermas’ describes as conditions that disrupt “life-world contexts” — that is, the shared societal 
arenas of human inter-relationships — seem, for Giddens, conditions that raise private 
fundamental existential issues. Habermas traces his ideal speech situation to the unleashing of 
intersubjective contexts from the past and tradition, by a modernity that de-legitimates positivism 
at the same time as it makes the capacity to establish positivist claims within sociality the mainstay 
of social creation and reproduction. However problematic it may be, Habermas’ split between 
system and life-world sets his critique of modernity apart from any accounts of intra-personal 
states, consciousness, or subjectivity. For Giddens, it seems, the critique of modernity and his 
account of consciousness coalesce:  
 
Life politics is a politics of self-actualization in a reflexively ordered environment, where that 
reflexivity links self and body to systems of global scope. [Life politics] concerns political issues 
which flow from processes of self-actualization in post-traditional contexts, where globalizing 
influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self, and conversely where processes of 
self-realization influence global strategies.171  
 
At this point, Giddens’ approach to subjectivity seems to ‘internalize’ the affectivity of the 
sociality he otherwise so keenly theorizes. It seems that Giddens’ subjectivity ‘takes-on’ the radical-
critical potential of late-modernity in sum total. This seems to mean that drawing formative claims 
from Giddens’ ‘stratification model’ requires that analyses seek transcendental justification; if any 
content is to be derived from analyses based on it, it would require knowledge of intra-personal 
psychological states. Alternately, Giddens’ reflexive subjectivity ‘accumulates’ capacities to 
intervene in the world — that is, to deploy agency — in the same way and of the same qualities as 
do abstract systems in late-modernity. 
The present thesis concurs with Carole Smith’s argument that, “For Giddens, the 
sequestration of experience is the sequestration of morality”.172 Smith’s claim allows me to suggest 
that Giddens’ subjectivity becomes something of an automaton. The claims of the life politics that 
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Giddens associates with the reflexive project of the self are, arguably, of the form that social 
demands take when emanating from within abstract systemic parameters. Hence, Giddens suggests 
that “the body can no longer be taken as a fixed — a physiological entity — but has become 
deeply involved with modernity’s reflexivity”. Yet, this type of claim forces Giddens into 
something of a compromise later. He claims that, because “the body has become available to be 
‘worked upon’ by the influences of high modernity … [i]t has, as it were, a thoroughly permeable 
‘outer layer’ through which the reflexive project of the self and externally formed abstract systems 
routinely enter”.173 The problem here is that the body is a physiological entity. Embodiment is a 
fixed condition, at least, insofar as being an embodied individual is the predominant way that 
Anglo-American subject-agents ‘be’ in social worlds. What might change, through the reflexive 
project of the self, are the ways that fashions, nutritional ‘fads’, or plastic surgery, for example, 
have become relatively widespread as techniques used by embodied subject-agents as seen, in 
analysis, to be living-out a self-orienting and projecting dominant subjectivity in particular 
conditions. 
As an alternative, Part III approaches contemporary sociality in ways that do not bring the 
“reflexive ordering of self-narratives” into analytic focus itself, as Giddens’ schema seems to do. 
Rather, it treats conditions for the constitution of subjectivity as if these push or extrude 
reflexivity. Subject-agents are impelled to act, create meanings, or modalize things as if human-
being were not anchored in space, time, and amongst others, but in an immaterial world of 
‘footloose’ global networks and aestheticized disembodied ‘sensations’. That is, I want to treat the 
formation of subjectivity in terms of a consistent tension between, on the one hand, the constant 
monitoring and adjustment of worldly actions that reflexivity implies and, on the other hand, a 
practical consciousness that facilitates actions and a somatic aspect of being that implies 
physiognomic limits amidst the conditions and contexts of sociality. I will suggest that the 
reflexivity which late-modern Anglo-American sociality frequently if not consistently impels or 
‘demands’, works to undermine claims that can be made about how subjectivity manifests in 
norm-forming settings.  
This is not to claim that worldly affect works or does not work at an ‘existential’ level. 
Rather, because subjectivity is a social creation; the shared and communicative condition that 
human-being ‘is’ in the world, anchored in material-physical embodiment and a peculiar modern 
artificialism — the analysis needs to limit itself to ‘weak’ empirical claims. Because Giddens’ 
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schema seems to require knowledge of intra-personal states, rather than merely recognizing that 
existential states, such as anxieties, are possibilities that may or may not be ‘acted upon’, his 
schema seems to imply ‘strong’ empirical claims about the qualities and preponderances of these 
anxieties. These are partial grounds for discussing what I argue are conditions for the deferral of 
almost irreconcilable tensions upon which a dominant contemporary Anglo-American subjectivity 
turns. This allows the discussion to approach the social formation and constitution of subjectivity 
without jettisoning analytic commitment to embodiment, or overemphasizing the intertwining of 
human-being and generalized late-modern conditions. As Giddens otherwise makes clear, 
engagements within sociality impel agency as if subject-agents are often disembodied or immaterial 
‘beings’. 
 
… … … 
 
The chapter now relates Giddens’ theses on life politics to Beck’s work on how contemporary 
‘individualization’ works to condition a post-materialist ‘subpolitics’. In many respects, Beck 
extends Ron Inglehardt’s sociological research. Inglehardt argues that shifts away from heavy 
industries, mass employment, and relatively homogenous personal-use commodities, towards a 
proliferation of information-centred industries, knowledge work, and a relatively expanded array 
of heterogeneous personal-use commodities, condition a major schism in Western “value 
formations”. For Inglehardt, and others, a wide-reaching ‘post-materialism’ has emerged since the 
1970s within “advanced industrial society [and] leads to a basic shift in values, de-emphasizing the 
instrumental rationality that characterizes modern society”.174  
Beck claims that such widespread post-materialism centres on an individualism that is, at 
once, ‘egoistic’ and ‘altruistic’ and central to “subpolitics … based on the defence of life as a 
personal project” and the “rejection of its adversaries; a powerful market system on the one hand 
and a communalism that imposes purity and homogeneity on the other”. Beck describes this 
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“subpolitical arena” as motivated by calls for “government from below”, and rejects the 
institutional dimensions of sociality. These calls are incompatible with subpolitical “claims for 
participation and self-organization”. On the one hand, “political imagination and action are 
confronted with challenges of a quite unprecedented scale”. On the other hand, individualization 
“erod[es] the social-structural conditions for political consensus, which until now have made 
possible collective political action”. Beck points out that “at the centre of the new ethics is the idea 
of quality of life”: 
 
[C]ontrol over a person’s ‘own time’ is valued more highly than income or more career success. 
[P]roviding there are basic securities, lack of waged work means time affluence. Time is the key 
which opens the door to the treasures promised by the [post-materialistic] age of self-determined 
life; dialogue friendship, being on one’s own, compassion, fun, subpolitical commitment. [T]his 
marks a shift away from the struggle for distribution of material goods … toward a demand for … 
scarce immaterial resources which cannot be expressed in the exchange of money. [R]est, leisure, 
self-determined commitments and forms of working, relationships, family life … these are the 
values of a self-oriented culture which is sensitive to ecological concerns. 175  
 
Beck appears to implicitly accept, akin to the post-materialist individuality he finds at the 
centre of subpolitics, the empirical possibility of a timeless and consequence-free desiring form of 
life. Beck traces the path cut by post-materialist individualism, into the realm of a subpolitical 
“antipolitics [that] opens up the opportunity to enjoy one’s own life and supplements this with a 
self-organized concern for others that has broken free from large institutions”. For Beck, a post-
materialistic individualism that “calls for life as a personal project” has “broken free from large 
institutions”, and is no longer about “the distribution of material goods” but, about “scarce 
immaterial goods that can hardly be offset by (expressed in) money”. Beck conducts his inquiry 
along these lines because wanting “to open up a mode of thinking and acting for realistic utopian 
opportunities”. I am suggesting that this is a problem for Beck, because it means he emphasizes, as 
an alternative to orthodox politics, the very idealistic immaterial paradigm that he identifies, with 
such acuity, as manifest across core arenas for contemporary Western sociality. In doing so, he 
risks inferring that contemporary conditions no longer require the material-physical settings that 
constitute the human world.176  
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161, 213. Parentheses in original. 
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Arguably, Beck loses sight of possibilities for questioning how particular legitimizing 
dynamics might frame evaluations of values, or forms of authority, for example, such that 
erstwhile ‘immaterial’ claims can hegemonize political domains. Because he seems to recognize 
post-materialistic subpolitics as being actually about ‘immaterial goods’, Beck limits his analyses to 
an account of the ‘legitimate’ demands commensurate with what the present thesis suggests are the 
operational imperatives of sociality in core societal arenas. Many conditions for Giddens’ life 
politics of the reflexive project of the self, and Beck’s subpolitical arenas, do seem central to 
sociality across contemporary Anglo-American settings. However, as will become clear, these are 
largely indistinguishable from the ‘stakeholder’ politics that, through a series of illustrative 
examples in Parts IV and V, seem closely bound up with emphases on ‘maximizing shareholder 
value’ rising to prominence over decades of neoliberalization and financialization. Within such a 
paradigm, ‘creative’ labour becomes life-work, and self-creation is returned to subject-agents, 
liberated, as it were, from ‘clock-watching’ full-time employment. At the same time, such 
possibilities for self-realization and ‘options’ for personal autonomy seem to circumscribe the job 
of ‘being’ human under a particular normative order: that of almost ever-increasing flexibility and 
‘entrepreneurial selves’.  
While pointing to lived societal and relational phenomena, analyses that place post-
materialistic individualism, life politics, and subpolitics, at the centre of their approach, 
nevertheless, seem not to differentiate between claims made achievable within norm-based and 
relational contexts, and those made achievable within large-scale structured and institutionalized 
conditions. Post-materialist theories of life politics and subpolitics might help to describe a 
situation-specific formation of ‘enlightened’ liberal individualism. However, such analyses do this 
by obscuring what is the ongoing material abstraction of ‘immaterial goods’ and extension of inter-
relations that embodied subject-agents carry-on in space, over time, and through institutions. As 
Chapter 6 suggests, services or information, for example, might attain ‘values’ as commoditized 
things and, therefore, ‘act’ in material-like ways. Contemporary conditions do seem to frame 
subjectivity amidst myriad elaborations of personal desiring and creative self-development, which 
tends towards prioritizing so-called ‘immaterial goods’, as conditions also privilege occupational 
flexibility and casualization. However, the suggestion here is that such immaterial ‘goods’ need to 
remain as abstract material or material-like ‘things’ in analysis. Humans create and reproduce them 
and in doing so, give them values and rank them within the particular social-historical conditions 
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and certain material-physical contexts they also create and reproduce. Regardless of what might be 
the phenomenal immateriality of such ‘things’ — leisure time and creativity are two examples — 
the present thesis suggests that these are socially ‘given’ values, which link their holders and 
handlers to social power in different ways and, so, need to remain open to discussion as material-
like things. That is, the approach developed here is required to ‘hang onto the world’, even though 
the particular conditions under discussion might mean that ostensibly ‘immaterial’ goods are 
relatively more important to the creating and reproducing contemporary social worlds.  
Recognizing ways that contemporary conditions also seem to create an excluded 
underclass allows me to suggest how, indeed, contemporary core societal arenas effectively ‘filter 
out’ modes of engaging that do not fall under the aegis of a dominant form of life. Arguably, 
recognizing such an underclass suggests a ‘raising of the bar’, such that the basic unit of labour in 
core arenas for sociality effectively leaves unskilled ‘hand’ power beneath the minimum levels of 
literacy, numeracy, and ‘cultural capital’ required for the least valuable productive inputs. Hence, as 
Habermas, Bachrach and, for example, Fraser suggest, such groups lose purchase in the political 
sphere. My discussion of conditions for such an underclass also implies that conditions such as 
casualization and flexibility regimes extend across sociality. Organizational practices that Sennett 
and Ehrenreich so accurately depict — such as those which ‘go on’ casual employment, high 
labour mobility, and employment flexibility predominate in organizational domains, for example 
— seem to extend across sociality. As I suggest throughout Parts IV and V, flexitime, the no-collar 
workplace, and work-from-home initiatives imply that subject-agents work ‘on their own time’ 
and, to an extent, present and self-present ‘in their own ways’. Conditions for such a ‘return’ of 
time and the body to Anglo-American subject-agent’s ‘control’ seem also to render freedom and 
autonomy inalienable duties.  
It is in this sense that I begin to suggest that a pervasive ‘wholism’ seems to obscure 
almost all modes of engagement ‘in the world’ not conducive to those of a dominant subjectivity 
enframed within core societal arenas. As will be suggested in Part IV, contemporary conditions 
seem to displace citizenship ‘rights and duties’ with what seem to be instrumentalist stakeholder 
‘contributions and benefits’. Through a series of illustrative examples, the chapters therein will 
suggest how structural changes that economists label neoliberalization and financialization, and the 
erstwhile Info-Tech Economy these are said to create conditions for, might frame what Geoff Sharp 
describes as “technologically extended forms of the social”. These are taken to be social forms that 
imbricate “intellectual forms of life” within key arenas for creating and reproducing sociality. They 
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imply that a “new level of individuation … is readily grafted onto the individualism of expanding 
desire” central to market-oriented Anglo-American liberal-democracies.177  
Such conditions may bring particular cultural discourses — centring on relative affluence 
and ‘personal-use’ commodities, privatist concerns with lifestyle, vocational holism, and, 
ostensibly, post-materialist ‘demands’, such as for ‘quality-of-life’ or ‘green consumerism’, for 
example — to the fore in Anglo-American settings. In core arenas, where technological 
complexity and widespread affluence foster relatively high levels of education and articulate 
dispositions, a dominant subjectivity appears to offer possibilities for unprecedented subjective 
realization of personal ‘freedom’. These are at once liberating and circumscribing. Freedom within 
core arenas for sociality seems, in many ways, limited to consumption and aesthetic forms of 
liberty, such as held out by personal-use commodities, or which ‘passionate’ terms of employment 
offer. These are conditions for the heightened satisfactions, the jouissance, that I argue makes 
deployments of capacities for enjoyment central to a dominant subjectivity. These are also 
conditions for the enervated dissatisfactions, the lassitude, that I suggest make world-weariness, 
languor, and jadedness — the tepid obverse of satisfaction — an erstwhile disinterest redeemable 
almost only in stakeholder choices to enact capacities or undertake obligations, central to the same 
dominant subjectivity. These are some of the grounds for my central argument that, a dominant 
contemporary subjectivity turns on almost irreconcilable tensions that sustain a deferral of worldly 
dilemmas.  
 
… … … 
… … 
 
                                                 
 
177 Sharp, "Extended Forms of the Social," 223, G. Sharp, "Is This the End of History?," Arena 19, no. New Series (2002): 6. 
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9 Research problems 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the discussion so far, reflects upon issues raised in Part I and discussion 
of Anglo-American social conditions and theories of subjectivity in Part II. The chapter raises 
these issues as methodological concerns, in order to set out the research problems that will guide 
development of a framework for analysis in the following chapters. This chapter identifies the 
project’s key research problem as one centred on developing an approach to theorizing a 
dominant Anglo-American subjectivity that avoids ‘strong’ empiricism. Describing the problem as 
a theoretical and methodological issue in this way means raising a number of points that relate 
directly to the thesis’ applied inquiry. The chapter clarifies the epistemological groundings for my 
central argument that a dominant subjectivity has emerged in contemporary Anglo-American 
societies that moves between relatively heightened satisfactions and enervated dissatisfactions, an 
important consequence of which is that persons are often bound to defer existential and ethical 
dilemmas that social worlds might raise for them as socialized subject-agents. The chapter 
concludes with an outline of the steps Chapters 10, 11, and 12 take. In these ways, the chapters in 
this Part of the present thesis background a series of illustrative examples, which are discussed in 
Part IV.  
 
… … … 
 
To recap briefly, the present thesis begins by suggesting how, since the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the relatively increased importance to job of creating and reproducing Western societies 
of material things, as well as the knowledges and techniques associated with their uses, might have 
affected a modern subjectivity. Combining engagements with Mukerji’s and Dumont’s historical 
anthropology, Chapter 2 focuses upon how modern materialism and Occidental Judaeo-
Christianity intertwined amidst emergent and expanding capitalistic markets, large-scale 
industrialization, and representative nation-state government to valorize individual exemplarity and 
personal uniqueness in worldly affairs. The chapter uses concepts of ‘materialism’, ‘Western 
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individualism’, and ‘modern artificialism’ to describe modernization in terms of societal and 
relational engagements where conditions came to privilege a self-creating and asserting, relatively 
autonomous and autarchic form of life. It sets out a provisional definition of subjectivity as the 
‘immediate’, self-orienting and self-projecting condition that human-being takes in modernizing 
Western conditions. Chapter 2 also uses these discussions to look at Western modernization in 
terms of changing practical and discursive ‘normative’ conditions and shifting material-physical 
‘ontic’ contexts. 
In particular, the chapter uses Dumont’s concept of ‘modern artificialism’. The concept 
describes a generalizing of the application by persons to worldly affairs of private will-objectives 
that are, in effect, the socially conditioned concentrating within their personal ‘wills’ of ‘objectively 
true’ reality.178 As a historiographic claim, Western ‘individuals’ act, create meanings, and modalize 
things such that the world corresponds with and, so, responds to their individual wills, rather than 
the traditionally ordained Truth of a definitive cosmology. In the sparest sense, I define modern 
artificialism as the ‘art of making’ reality. Modern artificialism implies that humans ‘encounter’ or 
‘experience’ the (socially created) ‘world as it is’. Modernization frames the world as reality — ‘all 
there is’ — such that the world can only ‘be’ for a single human in the ‘act’ of ‘being’. Recognizing 
subjectivity on these terms also implies that sociality itself be seen to legitimize the Natural order 
of things. Discussing subjectivity in these terms means looking at sociality in terms of humans 
acting within and conceiving of the world as subjected to ‘material forces’. This means taking 
modern ‘secularization’ to mean that humans create and reproduce the social world within a field 
of material-physical binding variables that encompasses in sum total.  
Using these concepts, Chapter 3 discusses subjectivity in political terms, that is, in relation 
to a dynamic conception of social power. Habermas’, and Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner’s work 
allows discussion of Western modernity as an unstable social world that can be said to ‘be’ what it 
is created and reproduced ‘as’. In this sense, the creating and reproducing of structured and 
institutionalized patterns of access to and monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses 
might be said to historically privilege particular milieux. Moving to consider social power as such 
means that subjectivity brings into generalized contention what the world ‘is’ while also 
‘concretizing’ what it can be. However, insofar as such modernizing Western forms of authority 
and value criteria are seen as contingent and arbitrary effects of the dynamics of social power — 
                                                 
 
178 Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology, 4, 8. Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology 
in Anthropological Perspective, 56. 
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of practical and discursive conditions that humans create and reproduce amidst material-physical 
contexts — these also endure in space, over time, and through institutions. This is to say that 
normative conditions predominant in particular social worlds ‘go on’ amidst an ontic ‘context’ that 
is, itself, always-already socially created and construed in relation to the socialized and embodied 
job of being human.  
The provisional definition of a dominant subjectivity — as ‘immediate’, self-orienting, self-
projecting and, so, self-creating and self-asserting — implies it is the social creation of, but also 
socially created by humans ‘being’ in particular ways. Chapter 2 also raises a requirement that 
inquiry delineate between subjectivity and individualism. These discussions point to the 
predominance of a particular formation of individualism, as a situation-specific aspect of a 
dominant subjectivity. The Chapter looks at how particular patterns of monopoly over and access 
to materials, practices, and discourses, amidst certain material-physical contexts, can be said to 
privilege a predominant form of life. For the present thesis, subjectivity is the form taken by 
human-being in modernizing (Western) conditions. This means discussing human-being in its 
‘material-physicality’ and its manifest ‘situation-specificity’. Subjectivity is the socially created and 
reproduced ‘limit’ of arbitrariness and contingency, as well as the source of forms of authority and 
value criteria that ‘go on’ in particular conditions.  
As the thesis brings it in, however, the term ‘legitimacy’ demands a two-sided definition. 
On the one hand, it warrants definition in relation to what goes on within society. In this sense, 
the present thesis takes ‘legitimacy’ to have meaning in reference to a particular society’s forms of 
authority and criteria for establishing values. Where this meaning is used, the term will be written 
in single inverted commas. On the other hand, legitimacy also warrants definition from within 
inquiry’s analytic perspective. Legitimacy in this sense may or may not concur with a society’s 
norms or values, such as justice, equality, or liberty, for example. Without inverted commas, 
legitimacy has meaning in relation to the enduring continuities and commonalities that humans 
create and reproduce in time, over space, and through institutions. Social worlds involve legitimacy 
because they endure and recur in ways that mean inquiry can re-present them in theory.  
In this sense, the material-physicality of subjectivity — enduring in space, over time, and 
through institutions as an always-already embodied and socialized condition — implies that 
human-being be seen as the limit of contingency and arbitrariness. Looking at subjectivity as the 
‘immediacy’ of human-being — ‘being’ human in a world that encompasses in sum total: in reality 
— allows the present thesis to focus upon a situation-specific form of life, and the dynamics of 
social power that humans create and reproduce because ‘going on’ amidst an arbitrary and 
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contingent ontic field. The forms of authority and value criteria conditioned in and through the 
dynamics that social power takes in modernity imply patterns of monopoly over, and access to 
materials, practices, and discourses that endure in space, over time, and through institutions. 
Chapter 2 begins to suggest an approach to subjectivity as a condition of ‘shared’ space and time, 
and institutions, as well as of interanimate179 relational forms held in-common: which subject-
agents ‘carry’ with them, and communicate with each another. That is, the present thesis sets out 
to discuss a dominant Western subjectivity as a social-historical condition that ‘goes on’ in relation 
to what might be seen as the norm-based and relational condition that is human-being.  
Taking subjectivity to be an ‘immediate’ and self-orienting condition — human-being as 
‘self-consciousness’ in a ‘total’ social world that turns on autonomous self-creation and self-
projection within ‘objective’ reality — implies discussing the job of creating and reproducing social 
worlds as if contingency and arbitrariness are made particular in particular ways. Hence, the 
present thesis recognizes a dominant subjectivity in a way that also means recognizing the 
particular situations in and through which liberal individualism creates and reproduces 
contemporary Anglo-American sociality.  
However, looking at subjectivity in this way also means avoiding references to a 
(transcendent) point ‘beyond’ the world, while explanation remains ‘external’ to embodied — 
therefore, ‘psychologically’ inaccessible — subject-agents. On the one hand, recognizing material-
physical totality as the (social-historical) enframing context for subjectivity — because created and 
construed in sum total as reality — implies a need for inquiry to focus upon arbitrariness and 
contingency as enframing contexts. On the other hand, recognizing subjectivity to mean that 
subject-agents ‘bear’ enduring commonalities and continuities — because creating and 
reproducing materials, practices, and discourses that constitute social worlds in sum total — 
implies a need for inquiry to focus upon normative conditions. Furthermore, taking human-being 
to be a norm-based and relational condition implies that inquiry itself make clear its relation with 
these two ‘ontological’ and ‘normative’ registers.  
Chapter 2 suggests how a modern Western subjectivity can be seen as dominant in 
conditions where milieux of bourgeois private citizens that, by virtue of their control over wealth 
and power, arose to assert themselves politically against milieux defending the authority of faith 
and validity of ancestry. That is, Chapter 2 recognizes a dominant subjectivity as ‘being’ deeply 
individuated in particular ways. The bourgeois private citizens, which Habermas describes as 
                                                 
 
179 The term ‘interanimate’ is taken from; W. van Orman Quine, Word & Object (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1960), 9-12. 
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‘propelled by their drives as free men’ amidst an ostensibly self-evident Natural Order, might be 
seen as milieux that acted within structured and institutionalized conditions which privileged a 
particular form of life. Alongside other formations of individualism, the liberal sovereign 
individualism such milieux represent in practice might be said to have become central to the job of 
creating and reproducing sociality. This raises concerns with what Habermas calls a ‘bourgeois 
culture of arts and letters’ that, although similarly antipathetic to religious dogma and hereditary 
privilege was, nonetheless, opposed the predominant individualism of the liberal-democratic 
bourgeois ‘public sphere’ based in restricted franchise, Natural Law, and representative 
government. In practice, modern Western subjectivity might be said to impose upon the world 
what the world ‘is’ and ‘can be’ because particular actions, meanings, and things come to be 
‘privileged’ as situations in relation to the job of creating and reproducing it. 
… … … 
 
These elements in Chapter 2 inform discussion in Part II, Chapters 5 and 6, concerned with 
Anglo-American ‘countercultural’ individualism since the 1960s and 1970s and Chapters 7 and 8, 
which develop the concept of ‘core arenas for sociality’. However, this emphasis on how social 
worlds can be said to ‘endure’ in space, over time, and through institutions, might call to mind that 
strand of nostalgic conservatism which sees modernization as a force that undermines the 
coordinating and constraining effects of traditional hierarchies and ancestral values. Briefly pausing 
to consider how such conservative theory might account for modernization and social change 
distances the present thesis from such a perspective. 
François Furet seems to adopt such an order of conservatism where arguing that, “With 
the French Revolution … the notion of erasing the past bespeaks modern artificialism, the 
obsession with constructing society rather than considering it as given by the Natural or divine 
order of things”.180 Furet appears to observe materialism, Western individualism, and modern 
artificialism, but to leave un-reflected upon the normative and ontic ‘ramifications’ that subjectivity 
would seem to imply. While large-scale radical movements, such as those of the French 
Revolution, might aim in one way or another at ‘erasing the past’, it also seems the case that 
modernization, of itself, demands ‘construction’.  
                                                 
 
180 F. Furet, "Democracy and Utopia," Journal of Democracy 9, no. 1 (1998): 66. 
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The present thesis suggests that, contra Furet, it is modern artificialism that bespeaks 
erasing the past. At least, insofar as subjectivity implies orienting the self in relation to reality and 
projecting the self in relation to society in sum total, which might include a culturally defined 
relationship with ‘the divine’ or Nature. What might have once been ‘given by the Natural or 
divine order of things’ becomes, in Western modernity, an impossible scenario. To look at things 
in this way seems to demand of inquiry a shift across analytic registers. In one register, materialism 
and individualism, modern artificialism, and subjectivity point to an unstable and risky condition 
that the world ‘is’ what humans create it to be. In another register, such conditions mean that the 
world ‘as is’ demands intervention and reflection because humans ‘be’ within it as material-physical 
‘beings’. Conservatism’s appeals to the given-ess of a Natural order would again seem, in practice, 
to work as a justification for existing forms of authority and value criteria. Subjectivity, in its barest 
philosophical meaning as ‘self-consciousness’ — and as used here to mean the ‘immediate’ self-
orienting, self-asserting, and creating condition that human-being takes in modernity — would 
seem to mean that modernization demands critical reflection upon the creating and reproducing of 
itself, as an encompassing totality.  
Elements of Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, extend Chapter 2’s approach, which takes formations 
of individualism to be situation-specific aspects of a dominant subjectivity. These chapters develop 
a concept of ‘core arenas’ to suggest how contemporary ‘globalizing’ conditions across Anglo-
America might be said to privilege particular patterns of access to and monopolies over materials, 
practices, and discourses. These chapters take up Giddens and Sharp to suggest that, amidst 
relatively complex abstract systems and technologically extended forms of the social, conditions in 
‘core arenas’ might be said to privilege a particular form of life. The concept of ‘core arenas’ 
focuses discussion upon the intertwining of structured and institutionalized conditions with social 
and cultural practices and discourses, and sees these in relation to recent Anglo-American social 
history. Taking core arenas to be the ‘sites’ for a dominant subjectivity in particular means linking 
the industrialization of culture over recent decades — including the widespread imbricating of 
hitherto ‘countercultural’ individualisms into the ‘mainstream’ — to the predominance of relatively 
well-educated, articulate, worldly, and ‘creative’ forms of life. Looking at individualism as a 
situation-specific aspect of a dominant subjectivity in these ways points toward possibilities for 
inquiring into modernizing conditions without stepping beyond them, or evaluating culture from 
within an implicitly determined hierarchy of cultural forms.  
In these respects, the present thesis aims to avoid theory that, since ‘the events of 
September 11 2001’, would evoke ‘the moral order’ or ‘true values’ as if requiring little or no 
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appraisal as to their sources within human sociality. In addition, the present thesis aims to aver 
from theory that, at the ‘end of the Cold War’, seems based in the kinds of ‘post-materialist’ 
individualism which might ultimately carry inquiry upon the wave it describes, in a direction that 
partially elides critical reflection upon its own foundations. The present thesis uses these 
discussions to distance itself from those kinds of “romantic ruthlessness” that, in practice, might 
work in support of unjust uses of power to assert the naturalness of a ‘given order’. These 
discussions also orient inquiry away from those kinds of “self-abnegating romanticism” that, 
because ‘forgetting’ the always-already material-physical and socialized state that is human-being 
might, in practice, point to an unbinding of social power that leads to deepening economic 
inequity.181  
 
… … … 
 
This said, Chapter 3 suggests that early modern Western philosophy of the subject might 
retrospectively be seen to reflect upon the human condition based in ‘strong’ empirical claims. The 
chapter looks at Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, as well as Marxist theory, in order to suggest 
how these seem to unify analyses around something beyond the world itself: a transcendent, 
metaphysical, or utopian principle. The chapter suggests an odd meeting point between some 
types of Marxist theory, and liberal-conservative rational action theory. On the one hand, it might 
be said that certain Marxist theories ‘aggrandize’, while on the other hand, rational action, or game, 
theory seems to ‘trivialize’ inquiry. It is suggested that a pre-theoretical universal constant, such as 
species-being or rational action, unifies analyses because interceding upon what both approaches 
otherwise recognize as the secular radicalization of human-being in modernizing Western 
conditions: as ‘immediate’ self-orienting and self-projecting subjectivity. 
Chapter 3 takes up Delanty’s and Pippin’s suggestions that Kant and Hegel might provide 
the groundwork for taking things in another direction: that is, away from a ‘strong’ empiricism 
which make the ‘immediacy’ of being in reality the basis for claims about the world and ‘being’ in it. 
This is not to suggest that ‘strong’ empiricism is not, but that it is the discrete moment of ‘being’ 
in reality. Hence, the present thesis’ emphases on moving away from claims about reality, while 
recognizing that being ‘immediately’ in reality is the social-historical and material-physical condition 
                                                 
 
181 Here, I draw upon Alfred North Whitehead’s point that “romantic ruthlessness is no nearer to real politics than is romantic 
self-abnegation”. See, Whitehead, Science & the Modern World, 135.  
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for ‘subjectivity’. Delanty and Pippin suggest that both Kant and Hegel indicate possibilities for 
non-metaphysical theories of subjectivity. For Delanty, Kant makes clear that judgement 
concerning an aesthetic dimension of human-being need to be seen as affairs of ‘public sense’; lest 
these be taken for objective, an illusion. Meanwhile, for Pippin, Hegel sees ‘the empirical sciences’ 
as being based in reflection upon human-being and not, merely, the facts so found and so 
experienced.  
In this light, it might be said that Kant and Hegel recognize ‘strong’ empiricism as a 
problem for making claims about the world. Adopting ‘strong’ empiricism might mean things 
could readily be taken for objective, an illusion, and implicate within inquiry facts as (subjectively) 
found and experienced. The present thesis takes Delanty’s and Pippin’s insights to mean both 
Kant and Hegel, in distinct ways, pointed to a need for inquiry to be based in a perspective upon 
human-being as ‘lived-through’ in the world as a norm-based and relational condition radicalized 
by modernization.  
These philosophical discussions — insofar as they deal with subjectivity as the human 
condition in (Western) modernity — help to orient my approach around human-being as an 
ongoing and dynamic condition. Looking at things in these ways implies a need to develop an 
approach to social conditions, ongoing sociality, and subjectivity that recognizes the irreducibility 
to ‘strong’ empiricism of claims about social worlds. This suggests a need for an approach that 
rests in a ‘weak’ empiricism that does not unify analyses within a perspective that assumes the 
world ‘is’ for other than a single human in the act of ‘being’. By ‘weak’ empiricism, I mean tracing 
links between claims about the empirical world through normative conditions to material-physical 
contexts — that is, through inquiry’s ontic commitments — and back again. On the one hand, the 
present inquiry needs to look at normative conditions as what humans create in order to ‘go on’ in 
shared material-physical contexts. On the other hand, it needs to look at material-physical 
contextuality as a totality of binding variables,182 which humans ‘be’ amidst because ‘going on’ 
springs from the normativity that humans create and reproduce as embodied ‘beings’ in space, 
over time, and amongst others.  
Describing material-physical reality in terms of the ‘immediate’ moment of ‘being’ implies a 
commitment to ‘weak’ empirical claims, it requires a kind of agnosticism characterize inquiry. 
                                                 
 
182 The concept of the ‘ontic field’ as a ‘totality of binding variables’ that presses upon inquiry a need for ‘ontic commitment’, and 
the idea that such work can be carried through using ‘ontological categories’ are discussed in detail in Chapters 11 and 12. 
These chapters bring in these motifs through engagements with Willard van Orman Quine’s and Jan Westerhoff’s philosophy 
and Paul James’ and Carol Gould’s social theory.  
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Inquiry itself goes on in relation to reality as what encompasses the ‘immediacy’ of being human 
and to human-being as a norm-based and relational condition. Hence, Chapter 3’s suggestion that 
subjectivity might be seen as having difference that precedes identity (qua self-recognition) because 
human-being is an embodied material-physical condition. Gaining iteration as difference, or 
identity, is said to be a condition of ‘being’ an embodied subject-agent, in space, over time and 
amongst others. Again, this raises a need for the present inquiry to work across analytic registers. 
In one register, subjectivity manifests because subject-agents ‘are’ embodied beings in space, over 
time, and amongst others. In another register, patterns of subjectivity mean that subject-agents can 
be said to make (material-physical) reality ‘real’ in particular ways, and to create and reproduce 
affective worldly social ‘orders’. For the present thesis, a dominant subjectivity is ‘being’ amidst the 
peculiarly modernizing and globalizing societal structures and institutions that humans create and 
reproduce as (contemporary Anglo-American) social worlds. In this sense, it might be said that the 
social-historically conditioned qualities of ‘immediacy’, self-projection, self-orientation, self-
assertion, and self-creation seem manifestly to ‘go on’ in tension with the norm-based and 
relational condition that human-being can be said to ‘be’.  
 
… … … 
 
While Chapter 3 relates this provisional definition of a dominant subjectivity to early modern 
Western philosophy of the subject, Chapter 4 brings in, in a limited way, Durkheim and Weber. 
Chapter 4 uses Durkheim’s account of individuation and Weber’s discussion of vocation and 
authority in mass democracies to frame discussion of conditions for an ‘immediate’, self-orienting 
and self-projecting, self-creating and asserting dominant subjectivity.  
Chapter 4 looks at conditions that Weber identifies with Western modernization — in 
particular, the tendency for large-scale structured and institutionalized inter-relations to turn upon 
‘instrumental’ forms of rationality — as if, in key respects, it is antithetical to a definition of 
human-being as a norm-based and relational condition. In these respects, the present thesis does 
not use these sociologists’ work to calibrate its account of modernizing and globalizing conditions 
in relation to an absolute, constant, or ‘objectively desirable’ condition. Rather, its critique is 
conducted in relation to a claim that takes human-being to be what ‘goes on’ at the level of 
material-physicality — humans ‘are’ because being human is an embodied, norm-based and 
relational condition, which ‘goes on’ in space, over time, and through institutions. Where the 
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contemporary Anglo-American West is taken to ‘go on’ amidst ‘globalizing’ conditions, it is 
arguably the case that interanimate situatedness and inter-relational proximity remain the stuff of 
human sociality.  
A dominant subjectivity might be said to manifest amidst relatively expanded productive 
forces, societal complexity and abstractedness, extended forms of inter-relating, and deeply 
individuating conditions that, amongst other things, mean a messy totalization of forms of 
authority and value criteria which partially obscure or annul aspects of human-being as a ‘lived’ 
condition. The chapter uses Durkheim and Weber to suggest how a dominant subjectivity may 
manifest in relatively complex, abstract, and extended conditions, where particular practices and 
discourses seem to impel relatively high levels of formal education, articulateness, and individual 
autonomy. In these respects, the claims for mass democracy and challenges to authority that 
Weber sees as part of industrial and capitalistic (Western) modernization might be seen in terms of 
core societal arenas and particular situation-specific formations of Western individualism.  
 
… … … 
 
The chapters in Part II use these exegeses to background discussion of relatively recent social 
conditions and public affairs alongside contemporary social theories of subjectivity. A summary of 
key points that these chapters raise will serve as a guide for development of an approach to inquiry 
in Chapters 10, 11, and 12. 
(1) The first point concerns theory that reaches beyond the boundaries of the human 
social world, for an extra-worldly motif that might be said to work as a universal constant. Theory 
of this order may ‘go too deep’, and obtain explanatory force by opening inquiry up a utopian 
future. Or, it may make a hermeneutic project, itself, analyses’ heuristic device, in which case 
subjectivity becomes a kind of gnostic device that is set-off in pursuit of an ever-receding horizon. 
Maintaining analytic distinction between, for example, difference and identity in this case becomes 
appraising subjectivity in relation to sociality conceived as a common hermeneutic project. Theory 
of this order seems to bind inquiry to claims that subjectivity is on a trajectory ‘away from’ or 
‘towards’ the achievement of an idealized future-perfect or ever-expansive ‘utility’ or, that an 
inauthentic subjectivity always fall just short of some ultimate authenticating anchor point.  
(2) A second point implies theory may ‘be too shallow’, and assume that the world is of a 
pre-social Natural Order. This second theme concerns theory that establishes an arbitrary logical 
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pre-supposition, such as rational self-interest or, alternately, a fallen state and that in the job of 
social analysis is transformed into an empirical claim. Embedding, for example, a rational actor 
within theory in this way might imply that inquiry cannot but find empirical conditions for either 
limitations upon or a profusion of rational actions. Similarly, embedding a claim that humans share 
a fallen state, or essentially sinful nature, within theory implies that inquiry cannot but find 
empirical evidence for unconstrained sinfulness, or strong safeguards against such action.  
(3) Alternately, a third point concerns theory that may substitute ‘means’, such as social 
power for ‘ends’, such as a form of authority or criteria for determining value. This third point 
seems to disallow specific claims as to the relationship between human-being as a ‘lived’ condition 
and being human as ‘living’ amidst a particular state of affairs. In practice, such theory might assert 
the rather bland truism that power is ‘everywhere’ sociality, while eliding that demands are placed 
upon individual subject-agents by ‘others’. Because seeming to conflate social power with what the 
‘physical’ sciences might describe as force or inertia, such theory appears to frame inquiry in a way 
that makes asserting personal will-objectives over the world the primary strategy for avoiding the 
vicissitudes of social power. Such theory constructs ‘power’ in such a way that it eclipses 
possibilities for thinking about human-being as a shared and communicative condition: ‘power-as-
ends’ means a wholesale subsuming of the terms by which it is deployed by humans as they ‘go on’ 
in social worlds.  
(4) A fourth point arises with theory that seems to imbricate its topic, subjectivity, so 
neatly within the society it sets out to explain that analysis seems to jettison its commitment to the 
material-physicality of ‘being’ human, such that inquiry loses its critical edge. This fourth point 
concerns theory that describes conditions that may be relatively complex, abstracted, socially 
extended, and intensive, yet allows its account of subjectivity to follow the same trajectory. In a 
way similar to theory that it might be said ‘goes too deep’, such theory seems to require ‘strong’ 
empirical claims that unify reality in ‘psychologizing’ claims. A point of difference between these 
first and fourth points is, however, that the latter seems to involve reducing subjectivity to a kind 
of replica of conditions in the relatively complex, technologically extended, abstractly mediated, 
and largely systematized sociality it theorizes. Such theory discusses engagements within 
contemporary sociality as if human-being were, itself, a post-materialistic condition of constant 
‘self-creativity’: a project of self-emendation where there are only ‘players’; that is, relatively 
affluent, well-educated, and articulate ‘winners’ and those who wait, as it were, on post-materialist 
society’s margins as potential ‘winners’. 
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Therefore, the present thesis aims in the next chapters to discuss an approach to inquiry 
that (1a) and (2a) avoids theory that goes ‘too deep’ or ‘too shallow’ by accounting for subjectivity 
as a socialized creator of social worlds that are norm-based and relational and, also, a reality that is 
the artifice which individual subject-agents make ‘real’. Discussion in the next chapters also works 
to develop an approach to inquiry that (3a) avoids transposing ‘means as ends’ by recognizing that 
humans create and reproduce forms of authority and value criteria, and the means for sustaining 
and developing challenges to their legitimacy. Therefore, the developing approach recognizes 
society’s normative contents are bound up intimately with the actions, meanings, and things that 
humans create and reproduce as part of the job of ‘going on’ in material-physical world that 
endures in space, over time, and through institutions. Furthermore, the next chapters discuss an 
approach to inquiry that (4a) works to avoid imbricating a dominant subjectivity within sociality in 
ways that mean it closely resembles a functioning unit of a system-like social world. In this sense, 
the developing approach maintains commitment to material-physical embodiment across 
ontological and normative registers in relation to a claim for human-being’s ‘normativity’ as a 
norm-based and relational condition. 
 
… … … 
 
To conclude this chapter, I outline the steps that Chapters 10, 11, and 12 take to develop a 
framework for inquiry based around these themes. Chapter 10 discusses anthropological theories 
of societal dynamics that focus upon the creating and reproducing of social structures and 
institutions that, in part, establish enduring yet contestable forms of authority and value criteria. 
Chapter 10 also discusses anthropological theory of relational dynamics that focuses upon what 
are seen as the commonalities and continuities that humans create and reproduce because they ‘go 
on’ within in-common and enduring material-physical social worlds.  
This discussion begins to conceptualize subjectivity in terms of the imagining of ‘real’ 
worlds, which subject-agents materialize as material-physical reality. The chapter begins to define 
the impetus for ongoing sociality in terms of a ‘weak’ empirical claim that human-being is a norm-
based and relational condition. Chapter 10 suggests that what is ‘kept out’ of sociality is an 
important focal point for inquiry. In relation to contemporary Anglo-American societies, the 
chapter suggests that what is ‘kept out’ of the inter-relations that create and reproduce forms of 
authority and value criteria is, of itself, the liberal individualism central to the job of creating and 
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reproducing Anglo-American societies. The chapter suggests such individualism might be seen as a 
situation-specific aspect of a dominant subjectivity. Looking at societal and relational dynamics in 
these terms allows a conceptual separation between the dynamics of ‘legitimation’ and the ongoing 
legitimizing of the order of things that ‘goes on’ because sociality is an enduring human creation. 
This means orienting inquiry towards a critique of the structures of authority and value criteria, 
and the modalities of institutionalization that mean these can be seen as enduring and extending, 
in space, and over time; as giving form and content to affairs in-common; and, as marking out the 
continuation, perpetuation, and propagation of social relations.  
Chapter 11 uses engagements with current philosophy and social theory to develop a 
schematic approach to inquiry that takes modernity to be a pervasive ‘wholism’ of binding 
variability. This discussion develops a set of ‘ontic commitments’ that frame the inquiry over an 
ontological register, recognizing ontology “entails a normative component”.183 The chapter sets 
out a framework for analyses that discusses ‘ontological categories’ of spatiality, temporality, 
embodiment, and institutionality as making possible ‘states of affairs’. The chapter suggests these 
‘categories’ can be said to enframe the social formation of subjectivity. It then combines 
engagements with current social theory and social philosophy to discuss the social constitution of 
subjectivity where conditions can be said to affect sensing, perceiving, and imagining layers of 
‘being’. Chapter 12 links the ontological categories of temporality, spatiality, institutionality, and 
embodiment with this schema to conceptualize the social constitution of subjectivity in terms of 
three coeval layers of somatic, ‘practical’, and reflexive subjectivity. It concludes by setting out an 
approach to inquiry that brings these two levels of analysis within an ontological register to inquiry 
over a normative register. The chapter approaches inquiry over a normative register that, on the 
one hand, discusses normative conditions that ‘go on’ in and through the creating and reproducing 
of social and cultural practices and discourses. On the other hand, it uses the claim that human-
being is a norm-based and relational condition to draw inquiry over ontological and normative 
registers together. The chapters in Part IV take up inquiry on these terms through a series of 
illustrative examples.  
 
… … … 
… … 
                                                 
 
183 Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, 128. 
 129 
10 Societal and relational dynamics   
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter develops a theory-based approach to societal and relational dynamics184 through 
engagements with Maurice Godelier’s and Annette Weiner’s social anthropology. In terms of 
societal dynamics, I use these authors’ work to frame my approach to social power and value. 
These authors help me to look at humans as creating forms of authority and value criteria as they 
reproduce social structures and institutions and, in so doing, privilege patterns of access to and 
monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses that might be said to enframe a dominant 
subjectivity. In terms of relational dynamics, I use these authors’ work because it helps me to set 
out an approach to human interrelations that focuses upon how humans can be said to relate as 
they engage in time, in space, through institutions, and amidst things as embodied subject-agents. 
These authors’ work helps me to ground my argument in appeal to a normative claim that human-
being is, of itself, a norm-based and relational material-physical condition.  
Engaging work by Godelier and Weiner allows the inquiry to discuss social conditions and 
subjectivity while maintaining commitment to embodiment, and ‘weak’ empiricism. However, this 
raises a distinct theoretical-conceptual problem. That is, approaching sociality through a lens that 
focuses upon the dynamics of social power, and of inter-relational commonalities and continuities 
diminishes the importance of analyzing symbols and signs. Because the analysis of signs and 
symbols is sometimes taken to be a primary concern in theories of subjectivity, notably those 
based in psychological or psychoanalysis, I take this issue up briefly in the second part of the 
chapter, insofar as it has a bearing on the direction of my argument. In the next chapter, I bring 
this normatively grounded approach to societal and relational dynamics to theory of contemporary 
modernity to set out a framework for analysis of the formation of a dominant subjectivity that 
traverses normative and ontological registers. 
 
                                                 
 
184 N. B. My use of the term ‘dynamics’ here is not intended to mean diachronic or synchronic ‘functioning’, or a combination of 
these in some ‘functional order’. Rather, I use the term to mean that the societal, ‘in-common’, and inter-relational, 
‘communicative’, aspects of social worlds at which inquiry looks, ‘from within’, are ongoing and endure in space and over time. 
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… … … 
 
For Godelier, society “is brought into existence and sustained only by the union, by the 
interdependence of … two spheres and by their difference, their relative autonomy. [C]ontractual 
exchange, on the one hand, and non-contractual transmission on the other … both of which are 
equally necessary and exist only by means of one another”.185 On the one hand, “alienable things” 
are open to exchange, through reciprocity, contract, commoditization, sale, and trade, or gift-
giving and, therefore, to determination and symbolic representation as items of value. On the 
other hand, “inalienable things, which are not governed by contract … not negotiable, which are 
located outside or beyond the domain of reciprocity”, which “individuals or groups keep for 
themselves”, such as “narratives, forms of thinking, specific, or abstract objects” are “anchored in 
the nature of things” because ‘transmitted’ as humans engage, interact, and relate in material-
physical settings.186  
In Western modernity, a vast multitude of actions, meanings, and phenomena are 
‘alienable’. Primarily, it is a universal medium for exchange, which take the form of money and its 
‘financial’ permutations, such as consumer or investment credit, for example, which facilitates the 
‘alienability’ of things. In Godelier’s terms, money and its permutations serve as stand-ins for what 
is ‘alienable’ in modernity: it signals socially created ‘values’ of ‘things’. Godelier suggests, “The 
possession of money has become the necessary condition for a physical and social existence” in 
globalizing modernity. However, he also recognizes that, even though “everything, or nearly, is for 
sale” as a condition of so-called neoliberalization, this seeming universal exchangeability — 
apparently reducing almost all aspects of sociality to economic calculation as “alienable things” — 
does not, for him, constitute the “universal fact” of human sociality.187  
In this sense, Godelier militates against both ‘crass’ Marxist and utilitarian materialisms. In 
the light of Godelier’s thesis, the constituting of sociality appears more than the effect or sum total 
of a nexus between the contract-like establishing of exchange-values and the creating of norms 
framing use-values. Theorizing societal dynamics in terms of the intertwining of “twin spheres of 
exchange and transmission” facilitates analyses of how subject-agents ‘create’ sociality, yet also 
facilitates discussing what subject-agents ‘bring’ to exchanges in order that they attribute value to 
                                                 
 
185 Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, 27, 33-36. 
186 Ibid., 33, 34, 35-37. 
187 Ibid., 204. 
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things. To operationalize his thesis, Godelier engages Annette Weiner’s argument that a central 
feature of societal dynamics is the manifesting of “inalienable possessions”, or things, through 
social practice, cultural discourse, and worldly phenomena. Godelier, with Weiner, argues it is the 
social creating of ‘inalienable’ things that facilitates the valorizing of exchanges, by serving to 
stabilize forms of reciprocity, contractual bartering or, the cash-mediated commodity trading 
predominant in globalizing modernity; 
 
[T]here is always, in every human activity, if it is to be constituted [in the material world], something 
that precedes exchange and in which exchange takes root, something that exchange both alters and 
preserves, extends and renews at the same time. Beyond the sphere of exchanges lie other domains, 
another sphere constituted of all that humans imagine they must withhold from exchange, 
reciprocity, and rivalry, which they must conserve, preserve and increase … which partakes of 
(imaginary) continuity, which is rooted in time, in the blood, in the soil, and, so on. But [this] 
imaginary cannot transform itself into the social, it cannot manufacture ‘society’ by existing on a 
purely ‘mental’ level. It must be ‘materialized’ in concrete relations which take on their form and 
content in institutions, and of course in the symbols which represent them and cause them to send 
messages back and forth, to communicate. When the imaginary is ‘materialized’ in social 
relationships, it becomes part of social reality.188 
 
For Godelier, a consequence of human engagements within sociality is the transmission of 
commonalities that “affirm deep seated identities and their continuity over time … affirm the 
existence of differences of identity between individuals, between the groups which make up a 
society or which … situate themselves respectively within” different societies.189  
Godelier uses the term ‘myth’ to describe continuities and commonalities that humans 
‘imagine’ and, in action, ‘materialize’, thus, ‘transmit’ though and between each other in spatial and 
temporal, socio-cultural and institutionalized contexts. Importantly, Godelier does not argue the 
mythical realm is itself society, or that myths create social reality. His notion of ‘myth’ in these 
respects is incommensurate with and, indeed, antithetical to philosophical idealism or 
transcendental metaphysics. In this sense, I am taking Godelier to imply sociality is a phenomenal 
reality where actions, meanings, and things emanate particular configurations of practices and 
discourses, and material-physicality, because humans ‘are’ in time, in space, and amongst others. It 
is in these respects that Godelier’s thesis begins to make possible a mode of analysis that would 
                                                 
 
188 Italics, emphases and parentheses in original. Ibid., 27, 35, 36, also, 133-38, 66. 
189 Ibid., 33, also, 171-75. 
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recognize ongoing sociality as the enframing of particular ‘forms of life’ and as an arena in which 
socialized subjects, as meaning-creating agents, ‘go on’ in the societies they create and reproduce.  
I now turn to address Weiner’s work directly. Weiner discusses how “inalienable 
possessions” might be said to manifest in and through the job of creating and reproducing 
particular practical and discursive conditions and material-physical contexts:  
 
The work of keeping relationships, possessions, and cosmological [or secular] authentications 
dynamic and vital, given the natural and cultural propensity for loss, entails the creation of 
difference that activated nodes of power and domains of authority while delimiting constraints 
against hierarchy. It is against these opposing forces that difference is established so that the power 
that difference generates is, simultaneously sought after, yet submerged; proclaimed, yet disguised; 
nurtured, yet defeated.190  
 
Weiner suggests the socio-cultural creation of “inalienable possessions” affectively 
generates power, validates control, verifies difference, or supports the evaluation of phenomena, 
while also framing potential restraints upon authority, difference, hierarchies, or value criteria. 
Through sociality and, therefore, in the commonalities and continuities ‘materialized’ in it by 
socialized, embodied, subject-agents they themselves appear to construct and construe the 
“inalienable possessions” that “color the styles, actions, and meanings that create the exchange[-
ability]” of “alienable” actions, meanings and things. For Weiner, “inalienable possessions are 
embedded with culturally authenticating ideologies … that give shape and drive to political 
processes” and “project political potential onto every essential exchange”.191  
Weiner’s argument means that, to look at the transmitting of commonalities and 
continuities as materialized in space, over time, upon bodies, and through institutions is to look at 
what binds sociality as an ongoing affair fraught by a problematic world. Her thesis implies that, in 
shifting socio-cultural and material-physical environments, inquiry into ongoing sociality might 
discuss metamorphosing and violable normative and material criteria for authenticating power, 
establishing value, as well as for challenging authority, resisting hierarchy, or expressing similarities 
and differences. Hence, for Godelier, “Beyond the realm of economic exchange and symbolic 
representation, of contract and reciprocity, there remains all that goes into the bonds between 
                                                 
 
190 Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping While Giving, 150. 
191 Ibid., 33, 34, 149-53. 
 133 
individuals, all that comprises their relationships … all that means that human beings live in 
society but that they must also produce society in order to live”.192  
 
… … … 
 
This approach to societal dynamics, however, might raise comparison with three different 
theoretical perspectives, which discussion pauses briefly to examine here. First, Godelier’s and 
Weiner’s theses might be seen as moving close to a kind of pragmatic contractual liberalism, 
because taking up what might be called an ‘agency’ perspective on inalienable things. However, I 
suggest that this would involve arguing that ‘inalienable possessions’ directly assert the value of 
things or empower human agents because they preternaturally subscribe to some inherent ‘Natural 
law’ or univocal symbolism. Therefore, Godelier’s and Weiner’s theses are taken to imply that 
nature, as well as any symbolic references that may emanate from the world as natural 
environment, is a continual social ‘innovation’ and not ‘a given’, as contractual liberalism might be 
said to assume.  
Second, focusing upon societal dynamics in these terms might call to mind the concept of 
‘biopower’ in governmentality theory. Arguably, as Chapter 7 suggests, these approaches appear to 
cast ‘power’ as if an end in itself. While they might make it possible to classify, or taxonomize, 
examples of ‘sovereignty over bare life’, governmentality theory relativizes inquiry because not 
differentiating between conditions for the creating and maintaining of ‘legitimate’ normative 
orders and overstepping or obfuscating them. In these respects, Godelier’s and Weiner’s theses are 
taken up because offering a perspective on the creating of social power and norms that is critical 
about how sociality and subjectivity might ‘legitimate’ power and actualize value in the absence of 
references to embodied human-being, in space and time, and amongst others. It offers a purview 
on practical and discursive conditions that generate forms of authority and criteria for verifying 
differences in value that also opens potential constraints upon them to analysis in relation to the 
job of ‘being’ human. 
Third, and in a slightly different way, Godelier’ and Weiner’s theses might call to mind 
Bourdieu’s extensive discussions of “symbolic alchemy”, “symbolic violence” or “symbolic 
capital”. While Chapter 12 discusses Bourdieu in more detail, his concept of “symbolic violence”, 
                                                 
 
192 Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, 36, 210. 
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which explains the social creating of sources of “symbolic capital” in terms of the accumulation of 
power amidst “individual self-deception sustained by a collective self-deception, a veritable 
collective misrecognition inscribed in objective structures … [that] excludes the possibility of 
thinking otherwise [about power in society]” is interesting here.193 Arguably, while “inalienable 
possessions” might be cast in this way — as if translucent repositories for “symbolic capital” — 
doing so would be to imply these activate “nodes of power and domains of authority” without 
also “activating possibilities”194 for brinkmanship or for politicizing modes of exchange, beyond 
what might arguably be seen as cynical acts of ‘capital’ accumulation. In these respects, because 
casting societal dynamics in terms of shared and communicated — ‘norm-based’ and relational 
contexts — Godelier’s and Weiner’s approach allows social power and value criteria to be seen as 
always and already within the (potential) control of humans. The questions raised by the possible 
or probable appropriation of these by single subject-agents remains beyond the scope of the 
present thesis’ inquiry.  
 
… … …  
 
To return to the main thread of this chapter, the discussion looks at how Godelier’s and Weiner’s 
theses open possibilities for inquiry from a perspective that sees committing actions, creating 
meanings, and modalizing things as ‘materializing’ a reality that, of themselves, appear to “legitimize 
the order of the universe”:  
 
What is produced and reproduced through the establishment of the personal bonds [constituting 
sociality] is all or part of the social relations which constitute the foundations of the society and 
which endow it with a certain overall logic that is also the source of the social identity of … groups 
or individuals. [What] individuals and groups which make up a given society [manifest] is not only 
their personal [or corporate] wills but a-personal or impersonal necessities having to do with the 
nature of their social relations, which spring up again and again in the process of producing and 
reproducing them. 195  
 
                                                 
 
193 See, for example, P. Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, trans. G. Sapiro, et al. (London: Polity Press, 1998 [1994]), 
95, 99-103. 
194 Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping While Giving, 150. 
195 Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, 33, 102, 72, 77. Italics in original. 
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In this sense, sociality is seen as the ongoing constituting of particular yet consistently 
metamorphosing and violable normative conditions amidst material-physical ‘worldly’ contexts 
that encompass in sum total. However, the term ‘legitimation’ raises a conceptual issue that 
requires further clarification. Insofar as the term is central to Habermas’ theory of modernity and 
modernization, “Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order’s claim to be 
recognized as right and just; a legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means a political order’s 
worthiness to be recognized. This definition highlights the fact that ‘legitimacy’ is a contestable validity 
claim; the stability of the order of domination (also) depends on its (at least) de facto recognition”. 
Hence, I take Habermas as offering a political account of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legitimation’: “Only 
political orders can have and lose legitimacy; only they need legitimation”.196  
Here, discussion points up a difference between Habermas’ use of ‘legitimation’, and 
Godelier’s and Weiner’s use of the term. Based in a perspective that implies to commit actions, 
create meanings, or modalize things is to materialize a phenomenal reality that, of itself, “legitimizes 
the order of the universe”,197 the thesis takes Godelier’s and Weiner’s use of legitimation to imply 
the existence of analyzable states of affairs, in societies, which involve social power. That is, 
Godelier’s and Weiner’s use of legitimation here implies that sociality ‘goes on’ in ways that, in 
analysis, imply the creating and reproducing forms of authority and value criteria within delineable, 
because ‘held’ in common and continuing, spatial and (epochal, or linear historical) temporal 
contexts. As such, Godelier’s and Weiner’s theses orient the present inquiry towards a focus upon 
what subject-agents might be said to “crystallize and reproduce” as conditions for the ongoing 
formation of subjectivity. By opening to discussion actions, meanings, and things as what 
socialized subject-agents have “in common … by the fact of belonging to the same society”,198 in 
space and over time, the suggestion is that these are open to inquiry because they effect lasting 
structures and institutions. These engagements with Godelier’s and Weiner’s theses help to orient 
analytic focus towards ways that sociality may privilege particular practices and discourses, over 
others, within a pervasive societal context. Moreover, these imply my inquiry into the formation of 
subjectivity might focus upon the ongoing creating and reproducing of particular normative 
conditions within a field of structured and institutionalized ‘ontic’ contexts. Hereafter, the present 
                                                 
 
196 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, ed. T. McCarthy, trans. W. Rehg, 
Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999 [1992]), 31-33, 385-86, 488-90, J. Habermas, 
Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1979 [1976]), 178-79, Habermas, Legitimation 
Crisis, 36-37, 95-103. 
197 Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, 172. Italics in original. 
198 Ibid., 33, 35, 177. 
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thesis takes ‘legitimate’ to mean the worthiness, as just or right, of a social order, and legitimate to 
mean the lasting or enduring qualities of a social order. 
 
… … … 
 
Discussion now revisits the discussion of Godelier’s and Weiner’s theses, and brings them to bear 
more directly upon inquiry into conditions in the contemporary Anglo-American West. I want to 
link these engagements to my suggestions in Chapters 2 and 3 that modernizing structured and 
institutionalized conditions seem to privilege a particular formation of liberal individualism as a 
situation-specific ‘aspect’ of a dominant subjectivity. This discussion relates Godelier’s conceptual 
schema more directly to the present thesis’ argument and, as such, moves away from his term 
‘myth’.  
Godelier uses Jean-Joseph Goux’s commentary on passages from Marx’s Capital to discuss 
the ‘paradoxical’ constituting of capitalistic societies in which almost everything is possibly ‘for 
sale’. Godelier looks upon Marx as describing how money, manifestly ‘inalienable’, is also the 
means for exchanging what is ‘alienable’, where “in principle, a person could obtain immediately 
and without restriction, gold coins in exchange for the banknotes or other monetary signs in 
circulation … [because] paper money represented gold”. Godelier takes Marx’s argument that, “as 
the standard of value, gold is merely nominal money and nominal gold; purely as a medium of 
circulation it is symbolic money and symbolic gold; but in its simple metallic corporeality gold is 
money or money is real gold”.199 Godelier wants to look upon gold as both money, the motor for 
exchange, and the anchor point for monetary value:  
 
[I]n the midst of a market economy, of universal currency, and generalized competition … 
something needs to be kept out of circulation … withheld from the sphere and the movement of 
exchange in order for the mass of the market and bank exchanges to be set in motion, for 
everything that can be bought or sold to begin circulating. [Money appears to] occupy two places at 
the same time, one at the very heart of the exchange process … as a medium of payment, the other 
prior to or beyond exchange, where it constitutes a stable reference point for measuring the value 
of whatever circulates in these exchanges. 200  
  
                                                 
 
199 Ibid., 26-29. 
200 See, Marx, Capital, 183-84, 88. Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, 28-29. 
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Godelier argues, in retrospect, that Marx represents ‘real’ gold as the ‘inalienable’ aspect of 
money: both motor and anchor point for “industrial capitalist” society because subject-agents 
‘imagine’ it to be such. Godelier argues that, for a mode of exchange, for “a currency (symbol) to 
circulate and serve as wealth or capital, it must be authorized, as it were, by its ties with some reality 
which does not circulate, which is kept out of the exchange sphere and which appears as the true 
source of exchange value”. Godelier uses Marx’s thesis to argue that, in modernizing ‘capitalistic’ 
conditions, sociality might be said to go on as if socialized subject-agents collectively ‘imagine’ the 
power and value of money, which they materialize in the job of creating and reproducing 
capitalistic societies.201 
However, Godelier also recognizes that reading Marxist theory in this way fails to 
characterize sufficiently the ‘totalizing’ quality of modernity. In this sense, Godelier suggests that 
taking Marx’s thesis to relate the value of money to ‘real’ gold might be to point to an “inalienable 
possession” in particular historical conditions, but not sufficiently to explain the ostensibly 
‘mythical’ terms of inalienability in contemporary conditions. Godelier points out that the collapse 
of the “gold standard” — to which Nixon’s moves to end US dollar ‘convertibility’ might be 
added202 — raises empirical problems for Goux’s take on Marx’s work.  
It is here that Godelier takes a pointed step towards clarifying his rather muddy concept of 
‘myth’ in contemporary settings. He recognizes that modernization institutes a structural 
“differential” in Western societies; between those for whom money imbricates within productive 
sociality and those for whom (lack of) money excludes, marginalizes, and disenfranchises. Godelier 
argues that the structural composition of this “permanent deficit of solidarity” rests in the political 
institutionalization of the liberal-democratic nation-state, which enshrines and defends positive 
freedoms and “equal status before the law”.203  
What Godelier argues is that Western representative democracy, via the binding articles of 
constitutions, juridico-legislative machinery, and parliamentary governance, enshrines “the 
individual, the corporeal person” as the “inalienable thing”, which works to generate power, 
validate control, verify difference, and support value criteria for things in the world. However, at 
this point, I want to aver from uncritically accepting this aspect of Godelier’s thesis. It is too static: 
 
                                                 
 
201 Parentheses in original. Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, 33-37, 163-64. 
202 H. Kuroda, "The "Nixon Shock" And The "Plaza Agreement": Lessons from Two Seemingly Failed Cases of Japan's Exchange 
Rate Policy," China & World Economy 12, no. 1 (2004): 3-4. 
203 Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, 204-06. 
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[That] the individual, the person, may not be bought or sold by a third party … an individual’s body 
remains their own property; this is guaranteed by law, and this property can never be turned into a 
commodity. Individuals … as corporeal and spiritual singularities, cannot be put on the market as 
commodities, whereas everyday they can deal in the market as economic agents.204  
 
To support this claim, Godelier argues that the inalienability of the Western individual 
person is so because the parliamentary, liberal-democratic constitutional “legal system in which it 
is rooted does not belong to the sphere of market relations”.205  
Here, the chapter turns to set out some differences with Godelier, and then discusses the 
way the argument will move on move on. I first deal with the notion that the corporeal person is 
inalienable and, then, the way Godelier distinguishes between the Western nation-state (politicized 
juridico-legal system) and the market (capitalistic economic system). Presented in Godelier’s terms, 
‘economic’ inequities — injustices consequential upon spheres of production, consumption, or 
distribution — cannot manifest ‘legitimately’ “before the ‘law’” because Western liberal-
democratic constitutional ‘law’ recognizes persons as free and equal individuals. Yet, extending 
away from Godelier’s thesis, I suggest that the ‘law’ he points to intertwines and combines with a 
range of structured and institutionalized conditions. These are, notably, capitalistic markets and the 
liberal-democratic political domain. Conditions might be said to privilege engagements on 
particular terms: those of individual exemplarity and equalitarianism, and do not always rely 
specifically on (juridico-legislative) ‘law’, but also on economic differentials and ‘legitimated’, that 
is, un-contested modes of authority.  
Godelier argues that, in Western societies, it is the corporeal person as legally protected 
‘individual’ that is the “inalienable possession” which subject-agents “keep for themselves” and 
‘transmit’ and, as such, works as both motor and anchor point within sociality. However, a few 
empirical examples may serve to mitigate setting up the inviolability or non-sale-ability of the 
corporeal person in law as the source of the inalienable possession of contemporary Western 
societies. Most visible are prostitution, the sale of one’s corporeal body for the pleasure or use of 
others; pornography, which may be considered prostitution-in-abstraction, in some respects at 
least; and techno-scientific research, which may co-opt and utilize human, albeit, embryonic 
                                                 
 
204 Ibid., 205. Italics in original. 
205 Ibid., 206. 
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bodies. Arguably, all or some of these examples exist in the Anglo-American nation-states under 
the auspices of ‘law’.206  
However, more importantly in this sense, if less immediately discernible is the manner by 
which wage labour itself is the sale of human bodies. More contentiously, forms of micro-credit 
that involve garnishee-rights over wages and salaries earned over several decades might be seen as 
a kind of postmodern resuscitation of Medieval penury ‘schemes’. Where such monies are 
borrowed for ‘necessities’, such as higher education, accommodation, or means of transport, for 
example, these seem to imply the inveigling of embodied subject-agents into a web of life-long 
subjection. In these respects, Godelier’s thesis does not take into account the effects of abstraction 
and mediation that market-oriented modernity seems to bring. His thesis appears to recognize 
secular institutionalization but also imbricates this into analytic perspective by eliding the 
mediatized qualities of sociality in market-oriented liberal-democratic settings.  
Godelier argues that the inalienability of the Western “individual, the person” is so because 
the nation-state parliamentary, liberal-democratic constitutional “legal system in which it is rooted 
does not belong to the sphere of market relations”.207 However, the political nation-state itself may 
arguably be cast as an institutionalized complex that may cause individual corporeal persons to be 
“exchanged”; soldiers in war are exchanged for the ‘national good’, hostage exchanges are rare but 
occur, for example. In a more complex way, many aspects of the law, such as ‘three strikes you’re 
out’ legislation may result in subject-agents imprisonment for what, in many respects, may be 
slight misdemeanours. The death penalty’ might also be judged appropriate for psychologically or 
psychiatrically disabled or improperly defended persons. Nonetheless, these ethical-moral 
considerations aside, the death penalty might amount to ‘exchanging’ one corporeal individual for 
‘public safety’. Furthermore, some Commonwealth or, at least, British persons might, in the 
strictest legal terms, be Royal subjects and not citizens.  
As such, the thesis looks beyond the entrenching of the individual as a corporeal person, 
‘before the law’, as key source for the commonalities and continuities that anchor and impel 
sociality. Instead, it turns from the individual corporeal person, protected by the ‘law’ in Godelier’s 
thesis, because it seems to imply the political system stands apart from sociality per se, rather than 
capitalistic markets based in individual exemplarity and equalitarianism. Instead, I want to set out a 
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Series, no. 19 (2002): 61-72.  
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perspective on the ‘inalienable thing’, which might be seen as both anchor point and motor for 
contemporary Anglo-American sociality on less formalistic terms, by employing the dynamism 
that I take Godelier’s and Weiner’s theses to imply.  
Therefore, my argument looks to the liberal individualism that, because seen as a situation-
specific aspect of a dominant subjectivity, can be said to manifest as both motor and anchor point 
for the ongoing job of creating and reproducing Anglo-American sociality. I take liberal 
individualism to be the dynamic ‘lived’ form of life that the particular patterns of access to and 
monopolies over materials, practices, and discourses within these societies privilege. That is, such 
individualism is seen as the predominant form of life manifest in and through, the key way of 
‘going on’, within core arenas for sociality. The forms of authority and evaluation criteria that 
manifest in Anglo-American societies do so in relation to a predominant form of life, a liberal 
individualism that subject-agents ‘live’ and, so, embody in space, over time, and amongst others.  
In these respects, the distinction between individualism and subjectivity is important. In 
the next chapter, this delineation frames conceptualization of the approach as a method for 
inquiry. It means that looking at the same thing — subjectivity — requires three registers of 
inquiry. An ontological register attuned to the pervasive qualities of modernization, a normative 
register that recognizes social conditions are human creations, and a critique of normativity that 
relates being human in conditions that might privilege a particular form of life, to ‘being’ human as 
the ‘human condition’. 
 
… … … 
 
However, approaching societal dynamics in this way also implies a particular approach to relational 
dynamics, which I now pause briefly to discuss. Reflecting upon how my discussion in this chapter 
implies a particular way of conceptualizing (inter-)relational dynamics is important because, while 
maintaining analytic ‘weak’ empiricism, this comes at the cost of raising a relatively vexing 
theoretical issue. The discussion touches on this issue, because approaching sociality and 
subjectivity in the terms suggested here seems to problematize theory that conceives of the 
primacy of a ‘symbolic order’ in societal and relational dynamics. 
On the one hand, using these anthropologists’ work as the basis for theorizing societal and 
relational dynamics implies the primacy of an imaginary-‘real’ nexus that subject-agents ‘bring’ to 
reality. In effect, it implies that subject-agents ‘are’ a material-physical and, so, embodied imaginary-
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‘real’ nexus. In these respects, because humans are said to act, create meanings, and modalize 
things in time, in space, and through institutions, the ‘imaginary’ can be seen as that (embodied) 
aspect of human-being in social worlds. As such, the ‘real’ can be seen as the (embodied) locus for 
conscious ‘being’ in the world, over time, and through institutions, and the font of reflexive 
‘adjustment’ to a world where nature and culture change, fall apart, and wear out. Hence, I use the 
imaginary-‘real’ nexus here as the motif for human-being as a specific somatic state of existence. It 
is analytically inaccessible to my inquiry, yet a part of reality and, moreover, the source of the 
‘phenomenal’ universe. This is to take an agnostic view of things. This view of societal and 
relational dynamics implies a perspective that sees subject-agents imagine ‘real’ worlds and, so, (re-
)constitute and (re-)affirm relational ‘identities’ in space, over time, within bodies, and through the 
institutions that ‘going on’, of itself, creates and reproduces.  
Socialized, embodied humans materialize common and continuing ‘real’ worlds; that is, 
‘being’ human is effectively making reality. It might be said that humans share and communicate 
(within) reality in order to ‘go on’, but do not share, nor do they communicate reality. Embodied 
subject-agents ‘live’ particular continuities and ‘hold’ particular commonalities with others, which 
means that sociality involves structured and institutionalized ways of doing things within reality, but 
also that reality as such can be seen only as the ‘field’ in which arbitrary and contingent possibilities 
manifest. Identifying such arbitrariness and contingency made particular would, then, seem to 
imply not so much identifying a form of life — as is the job of ‘being’ human itself, of ‘living a life’ 
— as justifying identification as such in relation to what is in-common; the material-physicality of 
‘being’ human. Such an approach involves moving away from the duality, ‘identity – difference’, 
and towards a tripartite schema, ‘identity – difference, and particularity in relation to the enframing 
of identity – difference’. 
On the other hand, looking at sociality as such seems to demand that inquiry relegate 
concepts of the primacy of the ‘symbolic order’ in inter-relations to a subsidiary role. This 
approach contrasts with such theory; that is, an approach that discusses inter-relationality in terms 
of human-being as the interpretation(s) of symbols and signs. This approach suggests an 
analytically inaccessible nexus between imaginary and ‘real’ comprises subject-agents’ relationships 
within reality. For Godelier, “inalienable things” manifest a “visible synthesis … [that] combines 
and unifies the contents — imaginary, symbolic, and ‘real’ — of all social relations”. Bound within 
subject-hood, subject-agents constitute sociality, but transmit commonalities and continuities that 
“condense and unify the imaginary and ‘real’ components of social reality”, but this remains off-
limits to my inquiry. In this sense, the symbolic order “merely makes the system visible … The 
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symbolic logic is a logic of relations but these cannot be reduced to their symbols. And, as these 
symbols are polysemic, the content of these relations cannot be directly deduced from or reduced 
to the analysis of their symbols”. As such, the symbolic order works as static ‘signposting’ for 
action by more, or less, affectively “stating the order that should prevail in society”.208  
In the light of these engagements, conceiving of relational dynamics from a perspective 
based in, for example, ‘symbolic exchange’ might seem limited to pointing out the possible 
intentions that a symbol’s creator might hold, or cognitions that a symbol’s exchanger might make. 
In these respects, focusing on the primacy of ‘symbolic exchange’ would seem to require that a 
particular symbolic Code or Order stand beyond, preternaturally ordaining symbols or signs with 
meaning and value. Alternatively, such a focus would seem to imply an analytic capacity to 
intervene upon intra-subjective states. Chapter 5 suggests that certain structuralist and post-
structuralist theories might be said to work in this way: they seem to objectify societal and 
relational dynamics by setting ostensible ‘principles’ beyond sociality itself — a symbolic Code, or 
psychoanalytically derived constant — and, as it were, reading symbolic relations ‘back off them’.  
In these respects, the approach might call to mind Wittgenstein’s philosophy: subjects-
agents imagine ‘real’ worlds and, in action, creating meanings, and modalizing things, create and 
reproduce an ongoing reality that emanates signs and symbols which are manifestly ‘sign-posts’ for 
a form of life. As such, a symbolic order, such as the code by which traffic signals operate, might 
imply a particular form of life: that of drivers, for example, because symbols signal human’s ‘re-
cognition’ of them. Yet, these do not necessarily open to discussion the contents of any relation 
between cognition and signs, which might be to ‘sublime the logic’ of signs (as a kind of language). 
This implies that the present inquiry should recognize that humans represent ‘to each another’, 
and that such representations attain ‘justification’ in relation with others because they ‘are’ 
embodied, in space, over time, and amongst others. Moreover, in these respects, the argument 
takes reality and not the ‘real’ to be the important “indivisible remainder”: the ‘real’ or the 
imaginary-‘real’ nexus are merely the conceptualized groundwork for inquiry into societal and 
relational dynamics that requires its own justification in relation to human-being.209 
                                                 
 
208 Ibid., 104, 21, 27, 34, 74. 
209 Again, I take up Wittgenstein here to help clarify how focusing upon a symbolic Order might be a problem for the direction 
these engagements with Godelier and Weiner imply I take things. Discussing ‘certainty’ Wittgenstein, suggests, “Giving 
grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end:— but the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately 
as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game”. In addition, “If 
the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false.” In the light of my discussion here of relational 
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or a “kernel of the real that resists signification” because constituting an “indivisible remainder” that belies the never complete 
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Godelier’s and Weiner’s work is used here to imply analysis is always ‘indirect’; it aims to 
bring into view the affectivity of a reality that subject-agents materialize as the job of creating and 
reproducing social worlds. Therefore, my inquiry springs from ‘weak’ empirical claims about the 
world. Reality is an environment or atmosphere in which normative and material social existence 
‘goes on’. In this sense, these engagements mean that inquiry focuses upon a reality where 
socialized subject-agents, as it were, imagine along similar lines and, therefore, create particular 
worlds. Focusing on ways that social and cultural practices and discourses emanate commonalities 
and continuities because embedded in material-physical contexts implies a framework for analysis 
that recognizes subjectivity as the social enframing of subject-agency for a particular world.  
In conclusion, this chapter suggests how discussing relational dynamics in these terms 
implies a focus upon socialized subject-agents that imagine ‘real’ worlds and materialize these to 
constitute reality through actions, meanings, and things. This opens the formation of subjectivity to 
inquiry as a socio-cultural condition, while avoiding implicit or explicit intervention into intra-
personal states and, so, unifying analysis in ‘strong’ empiricism by extending reality beyond that of a 
single subject-agent in the act of being. Moreover, it suggests approaching analysis in this way 
implies sociality and subjectivity is taken as a norm-based and inter-relational ‘affair’ that involves 
the creating and reproducing of plastic and violable forms of authority and value criteria, as well as 
challenges to authority, resistance to hierarchies, and expressions of similarity and difference in 
material-physical contexts.  
As Chapters 2 and 3 suggest, modernity can be seen as implying that reality is ‘presence’, 
and subjectivity the self-orienting ‘immediate’ form that human-being takes amidst modernization. 
Bringing in the device of ‘modern artificialism’ here suggests a perspective upon sociality as, 
simultaneously, the creating and reproducing of a world that is a tergo concrete and ‘objectively 
true’, yet plastic and violable; where forms of authority and value criteria can be said to manifest in 
particular ways. For the present thesis, this means that what happens when embodied humans in 
space, over time, and through institutions, create and construe a material-physical world that 
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encompasses in sum total, leaves sociality open to monopolization through forms of authority and 
value criteria, but never to total domination.  
Therefore, engaging with Godelier’s and Weiner’s work here means looking to liberal 
individualism as a form of life that might be said to both anchor and impel the job of creating and 
reproducing contemporary Anglo-American sociality. Discussing a situation-specific aspect of a 
dominant subjectivity as such, means that inquiry focuses upon actions, meanings, and things as 
humans create and reproduce, which in space, over time, and through institutions, privilege 
patterns of access to and monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses. That is, these 
engagements help to approach sociality as the producing of normative conditions for particular 
forms of life because human-being is a norm-based and relational condition that ‘goes on’ amidst 
binding and encompassing material-physical contexts: wherein, as Weiner suggests, there exist 
‘natural and cultural propensities for loss’. Looking at societal and relational dynamics on these 
terms implies a framework for inquiry which looks at sociality as an in-common and enduring 
affair, which encompasses human-being in sum total. The next chapter sets out the approach to 
inquiry over an ontological register that focus upon the social formation and constitution of 
subjectivity. Chapter 13 sets out the approach to inquiry over a normative register that focuses 
upon the creating and reproducing of normative conditions as these can be said to privilege a 
particular form of life and in relation to a critique of normativity that springs from a claim that 
human-being is a norm-based and relational condition.  
 
… … … 
… … 
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11 The social formation of subjectivity 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter briefly discusses recent debates over how philosophical inquiry should take up and 
apply ‘ontology’. Initially, it discusses Jan Westerhoff’s contribution to these debates, and sets up a 
bridge between philosophical concerns to justify the concepts that structure reflecting on the 
world, and social theory concerns to justify an account of worldly conditions as humans can be 
said to create and reproduce them. Apropos the problem of avoiding ‘strong’ empirical claims, the 
chapter takes ‘ontology’ to mean the job of explaining, or ‘theorizing’, the material-physical totality 
of binding variables, the ‘ontic field’ that always and already enframes human-being within social 
worlds. Westerhoff’s work is used to distance ‘ontology’ from essentialist positivism and idealist 
metaphysics, and as a way into developing an approach to inquiry over an ontological register that 
recognizes analyses always contain epistemological and normative components.210  
On the one hand, the chapter ‘looks back’, and uses these discussions to ground the 
epistemological assumptions that have remained implicit in Parts I and II. On the other hand, the 
chapter also ‘looks forward’, and uses the caveats that Westerhoff places on ‘ontology’ as bases for 
operationalizing the approach the argument as a contribution to the critical social theory of 
subjectivity in the contemporary Anglo-American West. In these respects, it then discusses Paul 
James’ suggestions that critical social inquiry needs adequately to recognize how social-historical 
formation effects the ordaining of “ontological categories”. The chapter takes up James’ account 
of ‘ontology’ — as a concept that refers to “the basic framing categories of social existence … 
modes of being-in-the-world, [which are] historically constituted in the structures of human 
interrelations”,211 — in order to develop my approach to the formation of subjectivity over an 
ontological register.  
                                                 
 
210 I take ‘always’ here to mean ‘in all contexts’, and ‘already’ to mean ‘prior to perception, but not to human sensation’. Hence, I 
take it that ‘ontology’ seeks to explain the ‘ontic’ or, moreover, the ‘ontic field’. In these respects, I take up Westerhoff’s thesis 
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logic are, in one sense or another, ‘empirical’ by virtue of ‘always’ and ‘already’ being in a relationship to the material-
physicality of human existence. See, Quine, Word & Object, 238-43, Westerhoff, "The Construction of Ontological Categories," 
619. 
211 James, Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In, 324. 
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The chapter then turns to Pierre Bourdieu’s anthropological sociology. It revisits and 
extends discussion of Bourdieu’s theses on the ‘shared misrecognition’ or repression of ‘symbolic 
violence’ said to motivate sociality through a dynamics of ‘symbolic capital’. Nevertheless, those 
aspects of Bourdieu’s work that centre on the concepts of habitus, bodily hexis, and ‘practical’ 
consciousness help to shift from inquiry over an ontological register focused upon the formation 
of subjectivity and to a focus upon its social constitution. The chapter again brings in Wittgenstein 
to help clarify the direction Bourdieu’s concepts are taken. Hence, the chapter develops and 
schematizes what Chapter 9 describes as a need for inquiry to range across and unify analyses over 
an ontological register, normative register, and in relation to normativity as a ‘lived’ condition in 
particular (modernizing Anglo-American) social settings.  
 
… … … 
 
Westerhoff’s thesis is helpful here because it allows definition of material-physical contexts for 
sociality, the ‘ontic field’, in a way commensurate with the main research problem identified as a 
need for ‘weak’ empiricism. Westerhoff addresses an important problem in contemporary Western 
philosophy, which concerns attempts to use ontology to delimit or define the “essences of things”, 
arguing that “ontological claims about essences inexorably involve epistemology” and, therefore, 
do not stand as justified of themselves. Westerhoff’s central claim is that “ontological categories” 
need to be set out in terms of what they frame, rather than as defining the unifying or irreducible 
properties — the essences — of objects: 
 
[Philosophers] have to give up the idea that information about ontological categories supplies us 
with information about the essences of objects … since what things there are in the world is a 
contingent matter, claims about ontological categories cannot have the modal force attributed to 
them when it is claimed that they provide us with information about the essential properties of 
things. Ontology systematizes information about how objects can go together to form states of 
affairs … it provides us with a unified account of how objects in this world fit together into states 
of affairs.212  
  
For Westerhoff, “ontology looks much more epistemological than ontologists would like 
to think” because, to claim that “information about ontological categories supplies information” 
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about “the essences of objects” is to fail to recognize that, of necessity, ontology includes 
epistemological categorizations.213  
In this way, Westerhoff approaches ontology as a means for conceptualizing an arbitrary 
and contingent ontic field in which states of affairs may or may not arise meaningful, normative 
conditions. Westerhoff’s thesis implies that ‘states of affairs’, particular normative conditions, can 
be seen as manifesting amidst a totality of binding (material-physical) variables: an ontic field. That 
is, ontology can explain the ontic field as a material-physical context which holds forth possibilities 
that social conditions ‘be’ in particular ways, and recognizes that to explain conditions, as such, is 
to assume some relation with them. That is, ontology makes it possible to explain situations as 
arbitrary and contingent possibilities which may or may not give rise to particular state of affairs, 
while recognizing that the ontic field always(-already) gives rise to some kind of state of affairs. It 
might be said that recognizing the arbitrariness and contingency in and through which social 
conditions manifest cleaves the job of claiming that things ‘be’ in a way that means such claims 
require three interlinked perspectives. Rather than attempting to obtain an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, 
while maintaining a position ‘outside of either’, Westerhoff’s argument implies that to claim 
something ‘is’ is to establish a relationship between arbitrariness and contingency — the 
perspective from which inquiry takes place, and the material-physicality of ‘being’ human in space, 
time, and a social context.  
Using the way that Westerhoff ties ontology to arbitrary and contingent possibilities that 
states of affairs manifest allows the setting aside of ‘strong’ empiricism, qua the argument, but not 
to jettison possibilities that subjectivity has ‘strong’ empirical qualities. Arguably, the emphasis 
throughout Part I on the concept of ‘modern artificialism’ raises this matter as a social-historical 
claim. As such, Weber’s injunction that ‘disenchantment’ and ‘intellectualization’ do not mean “an 
increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives” but, moreover, “the 
knowledge that if one but wished, one could learn it at any time” offers some direction.214 In the 
light of Westerhoff’s thesis, it might be said that Weber’s claim means that subjectivity makes the 
reality that enframes human-being recognizable in sum total, not from within (individual) ‘being’ 
itself — even though ‘Western individualism’ may imply reality be taken this way, ‘psychologically’ 
— but, in relation to human-being as a ‘lived’ and, so, shared and communicative condition. 
Hence, I take Westerhoff’s suggestions to mean that inquiry needs some account of the universe 
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as it can be said to be in relation to being human within in it, in order to avoid the ‘strong’ 
empiricism that would merely posit how the world is or should be from within a single ‘being’.  
Westerhoff opens ontological categories to discussion as aspects of the phenomenal world 
and, thus, shifts ontology away from metaphysical speculation, and the polarity between positivist 
Realism and relativism. On the one hand, discussing ontological categories as contingencies 
through which states of affairs may manifest in particular ways dissociates inquiry into worldly 
human affairs from metaphysics, because making explicit a need for inquiry to clarify the 
perspective it assumes and relate this to the arbitrariness and contingency of possibilities that mean 
things manifest around it in particular ways. On the other hand, such an approach dissociates 
inquiry from essentialist positivism — which would imply that Nature is identical to that supposed 
to enframe worldly human affairs, or that Human Nature is of a fixed specificity — because 
loading onto inquiry a need to justify itself in relation to its ‘position as claimed’.  
Ontology indicates that a state of affairs can ‘be’ (in variable ways), while also indicating 
that claiming the world ‘is’ in particular ways requires substantiating in a different register. That is, 
while the sheer arbitrariness and contingencies of possible manifestations of states of affairs and 
things ‘is’, affairs and things do manifest in particular ways that hold, and do so in relation to the 
job of ‘being’ human. At issue here, alongside saying what particular affairs and things manifest, is 
the situation from which spring claims about what ‘is’. Westerhoff’s thesis effectively ‘de-mystifies’ 
ontology by delimiting, as part of inquiry, to the job of rendering how ontic contextuality might be 
said to enframes states of affairs. As such, Westerhoff’s work on ‘ontology’ allows inquiry to step 
from philosophy to social theory by offering a way into the job of doing it that ‘hangs onto’ 
material-physicality and the norm-based and relational condition that is human-being.  
These engagements imply that ontology contains epistemological ‘references’ and, so, 
indicates possibilities for a normative project; the ‘generative and unifying principle’ is the job of 
socialized embodied human-being, in space, over time, and amongst others. Hence, ontological 
references to material-physicality merely supply information about how a state of affairs may 
manifest, or ‘fit together’, and requires inquiry consider the always-already societal and inter-
relational qualities of the world. Based on these suggestions, inquiry might ‘step around’ 
metaphysics and positive ‘foundationalism’ and approach the world in terms of the shared and 
communicated, creating and reproducing by socialized embodied humans of particular states of 
affairs. Therefore, to discuss ontology is to bring to light material-physicality, as a totality of 
binding variables that also requires explanation in terms of both practical and discursive normative 
conditions and ‘normativity’: the societal and inter-relational condition that is ‘being’ human. This 
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means the approach inquires over an ontological register, focused upon how the ontic field can be 
said to enframe actions, meanings, and things, over a normative register, where materials, 
practices, and discourses manifest, and that relates these to what Weiner suggests is the 
‘problematic nature’ of the world that subject-agents materialize as they ‘go on’. That is, where 
human-being ‘is’ in ways that mean questions about what ‘ought’ to be arise. Ontological inquiry 
offers a way of setting out to explain how a totality of binding variables might be said to enframe 
subjectivity as what ‘going on’ can be said to be, where actions, meanings, and things come to be 
as particular historical, socio-cultural, and material-physical states of affairs, or situations.  
To reiterate in the light of Westerhoff’s work, it might be said that subjectivity requires 
explanation in terms of both ontological and normative commonalities and continuities that 
humans materialize as part of the creating and reproducing of sociality, because human-being is an 
embodied condition that, itself, ‘goes on’ in space, over time, and amongst others. Discussing 
ontology in this way means emphasizing the inseparability of inquiry over an ontological register 
from that of a normative register in relation to a critique of normativity.  
 
… … … 
 
To operationalize Westerhoff’s concept of ‘ontology’ — as supplying information about how 
states of affairs might ‘fit together’ in the world — the chapter now turns to aspects of James’ 
comprehensive approach to social theory. James builds upon and extends work by Hinkson, 
Sharp, Simon Cooper, and others associated with the ‘constitutive abstraction’ approach to theory, 
aimed at developing historical materialism in ways useful for social critique in ‘globalizing’ 
conditions. For James, contemporary social theory needs adequately to consider its own points of 
reference in relation to the “levels of analytical abstraction” it operationalizes, as well as those it 
operates under and within. James suggests that moving in this direction “tak[es] away the 
innocence of those abstract presumptions that, of necessity, are part of social inquiry”. It makes 
explicit “how the analytical, political, and the ethical are interconnected”. James’ work is used here 
to focus inquiry upon an arbitrary and contingent totality of binding (material-physical) variables 
that can be said to enframe embodied subject-agents as they create and reproduce social worlds.215 
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For James, ontology “refers to the most basic framing categories of social existence … 
modes of being-in-the-world, historically constituted in the structures of human interrelations”. 
James defines these “ontological categories [as] … embodiment, spatiality, temporality, and epistemology”. 
In the light of Westerhoff’s thesis, James’ ‘categories’ might be seen as offering a way to discus 
what goes into how states of affairs may fit together in the world. Construed in this way, ontology 
works as a means for discussing the enframing of human-being in relation to material-physical 
contexts. This is important because the way James relates ontology, as a tool in social theory, to 
social-historical form(-ation) avoids ‘bogging down’ inquiry in the epochal abstractions it explains. 
James’ approach is used here because it makes legible what the present thesis labels the ‘ontic 
field’; the ‘immediate’ material-physicality that is reality, yet avoids traducing reality to claims about 
‘being’ in it. James’ approach means conceptualizing differently reality, as the ‘platform’ for human-
being; social conditions, as subject-agents ‘materialize’ the world; and sociality, where practices and 
discourses intertwine amidst material-physical contexts in ways that mean subjectivity manifests as 
the form of life that human-being takes in modernizing conditions. 
The discussion here first looks at James’ ‘ontological categories’ of spatiality and 
temporality. It then discusses James’ categories of epistemology and embodiment, again bringing 
in Wittgenstein to help clarify the direction taken. James takes up Giddens’ thesis that “the 
separating of time and space and their formation into standardized, ‘empty’ dimensions” are 
consequences of the relatively complexity of globalizing modernization. For Giddens, tied up with 
the reflexivity that he identifies as a structural and institutional condition of modernization is the 
“separation of time and space and their recombination in forms which permit the precise time-space 
‘zoning’ of social life; the ‘disembedding’ of social systems”.216 However, using Sharp’s work on 
“constitutive abstraction”, James takes Giddens’ work in a different direction. James moves away 
from a concept of ‘time-space distantiation’ and, instead, suggests modernity’s effects upon 
temporality and spatiality can be seen as a social-historical totalizing of conditions for “time-space 
extension [and] abstraction”. In the light of James’ and Sharp’s re-thinking of Giddens’ work, it 
might be said that modernization extends, across the globe, forms of spatiality and temporality — 
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empty and measurable space and time — such that sociality ‘goes on’ in abstract and extended 
ways, in relation to the embodied, in-common condition that is human-being.217 
Through Sharp, James offers a means for recognizing the pervasive qualities of 
modernization, in relation to subjectivity and the social conditions enframing it, but ‘stops short’ 
of imputing these to the universe beyond human-being and reflection upon it. That is, 
approaching spatiality and temporality as ontological framing categories does not concretize these 
as reality but recognizes temporality and spatiality to be aspects of the reality that humans socially 
create and reproduce. By looking at spatiality and temporality as ontological categories manifest 
because modernization is a globalizing (social-historical) formation, James offers a view that, 
contra Giddens, sees the emptying out of temporality and spatiality and their totalization as 
symptomatic of a social-historical formation that happens to be ‘totalizing’ in particular ways. The 
implication here is that inquiry focuses upon the arbitrary and contingent as made particular in 
particular conditions rather than, as seems the case in Giddens’ schema, upon particular conditions 
made particular because arbitrariness and contingency enframe them.  
Modernization involves, among other processes, the standardizing of ‘empty’ clock-time 
and ‘measurable’ space. In addition, with the extension of these across social worlds, spatiality and 
temporality are ‘emptied out’ by globalizing modernization, as well as being ‘totalized’ across the 
world as measurable and empty categories of ‘time’ and ‘space’. It might be said metaphorically 
that modernity’s future rushes towards subjectivity, as subjectivity rushes ‘headlong’ into it, 
conferring upon actions in the present pressure to ‘choose’; modern ‘time’ brings the future itself 
into the present. What is described here as the self-orienting ‘immediacy’ of subjectivity implies the 
continual onrush of the future over subject-agents, and a piercing of this future by embodied 
subject-agents as they imagine ‘real’ worlds, and act to create reality. In a similar way, categorizing 
space as empty and measurable means recognizing it as open to appropriation, not merely in 
relation to (normative) notions of ‘property’, but in relation to individuated sovereignty over space 
that manifests as if ‘consumed’ by being in it. Recognizing modern spatiality and temporality in 
ontological terms, as such, means discussing subject-agents as an ‘autonomous’ unity of soma and 
psyche; that is, as corporeal, conscious, and reflexive ‘beings’.  
The account James gives of epistemology as an ontological category offers a similar means 
for approaching inquiry. As with spatiality and temporality, James sets up possibilities for 
comparison between different ontological formations, in and through which epistemology can be 
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said to delineate dominant modes of human ‘knowing-of’ the world. James also refers to 
epistemology in terms of a predominant “mode of enquiry”. James’ method makes it possible to 
discuss pre-modern tribal analogical ‘re-tellings’ as overlaid by traditional sacred textualized Truth, 
as well as by modern positivistic and systematized, analytically-derived ‘knowledge’, and 
postmodern relativized informational data.218  
Before moving on, I want here to generalize James’ concept of ‘epistemology’ and, in 
addition, bring in an ontological category of ‘institutionality’. To use institutionality as an 
ontological category might imply a somewhat slippery addition to James’ more definite concept 
‘epistemology’. At least, insofar as the term ‘institutionality’ may seem more or less a normative, 
rather than ontological condition. Nonetheless, it is arguably possible to discuss institutionality as 
an aspect of the ontic field and not stretch the scope of ‘ontological categories’ too far. The 
present thesis makes this move because its inquiry into the formation and constitution of 
subjectivity is considerably narrower in scope and, arguably, faces inwards, in relation to James’ 
comprehensive social theory of social-historical formation in modernizing and globalizing 
conditions. Durkheim is again helpful here, at least, insofar as his definition of ‘institutions’ might 
be seen, not only as sources of “social constraint”, but also as facilitating sociality: 
 
[The socially constraint that institutions supply] merely implies that collective ways of acting or 
thinking have a reality outside the individuals who, at every moment of time, conform to it. 
These ways of thinking and acting exist in their own right [but, of] course, the individual plays a 
role in their genesis. Since this joint activity takes place outside each one of us (for a plurality of 
consciousnesses enters into it), its necessary effect is to fix, to institute outside us, certain ways of 
acting and certain judgements which do not depend on each particular will taken separately … 
[T]he word ‘institution’ well expresses this special mode of reality … all the beliefs and all the 
modes of conduct instituted by the [social] collectivity.219 
 
In relation to the present thesis’ focus upon subjectivity, institutionality might be seen as 
an aspect of the material-physical totality of binding variables, the ontic field. This is because, 
along with temporality, spatiality, and embodiment, and in relation to these and the normative 
conditions created and reproduced therein, institutionality might also be ‘materialized’ in and 
throughout the job of creating and reproducing sociality. The present thesis takes it that 
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institutionality is always and already a part of the societal and relational dynamics that socially 
enframe the formation of subjectivity. In the Durkheimian sense, institutionality might be seen as 
partially constraining, but also as partially facilitating the job of creating and reproducing 
subjectivity. Moreover, the present thesis takes another step, and divides Durkheim’s meaning here 
over an ontological register as well as over a normative register. It takes instituionality to imply 
analytic focus upon the socially, or ‘collectively’, ordained constraint or facilitation that ‘goes on’ in 
and through the carrying on of societal and relational dynamics. Following Westerhoff and James, 
institutionality, like spatiality, temporality, and embodiment, can be seen as a material-physical 
‘limitation’ that means arbitrariness and contingency enframe ‘states of affairs’ in particular ways. 
Again, as James argues, taking ontology as such also implies social inquiry exists in a relation to its 
topic.  
Hence, ontological ‘categories’ always and already have a normative dimension, which 
requires explication. Partial motivation for this move comes from Wittgenstein: 
 
‘What the names in language signify must be indestructible; for it must be possible to describe the 
state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed. And this description will contain 
words; and what corresponds to these cannot be destroyed, for otherwise the words would have 
no meaning.’ I must now saw off the branch on which I am sitting.220  
 
Here, it seems, the ‘indestructible’ thing that for Wittgenstein the ‘names in language 
signify’ is embodied human-being. Similarly, what ‘corresponds’ to description containing words 
and, as such, ‘cannot be destroyed’, might be seen as the shared and communicative, embodied 
condition that human-being ‘is’. In a state of affairs where everything that is destructible is 
destroyed, language would end because human-being does. Wittgenstein’s apparent irony might be 
seen as aiming to show how the institutionality (in this case, of language) is a material-physical 
condition that exists in the bodies of subject-agents, because human-being is a spatial and 
temporal, interanimate condition.  
In this sense, where Wittgenstein suggests, “A name signifies only what is an element of 
reality. What cannot be destroyed; what remains the same in all changes”, he seems to view 
human-being as an always-already shared and communicative, embodied condition.221 Seeing 
institutionality as an ontological category would be to see sociality in its always and already sense 
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— that is, indestructible, insofar as its destruction would require humanity’s destruction — but, as 
arbitrary and contingent because humans create and reproduce the forms that instituionality might 
take. What remains the same in all changes is the material-physicality of human-being as an 
embodied condition, shared and communicated institutionally: in-common and enduring, in time, 
and over space because subject-agents imagine ‘real’ worlds and ‘materialize’ them as reality. 
Wittgenstein’s point that a name signifies only what is an element of reality might be taken to mean 
that signifying (signaling, pointing to) an element of reality — by using a ‘name’ — means making 
reality ‘real’, and acting such that an element of it is shared and communicated along particular 
lines. In this sense, institutionality might be said to manifest, not ‘out there’, but ‘out there inside’ 
socialized subject-agents. 
Interesting here is Wittgenstein’s point that, “Thought is surrounded by a halo:—Its 
essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of 
possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought”.222 The logic, the a priori order of 
the world is inextricable from human-being in the world, because its logic is the condition of 
embodiment, in space, over time, and amongst the ‘others’ that partake of the institutionality 
which substantiates ‘being’ in a particular social world. The always and already institutionality of 
subjectivity means it is ‘thinking for’ a particular world: its essence, logic, springs forth because 
human-being is ‘being’ for particular (modernizing) social worlds. At the ‘centre’ of societal and 
relational dynamics lay human-being, an analytically inaccessible socialized embodied imaginary–
‘real’ nexus that in practice materializes ‘real’ worlds. Material-physical contextuality binds human-
being ‘to’ reality in particular, which means to ‘go on’ is to imagine ‘real’ worlds, and to materialize 
them in space, over time, and amongst others. Subjectivity is ‘being’ for particular worlds; what 
‘goes on’ at the nexus of embodiment and modernizing social worlds, making reality ‘real’. 
Institutionality means that actions, meanings, and things always and already have 
illocutionary force and perlocutionary contents. For the present thesis, ‘illocution’ means that 
actions or things have meaning, by virtue of (simple) existence in social worlds. In addition, 
‘perlocution’ means that subject-agents take on meanings as a condition intrinsic to their ‘being’ 
human. Institutionality means the (social) world offers-up meanings for subject-agents while, 
because subject-agents ‘be’ in space, time, and amongst others, subject-agents generate meanings 
‘for’ particular (social) worlds. For the present thesis, an ontological category of institutionality 
does not point exclusively to language, the institution of the ‘speech-act’, but — because to be 
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human is to be embodied, in spatial and temporal contexts, as well as amongst others — to the 
manifest interanimacy of socialized, embodied, and imagining ‘being’ in a material-physical world 
replete with illocutionary force and perlocutionary contents.  
It might be said that institutionality means ‘states of affairs’ manifest in particular ways. 
The ontological category ‘institutionality’ offers a way into discussing the enduring commonalities 
and continuities that manifest as subject-agents act, create meanings, and modalize things. 
Discussing institutionality where recognizing subjectivity to be the ‘immediate’, self-orienting and 
self-projecting form that human-being takes in Western modernity, and to involve the 
predominance of a particular liberal sovereign individualism and modern artificialism, means 
focusing upon how an always-already illocutionary-perlocutionary aspect of being human might be 
seen to propagate and perpetuate (normative) forms of authority and value criteria. An ontological 
category of institutionality allows inquiry to focus upon the ‘institutionalization’ of normative 
conditions amidst a reality that, because materialized by subject-agents as they imagine ‘real’ worlds, 
also involves the creating and reproducing of challenges to these.  
 
… … … 
 
While this emphasis upon subjectivity as an embodied, so, ‘empirical’ condition in time and space 
might call to mind Bourdieu’s sociological work, I remain with James here, and take up Bourdieu 
in the next chapter. This is because James’ approach to ontology offers a way into analyses that 
demands inquiry makes clear both perspective upon, and position in relation to, its topic in a way 
that Bourdieu’s theory might not allow. Adapting aspects of James’ schema to inquiry into the 
social formation of subjectivity over an ontological register means not concretizing theoretical 
assumptions about the essences of states of affairs. Put differently, it means that inquiry involves 
reflecting upon its own abstractions in order to clarify its claims. In particular, it avoids 
concretizing epochal abstractions, such as between modernity and postmodernity, for example, 
within theory. Rather, a key implication of taking up these aspects of James’ schema is that social 
worlds are seen as part of the formative groundings for social theory, to which theory may be a 
contribution to the social construction of predominant ways of abstracting from the world in 
order to ‘go on’.  
To clarify, for James, conditions formed in the predominance of non-modern ‘tribal’ social 
forms mean that ‘lived’ temporality are seen as based in ‘nature’s cycles’, the seasons and the 
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weather, for example. It is only by fiat of social-history that temporality, as ‘lived’ in such non-
modern forms, is said to have been of the past. Although modernization encompasses the entire 
globe, and in many areas threatens to annul ‘tribalism’ as a social form tout court, modes of ‘living’ 
temporality based in ‘nature’s cycles’ remain in existence. Moreover, the seasons and weather 
themselves are not of the past, nor are ‘lived’ experiences of these as aspects of the ontic field. 
James’ schema allows inquiry to view contemporary modernization as something that envelops 
and subsumes non-modern social forms within its own predominant orders: which turn on 
‘empty’ clock-time and measurable space. Non-modern ‘tribal’ forms may no longer predominate 
in social worlds and, so, can be said to have gone on in the past, but this is not to say these are of 
the past. Similarly, in relation to epistemology, it might be said that analogical and telling, as 
predominant forms of wisdom, of knowledge-ability, did manifest in the past as dominant ways of 
‘living’ epistemology. Yet, to claim that globalizing modernization or postmodernization dissolves 
these as aspects of the human condition seems to concretize an epochal abstraction over sociality; 
such that face-to-face and ‘folk’ epistemes suffer in analysis the same un-reflected upon fate as 
these so frequently encounter in contemporary conditions. For the present thesis, analogy, telling, 
and folk wisdom, as modes of inter-relating, remain important aspects of human-being, even in 
amidst allegedly all-encompassing hypermodern conditions.  
Just as with temporality and spatiality, or embodiment, institutionality might be said to 
manifest differently if seen as ‘transmitted’ through the kinds of things humans materialize in 
modernizing an globalizing conditions. The relative complexity, extensity, and intensity that seems 
a pervasive conditions in contemporary sociality might be said to enframe subjectivity in ways that 
make institutionality relatively more structured, or concrete than, for example, in conditions 
predominated by face-to-face ‘presence’, or where visual and auditory cues manifest as parts of 
‘nature’ relatively unmodified by human intervention. For the present thesis, ‘real-time’ interaction, 
or ‘virtual being’ are seen as augmentations within the predominance of modernizing conditions. 
Moreover, institutionality as an enframing category for forms of authority and value criteria might 
be seen to manifest more comprehensively in scope and reach in contemporary conditions. In 
relatively small-scale pre-modern social formations, informal ‘moral codes’, or ‘in-kind’ exchanges 
may predominate. Amidst the predominance of modernizing conditions, formal juridico-legislative 
‘law’, or contractually mediated money exchanges, for example, yet be augmented by near-
omniscient postmodern techno-science support for surveillance techniques or ‘hedging’ and 
‘futures’ trading schemes. Similarly, printed text might be seen as the vehicle for concretizing and 
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formalizing language or, symbolic cues, in relation to the ‘art of the hand’, for example, which 
postmodern computing power amplifies and digitizes.  
This is not to suggest that contemporary subjectivity does not manifest under the orders of 
pre-modern or postmodern ontic contexts. The pre-modern categories of analogical wisdom, or 
seasonal temporality, for example, as well as postmodern categories of relativized temporality, 
spatiality and embodiment, made possible by technologically assisted communicative instantaneity, 
for example, do affect subjectivity across the contemporary Anglo-American West. While it might 
be said that disembodied postmodern forms of being, such as Artificial Intelligence or ‘cyborg’ 
embodiment exist in contemporary Anglo-American sociality, from the present thesis’ perspective 
upon subjectivity, what is important are what James labels ‘rationalized’ and ‘self-reflexive’ 
embodiment. These are taken to be the predominant formations that the ontological category of 
embodied ‘being’ manifests in contemporary Anglo-American conditions.223 
As such, what James refers to as cyborg and relativized embodiment, as well as analogical 
and mythical pre-modern embodiment are seen as intertwining predominantly rationalized and 
self-reflexive contexts for subjectivity. For the present thesis, such pre-modern and postmodern 
categorizations of the ontic field need to be seen as encompassing being-the-world because these 
interweave with modernization’s predominant ‘rationalized’ ontology. As such, James’ work 
frames the present thesis’ inquiry into a globalizing social formation in particular; where spatiality, 
temporality, institutionality, and embodiment are said to be ‘lived’ under the predominance of 
modernizing conditions. Using James’ schema in this way means raising the need to think about 
how ‘living’ can be said to ‘go on’ in relation to human-being. The relatively concentrated and 
intensive information-handling capabilities of ‘personal-entertainment’ devices or, the near-
simultaneity that draws different regions of the globe through the world-wide-web, for example, are 
here considered as abstracting and extending conditions for human-being that are, irrevocably, 
‘lived’ by human beings. Subjectivity ‘is’ being for particular worlds, which for the present thesis 
manifest in terms that James’ calls ‘modern’, and involve the predominance of ontological 
categories of empty and measurable time and space, and rationalized embodiment and 
institutionality. Recognizing the extended and abstracted qualities of social contexts means, 
therefore, bringing into question the kinds of a priori orders of the world that modernization 
creates, because embodied subject-agents, in space, over time, and amongst others, create and 
reproduce enframing categories for human-being. Using the aspects of James’ work in these ways 
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means gearing the present thesis’ approach to inquiry to analyses of socially created and 
reproduced abstractions and extensions ‘from’ a claim about human-being as a normative 
condition. It means approaching inquiry into a dominant contemporary subjectivity in ways that 
avoid romanticizing a pristine past or utopian future state-of-being while mooring social critique to 
the material-physicality of human-being as a norm-based and relational condition. 
 
… … … 
… … 
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12 The social constitution of subjectivity 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter brings in aspects of Bourdieu’s anthropological sociology that deal with the theory of 
subjectivity. The chapter takes discussion of James’ schema for analyses of ‘of departure for 
discussing Bourdieu’s interlinked concepts of ‘habitus’ and the ‘social field’. However, the chapter 
does not adopt directly Bourdieu’s schema, instead engaging Carol C. Gould’s work on social 
ontology and ethical norms. The chapter uses Gould’s work to reflect upon Bourdieu’s conceptual 
nexus between habitus and the social field through the anthropological approach to societal and 
relational dynamic discussed in Chapter 10. The chapter considers ongoing sociality to be created 
and reproduced by humans imagining ‘real’ worlds and materializing them — making reality ‘real’ 
— in order to ‘go on’ in problematic practical-discursive conditions and material-physical contexts. 
Setting-up the discussion in this way means that the chapter uses Chapter 11’s focus upon the 
social formation of subjectivity as a way into approaching the social constitution of subjectivity 
using a concept based in analyses of intertwining somatic, practical-ethological, and reflexive 
‘layers of affect’. The second half of the chapter links these two levels of inquiry over an 
ontological register to inquiry over a normative register. The chapter briefly revisits theory by 
Giddens and Habermas to explain the approach to inquiry over a normative register, and link the 
overall framework for analyses to the thesis’ critique of normativity discussed earlier. The chapter 
concludes by mapping out the approach to inquiry in schematic terms. 
 
… … … 
  
For Bourdieu, social conditions enframe “social agents” in action, as socialized examples of 
‘habitus’ in a particular “social field”. It might be said that Bourdieu’s work focuses upon 
conditions for the socializing of “social agents” into a kind of faux or crypto- self-sufficiency that 
is both embodied and institutionalized:  
 
[The habitus is] this generative and unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic and relational 
characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, that is, a unitary set of choices of persons, goods 
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and practices … habitus are differentiated, but they are also differentiating … generative principles 
of distinct and distinctive practices … classificatory schemes, principles of classification … of 
vision and division, [of] taste. The habitus fulfils a function … it is a socialized body, a structured 
body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a world or of a particular sector of 
that world — a field — and which structures the perception of that world as well as action in that 
world.224  
 
Bourdieu looks at “social agents” as actors engaging in the “social field”, in order to say 
something about the enframing of the habitus, the “generative and unifying principle” that points 
to embodied position or ‘situated-ness’ within the “social field”: 
 
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of 
existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be 
objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, 
objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express 
mastery of the operation necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated 
without being the product other orchestrating action of a conductor. [Habitus] could be considered 
as a subjective but not individual system of internalized structures.225  
 
Habitus frames being-in-the-world, it gives of order and, as such, is the specific-universality 
that “brings about a unique integration … of [statistically common] experiences”, which are said to 
manifest as and where “social agents” act in the “social field”. While arbitrary and contingent, in 
relation to the forms it might take, habitus might be said to represent the ‘potential’ inherent in the 
socializing or acclimatizing of embodied subject-agents to particular social worlds. For Bourdieu, 
habitus delivers to subject-agents particular preferences for social objectifications, because “every 
established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the 
naturalization of its own arbitrariness”.226  
Because “social agents” are bound to engage amidst particular social, cultural, economic, 
and political orders, Bourdieu’s “social field” emanates ‘rationality’. The habitus has ‘rationality’ — 
following Wittgenstein, it may be thought’s essence, logic, that presents an order that is the a priori 
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order of the world — that, it might be said, Bourdieu seeks to uncover and explain. Rationality, as 
such, underlines and qualifies “judgements of taste” as rational or irrational: as charming or gauche, 
for example. In analysis, Bourdieu’s “social agents” are bound to produce and reproduce habitus in 
distinctive ways because inhabiting, ‘living’, a form of life that is bound to a particular social field’s 
rationality: for the present thesis, sociality’s structured instituionality. These aspects of Bourdieu’s 
schema allow ongoing sociality to be seen as the ‘channeling’ of arbitrariness and contingency in 
particular ways. Bourdieu’s schema helps the present inquiry to focus upon the job of creating and 
reproducing patterns of access to and monopolies over materials, practices, and discourses while 
recognizing human-being as an embodied condition that ‘goes on’ in space, over time, and 
amongst others. 
However, Bourdieu takes the conceptual nexus of habitus and the social field further. He 
seems to use it to locate and specify the impetus for societal and relational dynamics as the 
rationality it represents’ “naturalization of its own arbitrariness”. For Bourdieu, the habitus 
necessarily implies doxa, the orthodox way of ‘being’ in a social world that prompts “shared 
misrecognition”. This chapter now extends suggestions made in Chapters 6 and 10 that these 
aspects of Bourdieu’s schema might be inappropriate for this inquiry. However, moving on, it is 
important to again point out Bourdieu’s explicit rejection of ‘rational actor’ theory.227 Rather, for 
Bourdieu, social agents act out habitus in the social field and, in doing so, produce and reproduce 
doxa, which works as a social point-of-reference for “symbolic differences”. “Doxa is a particular 
point of view, the point of view of the dominant, which presents and imposes itself as a universal 
point of view — the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the state and who have 
constituted their point of view as universal by constituting the state” or, universities, or art 
industries, for example. In relation to “the family”, Bourdieu sees habitus as the basis for social 
agents’ acceptance as normal of “prenotions of common sense and the folk categories of 
spontaneous sociology … [that] help to make the reality that they describe. In the social world, 
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behaviour [is] the search for distinction” , and flatly rejects Veblen-esque theory that would turn on concepts of ‘status 
seeking’ or ‘competitive consumption’ represented as Human Nature. Hence, I take Bourdieu’s argument to be that the “the 
ideology of natural taste”, which habitus is said to ‘refract’ before inquiry, implies merely that “to exist within a social space, to 
occupy a point or to be an individual within a social space, is to differ, to be different” in a material-physical social world. 
Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 83, 138-40, Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, 8-9.  
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words make things, because they make the consensus on the existence and the meaning of things, 
the common sense, the doxa accepted by all as self-evident”.228  
Hence, Bourdieu’s habitus is now seen as manifesting at the interstices of social agency (as 
subject-hood) and the social field’s doxa: 
 
[T]he incorporation of a social structure in the form of a quasi-natural disposition that often has 
all the appearances of innateness, habitus … the potential energy, the dormant force, from which 
symbolic violence, and especially that exercised through performatives, derives its mysterious 
efficacy. In practice, it is the habitus, history turned into nature, i.e. denied as such, which 
accomplishes practically the relating of habitus in and through the production of practice. 
[Moreover,] the economy of symbolic exchanges rests not on the logic of rational action or of 
common knowledge … which leads one to think of the most characteristic actions of this economy 
as contradictory or impossible, but rather on shared misrecognition.229 
 
Bourdieu describes social sources of “symbolic capital” and “symbolic violence” as the 
products of the accumulation of power amidst “individual self-deception sustained by a collective 
self-deception, a veritable collective misrecognition inscribed in objective structures … [that] 
excludes the possibility of thinking otherwise [about power in society]”. It seems that, for 
Bourdieu, the point is that symbolic difference begets symbolic violence, which are immanent in 
the “logic of symbolic goods and the alchemy which transforms the truth of relations of 
domination”. Shared misrecognition affords an occlusion that imparts to sociality the mysterious 
efficacy that means it and, so, domination ‘go on’. The mysterious efficacy that appears to 
motivate societal and relational dynamics springs from a matrix-like complex of shared 
misrecognitions: 
 
The form par excellence of symbolic violence is the power which … is exercised through rational 
communication, that is, with the (extorted) adherence of those who, being the dominated products 
of an order dominated by forces armed with reason (such as those which act through the verdicts 
of the educational institution or through the diktats of economic experts), cannot but give their 
acquiescence to the arbitrariness of rationalized force.230  
 
                                                 
 
228 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 164, Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, 8, 57, 67. 
229 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 78. Italics in original, Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, 95, 97-98. Italics, 
abbreviation in original. 
230 See, for example, Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, 95, 99-103. 
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Moreover, Bourdieu situates shared misrecognition and repressed symbolic violence in the 
“bodily hexis”. For Bourdieu, thinking about the socializing of agency means focusing upon “the 
relation [of a social agent] to the world is a relation of presence in the world, of being in the 
world”. Bourdieu extends Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to open to inquiry the 
socialization of individual humans as social agents by recognizing that, in analysis, humans can be 
seen as an embodied “principle of practical comprehension [that] is not a knowing consciousness 
… but the practical sense of a habitus inhabited by the world it inhabits”. For Bourdieu, the bodily 
hexis is the material-physical abode for that “practical sense”, which “enables one to act, as one 
‘should’ … without positing or executing a Kantian ‘should’, a rule of conduct. [C]ognitive 
structures are not forms of consciousness but dispositions of the body” that ‘express’ situatedness in 
the social field: 
 
Practical belief is not a ‘state of mind’, still less a kind of arbitrary adherence to a set of instituted 
dogmas and doctrines (‘beliefs’), but rather a state of the body. Doxa [therefore] is the 
relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a habitus and the field 
to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical 
sense. Bodily hexis is political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned into a permanent 
disposition.231  
 
For Bourdieu, to be an embodied social agent is to share in the misrecognitions that 
society enacts and, as it were, reproduce them. “Doxic submission of the dominated to the 
structures of a social order of which their mental structures are the product … in fact belongs to 
the order of belief, that is, to the level of the most profound corporeal dispositions”, which 
Bourdieu sees as accruing because social agents ‘go on’ in particular social worlds. However, 
making social agent’s self-deception, shared, or collective misrecognition the central feature of the 
nexus between habitus and social field means that it becomes the locus for a repressed, 
misrecognized, or denied symbolic violence that legitmizes and, as such, ‘legitimates’ domination, 
which might be to pre-empt analyses by implying that to ‘be’ human is to be dominated. For this 
reason, the present thesis avers from identifying or locating the impetus for sociality in repressed 
symbolic violence, and its apposite societal and relational motive, symbolic-cultural capital.232 
                                                 
 
231 P. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. R. Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990 [1980]), 53, 68. Italics in original.  
232 “Misrecognition, or forgetting, of the relation of immanence to a world that is not perceived as a world, as an object placed 
before a self-conscious perceiving subject … is no doubt the original form … of the scholastic illusion. The principle of 
practical comprehension is not a knowing consciousness … but the practical sense of a habitus inhabited by the world it 
inhabits, pre-occupied by the world in which it actively intervenes, in an immediate relationship of involvement … which 
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… … …  
 
In the light of this account of aspects of Bourdieu’s schema, the present thesis brings in Gould’s 
work, which links “social ontology and ethical norms”. Gould’s work helps ground Bourdieu’s 
schematic nexus between habitus and social field in the theory of societal and relational dynamics 
discussed in Chapter 10. As such, engaging Gould allows the developing approach to inquiry to 
move away from specifying or locating the impetus for ongoing sociality in ‘strong’ empirical 
claims. Gould’s social philosophical reflections are helpful because they allow the drawing of a 
thread through inquiry over an ontological register into inquiry over a normative register in a way 
that leaves open possibilities for a claim that human-being be seen as a norm-based and relational 
condition.  
For Gould, society is an ethical totality that does not require the positing of “transcendent 
or external ground beyond the human” or “a fixed human nature”. In addition, Gould avers from 
basing inquiry’s “conception of value or of right on any immediate, apodictic, and incorrigible 
moral intuition”, or assertion that “the grounding of a social ethics” requires a “naturalistic … 
deriving [of] oughts from is’s or values and rights from nonmoral facts”.233 Partially following 
Gould, the present thesis suggests, it is not that some “moral reality exists or subsists …” in itself, 
to be “read-off by reason or intuited by moral feelings”. Rather, it is the “capacity for self-
transformation in [human] activity” that can be said to ‘ground’ forms of authority and value 
criteria, and their ‘legitimation’ or challenges to them, because ongoing sociality legitimizes the 
order of the universe. Gould argues that “human beings create and transform their own natures in 
the course of their activity”, and that this means human-being is a “self-transforming condition”. 
Conceptualizing humans as ‘being’ (with)in an ethical totality means discussing “social reality [as] 
constituted by intentional and interacting human beings” that imagine ‘real’ worlds, and materialize 
them as reality in order to ‘go on’. Using Gould in this way means looking at “the genesis of value 
                                                                                                                                                          
 
constructs the world and gives it meaning”. Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 139, 41, 42. Italics in original. Bourdieu, Practical 
Reason: On the Theory of Action, 8, 54, 55. Elsewhere, Bourdieu argues that practical consciousness is not the same as moral 
consciousness, because at this level of analysis, “ethos is merely necessity made into a virtue”. See, Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of 
Practice, 77. Italics in original. 
233 Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society, 127-29. Inverted commas omitted, italics 
added. 
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and the ground of rights …” as always and already co-dependent with the material-physicality of 
human-being; its ‘normativity’ as a norm-based and relational condition.234  
Rather than adopting Bourdieu’s more broad concerns with how misrecognition may be 
said to animate forms of ‘cultural capital’, or ‘distinction’ that might mark out how, to a greater or 
lesser degree, social agents may act out a ‘feel for the game’, the present thesis takes a different 
direction. Bringing in Gould’s work means that forms of authority and value criteria are seen as 
being embedded in patterns of access to and monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses, 
which manifest amidst certain material-physical contexts. Looking at sociality through Gould, 
rather than Bourdieu, allows for a ‘weak’ empiricism that situates the impetus for societal and 
relational dynamics in a claim that the world is a problematic place for humans to ‘be in’. This 
approach avoids what Bourdieu seems to decry as the radical-romantic assertion that the universe 
of existence can be transcended, without jettisoning human-being itself. On the one hand, the 
thesis takes up Bourdieu’s suggestions that critical social theory is intrinsic to modernity, insofar as 
it can “rationally analyze domination … and the de facto monopolization of the profits of universal 
reason”, which in ‘daily life’ are otherwise so often taken to be ‘legitimate’.235 However, on the 
other hand, the thesis departs from Bourdieu’s line of argument, and does not aim to specify or 
define the locus for ongoing sociality, other than suggesting that human-being ‘goes on’ as a 
shared and communicative — norm-based and inter-relational — condition in a problematic 
reality.236  
The present thesis takes the social-historical claim that modernizing social formation is 
secular, or worldly, to mean that reality is an arbitrary and contingent enframing context in and 
through which humans create and reproduce particular conditions that, as Weiner suggests, mean 
that ‘going on’ is “replete with natural and cultural propensities for loss”.237 This means taking 
sociality to be an in-common and enduring affair that ‘goes on’ in particular, often, difficult and 
problematic ways because ‘going on’ as such is a norm-based and relational condition in an 
encompassing reality. Combining Bourdieu’s schema and Gould’s social philosophy allows the 
present thesis to maintain some of the job that Bourdieu attributes to the nexus between habitus 
and social field, but means cleaving it over ontological and normative registers. Cleaving the job 
                                                 
 
234 Ibid., 129. 
235 Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 83-84. 
236 In addition, this approach differs from what might be the conservative assertion that humans, as beings, confront a universe of 
a-human good and evil forces.  
237 Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping While Giving, 150.  
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that Bourdieu attributes to the nexus of habitus and social field over ontological and normative 
registers allows inquiry to develop its critique in relation to a ‘weak’ empiricism, which draws upon 
a claim that human-being is a shared and communicative condition that ‘goes on’ in a problematic 
world.  
Societal and relational dynamics ‘go on’ because subject-agents create and reproduce a 
material-physical reality that emanates commonalities and continuities and, amongst other things, 
involves situating and prioritizing affairs, persons, and things in relation to others and social 
worlds. In these respects, reality, said to be re-presentable in analysis as the ‘immediacy’ of ‘being’ 
limits inquiry to ‘weak’ empirical claims about it. Recognizing humans as imagining ‘real’ worlds, 
and materializing reality in order to ‘go on’ in this way might displace a need to specify the impetus 
for ongoing sociality, beyond Weiner’s ‘natural and cultural propensities for loss’. Rather, inquiry 
can traverse ontological and normative registers of analysis, in order to make claims about how 
reality’s arbitrariness and contingencies ‘come together’ to mean that states of affairs ‘go on’ in 
particular ways. Subject-agents might be said to ‘go on’ amidst certain material-physical ‘ontic’ 
contexts, and to create and reproduce practical and discursive ‘normative’ conditions that enframe 
a form of life ‘in-dominance’: a dominant subjectivity.  
 
… … … 
 
In order to operationalize this discussion as the basis for setting out an approach to the social 
constitution of subjectivity, discussion again brings in Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein helps to pick up 
from that place in Bourdieu’s schema that points to the bodily hexis and, instead, to set out from the 
‘weak’ empirical claim that human-being is a norm-based and relational condition that ‘goes on’ in 
a problematic world. The present thesis uses Wittgenstein, like Bourdieu, as offering a way into 
inquiry that sees embodied ‘being’ as a socially constituted, in space and time, and amongst others, 
form-of-life. Bourdieu’s “social agents” embody ‘their’ “practical sense” because seen as ‘living’ 
socialized “dispositions of the body”. Interesting here is Wittgenstein’s point that, “I know only 
what I call that”; which is to say, “I could not apply any rules to a private transition from what is 
seen to words”. Wittgenstein seems to suggest that to ‘be’ is to embody a private condition that is 
nevertheless always and already in-common, as if prior to private ‘knowing’. Wittgenstein seems to 
point to the material-physical condition that is ‘being’ an individual (an ‘I’) by conceptually 
separating embodied sensation from embodied perception. It might be said that, for Wittgenstein, 
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being human means that sensations ‘are’ perceptions because human-being is a shared and 
communicative condition. Sensation complements perception because, as well as ‘being’ in space 
and time, humans ‘be’ amongst others.238  
This is to take at face value Wittgenstein’s claim that, “To see this aspect of the triangle [as 
opposed to another, possible one,] demands imagination”. Subject-agents may empirically sense, 
that is, look at a picture or a printed word, or feel an action or a movement, whereas “to see … 
demands imagination”. By evoking a truism — that sensing and perceiving are ‘immediate’ 
biological-somatic affairs — Wittgenstein offers an approach to inquiry that separates sensation, as 
such, from perception, as self-consciousness in practice. Wittgenstein’s allusions to “mastery of a 
technique” and inductively “knowing how to go on” seem, therefore, to point to sensing and 
perceiving as an embodied ‘being’ that ‘goes on’, in space and over time, amongst others: that is, 
imagines ‘real’ worlds. The motif supplied by sensing, perceiving, and imagining ‘being’ might be 
combined with an expanded definition of subjectivity, as the ‘immediacy’ of ‘being’ amidst the in-
common and enduring reality that humans materialize as Western modernity. As such, 
conceptualizing subjectivity in terms of an imaginary-‘real’ nexus might now mean recognizing the 
reflexive practicing of an embodied ethology: subjectivity as ‘being’ normatively so-disposed in a 
material-physical context. Following Wittgenstein, to ‘be’ human (in space and time) means sensing, 
‘empirically feeling’, perceiving, ‘having language’, and imagining, using ‘these’ as tools and techniques 
in order to ‘go on’. This means setting out a tripartite schema that, through Wittgenstein, allows 
sensing, perceiving, and imagining ‘being’ to be discussed as what ‘goes on’ at the nexus of habitus 
and social field. Inquiry might now conceive of the social constitution of subjectivity as the 
affecting of sensing, perceiving, and imagining ‘being’ for particular modernizing social worlds. In 
these respects, the present thesis moves to approach the social constitution of subjectivity over an 
ontological register by delineating three coeval layers of affect: somatic, practical-ethological, and 
reflexive subjectivity.239  
The discussion now uses these suggestions to explain how inquiry over an ontological 
register combines these two levels of analysis, by drawing together and discussing links between 
‘categories’ and ‘layers of affect’. For the present thesis, somatic subjectivity means physical 
embodied sensation. Somatic subjectivity is seen as the embodied ‘hub’ of sensations. Focusing 
                                                 
 
238 Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action, 8-9. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, S348, 80, p177c. Bourdieu writes of 
his own work as being, in part, inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. See, Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 11, 31. 
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upon a somatic layer of affect in the social constitution of subjectivity allows inquiry to discuss the 
body as one ‘layer’ at which ‘being’ and social worlds can be said to intertwine. Somatic 
subjectivity also provides a bridge into inquiry at the level of ontological categories. A somatic 
layer of affect is, in this sense, the affective ‘site’ for embodiment. Combining these two levels of 
analysis means discussing how ontological categorizations of embodiment, as well as of spatiality, 
temporality, and institutionality, might be said to affect (material-)physical embodied sensation as 
part of the condition that is ‘being’ in the world.240  
The thesis takes practical-ethological subjectivity to mean perception: socialized 
‘consciousness in practice’ in- and of-the-world. Practical-ethological subjectivity is seen as the 
perceptive ‘hub’ of action and meaning for imagining ‘real’ worlds. Taking up suggestions that 
social worlds have illocutionary force and perlocutionary contents, practical-ethological 
subjectivity is seen as the (embodied) locus of particular forms of societal and relational 
engagements. As such, focusing upon a practical-ethological layer of affect requires discussion 
make explicit a link to ontological ‘categories’. Moving from the suggestion that to ‘be’ human is 
always and already to exist in material-physical reality now means discussing socialized 
‘consciousness in practice’ as that ‘constituent’ of subjectivity which ‘makes’ spatiality ‘space’, 
temporality ‘time’, embodiment ‘rational’, and institutionality socially structured ‘rationalizing’ and 
‘economizing’ institutions in modernizing social worlds. Focusing upon practical-ethological 
subjectivity shifts inquiry away from intervention into self-consciousness and towards a focus 
upon ‘consciousness’; what happens because ‘being’ is a somatic condition that ‘goes on’ amidst 
spatial, temporal, and institutional contexts in particular social worlds.  
For the present thesis, and pace Giddens, reflexive subjectivity means the monitoring and 
adjustment of ‘being’ in social world. Reflexivity is inexorably tied to somatic and practical-
ethological subjectivity because to ‘be’ is to ‘go on’ in space, over time, and amongst others as 
                                                 
 
240 Relating this concept of somatic subjectivity to the one of ‘the body’ often used in governmentality theory might help clarify 
further. Chapter 7 suggests that, in analyses, governmentality theory can seem to regard means, social power, as an ends. 
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imagining ‘real’ worlds. In analysis, reflexivity is ‘going on’, both on the world’s and on embodied-
being’s terms. However, contra Giddens, the present thesis does not posit a separation between 
“practical consciousness: what actors know (believe) about social conditions … but cannot 
express”, and “discursive consciousness: what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression 
to, about social conditions … awareness which has a discursive form”.241  
Subjectivity, seen as the form of life that is created and reproduced as subject-agents 
imagine ‘real’ worlds, and ‘materialize’ them in order to ‘go on’ in space, over time, and amongst 
others, implies a methodological perspective that differs from Giddens’ approach. Because 
Giddens’ schema seems to extend from ‘psychological’ claims about intra-personal states — rather 
than merely recognizing that existential, ethical, and material states, such as anxiety, or stress, for 
example, are worldly possibilities that may confront subject-agents in particular social worlds — he 
seems to make ‘strong’ empirical claims about the qualities and preponderances of such states. 
This is not to claim that worldly affect does not work at a ‘psychological’ level but that claims 
springing from ‘strong’ empirical claims, which explain intra-personal states, are not suited to the 
present thesis’ aims.  
Rather, the present thesis uses a division between levels of inquiry over an ontological 
register to frame an approach that delineates between somatic ‘sensation’, practical-ethological 
‘perceptive consciousness’, and reflexivity, that is, after Wittgenstein, ‘imagining’ subjectivity. For 
the present thesis, the suggestion is that ‘being’ lay not so much in self-identity and difference as 
created by a reflexive (self-)consciousness — a (Hegelian) thinking-of-being — but in the job of 
making reality ‘real’, such that modernization seen as legitimizing the order of the universe as well 
as the problematizing of sociality’s ‘legitimation’. Because subjectivity is seen as ‘enacting’ a private 
subject-hood amongst others — an ‘immediate’ self-orienting and projecting form of life that 
senses, perceives, and imagines ‘real’ worlds, and makes reality ‘real’ — this means thesis’ critique 
of normativity is based in the ‘weak’ empirical claim that ‘being’ human requires situations in and 
though which norm-based and relational claims might effectively ‘legitimate’ sociality.  
 
… … … 
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The discussion now pauses to explain the normative-justificatory aspect of the overall thesis’ 
argument. The discussion briefly revisits Giddens’ work, focusing upon his theory of the 
institutional reflexivity of modernity. It then turns to Habermas’ account of the forms 
‘legitimation’ takes amidst the relatively complex, abstract, and extended, structured and 
institutionalized conditions characterizing sociality in the contemporary West. These aspects 
Giddens’ and Habermas’ theories of modernity are used to link the present thesis’ modes of 
inquiry over ontological and normative registers to its critique of normativity. Giddens’, and 
Habermas’ work helps to suggest how in relatively complex, technologically developed Anglo-
American liberal-democracies, structured and institutionalized patterns of access to and monopoly 
over materials, practices, and discourses enframe a dominant subjectivity that oscillates between 
heightened satisfactions and enervated dissatisfactions because these work to privilege a particular 
formation of liberal individualism. 
Giddens discusses modernization as juggernaut-like and processual. While this aspect of 
his work might seem to imply some kind of functional system, ongoing ‘over people’s heads’, the 
present thesis takes Giddens’ work to mean that the job of creating and reproducing modernizing 
society can be construed ‘from within’ as social conditions that ‘go on’ without reference to ‘other-
worldly’ abstractions. Giddens’ thesis implies modernity is ontological: it is potentially all 
encompassing. Globalizing Western modernity imbricates the binding variables enframing it within 
ongoing sociality as, albeit, material-physical ‘properties’. The ontic contextuality that enframes 
sociality is naturalistic yet, manifestly a human creation, because, in the absence of cosmologically 
ordained, or positive Truth, reality encompasses in sum total. Giddens makes clear, in a specific 
way, that modernity involves “the susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material 
relations with nature, to chronic revision in the light of new information or knowledge”. For 
Giddens, “the reflexivity of modernity” means potentially all that ‘is’ and ‘can be’ becomes part of 
modernization. This aspect of Giddens’ approach casts light on an important condition of 
modernization; from within the perspective of reflection upon it, modernity is ‘set free’ from 
transcendentally ordained doxa. Giddens combines Marx, Durkheim, and Weber to explain what 
happens as myth and history, or past and tradition, give way to relatively complex structured and 
institutionalized conditions that — sustained in and through extensive “expert systems” 
(elsewhere, “abstract systems”) and abstract “symbolic tokens” — endure under the very ordering 
of affairs and things that sociality, itself, creates and reproduces.242  
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Giddens conceives the workings of institutional ‘reflexivity’ in the terms of a “double 
hermeneutic”, whereby “sociological knowledges” work as a ‘metalanguage’ that is “appropriated 
within social life” and influences “first-order concepts”. For Giddens, “Sociological knowledge 
spirals in and out of the universe of social life, reconstructing both itself and that universe as an 
integral part of that process. Modernity itself is deeply and intrinsically sociological”. Giddens suggests that 
the structured institutionalized qualities of modernity mean the taking up of ‘information’ about 
social worlds ‘goes on’ through the filter of sociological knowledges — such as sociology itself, 
economics, or, the ‘life-sciences’, for example — which combine and intertwine as the bases for 
future inputs into the job of creating and reproducing sociality. However, Giddens also argues 
that, “No knowledge under conditions of modernity is knowledge in the ‘old’ sense, where ‘to 
know’ is to be certain”; neither the social sciences nor the natural sciences support “the equation 
of knowledge with certitude”. Constituting ‘always uncertain’ modern knowledges, sociological 
knowledges enter and re-enter sociality as part of a reflexive “feedback loop”. Sociological 
knowledges are seen by Giddens to be “part of the very tissue of modern institutions” and, 
therefore, the “reflexivity of modernity”. For Giddens, “sociological definitions of phenomena”, 
such as the concepts “capital, or investment” are specialist-institutional concepts.243  
Nonetheless, because these constantly intertwine with the actions and discourses of “lay 
actors” — for example, he suggests most (in the West) hold savings accounts with banks and, so, 
possess rudimentary knowledge of specialist-institutional concepts like ‘capital’ or ‘investment’ — 
institutional reflexivity is seen by Giddens to involve “continual mutual involvement between 
economic discourse and the activities to which it refers”: 244 
 
[Sociological c]oncepts such as these, and the theories and empirical information linked to them, are 
not merely handy devices whereby agents are somehow more clearly able to understand their 
behavior … [t]hey actively constitute what that behavior is and inform the reasons for which it is 
undertaken. 
The pivotal position of sociology in the reflexivity of modernity comes from its role as the most 
generalized type of reflection upon modern social life.245  
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While sociological knowledges in the field of economics may be seen as working in the 
ways that Giddens describes it, picking up Chapter 8’s line of argument again here means raising 
issue with the concept of ‘trust’ in his theory. To reiterate, Giddens argues that, as “disembedding 
mechanisms, both symbolic tokens and expert systems, depend on trust”. Indeed, “the separating 
of time and space and their formation into standardized, ‘empty’ dimensions”, on the one hand, 
are seen as consequences of modernity’s relative complexity, abstractions, and extensive, system-
like conditions. Yet, on the other hand, these are said to depend upon the embodied and 
subjective “notion of trust [that] is basic to feelings of ontological security”.246  
For the present thesis, Giddens appears to argue that ‘trust’ works with precisely the same 
modalities in relation to relatively large-scale and complex structured and institutionalized 
conditions as it does where less structurally complex, institutionally concretized, inter-relationally 
mediated and technologically extended engagements constitute the predominant ways of ‘going 
on’ in social worlds. As Chapter 8 suggests, in relation to his theses on subjectivity, Giddens’ 
concept of ‘trust’ seems to work as an avatar that imports methodological transcendence into his 
theory. It seems that, for Giddens, modernization requires the ‘trust’ of all involved, at every 
conjuncture. Giddens’ schema seems to contain no means for ascertaining a degree of relative 
societal and relational complexity at which institutional reflexivity might cast ‘trust’ into 
irrelevance. Arguably, the notion of ‘trust’ introduces a fuzziness that means Giddens treats 
sociological knowledges alongside ‘sociological knowledges-as-subjective-knowledges’; it is as if 
these were the same thing. Giddens seems to treat of the pivotal position of sociology, as the most 
generalized type of reflection, as if inquiry could discuss institutional reflexivity and subjective 
reflexivity in the same ways. That is, Giddens seems to treat the intertwining of sociological 
knowledges and institutional reflexivity as if these were of the same order as what are, for the 
present thesis, somatically bound practical-ethological ‘knowledges’ and the reflexivity that 
intertwine as ‘being’. The present thesis takes ‘institutional’ reflexivity to be something different 
from subjective reflexivity.  
This raises a need to re-pose the intertwining of institutional reflexivity and the double 
hermeneutic towards a focus upon what goes into the creating and reproducing of normative 
conditions because structured and institutionalized along particular lines. Rather than following 
Giddens’ suggestion that modernity is “deeply and intrinsically sociological”,247 the present thesis 
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approaches modernization, and institutional reflexivity, as ‘intrinsically normalizing’ of particular 
practical and discursive conditions. A brief example helps to explain the direction taken here. 
Contemporary communications-entertainment industries consistently imbricate sociological 
knowledges into the (re-)productive domain in and through both practices and discourses. In 
Giddens’ terms, as contributors to the overall job of creating and reproducing sociality, these 
industries might be seen as an example of the institutional reflexivity that means sociological 
knowledges spiral in and out of social life. However, while these industries might incorporate 
sociological knowledges in the ways that Giddens suggests — through the statistical ‘ratings’ data 
used to sell audiences to advertisers, for example — other forms of knowledge that contribute to 
the communications-entertainment industries do not seem to sit so well with sociological 
knowledges so-defined. For example, the so-called ‘star-system’, various ‘cults of personality’, 
promulgations of ‘urban mythology’, as well as many promotional appeals purported to inform 
potential consumers of commodity’s use-values, amongst other things, do not seem 
commensurate with Giddens’ definition of sociological knowledges. Nonetheless, these do seem 
to spiral in and out of social life, in important and ways, and seem to affect the ongoing job of 
creating and reproducing sociality, at least, across the contemporary Anglo-American West.  
This differs from Giddens’ approach, which seems to involve a kind of positivist 
assumption that the double hermeneutic effect is, itself, hermeneutical; that is, Giddens’ model of 
the reflexivity of modernity seems to imply that ‘modernity’ involves an (ever increasing) 
understanding of ‘itself’. Giddens seems to use the concept of ‘reflexivity’ as something of a 
reason-unto-itself for modernization: a kind of principle that, once posited, obscures critique of its 
effects. Instead, the present thesis focuses upon the forms of authority and value criteria that 
institutional reflexivity might be said to ‘normalize’. Recognizing that modernization involves 
relatively complex systems and institutions that take in information about the world — or, rather, 
take in the world as information; as ‘data’ — and adjust actions accordingly, allows inquiry to 
move away from a tendency to see modernization as a ‘juggernaut’248 that, arguably, resembles a 
closed functional system. Looking at reflexivity in this way means saying more about the dynamics 
of authority and value that might be said to coincide with the relative societal complexity and 
intensity, and abstraction, and extended inter-relational forms central to ongoing modernization. 
This concept of the ‘intrinsically normalizing’ effects of reflexivity allows discussion to look at a 
broad range of practices and discourses — many of which may be trivial or, indeed, ‘false’ in 
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comparison with sociological knowledges — as affecting the kinds of forms of authority and value 
criteria that ‘go on’ within sociality. This approach recognizes that knowledges do spiral in and out 
of sociality yet, do so because amenable to particular orders of affairs and things. Whether 
knowledges that are said to spiral in and out of social life actually constitute sociological 
knowledges or otherwise is less important to the present inquiry than the degree to which, as social 
and cultural practices and discourses, these contribute to the job of creating and reproducing 
normative conditions.  
Reflexivity, seen as a condition of relative societal complexity, can be linked to a dominant 
subjectivity. Amidst an arbitrary and contingent ontic field that is “conceived as material forces”, 
reflexivity implies a wide-reaching, but not absolute, ‘normalizing’ of particular practical and 
discursive conditions, such that certain forms of authority and value criteria are taken as nature-
like. Recognizing reflexivity to mean that some conditions of modernization can be seen as 
‘intrinsically normalizing’ means inquiry can set out to discuss sociality on both Godelier’s terms, 
as if legitimizing the order of the universe and on Habermas’ terms, as if requiring political 
‘legitimation’.249  
Indeed, to to take these suggestions further, discussion now turns to Habermas’ aspects of 
thesis on ‘legitimation’. Habermas’ work is interesting here because his account of the “social 
evolution” of modernization allows links to be drawn between the historical development of 
(Western) societal complexity and claims about how such conditions might enframe subjectivity as 
a form of life. While the present thesis does not take up directly his extensive thesis on the 
“uncoupling of system and life-world”, Habermas’ work on ‘legitimation’ in relatively complex, 
modernizing conditions allows suggestions about how institutional reflexivity might be seen to 
work in relation to the normalizing of forms of authority and value criteria.250  
Seeing them as historical conditions of expanded industrial production, capitalistic market 
relations, and nation-state representative government, that is, of “modern bourgeois society”, 
Habermas devotes particular attention to the secularization and systematization of abstract and 
‘universal’ law and morality. In modernizing conditions — arising, it might be said, as proliferating 
objects, and knowledges and techniques associated with their uses, intertwined with Occidental 
Judeo-Christianity — intermittent yet ongoing crises of social integration, cultural ordination, and 
intersubjective contestation become increasingly reliant for redress upon ever-further codified and 
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systematized ‘law’. For Habermas, codified modern (Western) law takes hold where relatively 
increased societal complexity also involves the extension throughout societal and inter-relational 
dynamics of commodity-based market relations — said to turn on that “special exchange 
mechanism that transforms use values into exchange values” — and as the particular milieux these 
empower demand authority’s ‘legitimation’.251  
Like Giddens, Habermas argues that, where codified law manifests as a condition of 
modernity’s secularization, Truth in the cosmological sense falls-away as a unitary societal and 
relational “steering mechanism”. For Habermas, an important effect of the codification of law in 
such conditions is the manifesting of an external, nature-like ‘objective’ arbiter for (many) private 
moral decisions. Once embedded together with (cosmologically ordained) ethico-legal norms in 
traditional customary law, private morality in modernity becomes a matter of orienting the self in 
relation to society as an aggregate of moral individuals. Conditions arise that “shift the burden of 
social integration more and more from religiously anchored consensus processes [and towards] 
general action orientations”: 
 
Whereas civil society is institutionalized as a sphere of legally domesticated, incessant competition 
between strategically acting private persons, the organs of the state, organized by means of public 
law, constitute the level on which consensus can be restored in cases of stubborn conflict. 
[However, the] problem of justification is both displaced and intensified. Inasmuch as law 
becomes positive, the paths of legitimation grow longer. The legality of decisions, which is measured by 
adherence to formally unobjectionable procedures, relieves the legal system of justification 
problems that pervade traditional law [appearing as law and moral code united]. On the other 
hand, these problems get more … intensive where the criticizability and need for justification of 
legal norms are only the other side of their positivity — the principle of enactment and the 
principle of justification reciprocally require on another. The legal system as a whole needs to be 
anchored in basic principles of legitimation … these are, in the first place, basic rights and the 
principle of popular sovereignty; they embody postconventional structures of moral 
consciousness … they are in the bridges between a de-moralized and externalized legal sphere 
and a deinstitutionalized and internalized [privatistic] morality.252  
 
Discussing Habermas here allows modernization to be seen as ‘going on’ under the twin 
pressures of relative societal and inter-relational complexity and a self-orienting and projecting 
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subjectivity that creates and reproduces sociality as a totality that enframes it. Where increasingly 
complex, abstract, and extended, conditions ‘go on’ on such terms, the intrinsically normalizing 
aspects of modernity might be seen as, themselves, extending further and further from their 
‘ultimate’ bases in the norm-based and relational conditions that human-being ‘is’. Modernization 
creates and reproduces normative conditions for a dominant form of life that legitimizes the order 
of the universe as if by default, while the paths of ‘legitimation’ grow longer as consequences of 
‘being’ human as subjectivity, making reality ‘real’. Amidst the predominance of a liberal ‘sovereign’ 
individualism that is both motor and anchor point within sociality, the structuring of 
institutionality per se becomes ‘positive’ — a parody of exemplarity and equalitarianism obtains — 
while the paths of ‘legitimation’ that draw on norms-based and relational contexts grow longer.253  
 
… … … 
 
To conclude this chapter, and Part III of the thesis, I schematize these theoretical and 
methodological suggestions as the framework for approaching inquiry. The chapters in Part IV 
then discuss a series of examples that test conditions using the approach, to argue that a dominant 
contemporary subjectivity presents itself in Anglo-American societies that turns on a sustained a 
deferral of existential and ethical dilemmas.  
The discussion so far suggests an approach to analyses that combines two registers (N) and 
four levels (x) of inquiry. This approach inquires over (1ab) an ontological register that deals with 
‘ontic contextuality’, the material-physical enframing context for human-being that is the reality in 
and through which (1a) the social formation and (1b) the social constitution of subjectivity are said 
to ‘go on’. The approach to the social formation of subjectivity over an ontological register bases 
its analyses on the ‘categories’ of spatiality, temporality, institutionality, and embodiment. The 
approach to the social constitution of subjectivity over the same ontological register bases its 
analyses on three coeval layers of affect: somatic, practical-ethological, and reflexive subjectivity. 
Suggestions made in Chapters 11 and 12 for inquiry over an ontological register that combines two 
levels of analysis — ‘ontological categories’ and ‘layers of affect’ — bring the developing approach 
to a conjuncture with inquiry over a normative register. This is because, as both Westerhoff and 
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James help to suggest, the present thesis recognizes ontology as a mode of inquiry that always 
involves epistemological-normative claims.  
As such, the approach links the two levels of inquiry over (1ab) an ontological register with 
inquiry over (2cd) a normative register, which works over two analytic levels. These focus upon (2c) 
the creating and reproducing of ‘normative’ conditions in and through which social and cultural 
practices and discourses ‘go on’ and (N) a critique of normativity. Inquiry over a normative register 
that looks at practical and discursive conditions is itself broken down into three main perspectives 
(2c-xyz). The first (2c-x) focuses upon structured and institutionalized patterns of access to and 
monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses that frame or privilege a particular form of life. 
Here, the focus is upon how the dynamics of power and value intertwine and combine amidst 
structured and institutionalized conditions. The second (2c-y) focuses upon the actions, meanings, 
and things that subject-agents ‘materialize’ — as materials, as practices, coordinated forms of 
action, and as discourses, meaningful representations — as they ‘go on’ within sociality and, as 
such, mobilize, propagate, and perpetuate, a dominant subjectivity. Here, attention is directed at 
metamorphosing and violable normative criteria for authenticating power and establishing value, 
as well as for challenging authority and resisting hierarchy, or normatively ordained similarities and 
differences. The third perspective (2c-z) focuses upon situations that are seen to ‘go on’ in practice 
in relation to the two levels of inquiry over an ontological register, and (N) the thesis’ critique of 
normativity, which relates the inquiry to the claim ‘being’ human requires situations in and though 
which norm-based and relational contexts might affectively ‘legitimate’ sociality.  
 
… … … 
… … 
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13 Stakeholders and sustainability in practice and discourse 
 
 
 
 
 
The chapters in Part IV of the thesis discuss a series of examples as evidence for the claim that a 
new dominant subjectivity presents itself in contemporary Anglo-American societies. The aims of 
Part IV of the thesis are to look at what happens in practice in relation to the claims made in Parts 
II and III. These chapters use the theory and method developed earlier to frame discussion of a 
series of illustrative examples that support the thesis’ central argument. That is, a dominant 
subjectivity has emerged in contemporary Anglo-American societies, which oscillates between 
relatively heightened satisfactions and enervated dissatisfactions, an important consequence of this 
being that persons are often bound to defer existential, ethical, or material dilemmas that social 
worlds might raise for them as socialized subject-agents. These chapters operationalize the 
suggestion that conditions within globalizing modernization involves relatively complex, abstract, 
and extended societal and relational dynamics.  
Discussion here springs from Part III’s claim that contemporary Anglo-American sociality 
can be seen as the job of creating and reproducing practical and discursive ‘normative’ conditions 
and material-physical contexts, or what I have been calling ontic contextuality. The examples are 
used to highlight how particular normative patterns of access to and monopoly over materials, 
practices, and discourses, appear to situate a distinct liberal individualism as both motor and 
anchor point within contemporary Anglo-American sociality. The examples offer a means for 
discussing the ontological structuring of institutionality, spatiality, temporality, and embodiment, 
and affecting of somatic, practical-ethological, and reflexive layers of subjectivity. The chapters 
discuss these examples in relation to the overall project’s critical perspective, which springs from a 
claim that ‘being’ human is a norm-based and relational condition.  
The examples in Chapter 13 have been chosen as a means for examining contemporary 
social conditions through inquiry over a normative register. The examples used in Chapter 13 also 
allow sociality to be tested in relation to inquiry over an ontological register, with a primary focus 
upon the category of ‘institutionality’. Chapter 14 takes up from this discussion, and brings in 
further examples that concentrate upon testing conditions through inquiry over an ontological 
register. The examples in Chapter 14 allow inquiry to look at sociality in terms of what Part III 
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categorizes as spatiality and temporality. In Chapter 15, examples have been chosen to examine 
sociality through inquiry over the ontological category of embodiment, and in terms of the social 
constitution of subjectivity.  
 
… … … 
 
This, Chapter 13, picks up from Part II’s discussion that conceptualizes ‘core arenas for sociality’ 
amidst globalizing neoliberalization and financialization, and looks at examples of normative 
conditions within contemporary Anglo-American political, productive, occupational, and civil 
domains. Initially, this chapter discusses stakeholder politics and corporate sustainability as partial 
products of a synthesis, between government’s “engage[ment] in a process of restructuring … with 
a decisive effort at deregulation, privatization, and the dismantling of the social contract between 
capital and labour”, and market-based efforts to “maximize shareholder value”.254 Examples of 
contemporary government policies and business strategies are used to emphasize appeals to 
‘stakeholders’ and calls for ‘corporate sustainability’. These are said to motivate, propagate, and 
perpetuate a liberal ‘stakeholder’ individualism because addressing an ‘immediate’, self-orienting 
and projecting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ subjectivity within core societal arenas across 
contemporary Anglo-America. The chapter then discusses examples of moves by some non-
governmental organizations to support publicly ‘responsible’ businesses, and the ‘shareholder 
activist movement’.  
The examples support the claim that where engagements within such core arenas involve 
relatively widespread yet uneven affluence, high levels of education, and articulate dispositions, 
societal and relational dynamics that ‘go on’ therein can be seen to emphasize sovereign satisfactions 
and dissatisfactions. This is especially the case in relation to the domestic polity, occupational 
domains, and civil spheres, around public concerns like environmental or employment conditions, 
for example. The examples are used to suggest that, as engagements on terms other than those 
based in individuated desires’ satisfaction or dissatisfaction become relatively difficult to sustain, 
political parties, employers and commodity producers, as well as some civil society groups, appeal 
to a dominant subjectivity that sustains a deferral of problems raised in social worlds. It is in and 
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around such conditions that the thesis recognizes the social enframing of a dominant Anglo-
American subjectivity, largely cut-off from contexts that might work to ameliorate them, instead, 
sustains a deferral of such worldly dilemmas.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Reaganite calls to “the moral majority” and Thatcherite 
“assertions of the moral superiority of the independence of the individual from reliance on others” 
engage the polity in distinct ways. While similar appeals permeate George Bush Senior’s calls in the 
early 1990s “all Americans”, it is in Bill Clinton’s later “ubiquitous town meetings” and Tony 
Blair’s appeals for an “opportunity society” that explicit calls are made to citizens as ‘stakeholders’. 
George Bush Junior’s “heartland populism”, said to “combine patriotism with ‘homespun’ 
common sense views”, carries appeals to a competitive individualism that appositely mixes eager 
pleonexy with moral rectitude into the 2000s. Similar themes pervaded Australian Labor’s 1980s 
corporatist Wages Accord, and its more recent combining of “bread and butter issues” with 
appeals to “aspirational voters”, while the Liberal’s embrace of “upwardly mobile Howard 
battlers” has reinvigorated a more ‘rugged’ culturally conservative liberal individualism as the motif 
for its economic growth-oriented “relaxed and comfortable society”.255  
Although the United States’ Republican and Democratic, British New Labour and 
Conservative, and Australian Liberal and Labor parties differ in many important respects, what is 
important here are the similar gestures they make to Anglo-American subject-agents as an 
internationally and interpersonally competitive “community of stakeholders”. These parties seem 
to draw upon and re-present a liberal-democratic individualism that combines ‘traditional’ appeals 
to Anglo-American citizens, as bearers of individual ‘rights and duties’ yet, overlays these with 
appeals to stakeholders, as actuators of personal ‘capacities and obligations’, or ‘capabilities and 
responsibilities’. Alex Callinicos describes public appeals to such ‘stakeholders’ as casting large, 
medium, and small market-based, nation-state, and civil institutions, as well as localized groupings, 
and individuals themselves, as holders of the same interests, to the same degree. These rhetorical 
gestures and associated policies both appeal to and construe subject-agents as atomized monads, 
while situating Anglo-American nation-states, the local communities, and individuals they 
encompass, as competitors in an irresistible, juggernaut-like globalizing Stakeholder Capitalism. 
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More recently, political parties have appealed to “enlightened stakeholders” based in a perceived 
“new politics of well-being”, which is said to accompany relative increases in employment, 
education, skills, and affluence. This set of appeals becomes important in subsequent chapters, 
which discuss an array of social and cultural practices and discourses that address concerns with 
‘global’, social and personal ‘well-being’.256  
Commentators discussing British New Labour’s public justifications for “promoting 
stakeholding as a key tenet of its so-called ‘Third Way’ and ‘partnership’ initiatives, and the 
Employment Relations Act 1998 (‘Fairness at Work’)” recognize in them, appeals to “the twin 
instrumental views of the need for more social cohesion and inclusion and its associated benefits 
of competitiveness”. Such justifications are said to engage the polity via rhetoric and policies that 
propagate and animate a “stakeholder inclusiveness that is both economically and socially more 
desirable than its alternatives”: Old Labour’s emphases upon public ownership, Keynesianism, and 
universal welfarism. New Labour’s 2002 Sustainable Consumption and Production Strategy is one 
example here: it is “[d]esigned to help empower consumers and improve the environmental 
impacts of goods and services (e.g. with better information right through the supply chain to end 
consumers)”. Creating and extending conditions for enlightened personal autonomy and sovereign 
consumer choice, the Strategy seems directly to respond to and engender practices and dicousrese 
amenable to liberal ‘stakeholder’ individualism.257  
A similar rationale also appears to inform United States’ Republican government 2004 
decisions to increase “government-sponsored private voluntary programs …” — notably, the 
Department of Energy’s Climate Challenge and Energy Star Program for domestic consumer 
appliances, and the chemical industry’s Responsible Care Program — while making “deep cuts to 
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the Environmental Protection Authority regulatory budget”. In Australia, assumptions that 
competitiveness generates greater social cohesion and inclusion seem to inform the Liberal-
National government’s public justifications for re-regulating industrial relations. Its 2006 Work 
Choices legislation seems based in appeals to an autonomous and autarchic individualism that 
demands conditions for greater self-orientation and assertion, in preference to collective 
representation, in negotiations over employment. Work Choices is “a new, national workplace 
relations system that will provide more choice and flexibility for employees in the workplace. The 
system will offer better ways to reward effort, increase wages and balance work and family life”. 
Along similar lines are Australia’s “voluntary program to encourage the current 5.5% rate of staff 
with part-ownership of the firms they work for doubled to 11% by 2009”, and New Zealand’s 
Equal Opportunity Trust’s “recommend[ations] employers voluntarily devise policies that support 
non-work as well as workplace relationships, and train managers to recognize the value of healthy 
personal relationships”.258  
While, on the one hand, these policies may be seen to spring from an allegedly ‘neoliberal’ 
policy agenda that sets to the creating of conditions for market competition on the assumption 
that these generate a spill-over, which socially shapes natural environments in ‘responsible’ ways. 
On the other hand, and more importantly here, in actions, such policies seem to engage and 
animate individuals and businesses responsibly as enlightened monads, while, at the same time, 
relieving the polity as represented by government of its collective power to ensure that social 
agents per se act ‘responsibly’. These examples seem to take their cue from the kinds of voluntarism 
that might characterize Western individualism in norm-based and relational contexts. Yet, while 
such enlightened ‘informed’ voluntarism might characterize sociality in such contexts, these 
government policies appear to extend such context’s dynamics into situations where relatively 
complex forms of structured institutionality work to overlay norm-based and relational claims with 
instrumental convenience and efficiency criteria.  
Of course, such prestations to the Anglo-American polity have been described in terms of 
contemporary parties and government’s efforts to represent “economic growth” as the sole 
condition for social goods, and individual benefits. In this view, on the one hand, government’s 
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close management of markets and market relations to generate economic growth are measured 
and publicized as direct sources of social goods that benefit all stakeholders:  
 
Individuals well endowed with economic and social capabilities will be more productive; companies 
that draw on the experience of all of their stakeholders will be more efficient; while social cohesion 
within a nation is increasingly seen as a requirement for international competitiveness.259  
 
While, on the other hand, social goods and stakeholder benefits are measured and 
portrayed as individual and generic rights and freedoms created by economic growth. In this sense, 
benefits are represented as the products of government’s management of markets in ways that 
channel the ‘trickle-down’ of opportunities, for stakeholders, to develop capacities and participate 
in ‘the economy’ through employment, training, or investing: 
 
The model of wage labour that held sway during the industrial era — in which a worker 
abdicated a degree of freedom in exchange for a certain amount of security — is no longer 
applicable today. [T]he question [today] involves not simply the codification of the individual 
worker’s rights but rather the creation of professional conditions for people such that, over the 
long term, their capabilities and economic needs are sufficiently assured to allow them to take 
initiatives and shoulder responsibilities. The key terms within this perspective are not jobs, 
subordination, and social security, but work (understood in all its forms, not just as wage labour), 
professional skills, and economic security.260 
 
The present thesis suggests that such a shift in the rhetoric and practices of the stakeholder 
politics can also be seen in terms of a dominant subjectivity. These appeals seem to address a 
dominant subjectivity in conditions that Vaughan Higgins argues, work to “de-centre the nation-
state’s capacities to govern in the name of the social”. Stakeholder politics emerges in the lacuna 
created by a broad-based shift to ‘post-industrial’ conditions. Moreover, calls to stakeholders seem 
grounded in what Chapter 8 suggests are the erstwhile ‘immaterial’ claims of a post-materialist 
subpolitics. These characterize a domestic realpolitik that, as Bauman suggests, turns upon 
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“procla[iming] the dismantling of the welfare state ‘as we know it’ to be an issue ‘beyond left and 
right’, as once upon a time the creation of the welfare state used to be”.261  
These contemporary Anglo-American parties seem to engage the polity as if a combination 
of Knowledge Economy technologies and ever-further rounds of marketization, privatization, and 
re-regulation will bring societies out of a largely depressing, dirty, heavy-industry based, socially 
homogenous, and culturally conformist past, which offered little opportunity to ‘creatively-
minded’ stakeholders. Charles Leadbeater explains some of the thinking behind this embrace of 
the Information Revolution and its, peculiar, “new egalitarian agenda” by paraphrasing economist 
Robert W. Fogel: 
 
The modernist egalitarian agenda was based on material redistribution. The critical aspect of a 
postmodern egalitarian agenda is not the redistribution of money income, or food, or shelter, or 
consumer durables. Although there are still glaring inadequacies in the distribution of material 
commodities that must be addressed, the most intractable maldistributions in rich countries such 
as the United States are in the realm of spiritual and immaterial assets. Self-esteem cannot be 
redistributed in the way income can … assets of the spirit have to be personally produced; they 
cannot be delivered by the state.262 
 
This strange “synthesis of the free-market revolution and the welfarism that preceded 
it”,263 seems to characterize contemporary Anglo-American government-in-action and, in these 
respects, addresses a self-assertive and ‘creative’ dominant subjectivity. Like the examples drawn 
from the practices and discourses of the Creative Economy and its “new world of work” discussed 
later, contemporary stakeholder politics de-emphasize the material-physical ordering of relatively 
complex structured and institutionalized conditions. These instead emphasize the creative 
opportunities and imagination-driven initiatives that relatively complex structured and 
institutionalized conditions might also create, yet seem to do so as if these are always seen and 
experienced from within a disembodied realm of private autonomous desiring.  
Where, as Chapter 10 suggests, the creating and reproducing of liberal individualism works 
to anchor and impel ongoing sociality, the expansion of workplace flexibility and consumer 
choices under the rubric of stakeholder politics might be seen to animate an ‘immediate’, self-
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orienting and projecting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ dominant subjectivity. Moreover, this 
subjectivity appears to sustain a deferral of many dilemmas that sociality in the predominance of 
such a form of life might raise. Amidst widespread relative affluence, where engagements often 
require high levels of education, and articulate dispositions, government’s managing of ‘economic 
growth’ to create ‘professional conditions’ — where ‘self-starting’ stakeholders use initiative to 
‘grow’ personal capabilities — in part, creates conditions that emphasize sovereign satisfactions 
and dissatisfactions, while ‘reclassifying’ welfarism’s positive freedoms as public and personal 
‘costs’. As Bauman suggests, a poor and marginalized underclass have come to represent “the sole 
alternative to ‘staying in [a] game’” that centres on competitive emending of the self aimed at 
desires’ satisfactions, and the ‘empowering’ self-development of capabilities that facilitate 
expressions of dissatisfaction through sovereign choices.264  
 
… … … 
 
In the 1990s and 2000s, appeals to ‘stakeholders’ and ‘stakeholder communities’ were also made 
by market-based organizations within and from within Anglo-American societies, often, as part of 
an influential corporate sustainability ‘movement’. Through ‘corporate sustainability’, a plethora of 
contemporary businesses, including large, medium, and small corporations, employer, trade, and 
industry representatives, and financial, auditing, and business consultancies, enact practices and 
discourses that involve ‘stakeholders’. Indeed, it might be said that treating shareholding owners, 
managers, salaried staff, waged employees, local, national, and offshore contractors, producer and 
consumer communities, as well as individuals as stakeholders is central to corporate sustainability 
in practice. Generally, a firm adopting corporate sustainability aims “to go beyond traditional 
single ‘financial’ bottom-line [accounting] methods”, “measure impacts [of business activities] on 
the social fabric, environment and, in some cases, human rights”, as well as maintaining 
“competitive advantage” in capitalistic markets. As such, corporate sustainability is here seen as a 
permutation of “‘full-cost’ financial accounting methods”, which work to “internalize various 
social and environmental externalities” as business costs and, as such, “make doing good, doing 
well”.265  
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Several commentators link the emergence of a “global corporate sustainability agenda” to 
the “exclusive focus of corporations on shareholder value that arose as part and parcel of the 
Reaganite and Thatcherite ‘revolutions’”. Therefore, it is seen as a condition of the 
neoliberalization and financialization Chapters 7 and 8 discuss.266 Amongst others, Giles Atkinson 
and Lyuba Zarsky describe how by the late 1990s, “increasing discussion which has looked at 
sustainability from the perspective of smaller spatial scales (such as cities or regions) and economic 
entities (such as sectors or firms)” became part of market, and market-oriented government, 
concerns with the environmental and social effects of ‘globalization’. The corporate sustainability 
agenda is also said to be commensurate with the “Washington Consensus ‘model’”. As Gill 
Seyfang suggests, while the “term ‘sustainable consumption’ entered the international policy arena 
at Rio … its definition narrowed as it became a policy goal” such that, by the 2000s, the major 
globalizing inter-governmental, nation-state, and market institutions “saw market failure as the 
prime cause of unsustainability”.267  
Corporate sustainability ‘initiatives’ are developed, applied, and promoted by management 
theorists, corporate executives, globalizing bureaucrats, government organs, and environmental 
thinkers. Representing these might be former Greenpeace leader Paul Gilding’s claim that 
corporations and, indeed, “global capitalism itself, must go beyond financial obligations to 
shareholders and account for their activities in support of the people who work for them, the 
communities in which they operate, and the global environment”. Like Gilding’s “triple bottom-
line ‘reporting’”, numerous other sustainability ‘initiatives’, such as the corporate social 
responsibility programs practiced by commercial firms, and inter-firm voluntary Codes of 
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Conduct, such as the United Nations’ Global Compact, can be seen to inform a particular order of 
practices and discourses within core arenas.268  
In interviews with Fiona Haddock, “leaders of companies that shape up as socially 
responsible” suggest “sustainability is not just the warm, fuzzy feeling you get from buying free-
range eggs. It’s a management philosophy that ensures the continued, long-term success of a 
company”: 
 
[C]orporate sustainability takes in a broader base — the stakeholders … not just a company’s 
investors but also its employees, customers, suppliers, and the community at large. Here’s why. The 
fall of communism and the triumph of the free-market have slashed the influence of nation-states. 
Big business holds the reins of the world economy and, to a large extent, world politics. In an era of 
globalization … information technology is bringing transparency and fluidity to global 
communications. Where in the past they would not have given a flying forethought to sustainable 
development, today’s global consumers not only know what’s happening across the ocean some 
two to 12 thousand miles away — they also care.269 
 
The proponents of corporate sustainability seem not merely to promote a new globalizing 
order based in “caring, sharing corporations”, but actively to pursue a “new era of capitalism” 
based in “social and environmental responsibility”. The practices and discourses associated with 
corporate sustainability and this ‘new era’ often intertwine with calls to “unite in a shared 
purpose”. This ‘new era’ is said to supplant a failed and substantively different antecedent. Implicit 
here are claims that ‘top-down’ management, ‘full-time’ workforces and, importantly, ‘big’ 
bureaucratic governments, restrain “good corporate citizens”, and limit market relations to archaic, 
oppressive, hierarchical, and conformity-driven, largely, dirty, and heavy, industrial practices. This 
so-called “new era of capitalism” and its “new social realities” appears to unleash a nature-like 
tendency for high-technology, services, and consumption-centred, markets to engender 
unprecedented opportunities for personal ‘imaginativeness’ and ‘creativity’, individual ‘freedom of 
choice’, community development, ecological reparations, and to increase ‘democracy’.270  
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… … … 
 
Notably, however, several commentators allege that corporate sustainability merely improves the 
“public relations profile of business”, while delivering them from actual obligations to implement 
socially, or environmentally, sustainable practices. For example, Stuart Esrock and Greg Liechty 
claim, “There may be little relationship between a corporation’s self-presentation and its actual 
social responsibility performance”. While this is important, it relates only indirectly to the present 
thesis’ argument. It frames discussion of moves by several prominent non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) active across Anglo-American societies to support corporations that “have 
now moved towards managing their stakeholder relationships to varying degrees and appear to 
have moved away from a minimalist notion of being ‘responsible only for meeting legal obligations 
in generating profits for shareholders’”. These include public offers of support by NGOs to 
businesses in their efforts to account for employee ‘wellbeing’; enhance auditing, investor, or 
consumer ‘transparency’; stimulate Social Entrepreneurialism; develop guidelines for 
environmental care; and support ‘self-regulation’ through Codes of Conduct, for example.271 
These NGO actions, often based in explicit claims that “the environmental problem we 
are facing is symptomatic of the breakdown of our broader governance systems”, are interesting. 
The example provided by NGO action in support of ‘caring, sharing’ forms of market relations 
helps to explain how stakeholder politics and corporate sustainability might work in-action. 
Where, alongside some NGOs, certain governments also support ‘caring, sharing’ corporations — 
through market-based environmental ‘solutions’, consumer-driven “green power initiatives” or, 
indirectly, by “re-thinking welfare” and supporting “social entrepreneurialism”,272 for example — 
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these also seem to contribute to and reinforce practices and discourses that privilege sovereign 
choice through atomized forms of desiring within core societal arenas. While arguments that 
NGO support for corporate sustainability ignores or elides structured and institutionalized 
conditions that make markets and government key contributors to many of the ongoing concerns 
raised by them as civil groups are not the direct concern here, this is a relatively important point. 
On the one hand, NGOs that “encourage[e] industry innovation by naming the laggards and 
promoting the innovators”, “in the hope that other [corporations], and by extension, consumers, 
will follow the good example” work to link environmental problems to the relatively complex, 
abstract, and extended nature of structured and institutionalized forms of authority. Yet, on the 
other hand, such support and, indeed, promotions, seem to obscure or elide a link that would 
imply such problems are also ‘symptomatic’ of the similarly complex structured institutionalization 
of value criteria in contemporary Anglo-American conditions.273  
Such corporate sustainability ‘initiatives’ are not merely widespread, but in many ways 
important to the job of creating and reproducing Anglo-American sociality. Highlighting this order 
of relationship between markets and some civil society groups helps to suggest how conditions 
both enframe and address a dominant subjectivity. Where such relationships between markets and 
civil society seem to proliferate, conditions emerge that seem to elide many possibilities for 
engagements based in claims that it is, partially or wholly, government’s failure — as the main 
institutionalized bearer of concentrated social power — to reign-in or delimit injustices or 
pollution created by market activities. These examples suggest the extension of practical and 
discursive conditions that emphasize consumer sovereignty occlude alternative or critical 
engagements or expressions of concerns with environmental and social issues. In conditions of 
neoliberalization and financialization, these NGO actions appeal to antinomian and libertarian 
currents within Anglo-American liberal individualism that were themselves, once, largely eclipsed 
by the relatively collective forms of life manifest amidst welfare statism, mass-industrialism, and 
the predominance of mass-society forms of culture.  
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Looking briefly at ‘shareholder activism’ helps to explicate further the suggestion that 
situations which privilege liberal individualism work to emphasize sovereign desires’ satisfactions 
and dissatisfactions in conditions that marginalize or exclude engagements within sociality on 
other terms. Chapters 7 and 8 associate neoliberalization and financialization with a wide-reaching 
movement of middle and high incomes “into the orbit of the financial sector”, and increased levels 
of personal debt and consumption. By the late 1990s, and into the 2000s, several commentators 
had described how these earners of middle and high incomes, and their representatives — as well 
as, indirectly through ‘pension funds’, a relatively large number of lower income groups — began 
to assert themselves within the financial sphere in particular ways. As well as critical commentators 
Krippner, and Duménil and Lévy, management theorist Peter Drucker, and economist-policy 
advisor Robert Monks, describe how these groups, having been drawn ‘into’ the financial sector as 
albeit incremental corporate ‘owners’, began to exert influence upon firms as “shareholder 
activists”.274  
Such activism is said to “redefine the corporation as a social as well as an economic entity” 
by combining individual share-owning investors and the “immense financial power of the 
mainstream institutional shareholders to force corporations to adopt progressive social [and 
environmental] policies” or, to “maximize shareholder value”. Monks suggests that, in the United 
States at least, individual ‘activist’ resolutions, as well as actions by union-based pension funds and 
“ethical investment portfolios”, increasingly work to “exert pressure on fund managers” to 
devolve investments in corporations acting in ways incommensurate with “the material interests or 
stated ideals of members”. The key point here is that, while shareholder activism seems to express 
an array of public concerns, it ‘goes on’ amidst socially structured conditions that render market-
based relations the predominant institutionalized responses to them. The assumption is that, 
“When ownership becomes affectively asserted, the likelihood of corporations being run in a 
sustainable manner is vastly improved”.275  
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This is interesting when seen in the light of United States’ Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) moves in 2004 to support shareholder claims against managers by “pushing 
for even more shareholder democracy”. Arguably, a key effect of such policy is to pass through 
market relations, actions to address social injustice, environmental pollution, or economic 
miscreancy. On the one hand, what seems to background governmental support for shareholder 
activism are assumptions that solutions for environmental and social problems, or financial 
malfeasance, will be created as a spill-over where citizen-shareholder-activists choose ‘good 
corporate citizens’ over those that downsize, pollute, or mismanage. On the other hand, however, 
and more important for the present thesis, like stakeholder politics, corporate sustainability, and 
some NGO support for business, is that shareholder activism, both privileges a liberal 
individualism that empowers and marginalizes in particular ways.  
In conclusion to this chapter, it might be said that, like appeals to stakeholders, corporate 
sustainability ‘initiatives’, and NGO support for business ‘innovators’, ‘shareholder activism’ ‘goes 
on’ as an aspect of ongoing Anglo-American sociality that partially contributes to the creating and 
reproducing of a plethora of atomized opportunities for ‘creativity’, individual freedoms, and 
personal autonomy. Looking at ‘shareholder activism’ as supported by governments sympathetic 
to Washington Consensus policies helps to suggest how the environmental, social, and economic 
issues it raises can be seen in terms of expanded and extended individuated ‘opportunities’ for 
consumer-like exercise of sovereign choice. These examples are seen to both address and animate 
a particular formation of individualism amidst relatively affluent, well-educated, and articulate 
milieux, across contemporary core arenas. Moreover, it is where core engagements are said to ‘go 
on’ in these ways amidst particular cultural histories that a self-orienting and projecting, self-
asserting and ‘creative’ dominant subjectivity might be seen to manifest in and through a liberal 
‘enlightened stakeholder’ individualism. 
 
… … … 
 
Since the 1970s, increasing prominence within Anglo-American social, cultural, economic, and 
political affairs has been given to the kinds of social and environmental issues that concern the 
theorists and practitioners of corporate sustainability. Coinciding with the ‘industrialization of 
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culture’, increased participation in higher education, and expanded mass-communications media, 
such issues combine and intertwine with corporate sustainability in scientific research, legislation, 
re-regulation, as well as international dialogues and treaties. In these respects, and like the gestures 
surrounding stakeholder politics, corporate sustainability imbricates itself into Anglo-American 
sociality through appeals to “an individualism of expanded desire”.276 Discussing corporate 
sustainability in terms of the relative affluence, high levels of education, and articulate dispositions 
said to characterize many occupational and consumer engagements across core societal arenas 
helps to focus upon situations that animate such a liberal individualism, and support the claim that 
a new subjectivity presents itself in contemporary conditions.  
Interestingly, some social theorists have developed a concept of “risk society” to explain 
the effects of a range of institutional actions and subjective conditions prompted by widespread 
concern with such issues, especially alongside more recent emphases on ‘terrorism’ and ‘homeland 
security’.277 Where such issues are disseminated by the news-media across Anglo-American 
societies, ‘current affairs’ reportage might focus upon natural disasters, social dislocation, poverty, 
pollution, and human rights abuses, wars, and conflicts, for example. In addition, the news-media 
may discuss these issues in relation to specific events, such as the Vietnam War, Energy Crisis, and 
‘hyperinflation’, in the 1970s, the Bhopal and Chernobyl disasters, War on Drugs, or Iran-Contra 
Affair, in the 1980s, or Global Warming, the Gulf War, and conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in 
the 1990s and 2000s, for example. From within Anglo-American societies, public concern over 
these issues might be seen to take a number of forms. These might include relatively spontaneous 
collective actions, such as marches, demonstrations, or participation in civil society groups; legal 
claims for redress, such as ‘public interest suits’; political engagements, aimed at achieving 
legislative change; or, individual actions-in-concert, such as ‘shareholder activism’, ‘green 
consumerism’ and, of course, voting in elections, or referenda.  
In such conditions, both the stakeholder and corporate sustainability offer motifs for 
particular structured institutionalized responses to what might be seen as broad public concerns 
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raised by subject-agents and groups from within in the civil sphere. Richard Gosden claims that 
climatologist Phillip Kelly’s 1987 call for “fundamental changes in lifestyle and consumption 
patterns” across the global North prompted a “popular media that fell over each other in the rush 
to inform the public about their new responsibility to consume with green discrimination”. For 
Gosden, these issues and their reportage intertwine within wider conditions of ongoing 
neoliberalization. For him, these contributed to “the wave of green consumerism [that] was 
thereafter quickly established as an essential ingredient of the business culture’s plan to save the 
planet”.278  
While subsequent chapters discuss examples of commodity-based ‘social messages’, offers 
of high-quality, ‘self-care’, or ‘nutrition’, for example, this chapter moves to discuss in more detail 
contemporary occupational practices and discourses in conditions of neoliberalization and 
financialization. These chapters focus upon ways that contemporary Anglo-American occupational 
domains seem to emphasize sustainability, compassion, caring and sharing, and ‘socially 
responsible’ practices, which address a dominant subjectivity that, oscillating between sovereign 
satisfactions and dissatisfactions, sustains a deferral of worldly dilemmas raised by social worlds. 
These examples concentrate in particular upon links between so-called countercultural forms of 
individualism and emphasizes upon creativity and autonomy in the new world of work. Said by 
Paul Heelas to constitute part of a broad-based “turn to soft capitalism”,279 these examples help to 
illustrate wide-reaching shifts from ostensibly ‘cold and heartless’ mass-industrial to erstwhile 
‘caring and sharing’ employment and production practices as these enframe a dominant 
subjectivity that oscillates between heightened desires and enervated dissatisfactions. Seen to be 
commensurate with corporate sustainability ‘initiatives’, and often purported as contributions to a 
‘new era’ and its concomitant ‘shared purpose’, these examples emphasize contemporary 
conditions that privilege forms of individualism which bring sovereignty of choice and 
autonomous desiring into core occupational domains.  
Interesting here is Du Gay’s suggestion that a key epistemological premise of the ‘new 
wave’ management theory that became prominent in the early 1990s is its assumption that subject-
agents bring an autonomous and entrepreneurial self-hood to engagements with market-based 
organizations as employees, staff, contractors, suppliers, or consumers. This ‘new wave’ seems to 
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coincide with the emergence of global sustainability initiatives, and stakeholder politics in 
conditions of a broad-based shift away from social-democratic welfare statism, and towards 
policies based in recognition that “equality of opportunity is the key to economic prosperity”.280  
Du Gay argues that this approach contrasts with the ‘symbolic interactionism’ that 
dominated management theory and practice until the late 1970s. The older approach meant 
assuming that subject-agents seek to identify with firms, workplaces, occupational milieux or, in 
consumption, with specific cultural representations.281 For du Gay, the ‘new wave’ of management 
theories and practices began to displace interactionism in the late 1980s. It set out to “harness the 
psychological striving of individuals for autonomy and creativity and channel them into the search 
of the firm for excellence and success … in a sphere within which the individual constructs and 
confirms his or her identity”. Du Gay suggests that this ‘new wave’ shifts labour away from “an 
activity undertaken to meet instrumental needs”. Occupations at all levels, indeed, life itself, is said 
to become “a means to self-responsibility and hence self-optimization … the new wave is 
explicitly aimed at everyone”. This ‘new wave’ extends an invitation to managers, salaried staff, 
waged employees, contractors, and suppliers to join the corporation In Search of Excellence, while 
congratulating end-users and consumers for choosing to support “Best Practice”.282  
Arguably, the theories and practices associated with this ‘new wave’ constitute but a single 
facet of a more broad transformation of practices and discourses that the present thesis suggests 
emerge across Anglo-America in the 1990s. Notable here are firms engaged in the creation, 
production, distribution, and dissemination of personal-use commodities, and ‘cultural’, or ‘leisure’ 
products and services. One such firm that has grown exponentially since the 1980s, to employ 
over 27 000 persons in over 7 500 retail outlets across the world in 2005, is the Starbucks Coffee 
Company. While Starbucks is arguably a central feature in contemporary United States’, British and 
to a lesser extent, Australian cityscapes, the firm is also of interest here because of the associations 
it maintains with the libertarian countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Starbucks’ 
management deliberately cultivates a caring, sharing, and nurturing image, which the firm’s 
Mission Statement emphasizes in six Guiding Principles:  
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Provide a great work environment and treat each other with respect.  
Embrace diversity as an essential component in the way we do business.  
Apply the highest standards of excellence to the purchasing, roasting, and fresh delivery of our 
coffee.  
Develop enthusiastically satisfied customers all of the time.  
Contribute positively to our communities and our environment. 
Recognize that profitability is essential to our future success.283 
  
Indeed, Naomi Weiss investigated Starbucks as one of Fortune magazine’s “100 Best 
Companies to work for in America”, and “found an energy here — not induced by a caffeine rush 
— but from associates drinking up a robust blend of teamwork, sense of mission and challenge”. 
Weiss asks a rhetorical question of Starbucks’ management spokesperson, “How does a young … 
company on an aggressive growth track motivate more than 27 000 people and inspire balance and 
camaraderie?” The spokesperson’s response echoes the caring and nurturing rhetoric of the 
Mission Statement; “We use a special blend of employee benefits and a work/life program that 
focuses on the physical, mental, emotional, and creative aspects of each person”. In a separate 
interview with journalist Jon Carlin, Chief Executive Howard Schultz enthuses over wanting “to 
work with people who don’t leave their values at home but bring them to work, people whose 
principles match my own”. Schultz’s own book, Pour Your Heart Into It, encapsulates these 
principles in a business model that he suggests is applicable within any industry.284  
An interesting point about Starbucks as an employer — and one also applied by other large 
firms, such as Borders Bookstores, Wal-Mart, and Amazon.com, for example — is that it refers to 
employees as ‘partners’ or ‘associates’. This relatively subtle and recent move by such firms offers 
a way into discussing conditions where, it seems, labour at almost any level appears to become 
more than ‘just a job’, more than a time- or task-based exchange of effort for cash remuneration. 
Where erstwhile partners or associates replace staff or employees, the human effort these 
represent in practice seem to become opportunities for self-assertion. Even menial service jobs, 
such as making take-away coffee, take on the qualities, at least, in the corporate rhetoric, of 
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something akin to the life-work of the artist in Western culture. These become market-sanctioned 
opportunities for an ostensibly unbound project-of-the-self. Importantly, such metamorphoses 
extend beyond the occupational domain. Firms such as Starbucks employ subject-agents as store 
partners and regale consumers with information about a Commitment to Origins™, for example, 
the practices and discourses these create and reproduce manifest alongside and amidst what the 
present thesis describes as the policies of the stakeholder society.285  
References to partners and associates aside, the “sinewy, rounded lines and holistic 
atmosphere” that obtains within Starbucks’ outlets obscure an almost unprecedented level of 
hyper-efficiency, specifically directed at achieving single-bottom-line profitability. It seems that 
conditions for paid labour at Starbucks in the United States, at least, are such that store partners are 
employed on an hourly basis, and may have hours cut mid-shift, or be sent to other branches if 
trade slows on a given day. Similarly, Borders, the world’s second largest book retailer — and a 
socially responsible corporation “founded by two Ann Arbor hippies in the 1970s” — provides a 
gay and lesbian “domestic-partner” friendly health-plan for associates. Nonetheless, Starbucks’, 
Border’s, and the United States’ largest employer, Wal-Mart’s health-insurance plans, while “loudly 
touted” as evidence of social progressiveness by these firms in North American media discourses, 
continue to be derided by unions and labour advocates as “one[s that] most employees could not 
afford”.286  
Naomi Klein and Liza Featherstone, for example, argue that Noah’s Bagels, Whole Foods, 
Newman’s Own, Working Assets, and Powell’s Books, alongside Starbucks and Borders, use their erstwhile 
“socially responsible public profiles [as a] union busting tool”, and remain frequently “mired in 
acrimonious labour disputes”. At Borders, the “phantasmic liberalism” and geek-culture image 
central to the company’s internal and public profile as a “progressive company” coincides with the 
retaining of “Jackson Lewis, one of the leading union-busting law firms” in North America. Indeed, 
the firm regularly uses the mass-media to argue that unions are “inappropriate for Borders”, as do 
Starbucks, claiming in the Wall Street Journal in March 2006 that “its work environment makes 
unions unnecessary at the company”. As in the United States, Borders’ Australian branches are 
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targeted by unions and sustain employee claims that “staff are on low pay, have no penalty rates, 
and are discouraged from organizing their workplace”.287 
Globalizing bookstore Borders, makes clear that it “prefers to hire tertiary qualified staff”, 
with education levels beyond the obvious requirements of the book-trade for articulate and skilled 
workers. Borders actively seeks associates of this kind, it seems, because the creative dispositions 
and deeply individuated, autonomous lifestyle expectations that “tertiary qualified staff” bring to 
work are compatible with this particular, allegedly “aggressive, anti-union, and big …” globalizing 
corporation’s approach to efficiency and, so, profitability.288 This is where links between such 
market-based organizational strategies and the libertarian and antinomian countercultural 
individualisms spreading across Anglo-America and the West after the 1960s and 1970s become 
most visible. That is, this aspect of such operational strategies seems to hang on a deep-seated 
social and cultural rejection of divisions between labour and leisure: it taps into libertarian and 
antinomian modes of personal autonomy and sovereign desiring.  
 
… … … 
 
At this point, I want to break off from discussion that relates directly to the thesis argument, and 
look at some contemporary employment conditions in more detail. This brief digression allows 
discussion to link the occupational domain to broader currents in recent Anglo-American cultural 
and countercultural history. These examples help to clarify the direction of the overall argument, 
because offering insight into ways that the creating and reproducing of normative conditions can 
be said to ‘go on’ in dynamic terms, as the societal and relational enframing of a dominant 
subjectivity. The suggestion is that there exist these conditions, in and around which exists this 
subjectivity, which can be seen as creating sociality, and as the condition of ‘being’ human amidst 
the conditions such a form of life creates and reproduces.  
The case of Amazon.com, “Famous for its casual, unhierarchical management style, 
eccentric work habits and e-commerce pioneer of dotcommunism”, is also interesting. “In lieu of 
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full wages in the ‘heady days’ of the high-tech ‘bubble’” in the 1990s, Amazon.com distributed share 
options to its associates. However, when “the bubble finally burst”, prompting a unionization 
drive and claims for full-wages to replace what had become near-worthless stock options, 
Amazon.com’s response was to “export the troublesome operation to some less questioning region 
on earth, terminating most of its Seattle-based customer service workforce on the way”. 
Implicated in this move was Chief Executive Officer Jeff Bezos, who while denying allegations 
that the company was preparing to move offshore, underwent investigation by the United States’ 
government SEC for “selling USD $12 million of Amazon stock shortly before a report critical of 
the company was scheduled to appear”.289  
Another firm with close historical and rhetorical links to the 1960s and 1970s 
counterculture is Ben & Jerry’s Ice-Creamery. The firm uses countercultural symbolism both as a 
promotional tool — it retails ice-cream products labelled Cherry Garcia and Phish Food, named for 
past and present doyens of the ‘psychedelic’ scene — and in guidelines for its “corporate concept 
of linked prosperity” and “deep respect for individuals inside and outside the company and for the 
communities in which they are part”. Originating as a cottage industry, “begun by two Burlington, 
Vermont ‘longhairs’ in the 1970s”, Ben & Jerry’s expanded to operate more than 170 outlets across 
the United States’ and Britain by 1998, while achieving notoriety as a “famously anti-corporate 
[and] socially responsible ice-cream manufacturer”.290  
However, in spite of such sustainability ‘credentials’, including a policy for “the delivery of 
7.5% of pre-tax profits to charity” and a “top to bottom salary ratio of 7:1”, the company 
demonstrated marked recalcitrance over questions of unionization at its main plant in a 1998 
overtime pay dispute. While Ben & Jerry’s “disingenuously … argued that its employees didn’t need 
a union because they had better than average benefits (including paid family leave and health club 
memberships, as well as three pints of ice-cream daily)”, the company forbade media contact 
during the dispute, ostensibly under “legal advice”. Moreover, after conducting an investigation 
into the dispute, labour rights researcher Featherstone claims to have encountered a degree of 
employee reticence to speak to the media, which she argues “suggest an unusually hostile 
workplace”.291  
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While the case of Ben & Jerry’s seems to resemble the other examples discussed here, such 
as those of Nike, Starbucks, Borders, Amazon.com, Wal-Mart, and others, it takes on a somewhat 
different complexion when recognizing that globalizing consumer goods conglomerate Unilever 
purchased the firm in 2000 for USD $326 million. Unilever clearly transcends in scale the lifestyle 
niche-market in which the firm operated before the buyout, “pledg[ing] to increase sales at Ben & 
Jerry’s from USD $270 million … to USD $1 billion in five to ten years”. While the globalizing 
corporation shares the “socially responsible” ethos of the ice creamery’s original owners, Unilever 
spokesperson Steve Milton’s explanation for the purchase is interesting: “The company wanted to 
take a lead on the [CSR] issue internationally … [Unilever recognizes] corporate social auditing as 
the ‘next big trend’ after environmental accountability”. Regardless of the corporation’s 
enthusiasm for social responsibility, however, Unilever “instituted a hiring freeze” at Ben & Jerry’s, 
and “allowed wage ratios to blow-out to 16:1”, while appointee Director Yves Couette suggested 
publicly, “If you have to cut some jobs, that might happen, yes”.292  
As in the examples of stakeholder politics, corporate sustainability, NGO support for 
responsible businesses, and shareholder activism discussed in this chapter, such occupational 
conditions seem prestations to an individualism that turns on projections of exemplarity and 
emending the self. These set out to displace a past order of stifling homogeneity, conformity, 
‘dirty’ industries, bureaucratic inertia, and a ‘nannying’ welfare state. No longer arduous exercises 
in boredom, alienation, discipline, or emotional control, duty, or civil responsibility, contemporary 
occupations and stakeholder initiatives seem to offer opportunities for augmented forms of 
personal desiring and an ever-expanding array of choices; for contributing to meaningful 
relationships or embracing interesting and fulfilling tasks, for ‘climbing the ladder of opportunity’.  
This is where links to recent Anglo-American cultural history and, especially, the so-called 
counterculture are important. That is, calls to partners and associates to Pour Your Heart into It, 
seem to offer opportunities for personal autonomy and sovereign choice, but also to negate 
possibilities that employment relationships could be overly demanding, require long hours, be 
unrewarding, boring, tedious, or underpaid. Regardless of any actual quality of partner benefits on 
offer, the practices discussed in these examples put the workplace beyond possibilities that it may 
be the site for unfairness, injustice, or exploitation. The examples discussed here represent 
contemporary occupational practices that imply subject-agents work on ‘their own time’ and self-
present in ‘their own ways’. Where stakeholder communities and corporate sustainability combine 
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with government policies emphasizing workplace flexibility, it seems that employee enthusiasm, 
energetic application of the self to occupational tasks, said to be ‘fun’ and ‘fulfilling’, as well as 
incessant impulsion to self-improvement, seem to characterize occupational domains across core 
arenas for sociality.  
Such conditions become more recognizable in relation to subjectivity and a liberal 
individualism when looking at how several large and diverse Anglo-American corporations, such 
as General Electric and BankOne engage an array of consultancies to provide “employee outreach 
and education, and wellness programs” as methods for “educating employees to help themselves”. 
A key premise for such corporate action is that, “today, firms recognize that employees are 
essentially corporate athletes, and we have to keep them healthy and in peak performance on the 
playing field of the workplace”. Supported by a range of productivity and ‘well-being’ 
consultancies, healthcare firms, and insurance companies, corporations might deploy “Employee 
Assistance Programs (EAPs) [that] target the problem of presenteeism”. In contrast with 
absenteeism, when employees take time off, presenteeism “is the loss in productivity that occurs when 
workers are on the job, but not performing at their best”. It is seen as “an important part of the 
business strategy for companies that seek ways to reduce costs, improve productivity, and promote 
employee health and wellness”. Actions to limit presenteeism might include “integrated disease 
management and integrated health-related productivity improvement initiatives”, while “reaching 
out to employees who are dealing with mental stress, anxiety or depression … [or] need a lawyer 
for bankruptcy, for eviction, for child custody”.293  
For the present thesis, this particular order of the range of ‘well-being’ initiatives taken up 
by businesses in recent years seems to make subject-agents’ extra-curricular activities the focus of 
lifestyle-fashioning efforts. Such initiatives do not merely work as an abstract conjuring of subject-
agents as human effort — holders of time and skills offered in a market place — but, as holders of 
effort on what amounts to a ‘pre-purchase plan’: these seem to impel subject-agents’ to consistent 
optimizing of skills, education and, indeed, creativity. Presenteeism conjures and pre-defines 
subject-agents as if always holders of the same order of interests as those demanded within the 
occupational domain. Where corporations adopt presenteeism to facilitate employee health and 
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well-being, they seem to require subject-agents to emend the self; to strive for personal Best 
Practice. Such corporate “synergies for best practice” might also include “volunteerism programs”. 
The practices of volunteerism are based in claims that “the interests of both the individual and the 
organization have to be met and commitment to work, which once could perhaps be assumed, 
now has to be organized and bargained for.” Volunteerism fosters “the attitude employees bring 
to their jobs, the concept of being engaged and enthusiastic, of having absorbed the goals and 
values of the organization. They have put their hands up for the task”.294  
Volunteerism is another ‘initiative’ taken up by large, medium, and small firms operating in 
Anglo-American societies over recent years. For example, the multinational Alcoa Corporation uses 
“company-tracked employee engagement programs” to administer “employee volunteer efforts”. 
The corporation’s program of encouraging employees to volunteer — for example, volunteering 
‘Alcoans’ planted 5 000 trees in Swansea, Wales — “helped earn organizations throughout the 
world over USD$ 1 million in grants from Alcoa” in 2003. Virgin Blue Airlines has also used 
volunteerism to encourage employees to adopt ways of “relating to each other and customers as 
they would to friends or family”.295 Although a contentious point, initiatives such as Alcoa’s seem 
to open the way for the stigmatizing by employers or colleagues of employees who do not, cannot 
or, who refuse to join volunteerism programs in what are, essentially, civil activities. While in a 
different way, Virgin Blue’s initiatives seem to work as barriers to employment that demarcates 
particular forms of articulateness and employee dispositions. Moreover, Virgin Blue has been 
subjected to action in the civil courts in Australia for using employment methods designed to 
exclude particular kinds of employees.296  
While the present thesis does not discuss presenteeism and volunteerism in order to 
detract from claims that these are ‘high-minded’ initiatives. This may or may not be the case. 
Rather, the aim here is to suggest how these may work, in practice, to make self-assertion, 
autonomy, creativity, or, indeed, athlete-like emendation of the self a near-compulsory condition 
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for engaging in core occupational domains. Moreover, the aim is to suggest that where corporate 
sustainability is said to benefit “people, planet and profits”, and governments call for stakeholder-
based “opportunity societies”,297 initiatives such as presenteeism and volunteerism might be said to 
extend a dominant subjectivity that oscillates between satisfactions and dissatisfactions beyond the 
occupational domain.  
 
… … … 
 
These examples help to suggest that a kind of pervasive wholism encompasses core societal arenas 
across the contemporary Anglo-American West. These examples might be said to represent a 
blurring of distinctions between oppression or exploitation and stakeholder-like individual 
opportunities. Occupation on almost any terms seems readily presented as creative opportunities, 
expressions of sovereign Work Choices, Compassion, or Democracy. Just as corporate 
presenteeism aids employee well-being as well as lifts productivity; appeals to volunteers animate 
offers of opportunities for personal autonomy and sovereign choices in ways that work to assuage 
many existential, ethical, or material dilemmas which might arise in occupational domains. These 
seem to turn on offers of opportunities for self-assertion and creativity, yet effectively render mute 
possibilities for claiming or rejecting conditions that prompt fatigue, weariness, stress, or 
overwork, in ways incommensurate with the directives of a shared purpose. These seem to 
obscure possibilities that alternate or critical claims might enter negotiations. Arguably, such 
conditions make the creating by market-based organizations of social injustices, environmental 
pollution, workplace exploitation, or undemocratic situations non-possibilities.  
Described in this way, such conditions can be seen to frame a peculiar dissipating of 
divisions between non-instrumental leisure and instrumental labour activities. Where self-creativity 
and pro-activeness become key requirements for engaging in core arenas for sociality, exploitation, 
stress, or fatigue, unemployment, or ill-health become mere expressions of dissatisfaction: target-
markets for the purveyors of well-being, presenteeism, or volunteerism ‘initiatives’, for example. 
However, these examples also suggest that such conditions render relatively unequal power 
relationships between buyers and suppliers of human effort almost ‘non-possibilities’. On the 
other side of conditions that imply socially created problems manifest as ‘opportunities’ lay 
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enervated dissatisfactions. Contemporary existential, ethical, or material dilemmas, such as lack of 
meaningful work, stressful terms, or exploitative relations, for example, seem to gain iteration 
within the occupational domain, but almost only as private expressions of dissatisfaction. Indeed, 
the whole gamut of examples discussed here, from stakeholder politics and corporate sustainability 
‘initiatives’, to NGO support for responsible businesses and ‘stakeholder activism, might be seen 
in terms of a particular order of structured and institutionalized responses to a dominant 
subjectivity that oscillates between such heightened satisfactions and enervated dissatisfactions.  
This is also where examples more readily recognizable as the material for current sociology 
might be brought into inquiry, such as the relatively widespread use of communications and 
information technologies across the ‘new world of work’. In flexible job markets, various 
technologies, such as mobile telephony, home-internet connections, Global Positioning Systems in 
vehicles and plant, personal data storage and information retrieval systems, for example, are said to 
free subject-agents from paperwork and the office desk. However, simultaneously, these can be 
represented as the facilitators of heightened surveillance and more exact tasking. Such technologies 
allow for monitoring of ‘log-in’ times, communications, and make possible constant spatial 
locating of employees. Staying ‘in-touch’ and under constant surveillance through such 
technologies seems closely interrelated.298  
Here, suggestions by Ehrenreich, Pusey, Sennett, and others, that conditions of 
neoliberalization and financialization effectively normalize relatively long hours, heighten sources 
of stress, and create deep-seated insecurities or ‘precarity’ across a range of class, status, or 
occupational groupings become interesting. These critical sociologists often discuss contemporary 
conditions in terms of a “new world of work”, where widespread outsourcing, flexibility, and 
casualization bring enhanced individual responsibilities to manage time and money, while high 
labour mobility creates an absence of opportunities for meaningful relationships, or maintaining 
friendships and family ties. These authors describe a creeping precarity that “transcend[s] class 
divisions”. This precarity is said to coincide with a pervasive “lack of [social] security”, and to 
characterize ongoing conditions of neoliberalization and financialization. These insights into the 
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“personal consequences of work in the new capitalism” help to focus upon subject-agents’ 
experiences amidst what Sennett argues is a social, cultural, political, and economic “system that 
radiates indifference … where there is history, but no shared narrative of difficulty … no shared 
fate”.299  
For Sennett, such precarity is fuelled by increasing ‘casualization’ and the organizing of 
work-time around high technologies, and demand for relatively high vocational-educational 
attainment in service and service-type industries.300 Similarly, Bunting describes the increasing 
prevalence, across almost all forms of employment, of occupational demands for “emotional labour 
[which] requires not just physical stamina and analytical capabilities … but your personality and 
emotional skills as well”.301 While Ehrenreich discusses the “futility of the American corporate 
dream”, Pusey focuses upon the “dark side” of Australian “economic rationalism”. Both 
Ehrenreich and Pusey concur; “the proportion of full-timers working standard hours of work 
dropped significantly and the proportion working very long hours rose dramatically” in recent 
decades, implying that “increased productivity is experienced by employees as increased intensity of 
work”, which brings demands for “unconditional commitment to work harder”.302  
Sociology of this order is also commensurate with policy-oriented statistical econometric 
analyses by Ken Hudson and Jared Bernstein, for example. Hudson and Bernstein argue that, “in 
the ‘long-term’, beginning with the major structural shifts” of the mid-1970s, which have been 
exacerbated by the “early 1990s’ recession”, contemporary conditions manifest as a “jobless 
recovery”. They suggest that, into the 2000s, “nearly 30% of [US] workers are employed in … 
non-standard jobs — part-time work, independent contracting, temping, on-call work, day labor, 
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and self-employment”, while “many of those who have kept their jobs are facing less job 
security”.303  
Discussing examples of what are, in effect, corporate sustainability-styled efforts to create 
‘work-life’ balance, enhance personal ‘well-being’, or expand ‘environmental stewardship’, for 
example, and linking these to particular recent cultural and countercultural histories helps to relate 
the discussion to conditions that the sociologists describe as ‘precarious’. It seems that time, space, 
and the body, are ‘returned’ to subject-agents in contemporary conditions, yet, on terms that make 
much of freedom and autonomy and offer little recourse for occupational grievances: beyond, that 
is, dissatisfaction as expressed in choices to change employers. While later chapters will discuss 
examples that suggest a similar set of conditions prevails in relation to ‘green’ and ‘fair trade’ 
commodities, these examples suggest how contemporary conditions render the creation of 
conditions for injustice or exploitation non-possibilities.  
These examples appear to allow for little room for collective assessment or 
institutionalized actions that would reject or modify the peculiar offers of personal autonomy and 
individual liberty made under the aegis of ostensibly ‘caring, sharing’ employment conditions. 
Ronald Paul Hill and Debra Lynn Stephens’ study of Compassionate Organizations in operations at 
the Ideo, Intel, and Microsoft information technology hardware and software manufacturers, as well 
as at the Nike leisurewear producer, designer, and distributor are interesting here: 
 
Compassionate Organizations offer employees exciting and fulfilling workplaces [where] the elicitation 
of sheer enjoyment or fun in activities … [that] fail to distinguish between work and play … are 
stimulating emotionally as well as intellectually complementary and creativity-enhancing. [These] 
recognize and appreciate the needs and desires of major internal and external constituencies, and … 
operate to find synergies between the goals of these subgroups and the larger institution. This 
vigilance goes beyond the traditional market-driven approach … of the previous century, to include 
a fuller understanding of and dedication to meeting the many and varied requirements of human 
existence.304  
 
Hill and Stephens’ suggest that the operations of Nike are “consistent with this 
perspective” and, as such, describe the firm as being a typical Compassionate Organization:  
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Nike has developed a campus environment at its Beaverton, Oregon facility that provides a variety 
of services to meet professional and personal needs. Exercise facilities allow employees to engage in 
virtually any sport or physical activity throughout the day. There are a number of restaurants … 
where employees gather to chat informally or just unwind. Shopping for clothing or gifts often 
occurs at the Nike store, and workers receive steep discounts off retail prices. Parents can 
participate in a number of family events sponsored by the company, and their young children are 
given day care facilities in a near by building.305  
 
While the creating of such conditions at Nike’s Beaverton campus are seen as emblems for 
the central tenets of the ‘compassionate’ organizational theory, Hill and Stephens’ appraisal does 
seem to contradict numerous criticisms of the firm’s operations. Some critics actually regard Nike 
as “a globally understood symbol for exploitative, irresponsible, inflexibly pitiless capitalism”. 
These criticisms jar with claims the firm, itself, makes on its website; “Nike is committed to being 
a responsible corporate citizen”. While criticism in mainstream media, peer-reviewed journals, and 
through activist channels allege the firm uses a range of strategies that create extremely low wages, 
exploitative work practices, and human rights abuses at its production sites, Nike’s website features 
images of young women, arm-in-arm, laughing and joking outside what seem to be factory gates 
somewhere in South East Asia. However, whether or not Hill and Stephens’ claims are ill-
considered, weakly researched or, merely, research with a limited scope and intent, and Nike’s 
website a cynical ruse designed to give positive ‘spin’ to an exploitative business strategy, or an 
attempt to clarify affairs before a defamatory opposition, such matters lay beyond the ambit of the 
present thesis’ argument. That is, this brief discussion of aspects of the theories and practices of 
The Compassionate Organization suggests something different.306  
This is important when considering ways that other large firms, such as Wal-Mart — the 
United States’ largest employer, owner of British ASDA, Canadian Woolco, and part of an 
“enduring alliance” with Australian Woolworths — that also “make much of its commitment to 
communities, its workforce, and the environment”. Such claims sit in stark contrast with 
                                                 
 
305 Ibid.: 339. 
306 A point emphasized when United States’ anti-exploitation activists threatened to turn “Starbucks [Coffee Company] into the Nike 
of coffee” by ‘outing’ it for human rights abuses in producer countries in 2000. M. Hornblower, "Wake up and Smell the 
Protest," Time 15, no. 58 (2000): 57. See also, D.M. Boje, "Corporate Writing in the Web of Postmodern Culture and 
Postindustrial Capitalism," Management Communication Quarterly 14, no. 3 (2001), Klein, No Logo, 328-50, A. Rebendsdorf, "Nike 
Capitalises on Anti-Capitalists," AlterNet/Corpwatch www.corpwatch.org August 7, no. Accessed 10 Sep 2001 (2001), E. 
Schlosser, Fast Food Nation: What the All-American Meal Is Doing to the World (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 267-68, C. A. 
Stabile, "Nike, Social Responsibility, and the Hidden Abode of Production," Critical Studies in Media Communication 17, no. 2 
(2000): 187-89. NikeCorporation, Manufacturing Practices [corporate webpage] (Nike, 2003 [cited 16 May 2003]); available from 
www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=overview. 
 208 
accusations made by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services in 2006. The report claims 
that Wal-Mart, and another large, albeit, more recent CSR advocate, McDonald’s, rely on federal and 
state-funded “Medicaid, food stamps, and welfare rolls” in lieu of supplying healthcare fund access 
to United States’ employees. It claims that “12 000 Wal-Mart … [and] 11 359 McDonald’s 
employees and their dependents received [federal or state-funded] benefits last year” in Ohio. A 
similar report in Georgia claims that “10 000 children of Wal-Mart employees were enrolled in the 
state’s program for needy children in 2003”.307 Moreover, critics argue that Wal-Mart offers a 
health-care fund “so costly only two in five workers buy it”; uses extreme anti-union tactics; 
discriminates based on gender; along with Gap, Hilfiger, May Company, and Sears, knowingly engages 
offshore ‘sweated’ labour; uses illegal immigrant cleaning contractors “in conditions one step away 
from slavery”; and locks associates “inside overnight to prevent theft”.308  
Arguably, representations of compassion, caring, and sharing work to obscure a genuine 
labour-leisure divide within and from within core Anglo-American societal arenas and elides 
possibilities for reflecting on qualitative divisions between on-shore ‘creative’ and off-shore 
‘manufacturing’. Where such strategies seem to proliferate amidst labour market ‘flexibility’ 
reforms, they obscure possibilities that domestic or foreign workplace practices could be 
exploitative. The voluntarism implicit in compassionate organizational practices, while attuned to 
“services to meet professional and personal needs”, seems ill-tuned to the vagaries of the market 
relations it otherwise supports and enacts.309  
Where organizations provide well-being services for employees, and government policies 
encourage social entrepreneurialism and workfare, corporate compassion combines with 
workplace flexibility policy to engender a kind of inversion, whereby liberal-democratic emphases 
on individual exemplarity and equalitarianism, freedom and opportunity, become sources for near-
consistent requirements for self-assertion and creativity. Alongside governmental policymaking to 
enhance stakeholder opportunities, a “gooey corporate hug” seems to relieve labour efforts of any 
determinate end, while portraying offshore associates as pro-active “petitioners for the overflow of 
                                                 
 
307 S. Tripathi, "Wal-Mart Pays a Price: The Global Corporation Has Suffered a Triple Blow to Its Empire," The Guardian, 3 Aug. 
2006. J. Carr-Smyth, "Ohio Workers Depend on Public Benefits; Wal-Mart and McDonald's Top List," The Plain Dealer 2006, 
A1, S. Mitchell, "Roger Corbett's Other Big W," Australian Financial Review, 10 Oct 2003, 48. 
308 Anonymous, "Made in Sweatshops," Multinational Monitor 20, no. 1/2 (1999): 4, C. Cray, "Wal-Mart Cuts the Union," 
Multinational Monitor 21, no. 4 (2000): 4, Editors, "Wal-Mart Has Been Taken to Court ..." The Guardian Weekly, November 20-
26 2003, 12, Featherstone, "Wal-Mart Values Selling Women Short," 11, 13-14, J. Kirby, "The Myth of Ethical Investment," 
The Monthly: Australian Politics, Culture, and Society, no. 14 (2006): 21, A. Rowell, "Welcome to Wal-World: Wal-Mart's 
Inexhaustible March to Conquer the Globe," Multinational Monitor, no. October (2003): 16. 
309 Hill and Stephens, "The Compassionate Organisation in the 21st Century," 338. 
 209 
abundance” created by Anglo-American sociality said to be heavily reliant upon the economies of 
personal-use and household consumption. Within core arenas, contemporary subject-agents seem 
“free, to follow paths that lead everywhere, but to a stable career. Free to change discipline, job 
title, clothing, and personality, and … free to sleep under a bridge”.310  
These examples suggest that, beyond almost incessant demands for self-assertion and 
emendation, and the assuagements manifest in achievements of personal satisfaction through these 
have an obverse; the choice not to partake, and exercise consumer-like sovereign dissatisfaction. 
While sociologists clearly demonstrate relatively heightened levels of dismay and anxiety exist 
across the contemporary Anglo-American West, these seem not to register in occupational 
domains, or the domestic polity as such. Where grievances or claims do manifest, they seem, so 
often, cast as stakeholder opportunities, or health and well-being initiatives. Occupations or civil 
engagements might be said to work through thinly veiled calls to ever-further assertions of 
individual autonomy and sovereign choice. In such conditions, the predominance of a particular 
formation of liberal individualism seems to mean subjectivity oscillates between heightened 
satisfactions and strangely insipid dissatisfactions. A dominant contemporary Anglo-American 
subjectivity is freed to pursue almost unbounded self-sovereignty, yet bound to near-incessant 
maintenance of individual viability and emending of the self that sustain an ongoing deferral of 
worldly dilemmas. 
These examples imply conditions where rights — in employment, for example — undergo 
something of metamorphosis. Where occupations require presentation of the self on the playing 
field of work in athlete-like optimum condition, stakeholder opportunities become impulsions to 
develop capacities and fulfill obligations through near-consistent emendation of the self. The 
present thesis suggests that these examples work to animate a formation of individualism that 
overlays citizenship’s rights and duties with liberal stakeholder’s capacities and obligations. These 
examples point to the stakeholder as something slightly different from the citizen. It seems based 
not merely on the legal act that is said to “mark an individual citizen’s voluntary recognition of a 
political order”,311 but on an extension of it which introduces into Anglo-American citizenship a 
relatively exclusive order of contributed capacities and fulfilled obligations.  
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This is not to argue that rights become restricted to specific groups within sociality; 
although this may often be the case. Nor is it to argue that duties disappear beneath the weight of 
a market-based ‘harmony of interests’; although public rhetoric might proclaim the beneficence of 
an ‘invisible hand’ extends across all spheres of existence. Where seemingly widespread 
awarenesses that globalization creates large-scale environmental or social problems seem delimited 
to individuated ‘consumer choices’, collective, community, or universalistic claims continue to 
arise, yet, by and large, fail to generate responses at the level of relatively complex, abstract, and 
extended structured institutionality. Rather, I am suggesting that this emphasis upon stakeholders 
brings in conditions that imbricate a situation-specific formation of liberal individualism into 
sociality in ways that mean social and cultural practices discourses obscure or elide public 
concerns, at least as aired by civil society groups.  
A strange kind of inversion seems to take place here. Not only do citizenship’s rights and 
duties seem overlaid with stakeholder capacities and obligations, but liberal-democratic notions of 
equalitarianism seem to fold back in upon themselves here, making equality a task of achieving 
parity through emendation of the self. A recent health and wellbeing initiative proposed by 
government helps to take this point further. In Britain in mid-2003, conservative newspapers and 
tabloids reported on a Blair government proposal that, “Patients of the National Health Service 
(NHS) sign a ‘contract’ with their GPs, under which they will pledge to lead healthy lifestyles”. 
The policy document recommends that general practitioners begin “reminding patients about the 
limits of the NHS and about their responsibility in using its resources sensibly. It is one [message] 
we [the government] want to take forward”.312 Such proposals imply conditions that would 
privilege emended selves, over ‘un-emended’ selves. These seem verily to enforce individual 
exemplarity in the name of equality. On the one hand, sovereign individualism remains instate as a 
motif for the autonomous citizen, yet, on the other hand, in an odd equalitarian twist, such policy 
implies conditions where the emending of the self becomes an enforceable requisite for social 
participation.  
To discuss a slightly different example, contemporary government actions to marketize 
public services — notably, in areas hitherto seen as unprofitable, such as welfare or charity 
provision, for example — are said by some commentators to extend the principles of consumer 
sovereignty into many areas of society. In other words, these actions might be said to expand the 
liberal individualism animated within core societal arenas out, to potentially encompass hitherto 
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marginalized or excluded groups. While such moves are said to displace welfare and charity by 
“empowering the powerless” in particular ways, they also bring instrumentalist engagements based 
on the institutionalized value criteria ‘capital’ to milieux hitherto left uninvolved in them: through 
“social entrepreneurialism” programs to ‘build’ economic, or social, environmental, or cultural 
‘capital’, for example. For Jeremy Seabrook, these programs emphasize forms of ‘Participation’ 
that “now suggest poor people themselves must provide amenities neglected by the State and 
priced out of their reach by the market”.313  
The poor, frail, unwell, or otherwise disenfranchised are cast, alongside the un- and 
underemployed, not so much as undeserving, or morally weak, as had been the case in the 1980s, 
but as if in need of opportunities to climb the ladder or ‘tap into’ the Creative Economy. Arguably, 
these examples imply the imbricating of charity and social security into sociality in ways that set a 
benchmark for participation that partially alters citizenship’s rights and duties by overlaying these 
with capacities and obligations. The individuated rights and duties concomitant with citizenship in 
Anglo-American liberal-democracies seem to shrink, as stakeholder opportunities emerge to 
address a self-projecting and orienting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ subjectivity.  
Contemporary ‘global’ management theory describing the position of market-based 
organizations within contemporary globalization, such Maurice Thévenet’s work, helps to explain 
conditions that combine demands for constant projection of individual exemplarity with this 
peculiar equalitarianism: 
 
There may be a risk today, or an illusion … that the company could (should?) do what the rest of 
society has not been able (willing?) to do. If companies should comply with universal values, we 
could expect from the rest of society that people do know these values, and practice them. 
The key to global [social and environmental] responsibility will be, at the end of the day, behavioral 
responsibility from people. There cannot be any kind of global responsibility … if we do not think 
in terms of the responsibility of individuals. There cannot be a sense of responsibility for the 
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individual if he or she is not trained to increase his or her level of maturity. It is difficult to say how 
a company could or should fulfill the duty of the society (family, school, etc.) … a company could 
enhance the level of consciousness of people … in the course of their professional experience. 
There is some necessity for companies to enhance the level of people in all areas, behaviors 
included.314 
 
 For Thévenet, “individual responsibility and exemplarity” are “force[s] for change” and 
make global corporate social and environmental responsibility possible. This is because the 
“exemplarity of a company derives from individual behaviors”.315 The peculiar equalitarianism that 
Thévenet seems to appeal to — whereby instrumentalist corporations press subject-agents to act 
responsibly as individuals — might be seen in terms of conditions where liberal individualism 
works as both motor and anchor point within sociality, yet structured and institutionalized 
complexity overlays norm-based and relational contexts.  
Throughout these examples, practices and discourses seem to animate and address a form 
of life that ‘lives’ a harmonious interweaving of consumer-sovereign choices and instrumentalist 
convenience and efficiency criteria.316 Stakeholder politics, corporate sustainability, NGO support 
for responsible businesses, and shareholder activism appear to ‘go on’ as if “network forms of 
governance based on mutual trust, friendships, reputation, shared ideology, and reciprocity” held, 
in practice, across relatively complex, abstract, and extended modernizing and globalizing 
conditions. It is as if the forms of authority and value criteria central to Anglo-American 
globalizing modernization did not effectively neutralize, in all but inter-personal engagements, the 
affectivity of norm-based and relational contexts in relation to its structured and institutionalized 
conditions.317  
Two further examples help to clarify. Shoshanna Zuboff describes the politics of this new 
era, “believ[ing] that capitalism, as it now exists, is broken and can’t be fixed … will move on, as it 
has before, to a new evolutionary stage”, a Support Economy: Why Corporations are Failing Individuals 
and the Next Episode of Capitalism. For Zuboff, “Capitalism … is too focused on production and not 
on the end consumer. What we see around us today will usher in a new era … focused on meeting 
the needs of the consumer. The eBay mode of commerce is a primitive step on the way to a new 
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era of capitalism” where “the consumer will win … because if you sell a piece of junk through eBay 
you soon earn a reputation as someone to be shunned. Deliver quality goods and make the 
transaction painless and you earn rave reviews”. Zuboff argues that the “old capitalism has had its 
day”. Moreover, it has “left behind the distrustful, the resentful, the stressed majority who stand 
ready with their cash, skills and commitment”. Zuboff seems to address an affluent, well educated, 
and articulate ‘majority’, stressed by top-heavy ‘old’ corporations and bureaucratic government 
that frustrate sovereign consumer choices and undermine the new Support Economy’s “potential 
[for] wealth creation and quality of life”.318 
Zuboff’s Support Economy treats of globalizing sociality as if it were a localized 
community, and did not involve relatively complex structured and institutionalized conditions. 
Such conditions might create opportunities for stakeholders to embark upon projects of individual 
development, community, and meaning, but also create situations that sociologists describe as 
‘precarious’. This is especially the case in relation to Lynda Gratton’s theory of the Democratic 
Enterprise. Gratton uses the twin motifs of the new era and its shared purpose in 
recommendations to businesses that account for political and economic power in particular ways. 
Gratton argues that the Democratic Enterprise is “renewing democracy through the corporation” 
because cognizant of a unifying “shared purpose”: 
 
[Market-based] organizations are now the predominant fact of economic life, as important for 
individuals as the states with which we more usually associate the exercise of democratic functions. 
For the individual the possibilities of democracy are the possibilities of creating lives of meaning — 
of becoming the best they can be. [R]emote technologies … higher educational standards and, not 
least, generations of young people who aren’t prepared to put up with the exploitative relationships 
that dogged their parents [demand] delightful organizations. [These are] based around individual 
autonomy and reciprocal obligation … self-determining employees do not exploit their colleagues 
or the organization because power has to be negotiated. And they choose to stay and provide their 
resources because the company … has a purpose that engages and interests them, a shared purpose 
that removes the need for command and control. The purpose and destiny of the company is also 
their purpose and destiny. The Democratic Enterprise works on a different operating system, one that 
is internalized in the individuals that make it up … people want to join, and their children to join, 
for the opportunities they offer for individual development, community, and meaning.319  
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Gratton’s theory of democracy seems to cast matters of a political nature — that in liberal-
democracies might be said to involve ‘legitimating’ the exercise of power — as if negotiation in 
occupational domains never involve claims incongruent with the purpose and destiny of the 
company. When power has to be negotiated with market-based organizations putting these 
principles into practice, possibilities that negotiations can take place outside the ambit of the 
purpose and destiny of the company are occluded. By making sovereign satisfactions and 
dissatisfactions central to negotiations over power these delimit negotiations over power before 
they can begin: dissatisfied employees choose to work elsewhere. However, a range of conditions 
may curtail the shared purpose said to ‘remove the need for command and control’, not least of 
these being a globalizing ‘de-regulated’ marketplace that also admits of undemocratic or 
uncompassionate enterprises. These corporations must remain competitive in capitalistic markets, 
regardless of management vogue, and seem to call upon employees to orient themselves in relation 
to a ‘shared purpose’ that is not necessarily consistent in its demands.  
A dominant subjectivity that oscillates between expressions of sovereign satisfactions and 
dissatisfactions defers, or displaces resolving dilemmas of this order. The voluntary codes, 
personal creativity, individual responsibility, transparency, autonomy, reciprocal obligation, self-
determination, power to negotiate, or choosing to stay and provide resources or to leave, discussed 
here imply the exclusive points-of-contact for engaging within occupational domains are personal 
autonomy and sovereign choices. It seems that, in a ‘new era’, occupational domains entertain 
expressions of desire’s satisfaction and welcome expressions of dissatisfaction insofar as these do 
not impede convenience and efficiency criteria that are lifted above-and-beyond negotiation. Such 
conditions do not so much as nullify possibilities that the world might be problematic but, occlude 
resolutions that involve things other than augmented individual autonomy and personal 
sovereignty in relation to dilemmas that social worlds might raise.  
 
… … … 
 
The chapter now moves to focus more upon examples of cultural practices and discourses that are 
said to characterize the New or Creative Economies of the 1990 and 2000s. Employee team-
building or morale-boosting programs became a relatively common tool used by commercial firms 
and government departments to increase productivity and “dedication to the organization”, 
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“foster staff teamwork and motivation”, “reward service and effort”, or “boost staff ‘energy-
levels’”. These might be said to extend organizational culture into civil or, indeed, ‘leisure’ 
domains, but can also be seen to extend appeals to a liberal individualism in occupational domains.  
An extraordinary example helps to describe how such programs, which attempt to develop 
“group bonds”, “allegiance to the team”, and employers, bring personal autonomy, sovereign 
desiring, fun, commitment to others, and camaraderie, into contemporary workplaces. In July 
1998, the British Eagle Star Life insurance company held a “weekend intensive motivational 
course” to build “team spirit among new sales staff”. The culminating event of this weekend 
intensive was a “psyching up exercise” purported to “test employee resolve”. As with events held 
at similar such courses, the test was billed as an initiation-type ceremony. However, at the Eagle 
Star ceremony trainees were encouraged to walk barefoot over “a fire pit of red-hot coal”, which 
resulted in the hospitalization of seven employees with “serious burns to the soles of their feet”.320  
Another, albeit, less hyperbolic example is the Corporate Battle of the Bands, an annual event 
attended by a range of corporate employees, largely from high-level positions, in the finance and 
service industries across Australia, Britain, and the United States. These include the annual Telstra 
Corporate Battle of the Bands, at the Sydney Entertainment Centre, the Corporate Clash, at the 
Hammersmith Palais, and the International Corporate Battle of the Bands, at Cleveland’s Rock’n’Roll 
Hall of Fame. Such events bring “workmates from a single company together as a rock band [that] 
must include at least one senior executive”, in order to perform in front of “bosses and co-
workers”. The corporate-sponsored eisteddfod emphasizes inter-personal bonding and team-
building, and are said to be inspired by institutional allegiance and the desire to play music. While 
also raising funds for charity, the Battles are seen as “an exercise in promoting business, 
networking, and having a lot of fun in the process”:  
 
A singer struts across the stage, the crowd roars its response and a drummer starts tapping out a 
beat. From a thick fog of machine-made smoke, a guitarist emerges to rip out a lead break. A pair 
of lithe blondes run to the foot of the stage and start bopping about. Apart from the small crowd of 
dancers … diners are seated around tables, scoffing Atlantic salmon and quaffing fine wine … 
Company bigwigs are seated at the $275-a-head tables; those on the lower rungs of the corporate 
ladder fill out the cheap seats at the back of the hall.321 
                                                 
 
320 T. Woodward, "The Baptism of Fire: Insurance Firm Trainees Hotfoot It to Hospital after Bed of Coals Test," Daily Mail, July 
14 1998, 5. 
321 Corporations taking part in the Australian, British, and United States’ events include the Telstra Corporation, Johnson & 
Johnson/Jansen Cilag, Westfield Corporation, AMP Capital Investors, The Macquarie Bank, Kimberly-Clark, Prebon Yamane, Marsh & 
 216 
 
Here, the bonds between audience and performer, the collective desiring enacted to 
produce harmony, melody, and syncopation, the discipline, the solidarity of performing in unison, 
and the catharsis of dance combine as groundings for friendliness, cooperation, and camaraderie. 
Such events are outlets for leisure-desires; these facilitate the aura of charisma, communal 
bonding, and romantic freedoms often associated with music in Western cultures.  
However, lurking beneath the solidarity and collective identities forged by band members, 
audiences of employers, and colleagues, are awarenesses that all is for one night, only. At events 
such as these, a frisson of interpersonal bonding and carefree living partially, and temporarily, 
obscure the unsettling lack of common ground engendered by highly competitive working 
environments, tight employment markets, pressures to educational attainment, and skills 
maintenance. As one band member claims, “I’ve got a day job to look after so I can’t get too 
carried away”, while another refers to the following day, when co-band members will “sit about 10 
feet apart in an aggressive work environment”. As is arguably the case in most such ‘team-building’ 
exercise, the spectre of performing in occupation tomorrow haunts this evening’s performance, as 
does the looming knowledge that band-member camaraderie will be meaningless the next day at 
the office.322  
It seems that the kind of “gooey corporate hug” attributed by Klein to “corporate 
practitioners of ‘Social Responsibility’”323 both underpins and diminishes the Corporate Battle of the 
Bands. On the one hand, corporate support for team-building and collective harmony frames 
offers for experiences of release from the imperatives to act instrumentally which go with deeply 
atomized and, possibly, precarious occupational domains. Yet, on the other hand, corporate 
sponsorship for such extra-curricular events seems almost completely to envelop participants 
within the very conditions that such programs appear to assuage. Whether as aids to enhance 
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collective achievement, capacities for interpersonal group bonds, or personal communication 
skills, such practices seem to extend a specific kind of relationship beyond the occupational 
domain.  
Because such programs so often take place offsite, out-of-hours, or on weekends, these 
effectively blur embodied, spatial, and temporal differences between occupations and leisure. 
Similarly, such examples highlight ways that the norm-based and inter-relational contextuality that 
always and already enframes the job of ‘being’ human are brought into tension as a condition of 
imbrication within relatively complex structured and institutionalized forms of authority and value 
criteria. Such team-building courses and events extend the spectre of demands for aggression and 
competitiveness or, more commonly, monotonous workaday acts of individual exemplarity. The 
relative proliferation of these kinds of initiatives draws leisure, desiring, and joy, commitment to 
others, and feelings of belonging, into the orbit of commodity relations and, more subtly, legal 
contractual obligation. These seem to link subject-agents and groups to each other in ways not 
directly accountable for as exchange relations or formal contract. In these examples, the mores of 
the occupational domain seem to retract from visibility, while their influence is extended beyond 
it. These examples highlight the kinds of situations that Bunting argues “demand emotional 
labour”, and which Sennett suggests make teamwork a tool that silences possibilities for dissent 
and criticism.324  
The opportunities for self-orientation and projection, self-assertion and ‘creativity’ on offer 
seem to accompany a near-complete absence of possibilities for avoiding them. Unenthusiastic 
employees do not only ‘miss out on the fun’, but also risk ostracism by colleagues, and negative 
sanction from employers seeking to engender workplace harmony and a ‘team-spirit’. Such 
initiatives might not occlude dissent per se, but more so, obscure mere abstention. Amidst a 
backdrop of instrumental and competitive individualism and, what the sociologists call precarity, 
such initiatives appear to mandate near-consistent emending of the self.  
These examples suggest how practices and discourses in occupational domains seem to 
offer assuagement through desires’ satisfaction. What is interesting about the examples is that 
individualism based in desires’ satisfactions, arguably, long associated with civil, consumer, or 
privatist social and cultural domains, seems extended to commoditized labour-exchange and 
contractual relations. That is, these seem to make desires’ satisfactions the near-final point for 
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arbitration in domains that ‘go on’ under the order of what are that relatively more ‘concrete’ 
structured and institutionalized forms of authority and value criteria of (nation-state) law and the 
markets. The result is that desires’ dissatisfactions work as the primary route for raising claims in 
occupational domains. Requirements to be an avid team-player, relish opportunities to shine — or 
to ‘optimize peak performance on the playing field of work’ — seem to render not only criticism 
and unwillingness, but also plain non-engagement and inability to engage non-possibilities. These 
examples help to describe conditions that Ehrenreich and Pusey, for example, explain in terms of 
the financialization and neoliberalization that leaves “the excluded middle” within Anglo-
American societies with little or no recourse to raise claims beyond consumer-like sovereign 
expressions of desires’ satisfaction or dissatisfaction.325  
 
… … … 
 
To conclude the chapter, it is suggested that discussion here indicates a partial 
reconfiguring of divisions between leisure and labour might manifest in what is often labeled the 
Creative Economy. The chapter suggests how structured and institutionalized patterns of access to 
or monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses might work themselves out within core 
arenas for sociality, such that conditions seem to frame opportunities for personal autonomy and 
sovereign choice, as well as for fatigue, weariness, stress, overwork, or exploitation. The concept 
of ‘core societal arenas’ helps to focus inquiry here upon conditions arising where the large-scale 
movement of manufacturing industries out of Anglo-American societies have taken place 
alongside the emergence of financial, knowledge, and service-based industries requiring relatively 
complex technologies, and workforces holding relatively high levels of skill, education, and 
articulate dispositions. In addition, it focuses attention upon conditions where large-scale 
‘privatization’ programs and labour market ‘deregulation’ coincide with employment ‘flexibility’ 
policies, workforce ‘downsizing’, and ‘casualization’; reduced income taxes coincide with cuts to 
welfare spending; and relaxed consumer credit laws foster high rates of personal-use commodity 
consumption, and a broad-based transfer of upper and middle-incomes into the financial sector. 
Looking at things in this way means avoiding what Flew argues is the “simple assumption that jobs 
in the creative sectors necessarily have high degrees of autonomy and are well paid”, while 
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contemporary service industry “jobs basically involve following orders, or … [are] synonymous 
with deskilling”.326  
Occupations in relatively information-intensive, communications-oriented, and 
knowledge-based industries, while often requiring highly-skilled, educated, and articulate 
workforces are, however, frequently irregular, intensely service, client, or customer-oriented. 
Levels of literacy and numeracy, or articulate dispositions, as well as the relative authority and 
‘creativity’ in occupational tasks, once seen as the preserve of the ‘professions’, seem to become 
commonplace requirements for engaging in the ‘new world of work’. Discussing social conditions 
in these terms also involves claims about the industrialization of culture. As Chapter 6 suggests, 
Heath and Potter, and Frank, discuss these links in particular ways. Somewhat problematically, 
however, Heath and Potter use rational actor theory to discuss a relationship between (Western) 
countercultural individualism and consumerism. This thesis discards Heath and Potter’s rather 
contradictory thesis, which defines counterculture as a form of elitism and as something so 
generalized that it forms the impetus for “globalizing consumer capitalism” in its Anglo-American 
manifestations. And, rather, follows Frank’s, and more importantly, Mukerji’s, more sanguine 
appraisals of the historically consistent intertwining of hedonism and Puritanism, to claim that 
over several decades, so-called countercultural sensibilities provide important loci for practical and 
discursive appeals to what Sharp calls the “individualism of expanded desire”. Where these 
examples suggest market-oriented liberal-democratic conditions work to extend such appeals into 
contemporary occupational domains, it might be said that the liberal individualism animated 
therein, partially work to create and reproduce conditions for a dominant subjectivity that 
oscillates between desires’ satisfactions and dissatisfactions.327 
Seen in combination to represent contemporary conditions, these examples might be said 
to animate a somewhat specious communitarianism. This ‘stakeholder communitarianism’ partially 
obscures the dynamics of power and value criteria that manifest amidst relative societal 
complexity, “abstract systems”, and “technologically extended forms of the social”.328 Where 
governing parties and corporations embrace stakeholders in contemporary Anglo-American 
market-oriented liberal-democracies, they seem to respond to public concerns as if privatist, 
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atomized, individuated solutions to worldly dilemmas — such as would be resolved by “emotional 
faith or social beliefs”— were unimpeded by the particularities of societal and relational 
complexity. While corporations, like any other “legal person” must obey ‘the law’ in general, the 
examples discussed here seem to appeal to subject-agents as if the specificity of interest set up by 
the legal responsibility and sustained by economic imperative to maximize profitability or 
‘shareholder value’ were of little or no socio-political consequence.329  
Although the law guarantees property rights to owners of (shares in) a corporation, it also 
separates them as embodied subject-agents from liability for a firm’s actions, while compelling 
managers to aim solely at maximizing shareholder value. That a corporation exists as an artifice of 
the law, a ‘legal person’, implies it is a condition of the abstract and extended forms that societal 
and relational dynamics take in contemporary conditions. Claims that “companies are duty bound 
with economic and profit-making functions for society’s survival and development”, both explicit 
and implicit in these examples, ‘materialize’ the leap from an arbitrary supposition about the 
functioning of market-oriented liberal-democracies to fact-like assertion that “economic and 
profit-making activities” always, and automatically, ensure “society’s survival and development”.330  
Sociality seems to ‘go on’ as if instrumental forms of authority and market-based value 
criteria do not challenge or place under pressure the kinds of claims central to issues aired by civil 
groups as public concerns. These examples seem to obfuscate possibilities for practices and 
discourses that are incommensurate with the increased convenience and heightened efficiency 
imperatives that conditions of neoliberalization extend across sociality. The conditions that these 
examples represent work to resolve somewhat tendentiously, what was, until recently, a tense and 
contradictory relationship between capitalistic markets and nation-state government. These are 
examples of conditions for a conflating of particular forms of ‘interestedness’ with the ‘interests’ 
of society in general. Such conditions can be seen in terms of appeals to a self-orienting and 
projecting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ dominant subjectivity that is effectively ‘structured into’ 
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Anglo-American institutionality, temporality, spatiality, and bodies through the practices and 
discourses of liberal individualism.  
In the same movement, these support the kinds of de-regulation and market-oriented re-
regulation that confound possibilities that norm-based and relational claims affect the job of 
creating and reproducing sociality. It is in this sense that liberal individualism seems to represent a 
kind of overt catholicization of such a subjectivity. Conditions seem to engender individuated 
expressions of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in ways that make these the means for engaging 
within sociality, in occupations, or, where raising environmental or social concerns, for example, 
efforts of self-orientation and projection, self-assertion and ‘creativity’. For the present thesis, 
conditions that the sociologists characterize as precarious can include offers of opportunities for 
personal sovereignty over choices, and autonomy in desiring. However, these offer assuagement, 
rather than resolution to the dilemmas that this precarity raises. Of interest here is not so much 
that conditions across core arenas’ ‘new world of work’ are replete with precariousness but that, 
within them, opportunities for redress seem delimited to the velveteen motivations of heightened 
individual satisfactions or the enervation of dissatisfactions with choices taken. These conditions 
seem to give a double-edge to government offers of ‘opportunities’ and corporate claims that You 
Matter! 331  
It is suggested that Dumont’s and Godelier’s claims, after Alexis de Tocqueville, that a 
“permanent deficit of solidarity” means almost any “new solidarities … take the form of the 
negotiated contract” in market-oriented liberal-democracies might be extended.332 A kind of loose 
‘competitive’ solidarity seems to pervade structured and institutionalized Anglo-American 
modernity that turns on the satisfactions and dissatisfactions, expressed by the sovereign desires 
and choices of citizen-stakeholders. These examples suggest a kind of pervasive wholism has 
emerged in contemporary conditions, such that claims emanating from norm-based or relational 
contexts continue to arise, but are largely emptied of alternate, marginal, or critical force.  
As relatively widespread affluence, and requirements for high levels of education, 
occupational skills, techno-informational aptitudes, and articulate cultural dispositions combine 
amidst particular cultural histories, societal and relational situations seem to ‘go on’ in ways that 
delimit possibilities for occupational grievances to extend beyond private dissatisfactions with the 
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employment contract. The examples discussed in this chapter suggest a near-consistent impulsion 
for subject-agents to engage, not as mere ‘entrepreneurial selves’, but as antinomian and libertarian 
contributors to a shared purpose that, by-and-large pervades occupational, civil, political, and 
cultural domains. The notion of a pervasive wholism comes in here, and helps explain how such 
conditions work to obscure alternate, critical, or marginal forms of life within core arenas across 
sociality. This obscuring might be seen as the ‘negative dialectic’ of a dominant contemporary 
subjectivity that oscillates between heightened satisfactions and enervated dissatisfactions. The 
examples help to discuss some of the conditions that obscure alternate, critical, or marginal forms 
of life, and imply a dominant subjectivity sustains a deferral of worldly dilemmas irreconcilable to 
the liberal individualism privileged in and through contemporary sociality. The suggestion is that 
the emphases upon ‘stakeholder’ capabilities and obligations described here make for a folding-
back of sovereign satisfactions and dissatisfactions, such that these become demands for deeply 
individuated subject-agents to ‘creatively’ self-orient and emend the embodied self.  
 
… … … 
… …  
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14 ‘Social messaging’ and ‘me-time’: bodies in space and time 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter moves away from discussing subjectivity in relation to the polity, and economic and 
civil domains and, instead, looks at examples drawn from within Anglo-American social and 
cultural domains. As does Chapter 13, this chapter springs from the claim that a particular liberal 
individualism works as both motor and anchor point within ongoing sociality. Similarly, the 
chapter discusses the examples as evidence for the circumstantial claim that a new subjectivity 
presents itself in Anglo-American societies. In terms of the approach, the chapter uses Chapter 
13’s emphasis upon normative conditions to background a new series of examples. As an aid to 
discussion, the examples in Chapter 14 are organized around the two motifs of ‘social messaging’ 
and ‘me-time’.333 These motifs help to focus attention upon subjectivity amidst relatively complex, 
abstract, and extended societal and relational conditions, where particular ‘mainstream’ and 
‘counter’ cultural histories intertwine, and where engagements frequently involve relatively high, 
albeit, unevenly distributed levels of affluence, education, and articulate dispositions.  
Throughout the chapter, ‘social messaging’ refers to the embedding within goods or 
services of meanings that relate information about the world to contemporary subject-agents. 
Social messaging is interesting because it often involves relatively complex and abstract 
information about the world, or subject-agents’ within it, and is often associated with the kinds of 
social justice or environmental issues that Chapter 13 suggests civil groups often raise. The motif 
of ‘me-time’ refers to information or situations that frame ‘existential’ or ‘ethical’ reflections on the 
state of the self within in social worlds. Both social messaging and me-time are discussed in terms 
of recent cultural and countercultural histories. Both social messaging and me-time arise as 
subject-agents — it might be said, as a ‘public’ — are seen to act, create meanings, and modalize 
things within core arenas, in conditions of globalizing neoliberalization and financialization. In a 
sense, the motif of ‘social messaging’ is used to highlight practices and discourses that structured 
and institutionalized ‘responses’ to a contemporary form of life might create and reproduce, while 
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me-time refers to what happens as subject-agents ‘go on’ amidst particular patterns of access to 
and monopoly over materials, practices, and discourses.  
Organizing inquiry around these two motifs also means that the chapter raises and 
develops two concerns. First, discussing the examples through these motifs allows the chapter to 
recognize how contemporary sociality conditions an ostensibly enlightened and ‘worldly’, articulate 
individualism, which might be said to possess high levels of what is sometimes called ‘cultural 
capital’. Second, discussing things in this way allows the chapter to consider the examples in terms 
of interweaving ontological categories of spatiality and temporality. Raising these two concerns 
means the chapter also begins examining the examples in relation to the concept of interweaving 
‘somatic, practical-ethological, and reflexive subjectivity’.  
 
… … … 
 
In the late the 1990s and into the 2000s, increasing numbers of businesses across a range of 
industries, as well as governments and civil groups, created, produced, and distributed goods, 
services, and information using social messages. Many aspects of the stakeholder politics and 
corporate sustainability, NGO support for socially responsible firms, and shareholder activism, 
discussed in Chapter 13 can be seen in terms of social messages. Indeed, Anglo-American 
governments that use public announcements on a range of social and environmental issues are 
effectively disseminators of social messages. Such government actions might include advertising 
campaigns to alert a population to the perils of climate change.334 They might also be the products 
of government policies to encourage utilities to “inform households and businesses how much 
greenhouse gas was produced to supply their electricity”, or “Going for Green initiative[s] and a 
Green Code” to present “information to the public on environmental issues and sustainable living 
options”.335 As Chapter 13 suggests, contemporary government policies of this order seem based in 
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appeals to an individualism that combines consumer-like sovereign desiring with ‘enlightened’ 
values. In relation to this chapter’s aims, these social messages are said to represent institutional 
‘responses’ to such an individualism, which is presumed to utilize and interpret relatively complex 
and abstract information, and act upon knowledges as ‘stakeholders’. 
Social messages can also be seen as aspects of those fractions of personal-use commodity 
markets turning on exchanges of an increasingly varied array of ‘ethical’, ‘green’, ‘organic’, and 
‘fair-trade’ goods or services. The “ethical consumerism” that characterizes such relations often 
involves civil groups, such as the NGOs discussed in Chapter 13. Across Anglo-American 
societies in recent decades, live animal exports, whaling, organic farming, animal testing, 
petroleum, nuclear power, biotechnology, ozone depletion, labour conditions in relation to sports 
shoes, footballs, and carpets, political oppression in South Africa, Burma, or Tibet, and relatively 
individuated ethical-moral issues, such as vegetarianism, for example, have been the subjects of 
ethical consumer-styled movements. Seen in terms of social messaging, ethical consumerism is 
interesting at two levels. On the one hand, ethical consumer movements might both actualize and 
disseminate social messages. From this perspective, what Chapter 13 discusses as publicity 
campaigns, legal actions, support for firms said to be environmental ‘innovators’, or calls for green 
consumerism, can be seen as a mobilization expressing public concerns over social and 
environmental issues. Sometimes described as “democracy through the wallet”, the ethical 
consumerism that such mobilizations seem to prompt might be said to animate a liberal 
individualism that, making sovereign choices within markets, expresses atomized satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with broader worldly conditions.336  
On the other hand, civil actions to promote ethical consumerism, as well as ‘market-
research’, are important as prompts for businesses, especially in personal-use commodity markets. 
These firms might embed social messages within the goods and services they commoditize, 
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intending to convey information about the impacts of society upon natural environments, or 
human bodies, for example. In this sense, the whole gamut of corporate sustainability ‘initiatives’ 
that corporations practice within, and from within, Anglo-American societies can, in part, be seen 
in terms of social messaging. For example, both Dow Chemical’s call to investors — Don’t just trust 
us, track us! — and General Electric’s “Ecomagination education campaign”, might be seen as 
examples of social messaging. Social messaging of this order can also be seen to manifest as 
corporations respond to the shareholder activism that Chapter 13 discusses as a condition of 
‘upper’ and ‘upper-middle’ incomes becoming increasingly directed into ‘the orbit of the financial 
sector’. Furthermore, social messages involving information about social and environmental issues 
are central to the relatively large and influential “ethical investment portfolios” that Chapter 13 
also discusses.337  
Since the early 1990s, several firms, especially within personal-use commodity markets, 
combine ethical consumerism and marketing strategies to disseminate social messages as the 
means for promoting their wares. Notable here are the Benetton clothier’s controversial billboard 
and print-media advertisements portraying dying HIV/AIDS patients and Death Row prisoners, 
for example. Also prompting relatively wide-reaching news-media attention in the 2000s have been 
the Nike sportswear, Kenneth Cole, and Diesel casual-wear firms, which base promotional strategies 
based around ‘politicized’ social messages. These firms have conducted “faux anti-capitalist 
protests [as the] platform for launching a new sports-shoe range”, called for “peace in the Middle 
East”, promoted participation in United States’ elections, and demanded “gun safety legislation”, 
as well as urging subject-agents to take “Action! If you want to live a successful life you have to 
fight for it!” By 2005, other sportswear firms, like Puma, and high-fashion ‘labels’, such as Dior, 
Katherine E Hamnett, and Nuala, as well as ethical commodity-activist operations, such as American 
Apparel, Polichicks, Black Spot Sneakers, and Tight Knickers, some holding “Greenpeace’s Green Approval 
rating”, made public in more subtle ways, similar links between an array of ‘politicized’ social 
messages and their products.338  
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In contemporary market-oriented liberal-democratic settings, social messaging seems to 
appeal to but also to animate an individualism that exercises sovereign choices to achieve desires’ 
satisfactions, and to express dissatisfaction by choosing not to exercise sovereignty on these terms. 
In short, subject-agents are being asked to orient themselves. What governments, civil groups, and 
a range of businesses, ‘materialize’ in social messages is here seen in terms of what Chapter 12 s 
describes as a kind of ‘double hermeneutic effect’. In these respects, many governments, civil 
groups, and businesses take in information about social worlds and act on it as if deeply 
individuated subject-agents are well-educated, articulate, and worldly-aware.  
Using a slightly different perspective, discussion now focuses on some further examples 
using the motif of ‘me-time’. The relatively widespread phenomena of ‘downshifting’, “simple 
living” or, what Michael Maniates calls the “voluntary simplicity movement”, seems to involve 
information about the world in relation to humans ‘being’ in it:  
 
It’s quiet, countercultural, potentially subversive, but also mainstream. It flies low, usually hidden 
amidst reports of increasing productivity, rising consumer confidence, expanding personal debt, 
and the dizzying array of new products promising to make life easier, faster, more productive, 
and more rewarding. Unpromisingly rooted in an apolitical and consumerist response to social 
ills, it also sows the seeds of collective challenge to fundamental dysfunctions of industrial 
society. Focused as it is on the quality of work and quest for personal control of one’s time and 
one’s life, it resonates with the [Anglo-]American deification of individual freedom. But inevitable 
connections to questions of environmental quality, workplace control, and civic responsibility 
lend it more complicated hues.339  
 
Richard Gregg is said to have coined the term “voluntary simplicity” (VS) in 1936. He 
used it to describe the reaction by relatively well-educated yet financially struggling groups to the 
Great Depression through the embrace of “material simplicity”, advocacy of “production on a 
human-scale”, political “self-determination”, “ecological awareness”, and “a desire to free one’s 
self from external clutter [sic] and develop one’s inner life”. Like, Gregg and, more recently, 
Maniates, other authors, such as Everett Rogers and Dorothy Leonard-Barton, or Duane Elgin, 
recognize within VS a tense interconnectedness between conditions wherein personal-use 
commodity consumption provides the backdrop for ‘mainstream’ cultural life, and an enlightened 
individualism that is bound to ‘seek’ freedom from modernization’s chronic instability. While 
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hermeneutics-based claims about downshifting might suggest that the ‘movement’ draws on 
traditions deeply rooted in the individualistic peculiarities of Anglo-American Romanticism, the 
present thesis looks at the phenomena from a slightly different angle.340  
On the one hand, downshifting seems a relatively enduring Anglo-American cultural-
countercultural phenomenon that, on the other hand, has taken on a somewhat novel dimension 
since the 1980s. Downshifting can be seen as a relatively widespread phenomena that implies 
subject-agents act to engender a relaxation of spatial and temporal contexts for ‘being’, especially, 
from within core societal arenas. It might also be said that downshifting is one way by which 
relatively well-educated and articulate subject-agents might actualize ‘reflexivity’ about ethical and 
existential conditions. On the other hand, however, downshifting seems to take on new qualities as 
conditions emerge in the early 1980s that mean it becomes the target for a range of personal-use 
commodity producers, marketing, advertising, and promotional agencies. Into the 1990s, 
increasing numbers of firms continued to create niche markets based in appeals to ‘simplifiers’ and 
‘downshifters’ as desiring subject-agents; moves that the industry journal Marketing and Media 
Decisions describes as efforts to “Give Them the Simple Life”. Indeed, by 2000, Time-Warner, 
Goldman Sachs, and cigarette manufacturer Brown & Williamson each published downshifting-
inspired ‘glossy’ magazines. The advertising revenue-driven Real Simple, Simplicity, and The Art of 
Simple Living, somewhat ironically, offer information about “how to strip away the ambitions and 
lust for material goods that, for many, make living complicated and stressful”. What is important 
about these moves by businesses — to embrace what management literature since the 1980s 
consistently designates “a fast growing consumer market” — is that they address relatively 
affluent, well-educated, and articulate milieux through appeals to an enlightened individualism 
which is seen as desiring the means for shrinking space and slowing-down time amidst conditions of 
globalizing financialization and neoliberalization.341  
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… … … 
 
In order to take discussion further, the chapter now turns to concentrate upon some more specific 
examples. Again, informing discussion of these examples is the claim that a liberal individualism 
works as both motor and anchor point within sociality. This means inquiry looks at phenomena, 
especially, but not exclusively, personal-use commodities that — seen as ‘materialized’ by subject-
agents as they imagine ‘real’ worlds — appear to mobilize, propagate, and perpetuate, a dominant 
subjectivity amidst the interweaving spatial, temporal, embodied, and institutional contexts, which 
they also create and reproduce. These examples help to test normative conditions where 
widespread relative affluence, high levels of education, articulateness, and particular Western 
cultural and countercultural histories combine, in and through such a form of life.  
Alongside the examples already discussed, other relatively important fractions of personal-
use commodity markets that make use of social messages and offer opportunities for me-time 
within core arenas involve leisure, entertainment, or, similar ‘cultural’ pursuits. These examples 
involve the putting into practice of a relatively novel “design concept”, labeled by retailers, interior 
designers, architects, and promotional strategists, as the ‘3rd Place’. These 3rd Places are offered in 
retail outlets, office complexes, hotels, universities, hospitals, sporting, and other mass-
entertainment venues. They are designed into areas where crowds of ‘strangers’ intermingle, such 
as airports, and other mass-transit hubs, public libraries, shopping ‘malls’, bookstores, 
laundromats, gymnasiums, hairdressers, car washes, florists, and promenades, although they are 
most commonly associated with food and beverage outlets and, notably, coffee shops. The 3rd 
Places’ main quality is the offer of opportunities for comfort and casual informality amidst often 
stressful, fractious urban, suburban, and occupational environments.  
The example of 3rd Places form but a single aspect of a widespread range of ‘responses’ by 
personal-use commodity markets — to particular milieux within core arenas for sociality. Such 
‘responses’ are often based on market-research or sociology that suggests a wholesale shift has 
taken place, to an erstwhile Information Age that turns on a Creative Class. In this sense, Chapter 
13’s discussion of Compassionate Organizations, such as Ideo, Intel, Microsoft, and Nike, which offer 
“space where employees gather to chat informally or just unwind” at certain of their ‘campuses’, 
can readily be seen as purveyors of such 3rd Places. Whether provided by such major globalizing 
corporations, café or bookshop chains, such as Starbucks and Borders, or, relatively small, local 
‘independent’ firms, such as San Francisco’s City Lights, and Melbourne’s Readings, 3rd Places are 
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interesting because as prestations made to subject-agents as consumers, they combine both social 
messaging and offers of opportunities for me-time.342 These offers of “a stress free place between 
home and work” are an increasingly prominent way of using public, quasi-public, and private 
space across Anglo-American societies. The kinds of societal and relational engagements that ‘go 
on’ in and around 3rd Places — combining what are promoted as ‘high-quality’ commodities with 
space for “social bonds”, “stress-free relaxation”, “casual amiability”, and “pleasurable, light 
conversation”343 — presume relatively high levels of affluence, education, skills, and articulate 
dispositions and a liberal ‘enlightened stakeholder’ individualism: 
 
Going forward, business should grow the ‘platinum’ retail sector that caters to choosy customers 
interested in health, comfort, recreation, culture, individuality, enjoyment, and security. [This is] a 
homogenous cohort that crosscuts market-research categories of Baby-Boomers and Generation 
X … the Neo-Consumer [sector] that makes up 24% of the population in Australia and the 
United States. Across all age and gender groups, this cohort demonstrates a desire to be in 
control of their own lives, a passion for authenticity, an urge for the edge, a desire for change, an 
appetite for technology to accelerate slow-time, and continuous high-margin consumption, [and] 
a resurgent focus on the neighbourhood local village as a place for sharing [that is] fast displacing 
the moat encircled, isolating suburban castle.344 
 
In these respects, these 3rd Places and the prestations made in and through them seem to 
proliferate in conditions that Part II describes in terms of globalizing neoliberalization and 
financialization. They coincide with the emergence across core arenas of relatively high and 
sustained levels of personal-use commodity consumption, household ‘credit’ and ‘debt’, and ‘non-
standard’ working hours. The suggestion here is that 3rd Places offer relatively affluent, well-
educated, and articulate milieux opportunities to augment personal autonomy and animate 
individual desires’ satisfactions as part of ‘going on’ amidst contemporary market-oriented Anglo-
American liberal-democracies. What is interesting is that the prestations made in and through 3rd 
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Places arise in and around the plethora of well-being programs and stakeholder ‘initiatives’ that 
Chapter 13 sees in terms conditions for a near-consistent impulsion to emend and optimize the 
self. That is, to develop and maintain ‘stakeholder’ capabilities and responsibilities as an adjunct to 
citizenship rights and duties. These 3rd Places coincide with a ‘new world of work’, where irregular 
hours, dismantled hierarchies, and No-Collar casual informality offer opportunities for increased 
personal autonomy and expanded sovereign choices that, nonetheless, might also be sources of 
fatigue, stress, and exploitation, in conditions that leave little room for engagements within 
sociality on terms beyond sovereign satisfactions or dissatisfactions. For architect Julie Eizenberg, 
and sociologist Ray Oldenburg 3rd Places are a “generic design innovation”: 
 
[These 3rd Places] are public places that are snug and welcoming or informal. The first place is the 
home, often small, often crowded. The second place is the workplace, a desk, office, or factory 
floor. But, the third place is where it’s possible to have an informal meeting, chat to a friend, or just 
hang out. You know you’re in one when you feel the urge to slip off your shoes. The idea of a third 
space is personal, somewhere people socialize. We need to be sure we invest our [design] work with 
idiosyncrasies [because] people’s sense of self lies in the things they do in their everyday lives. 
Starbucks’ cafés are ideal 3rd Places. Repetition is not a problem, you can have more than one; it 
really depends on the quality of the space, Starbucks has comfy chairs, tables to sit at, an activity that 
doesn’t cost a lot. Most importantly, it has a policy where you do more than just purchase. You can 
hang out there … it gives people a little place to hang.345  
 
This is not exclusive to food and beverage outlets. Laura Miller and John Sutherland 
describe a similar emphasis on individually meaningful and personally authentic experiences in the 
3rd Place offered-up by Barnes & Noble, which “opened its first bookstore café in 1992”, and 
Borders, which Chapter 13 discusses as a socially responsible employer: 
 
The[se firms] devised a décor and layout which encouraged a hip sort of casualness and which 
treated books merely as one among a range of fashion accessories and leisure activities. [Borders and 
Barnes & Noble’s] stock was rich in ‘wallpaper’ tiles, whose function was not primarily to sell, but to 
dignify the environment. As one B & N publicity statement put it … these were ‘amusement parks 
for the mind’. [Nevertheless, the] relaxed mood camouflaged category management systems 
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borrowed from grocery chains, and a way with customer profiling that the FBI might have 
envied.346 
 
These 3rd Places might be seen as part of a broader shift towards what Mark Gottdeiner 
calls “themed environments”. Gottdeiner argues that it is spaces that are dedicated to personal-use 
commodity consumption, and its promotion, which epitomize the “themed environments [that are 
offered-up as] having the capacity of providing enjoyment for their own sake beyond the 
attractions they contain”. It is arguably the case that, until the emergence of themed environments 
and the ‘3rd Place’ concept, the key market ‘perception’ was that the commoditized goods and 
services, or entertainments themselves, such as the foods, beverages, films, or, carnival-type ‘rides’, 
on offer where what constituted the locus for desires’ satisfactions. Gottdeiner’s concept of 
“themed environments” is helpful here, because it allows a suggestion that the atmosphere said to 
exist in 3rd Places is premised on institutional ‘perceptions’ that contemporary, relatively affluent, 
well-educated, and articulate milieux desire “complete lifestyle experiences”. Such commercial 
ambitions are the intention at Waterstone’s outlet in Piccadilly, London, for example; “the biggest 
bookstore in Europe”, where “customers can sip smoothies in the juice bar, surf the net, visit a 
guest shop … dine in a full service restaurant, or attend author readings in a 175 seat 
auditorium”.347  
One globalizing corporation that claims as its own the concept of the ‘3rd Place’, and uses 
it as a platform for prestations of social messages and offers of opportunities for me-time is 
Starbucks. Indeed, “Store Development President, Arthur Rubinfeld believes that Starbucks is the 
ultimate 3rd Place — first is home, second is work, third is where you meet and interact”. Starbucks 
is worth discussing in some detail because the firm operates outlets across major and regional 
Anglo-American cities, suburbs, “Latte Belt ex-urbs”, and “sea-change towns”, is prominent in 
media-cultural representations, and is the prompt for a plethora of imitators, such as Australia’s 
Gloria Jean’s. Said to have originated as a “bohemian style café in Seattle’s farmer’s market” in the 
1970s, Starbucks was purchased by a business consortium in 1987, and used as the vehicle for 
marketing executive Howard Schultz’ plan to “grow the European coffee bar concept”, and 
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“reported its first USD$1 billion ‘quarter’ by January 2003”. Starbucks acts in personal-use 
commodity markets by “emotionally connecting to the customer based on the intimacy of 
Starbucks’ ambience”, “product placement deals”, and the hyper-efficiency methods discussed in 
Chapter 13 — which resemble closely those Miller and Sutherland link to Barnes & Noble and 
Borders — as well as what management theorists call “store cannibalism”.348  
What is important for the present chapter is that the 3rd Places offered by Starbucks are 
intended to work as platforms for the firm’s Commitment to Origins™. It is in Starbucks’ 3rd Places 
that links are made explicit between social messages of “corporate social responsibility” and 
atomized offers of me-time, in “our uncompromising attitude to quality”: Starbucks “mixes 
corporate values and a high-quality product”. This is evident in the way Starbucks’ “coffee bar 
concept [has been] brought to life by interior design mastermind Wright Massey”, also the author 
of promotional strategies for The Disney Company, Papa John’s Pizza, and Ritz Carlton Hotels. Wright 
Massey took up Schultz’ vision for Starbucks, and applied a “philosophy that recognizes branding is 
about reaching the heart and soul, not the head … the idea is to create a story line which brings 
credibility”:  
 
Each Starbucks’ store is an oasis for contemplation, a stress free place between home and work, a 
place for deep, meaningful experiences … grounded in quasi-mystical imagery, sinewy, rounded 
lines and holistic intimacy, where iconography adapted from coffee growing countries reflect 
growth, like that of vegetables and coffee beans. Despite language differences, cultural differences, 
the 3rd Place — what happens when coffee and people come to life — is exactly the same. We’re in 
the business of creating an experience around coffee and culture and the sense of community, and 
the 3rd Place.349  
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Offering opportunities for augmented desiring and joy, for extending, and emending the 
‘self-as-project’, 3rd Places proffer the lightest of templates upon which a liberal ‘enlightened 
stakeholder’ individualism asserts personal autonomy and sovereign choices. Subject-agents move 
within such spaces as embodied self-orienting individuals. The emphasis upon ‘high-quality’ goods 
and services, the “warmth and intimacy”, and “connecting with supplier communities” that 
constitute social messages and offers of opportunities for ‘me-time’ mean that, through 
promotional strategies that aim to attract worldly and discretionary consumers, these 3rd Places 
exemplify contemporary appeals to a relatively ‘enlightened’ liberal individualism. The offers of 
opportunities for me-time that Starbucks makes through its 3rd Places are premised on ‘perceptions’ 
that contemporary individuals demand me-time: “have a need to spend more quality time with 
oneself to enhance one’s well-being”. Such prestations appeal to an individualism that is perceived 
by the firm to be ‘doing good by doing well’ when engaging in consumption exchanges. As spaces 
harnessed for consumption, but encouraging subject-agents “to linger” and “savour the 
atmosphere”, such 3rd Places are designed to “encourage warmth and intimacy” between 
consumers, employees, managers, and the businesses responsible for provision of them. These 
commoditized spaces combine opportunities for relaxation, contemplation, and “social bonds”. 
They are sites extend the consumption-experience through “partner mentoring programs” with 
marginalized local communities, and beyond Anglo-American societies by “connecting 
[consumers] with supplier communities” in offshore locales.350  
Starbucks’ 3rd Places are sites for “a very intimate experience that takes place in a particular 
physical space and, as result of that, all of the signals that create the ambience, the romance, the 
theatre, emotionally connect to the customer based on the intimacy of the relationship”. Indeed, at 
Starbucks, store ‘partners’ do not wear uniforms, and the scripted-encounter is studiously avoided: 
somewhat famously, its customers are addressed using their first names. These offers by Starbucks 
emphasize the quality of the goods and services on offer in a way that makes them, the 
commodities, inseparable from “the ambience” that is explicitly a part of the socially responsible 
firm’s Commitment to Origins™. Such appeals presume an atomized and autonomous 
“individualism of expanding desire” that is enlightened, articulate, and worldly, and seeks solace in 
3rd Places from relatively complex, abstract, and extended conditions. Starbucks’ 3rd Places are said 
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to be places of respite from the world because their offers are, verily, to make the spatial contexts 
for ‘being’ more manageably ‘human’. Similarly, these are said to be sites for ‘stress-free’ relaxation 
because the offer is, in effect, to slow-down temporal contexts: Starbucks actively encourages its 
patrons to ‘linger’ and ‘bond’ with “supplier communities” in “amazingly comfortable chairs”.351  
Cast in this light, 3rd Places seem attuned to a particular form of life. They are ostensibly 
‘gatekeeper-less’ spaces for relaxation and respite from the world, which in the first instance, do 
not appear to contribute directly to instrumental ‘sales’ or ‘productivity’ goals. Indeed, it is 
arguable that even in their most common guise — as the point-of-sale strategies for promoting 
personal-use commodities discussed here — 3rd Places detract from, rather than emphasize, 
convenience and efficiency. The invitation at 3rd Places — to linger, browse, engage in light 
conversation, indulge, or “work upon one’s self” — forms an adjunct to what Chapter 13 suggests 
is an increasingly blurred distinction between occupational and leisure activities and, importantly, 
the market-based exchange relations these turn upon. Here, amidst an order of prestations 
directed towards relatively affluent, well-educated, and articulate milieux. The brasher commercial 
aspects of what are essentially market-relations do not so much recede from view, as undergo a 
somewhat shallow transformation. These 3rd Places foster the savouring of ‘high-quality’ 
commodities within “a little space just to hang” that facilitates conversation, sociality, networking, 
and “the exchange of ideas”. They offer “warmth and comfort”, while also furnishing the 
necessities for 24-7 Just Do It lifestyles. Not readily recognizable as a commodity and, possibly 
more important, in the absence of any entry fee or mannerist code, such uses of space appear to 
avoid any stigma that might attach to commodity exchanges or cultural hegemony: yet, these 
remain an explicit aspect of the globalizing commodity form. That is, the ‘gatekeeper’ mentality of 
older style commercial spaces gives way to a softer policy in 3rd Places. The entry ‘fee’ is not 
apparent as a cash transaction, nor does it depend on the bourgeois ‘mannerisms’ of luxury-goods 
emporia, or ‘clickiness’ often associated with artistic and fashionable ‘haunts’. 
Such prestations engender a subtle blurring of distinctions between public-collective and 
private-commercial space, as well as between (First World) spaces of consumption and 
occupations, (Third World) spaces of production. Of course, in materialist-analytic terms, where 
3rd Places are set-up within retail outlets or, in as part of ‘campus-type’ occupational domains, the 
commodity exchange or employment contract remains the key point of interest. On these terms, 
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the examples discussed here might be seen as the products of commodity-relations yet, the 
blurring of this distinction in practice is what is of interest for the present thesis. What seems 
central to the often low-key blurring of public and private space in and around 3rd Places — 
arguably, they are cast in the spirit of ‘public’ spaces, as well as the synthesis of collective and 
individual agencies in ethical and green consumerism is that politics is atomized and depoliticized. 
Indeed, like the debates over Nike’s labour policies that Chapter 13 discusses, Starbucks promotes 
its socially responsible “coffee conscience”, yet is accused by NGO Oxfam of “block[ing] an 
attempt by Ethiopia’s farmers to copyright … coffee bean types, denying them potential earnings 
of up to USD$90 million a year”. Like the subtle mix of capitalistic entrepreneurialism and 
charitable works that characterizes “the new contract culture” — also discussed in Chapter 13 — 
these examples represent within core arenas a subjectivity that expresses satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction through enlightened stakeholder choices, while dilemmas irreconcilable to such 
choices are deferred. 352  
The present thesis sees these 3rd Places as sites for prestations of social messages and 
offers of opportunities for me-time that are not so much ‘havens in a heartless world’, but sites 
construed to address a dominant subjectivity in conditions that mean citizen’s rights and duties are 
overlaid with stakeholder capacities and obligations. Offering a ‘home away from home’, or 
“ethical consumerism” amidst a globalizing society said to ‘go on’ 24-7; these examples appeal as 
points of entry into and assuagement from the vicissitudes of the world for an unobstructed, 
autonomous, and ‘creative’ Anglo-American individualism. These examples blur boundaries 
between profit-seeking enterprise and ‘chakra alignment’ by combining ‘high-quality’ with 
empathetic worldliness. In these examples, situations assuagement of what is seen by some as the 
relentless ‘buzz’ of 24-7 lifestyles in a Creative Age, and by others, the uncertain ‘precarity’ of 
flexibility regimes and consumption-oriented debt and credit in ‘corrosive’ societies.353 
 
… … … 
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The chapter now turns to briefly compare and contrast these 3rd Places with what some theorists 
describe in terms of McDonaldization and McDonaldized spaces. This brief discussion helps 
situate the present thesis’ approach to the problem of explaining a contemporary dominant 
subjectivity in relation to one interpretive application of Weberian and Frankfurt School theory, 
and to the somewhat large and well-known economic and cultural phenomenon central to it. 
Theories of McDonaldization are also interesting because they provide a way into discussing 
subjectivity in relation to theories of modernity and postmodernity.  
George Ritzer’s thesis explains how the mass-industrialization, suburbanization, and mass-
communications characteristic of a “burger culture” that rose to prominence in North American 
societies in the 1950s and 1960s characterizes contemporary conditions. Ritzer uses the eponym 
McDonaldization as a metaphor for conditions that are said to have originated in processes used 
by the relatively long-standing and popular ‘fast-food’ chain McDonald’s, which “has spread across 
American society as well as the rest of the world”. For Ritzer, McDonaldization is the socially and 
culturally transformational form that “instrumental rationality” takes on in conditions of 
globalization and hegemonic capitalistic industrialization. In relation to questions of subjectivity, 
Ritzer theorizes globalizing modernization as an expansive and extensive, systemic continuum 
that, through ever-increasing rationalization, all but disqualifies possibilities for personal 
autonomy, individual sovereignty, and ‘creativity’. Of course, many social conditions that Part II 
links to the decades of the Long Upturn, such as full-time industrial employment, relatively 
equitable income distribution, suburbanization, and automobilization, are commensurate with 
McDonaldization as Ritzer describes it. Certain other theorists of McDonaldization discuss its 
representations, and spaces commoditized in the McDonald’s style, as ahistorical virtual, hyperreal 
or simulated environments that offer respite and refuge from contemporary social worlds. For 
example, Douglas Kellner and Arthur Kroker both suggest the “phantasmagoric advertising” that 
McDonaldized corporations deploy in promotional strategies link McDonaldized spaces with a 
mythical “hypertrophy of abundance”, and “unending suburban sunshine” that “draws customers 
into a world of simulation, hyperreality”.354  
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The present thesis neither wholly embraces Ritzer’s argument, nor does it uncritically take 
on claims that McDonaldization manifests “postmodern rupture”. Instead, the metaphor 
McDonaldization is useful here because it helps to background explanation that recognizes the 
emergence over recent years of conditions such that the McDonald’s firm itself — along with many 
operationally similar firms, such as Burger King, Pizza Hut, and KFC — passed into temporary 
‘decline’, involving “outlet closures and highly-publicized menu changes”. I want to use these 
reports of declining and resurgent profitability, not to suggest that we are witnessing a complete 
passing of the McDonaldized ‘model’, and with it ‘modernizing’ conditions but, rather, to point-up 
the emergence of a new layer of predominant conditions within core societal arenas.355  
To begin to explain this suggestion, the references to ‘high-quality’ and ‘product origins’ 
made in 3rd Places are helpful. That is, in recent years, McDonald’s itself has seen fit to embrace not 
merely the 3rd Place concept, rolling out its McCafés” but, also, offering-up “new healthy eating 
alternatives” that, in 2006, created “a stunning market turnaround”. While the shiny-clean, 
efficient, and predictable gloss of the Golden Arches remains in some demand — often well 
positioned for a quick snack or meal-break with children — the nature of the snack has changed. 
McDonald’s now emphasizes “health and well-being”, corporate sustainability, and promotes itself 
as provider of a space for My me-time: I’m Lovin’ it! ™ The relative economic decline of McDonald’s 
and other “fast-food giants” — as well as other operations based in ‘mass-produced’ commodities, 
and visible economies of scale such as department store emporia, for example — implies these 
may have become somewhat peripheral as sources of profitability.356  
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The claim here is that, while McDonaldized spaces remain immensely popular, and fast 
food itself remains explicitly a part of contemporary sociality, 3rd Places and the other examples 
discussed here seem to represent changing conditions over recent decades. Indeed, a broad range 
of 3rd Place-styled spaces — primarily cafes, but also laundromats, and ‘backpacker’ hostels, for 
example — offer “Wi-Fi connectivity”, and are offered-up as sites for interpersonal ‘networking’ 
and places to “refuel during a hectic day”. Here, 3rd Places appear to offer-up opportunities for 
assuagement from the fraught, stressful, and often dilemma-bound, situations which Chapter 13 
describes through the sociologists’ concept ‘precarity’. These offers appeal to and animate a liberal 
individualism and, as such, differ markedly from those made by the purveyors of ‘traditional’ 
McDonaldized spaces and commodities.357 
The homogenized and garishness of McDonaldized spaces seems to offer little comfort, or 
opportunities for personal choice. Similarly, McDonaldization itself, which offers ‘high-volume’, 
‘low-quality’ products and the ‘scripted encounter’ between staff and customers, offers little to an 
enlightened individualism seeking stakeholder ‘dialogues’. Instead, it is spaces like 3rd Places that 
offer such opportunities; for self-assertion and worldly-awareness in ‘cozy’ surroundings. The 
point of 3rd Places lay not in an explicit ‘sales-pitch’, nor any phantasmagoric corporate-
imagineered spectacle but, rather, precisely in the situation as offered-up. Like social messaging 
embedded in clothing or sportswear, 3rd Places offer assuagement for dilemmas that worldly 
conditions might raise. These examples both appeal to and animate a relatively autonomous and 
‘creative’, articulate, ‘aware’ and, importantly, ‘authentic’ individualism. In ways far removed from 
McDonaldization’s shiny interiors, and fast but blunt process-like engagements, ‘new’ McCafes 
open their doors to health-conscious individuals with calls of Me-time! I’m lovin’ it.358 These 
examples encourage subject-agents to linger over ‘high-quality’ commodities and link ‘caring and 
sharing’ to profitability in ways that imply a complex of conditions has emerged, in and through 
which a new dominant subjectivity presents itself.  
Just as contemporary occupational domains might impel near-consistent emending of the 
self — in No-Collar or ‘compassionate’ workplaces, for example — yet, simultaneously, foster 
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weariness, overwork, or stress, while offering little or no recourse for complaint, the emphases 
upon community and ‘well-being’ discussed here seems to occlude alternate possibilities for 
redressing social or environmental concerns. These examples appeal to and animate an enlightened 
and authentic liberal individualism in ways that mean such affairs ‘return’ to sociality within core 
arenas as the desiderata of consumer sovereign choices. In practice and discourse, social messages 
make manifest a subtle unity between a globalizing ‘ethical’ market-sphere and relatively affluent, 
well-educated, and articulate, ostensibly, enlightened stakeholder milieux. These examples combine 
social messaging and offers of opportunities for me-time in prestations that facilitate and enhance 
moments of jouissance: instrumental intentions here frame the moment of personal desires’ 
satisfaction as a wholesome and articulate, and direct, expression of caring and sharing agency.  
Theorists as diverse as Sharp, Manuel Castells, and Paul Virilio — who focus upon 
“technologically extended forms of the social”, “information networks”, and “surveillance 
infrastructure” — are helpful here. The point that these theorists help to make is that 
individualism and subjectivity, seen as social-historical conditions of modernization, do not 
disappear beneath the ‘logic’ of systemic, expansive instrumental rationality, nor into a 
postmodern hyperreal simulacra. Rather, these theorists insights make it possible to suggest that 
engagements across core arenas for sociality now involve significant milieux that, relatively well-
educated and articulate, derive meaning from, consume, produce, and convey relatively complex 
and abstract meanings about the world, other persons, and the environment because they 
materialize ‘real’ worlds as part of ‘going on’.359  
Discussing the increasingly widespread form of promotional strategy that Starbucks uses is 
also helpful here. In general, Starbucks does not promote itself through ‘traditional’ media 
advertising channels; albeit, until 2005 and, then, only in Australia, when the firm began to place 
advertisements in magazines and newspapers. Elsewhere in the world, and over the period of its 
initial expansion in the late 1990s, Starbucks limited its promotional activities to store-based ‘info-
tisements’, non-advertising ‘viral’ or ‘word-of-mouth’ campaigns, and “product placements” in 
film and television. This is where popular cultural texts, such as the television series Sex and the 
City, or cinema film The Devil Wears Prada, for example, ‘place’ Starbucks products in the hands of 
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characters, and portray 3rd Places as both ‘a place between home and work’, and proxy sites for 
‘irregular’ work and ‘networking’.360  
When considering that, while ‘traditional’ advertising remains an important aspect of 
contemporary personal-use commodity promotional strategies, a subtle shift might be taking place, 
which the McDonaldization ‘model’ does not explain. The prestations of social messaging and 
offers of opportunities for me-time appeal to and animate an articulate and well-educated 
individualism, which institutions ‘perceive’ through the filter of market-research as ‘demanding’ 
personalized, ‘high-quality’, and ‘ethical’, commoditized goods and services, while expressing 
distaste for mass-production and consumption. As such, 3rd Places often form part of a broader 
move towards ‘sub-advertising’ promotional strategies, which complement “product placements”, 
tightly “‘stage-managed’ pseudo-word-of-mouth campaigns”, “viral marketing techniques”, and 
payola-like “info-tainment”, as practiced by the Krispy Kreme Donut Company, for example. The 
invitation to linger or browse stretches the value of the customer for the corporation; clothing and 
sportswear logos might be said to work in the same way. By “kicking back and enjoying … 
amazingly comfortable chairs”, or wearing ‘politicized’ clothing, subject-agents’ somatic presence 
itself becomes a contribution to commoditizing efforts that, elsewhere, work unhindered, in less 
caring and sharing ways.361 
Unlike McDonaldized spaces and commodity-offers, there are no references to an 
archetypal ‘hypertrophy of abundance’ or ‘suburban sunshine’ made in or through these kinds of 
offers. The social messages and offers of opportunities for me-time discussed here do not so 
much seem to draw subject-agents into a world of hyperreal simulation but, instead, offer 
(commercialized) spaces where ‘self-actualizing’ subject-agents might take up opportunities to 
emend the self, to experience heightened desires for quality from around the world, as authentic 
participants in (social) worlds. In this sense, postmodern and semiotic analyses that suggest 
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McDonaldized spaces represent a hyperreality might go ‘too deep’. They seem to graft onto the 
signs and symbols they explain — as related to the worldly phenomena that is their topic — their 
own interpretive insights. Rather, it is suggested that an authentic individualism is brought to the 
examples discussed here because the situations they offer can assuage — as means for escaping 
stress and fatigue, empathizing with others, or savouring ‘high-quality’ in a caring, sharing 
environment — through desires’ satisfactions.  
In this light, a tangential suggestion that relatively widespread shifts in popular music tastes 
follow a similar trajectory — from ‘stadium rock’ events, at which audiences witness the spectacular 
displays of ‘rock Gods’, to ‘raves’ and ‘parties’, at which participants create the ambience of a 
‘happening’362 — might also support these claims. Moreover, an array of relatively recent moves by 
regional and local governments — such as the Central Manchester Development Corporation’s 
Cultural Quarter, or Melbourne City Council’s 2030 projects — can be seen to appeal to and 
animate an individualism that is more ‘participant’ than ‘punter’. That is, the examples discussed 
here seem tied less to extra-somatic, delayed, or vicarious possibilities, and more to immediate 
embodied ‘being’. Designer Wright Massey’s emphasis on “investing design work with 
idiosyncrasies” and Eizenberg’s suggestion that “repetition is not a problem” for globalizing 
purveyors of 3rd Places also helps emphasize this point.363 The claim is that the examples discussed 
here ‘work’ because they embrace and mobilize the always unique and authentic ‘satisfactions’ of a 
dominant subjectivity in many ways bound to ever-further self-assertion and emendation. The 
examples augment existential and ethical reflections upon ‘being’ embodied, in space, and time, as 
well as amongst others, in contemporary Anglo-American conditions that often require high levels 
of education and articulate dispositions, personal autonomy, as well as stress, fatigue, and 
weariness.  
 
… … … 
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Interestingly, retail consultant Ross Honeywill argues that the ‘authenticity’ exuded by genuine 3rd 
Places is inconsistent with the formulaic qualities of globalizing chain stores, such as Starbucks, 
Waterstone’s, and Borders. Honeywill contrasts globalizing chain stores, which for him “are merely 
about the transaction”, with small-scale independent bookshops, cafés, and bars. For him, what 
matters are “intangibles, like connection and communication … genuine 3rd Places [offer] an 
environment where strangers can linger in good company”. Honeywill suggests that genuine 3rd 
Places appeal to “discriminating people more interested in authenticity than price”, because they 
are “not necessarily about the transaction … not just about putting books in bags”. Although 
defining them in the same way that globalizing chain Starbucks does — as “cozy places to hang out, 
following home, the first place, and work, the second” — Honeywill argues it is the small-scale, 
localized, independent and, often, alternative, ambience of particular spaces that makes a genuine 
3rd Place.364  
What is important here is that Honeywill’s claim is of a form that often arises in debates 
over the practices and discourses of contemporary individualism. For Honeywill, globalizing 
corporate chain stores offer only weak imitations of genuine 3rd Places. Starbucks, or Borders’, like 
globalizing purveyor of furniture and ‘lifestyles’ Ikea, for example, are pale commercialized 
imitations, and offer-up sham consumer experiences while, for Honeywill, ‘arty’ inner-city cafés, 
‘underground’ bars, and ‘independent’ bookstores are ‘genuine’, and offer authentic experiences. 
Discussion now pauses briefly to engage aspects of Habermas’ and Sennett’s work on early-
modern coffee shops and the formation of a “public sphere”. Bringing in Habermas and Sennett 
here allows the chapter to revisit issues raised initially in Chapters 2 and 3. These engagements 
help tie together the different strands of this and the previous chapter’s discussions, and provide a 
background for issues raised in Chapter 16.  
Habermas and Sennett discuss the formation of an early-modern “public sphere” that, in 
seventeenth and eighteenth century London, Paris, as well as elsewhere in Western Europe, used 
coffee shops as places to inter-relate and discuss worldly affairs. Moreover, the politically neutral 
forum that Habermas suggests coffee shops provided offered situations to these “bourgeois 
private citizens” — generally excluded from Royal court and Church hierarchy — in and through 
which, as a class, they could develop and exercise “political will”. For Habermas, coffee shops 
were places for meeting and discussing ‘news’ and information of concern to the milieux engaged 
in the commerce and industry that, as Chapter 2’s engagements with his work suggests, had 
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increased their wealth and contributed to a broad transformation of power structures favouring it 
as a primary source of authority. Habermas traces the genesis of the “public opinion” and 
subjectivity that, intimately tied-up with the emergence of what Dumont calls “Western 
individualism” and, importantly, “modern artificialism”, extended beyond the coffee shops to 
become the dominant form of life within modernizing Western societies.365  
Similarly, Sennett ascribes to the “public man” of seventeenth and eighteenth century 
coffee shops the emergence of the “public spaces” intrinsic to the social and cultural formation of 
a Secular and Rational liberal individualism. Sennett suggests that the erstwhile classless 
equalitarianism, unregulated atmosphere, and emphasis on individual exemplarity and ‘talent’, as 
well as their initial political marginalization as alleged breeding grounds for sedition, meant coffee 
shops were important sites for the development of the liberal-democratic principles of private 
autonomy, individual liberty, and secular ‘humanist’ equalitarianism. Both Habermas and Sennett 
use their claims as a framework for suggestions that more recent capitalistic-industrial 
modernization — notably, the development of mass-communications technologies and ‘mass-
mediatization’ of ‘news’ and information, as well as suburbanization and, later, automobilization 
— has significantly undermined possibilities for public spaces and a politically effective public 
sphere. Unlike the coffee shops of early-modernity, recent and contemporary conditions are said 
to make person-to–person and localized communication difficult, and are incongruous with the 
formation of norm-based and relational “public opinion” that might provide a bulwark against 
many of the irrationalities created and reproduced by globalizing modernization.366  
While Habermas and Sennett make it possible to discuss contemporary 3rd Places as a 
debased form of Anglo-American public sphere, this is not the primary aim here. The aim is to 
reframe slightly the focus upon subjectivity within these debates through the theory and method 
discussed in Part III. That is, the present thesis avers from suggesting that contemporary 3rd Places 
can be used as a metaphor for a historically emaciated political counterculture. Rather, I want to 
use their work to make a more low-key but related suggestion that claims independent or 
alternative 3rd Places are genuine, and offer ‘authentic’ situations, while corporatized 3rd Places are 
simulacra of these. The suggestion is that such claims spring from a kind of hermeneutics that links 
independent and alternative bookshops, cafés, and bars to a historicized concept of counterculture 
that also presumes it is, intrinsically, the expression of a progressive or radical political will. Such 
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claims seem based in propositions that seventeenth and eighteenth century coffee shops, as spaces 
for Rational discourse — an increasingly powerful public’s opinion — became spaces for 
Romantic reaction against it, once the bourgeoisie had achieved political power and cultural 
hegemony. Hence, such a countercultural history might link the culture of coffee shops, as 
described by Habermas and Sennett, to nineteenth century Parisian salons, early-twentieth century 
radicalized Left Bank Modernism, its mid-twentieth century transferal to New York’s Greenwich 
Village bohemian ghetto ‘dives’, and subsequent popularization with the Hippy counterculture of 
the late 1960s and Punk fads of the 1970s.  
While remaining a descriptive-interpretive history of modern counterculture’s 
‘modernization’, such claims seem sound. However, the form of claim that is represented by 
Honeywill’s suggestions that independent, local, and alternative 3rd Places are genuine often comes 
in here, and a further step is taken. Such an order of claims seemingly assert that aspects of 
counterculture — such as emphases on localized, small-scale, and artisinal production, the 
‘human-scale’, and empathy-based, equalitarian inter-relations, for example — are intrinsically 
political and survive intact globalizing modernization’s increased relative societal and relational 
complexity, abstractedness, and “extended forms of the social”.367 This form of claim seems to 
involve a subtle switch in analytic emphasis. The move from continuous histories that leave certain 
matters un-reflected upon to critical commentary seems to conflate antinomian self-expression 
with anti-authoritarian political will. When such a step is taken, argument effectively moves from 
critique of the situation to criticism of subject-agents.  
This form of claim raises a methodological conundrum that I want to avoid. On the one 
hand, such claims seem to require that analyses jettison commitment to material-physical 
contextuality and, so, adopt a utopian vision of the genuine that, always and already unrealizable, 
draws inquiry towards an ever-receding horizon of authentication, which opens claims that any 
horizons are genuine to assertions that they too, are simulacra. Alternately, such claims could 
require assertions that a specific set of worldly experiences are authentic and, so, involve asserting 
personal will-objectives over possible points of reference derivd from claims that others ‘live’ 
genuinely. On the other hand, such claims seem to require analyses jettison critique altogether, and 
embrace wholesale the globalizing conditions that mean some corporations are ‘caring and 
sharing’, or that might bring 3rd Places to those — not able to access the means for developing 
‘cultural capital’ — who otherwise would miss out.  
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What seem lost in such claims are those aspects of the critical perspective that allow 
inquiry to traverse situations and their contextuality in relation to human-being, as it can be said to 
‘go on’ amidst them. While it may be that localized, independently run or, culturally alternative 
sites for producing goods and services do practice certain processes that sustain aspects of these. 
Honeywill’s favoured 3rd Places might contribute to social justice or reduce pollution, because they 
are wholly based in person-to-person inter-relations or, through plain voluntarism. Large 
corporate chains also sometimes create and reproduce processes that do this. The issue is that both 
contemporary globalizing corporate and local independent alternative sites for producing goods 
and services ‘go on’ amidst conditions that abstract from and change inter-relations of ‘the human-
scale’, for example, and with social or, indeed, environmental stability more broadly conceived. 
For the present thesis, the focus here is not so much upon differences between independent-
alternative and corporate-commoditized situations, or the formations of individualism said to ‘go 
on’ in and through them, but on the interweaving of normative conditions and broader material-
physical contextuality as these relate to the job of ‘being’ human. The problem can be seen as one 
where such claims blur what is, for the present thesis, a necessary analytic distinction between 
situation-specific formations of individualism and a dominant subjectivity. As Part III suggests, 
this means linking inquiry over a normative register to inquiry over an ontological register, and to 
what is seen as the project’s critique of normativity.  
 
… … … 
 
As a way of concluding the chapter, I again raise the suggestion that a kind of pervasive wholism 
becomes visible to inquiry through the examples discussed here. An individualism that acts to ‘live’ 
spatiality at the ‘human-scale’, or ‘slow-down’ temporality, ‘goes on’ amidst globalizing and 
modernizing conditions that — in contrast with commoditized ethics, me-time, or simplicity that 
might be on offer — depends upon the kinds of ever-further efficiency and convenience ‘gains’ 
that partially work to extend space and speed-up time. Arguably, concerns raised by the purveyors 
of ethical or green commodities, politicized social messages, and downshifters, in many ways, 
‘materialize’ what can be described as norm-based and relational claims. Yet, under the aegis of 
relatively complex, abstract, and extended, market-oriented and liberal-democratic conditions, 
such claims seem to enter sociality as ever-further opportunities for desires’ satisfactions: these call 
upon contemporary individuals to self-orient in relation to collectively created social worlds.  
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The examples discussed here suggest an active obscuring of references to speed, efficiency, 
and calculability, and an undermining of ‘faith’ or ‘trust’ in systematized conditions that are often 
promoted by relatively large market-based organizations such as Starbucks, or the Unilever-owned 
Ben & Jerry’s, for example. The increasing commoditization of downshifting and “slow food”, and 
the broader phenomena of “organic agriculture”, as well as the embrace by corporations and 
government of stakeholder ‘communities’ are also instructive here. The “tie-dyed aura” of 
Starbucks’ 3rd Places, the “dignified environments” of Barnes & Noble’s and Borders’ or, what Eva 
Cox calls the “‘womanliness’ of The Body Shop ‘community’”368 mesh with an ambiancé that means 
ethical gestures become atomized acts of sovereign satisfaction. Social messaging offers 
opportunities for meaningful experiences, along with a wholesome worldly goodness; these offers 
provide a bridge that connects an autonomous and ‘creative’ individualism with market-agency.  
These help support suggestions that shifting emphases in social and cultural practices and 
discourses, as well as government, civil, and market ‘responses’ to them, can be seen in terms of an 
individualism characterized by relatively high levels of affluence, education, and articulate 
dispositions. The array of commoditized sovereign desire-objectives yet, also, the norm-based and 
relational claims, represented in these examples can be seen as actions, meanings, and things that 
subject-agents ‘materialize’ because they create and reproduce a particular form of life.369 These 
examples might be used to suggest conditions for an expansion of market-based relations into 
hitherto marginal areas. However, the present thesis suggests that the market ‘responses’ to a 
consuming sovereign liberal individualism represented in these examples can also be discussed 
using the methodological framework discussed in Part II. This framework, which also involves 
discussing the polity, occupational, civil, and cultural domains, traverses normative and ontological 
registers. It allows the thesis to look at the examples in terms of wider societal, relational, and 
historical changes and to suggest shifting forms of authority and value criteria involving such form 
of life an individualism imply a new dominant subjectivity presents itself. 
In the particular normative conditions discussed here, these examples hold out 
opportunities for assuagement of many existential, ethical, or material dilemmas that seem to arise 
as a liberal individualism is seen to work as both motor and anchor point within the job of creating 
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and reproducing contemporary Anglo-American sociality. This said, discussing subjectivity in 
relation to social messages and me-time might be taken to mean that the subjectivity under 
discussion is somehow is more ‘knowledgeable’ than other possible subjectivities, or subjectivity as 
manifest at some historical juncture. Rather, the examples discussed here allow a dominant 
contemporary subjectivity to be seen in terms of structured and institutionalized ‘perceptions’ that 
subject-agents ‘do’ things in particular ways. The relatively complex and abstract information 
disseminated in and through these examples does not mean that the present thesis argues that 
contemporary subject-agents necessarily hold high orders of ‘scientific’, ‘sociological’, or 
‘therapeutic’ knowledges about the world, societies, or themselves. However, the examples do 
inform suggestions that normative practices and discourses, combine with particular cultural 
histories, amidst relatively complex, abstract, and extended conditions, and that these are sufficient 
for the structuring of a range of institutions, in space, over time, and through human bodies, that 
appeal to and animate a dominant subjectivity as if subject-agents were knowledge-able as such. 
Moreover, framed by theory that sees a liberal individualism working as both motor and anchor 
point within sociality, these examples suggest that the structuring of institutionality on such terms 
brings sovereign satisfactions and dissatisfactions into sociality in ways that displace many alternate 
possibilities with situations that demand self-orienting individuals.  
These examples suggest situations that might offer to enhance desires’ satisfactions, while 
assuaging many of the ethical and existential dilemmas that everyday life in core arenas might raise. 
Seen as ‘going on’ amidst the interweaving stakeholder politics and corporate sustainability 
‘initiatives’ described in Chapter 13, these examples offer opportunities for symptomatic relief 
from what critical sociologists call the ‘precarity’ that pervades contemporary Anglo-American 
lifestyles; these are offers of opportunities for bringing spatiality, temporality, and, in many ways, 
institutionality, back-down to the ‘human-scale’. Looking at things in this way means focusing 
upon a tension between, on the one hand, the spatial, temporal, embodied, and institutional 
contexts that enframe ‘going on’ as the condition of ‘being’ human and, on the other hand, 
subject-agents as humans as they can be said to ‘be’ in contemporary Anglo-American settings.  
Through these examples, it might be said that contemporary spatial contexts enframe a 
self-orienting and projecting subjectivity that ‘lives’ at the interstices of demands made by the 
somatic context for ‘being’, and modern empty and measurable, as well as postmodern relativistic 
spatiality. This is what happens when social messages work to connect Anglo-American 
consumers with supplier communities. Similarly, contemporary temporal contexts that enframe a 
self-asserting and ‘creative’ and ‘immediate’ subjectivity — such as in 3rd Places, or when wearing 
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social messaging, for example — appear to impel an authentic individualism that is somatic 
‘presence’, yet is also bound to the onrush of future-time.  
The examples here reveal a relatively enlightened, affluent, well-educated, articulate, and 
worldly individualism that acts in contexts which can be seen in terms of a tension between ‘being’ 
in particular social worlds, and the relatively complex, abstract, and extended worldly conditions 
that enframe the dominant subjectivity that subject-agents ‘live’ as human ‘beings’. I am suggesting 
that these examples represent worldly conditions where a kind of pervasive wholism means a 
dominant subjectivity oscillates between heightened satisfactions and enervated dissatisfactions. 
‘Going on’ amidst a kind of velveteen embrace in conditions that, as these examples suggest, 
animate and appeal to a liberal individualism, such a subjectivity turns on an almost irreconcilable 
tension to defer many existential, ethical, and material dilemmas that Anglo-American social 
worlds might raise.  
 
… … … 
… … 
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15 Leisure and ‘well-being’: authenticity and reflexivity 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses examples that examine what happens in practice in relation to claims made 
in Part III, concerned with inquiry over an ontological register into the social constitution of 
subjectivity. The examples discussed here draw-together Chapter 13’s emphasis on normative 
conditions and Chapter 14’s focus upon spatial and temporal ontological categories to discuss the 
social constitution of somatic, practical-ethological, and reflexive subjectivity. The discussion takes 
up Chapter 15’s suggestion that, while differences between independent–alternative and 
corporate–commoditized situations can be discussed in terms of different forms of individualism, 
what is of interest to the present thesis are the interweaving of normative conditions and broader 
material-physical contextuality in the examples. The chapter considers the examples in relation to 
the critique of normativity based in a claim human-being is a norm-based and relational condition, 
which backgrounds the thesis’ Conclusion in Chapter 16.  
Initially, the chapter discusses a contemporary non-fiction work as an aid to explaining 
how conditions said to privilege a liberal individualism might raise worldly problems, yet make 
these difficult to resolve in ways not involving exercises of sovereign choice or individuated 
desires. The chapter then concentrates on examples of contemporary travel and ‘extreme’ sports 
pursuits, personal health, nutrition, ‘well-being’, and ‘New Age’ practices. These examples focus 
upon how offers of ‘high-quality’ goods and services, or those embedded with relatively complex 
or abstract information appeal to and animate an authentic form of life. The chapter looks at these 
examples as representing actions, meanings, and things that mobilize, propagate, and perpetuate a 
dominant subjectivity because arising in conditions that privilege authentic individuated desires’ 
satisfactions and dissatisfactions. As such, a dominant subjectivity that turns on a sustained 
deferral of ethical and existential worldly dilemmas is said to emerge in conditions where such 
liberal individualism works both as motor and anchor point within sociality. 
 
… … … 
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Directly framing this chapter’s discussion is Chapter 8’s use of the concept of ‘core arenas’. Here, 
it helps to explain conditions for a dominant contemporary Anglo-American subjectivity amidst 
the industrialization of culture that has arisen over several decades of neoliberalization and 
financialization. Also framing discussion here are Chapter 2’s engagements with Mukerji’s, and 
Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner’s work. These are brought back to emphasize how the creating and 
reproducing of intertwining normative conditions and material-physical contextuality in Western 
and, moreover, Anglo-American modernization can be seen in terms of a liberal sovereign 
individualism that combines ‘hedonistic’ and ‘Puritan’ sensibilities. The chapter uses these earlier 
discussions to background a link between antinomian and libertarian sensibilities — seen by some 
as the preserve of a radical-progressive, politicized ‘counterculture’ in the 1960s and early 1970s — 
and the liberal individualism that the thesis sees both motor and anchor point within 
contemporary Anglo-American sociality. This discussion is important because it allows the chapter 
to look at an apparently generalized antipathy to large-scale political and economic, as well as 
social and cultural institutions that might be said to characterize contemporary individualism, while 
avoiding theoretical conundrums of the kind raised in Chapter 15.  
The first example discussed here is a contemporary non-fiction text — media business 
commentators Helen Trinca and Catherine Fox’s Better Than Sex: How a Whole Generation Got 
Hooked on Work. The book sets out to explain individualism in the Information Age and its Creative 
Economies. What is interesting about Trinca and Fox’s argument is the way it appeals to ‘go-getting 
careerist’s’ enthusiasm for existing social conditions, while also being somewhat critical of them as 
contexts for everyday life in Anglo-American societies. The authors make an enlightened liberal 
individualism the avatar for a high-technology free-market nirvana yet, recognize that the world 
they describe can also be problematic. Trinca and Fox argue that contemporary conditions appeal 
to an individualism centred on “creativity and enthusiasm” — a “desire to get ahead”, “stay on 
top”, and “cut one’s own path” — because offering liberty from homogeneity, bureaucracy, and 
“a one-size-fits-all culture”. For Trinca and Fox, “as technology revolutionizes the world” it 
displaces dirty, heavy industry, hierarchical workplace structures, as well as smog, noise, and 
commuter gridlock. Their suggestion is that in place of these has arisen “a highly educated 
workforce … a new generation unwilling to take orders. Today’s workers increasingly negotiate 
their own way at work … employees are beginning to realize that they are not passive players. 
They sense they have leverage …” yet suffer from overwork, stress, and fatigue.370  
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In some ways resembling Beck’s more critical-theoretical work on sub-politics and a post-
materialist individualism said to combine “egoism and altruism”, Trinca and Fox argue that “old 
style organizations and the lens of [collective] values and goals … limited personal potential” and 
did not offer possibilities for “job satisfaction”, because “people disappeared into the group”. 
Moreover, “today, people see themselves as having an individual relationship with their employer. 
[They] face-off against the organization, and the avalanche of inspirational texts, or the countless 
other methods that a company uses to turn us into the kind of workers they think they need for 
the twenty-first century”. They argue that large-scale, ‘top-down’ bureaucratic administration is 
antithetical to the needs and interests of an informed, articulate, and ambitious, free, and creative 
individualism. Such an individualism is enlightened, consistently monitoring the subjective position 
of self in relation to the world, and ‘pro-actively’ sharpening personal ‘talents’. The individualism 
that Trinca and Fox appeal to and describe hones an embodied self as the abode for the tools and 
techniques presumed to be requirements for self-orienting and competitive engagements that 
mean always “living life to the full”.371  
Trinca and Fox’s gushingly enthusiastic paean to Just Do It careerism helps to set in relief 
Bunting’s more sober suggestion that demands made by a broad range of occupations for 
“emotional labour [mean] it is not just your physical stamina and analytical capabilities which are 
required to do a good job, but your personality and emotional skills as well”. Where the 
performance of such emotional labour is near-to imperative, joy, fun, and desiring — sometimes 
regarded as immaterial ‘goods’ — as well as presentation of the self seem made-over. On the one 
hand, these mask subject-agents’ engagements as if always expressing atomized desires’ 
satisfactions. Labour on these terms is largely seen as a matter of sovereign choice, or an 
expression of desires’ dissatisfaction. While, on the other hand, the veneer that emotional labour 
supplies appear to constitute a kind of decidedly instrumentalized cultural capital that passes 
through sociality to overlay economic capital per se. This example helps to take Chapter 13’s 
discussion of volunteerism a step further. The suggestion here is that, in emotional labour, value 
created through commoditized labour exchange relations becomes embedded in and dependent 
upon the bodies of subject-agents as authentic participants in the business’ enterprise. Arguably, as 
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the creativity and enthusiasm demanded in emotional labour-situations has become normalized, as 
the instrumentalism it masks has also become pervasive in scope.372  
It is facing these kinds of problems that the co-authors’ gushing enthusiasm for the 
“enormous gains” that such “intense commitment to life” makes possible becomes somewhat 
ambiguous. Trinca and Fox recognize that the contemporary individualism that they embrace and 
promote “has its downside”: 
 
The agenda [that arose in the] 1990s was about choices and about the possibility of having fun amid 
the commitment to high performance and productivity The [new] workplace is informal enough to 
allow you to duck out for a coffee without feeling guilty, but stress may be a routine part of your 
day. Employees are under more pressure to produce yet, they have more physical freedom than 
ever. They are constantly monitored for performance, but how they reach their targets may well be 
up to them. Results, dollars and the bottom-line dominate their working days, yet they don’t have 
to ask permission to go out for a cigarette.373  
 
In the co-authors’ work, ever-further flexibility-measures and technological ‘innovations’ 
provide a terrain over which it is expected an ever-improving and higher-achieving, success-
oriented individualism is to be driven. It seems that atomized expressions of dissatisfaction are the 
chief tools of such an individualism in conditions that raise such existential and ethical dilemmas. 
Whether in choices over coffee breaks, commitments to productivity, or occupation-induced 
stress, the dilemma itself becomes an enduring state. For the individualism that Trinca and Fox 
outline, attaining a somewhat unclearly defined, yet, unarguably instrumental and atomistic success 
appears as the ultimate socially sanctioned condition:  
 
[W]ork is now at the centre of people’s lives; it’s the thing they do to make money and meaning 
… many people are consumed by work because it is the element of their lives which is most 
affirming. For many people their work life is more fulfilling, empowering, consistent, and 
controllable than their sex life. Better than sex, in so many ways.374  
                                                 
 
372 These suggestions are in many ways motivated by Margaret R. Somers’ suggestions that “social capital has been imported into 
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in original, Queensland, "Hopper and Others Versus Virgin Blue Airlines Pty. Ltd." 
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Under the order of the atomized individualism Trinca and Fox recount, the predominant 
desire-objectives are total freedom of will and complete unbinding from constraint. Trinca and 
Fox seem to describe a kind of pleonexia that takes labour itself as one more source for ever-greater 
desires’ satisfactions in conditions that, as Chapter 13 suggests, involve the mores of the 
occupational domain retracting from visibility while their influence becomes extended beyond it. 
On the one hand, the co-authors recommend full and uncritical involvement in conditions 
that are sufficiently complex and institutionalized that they offer room for “stellar career 
advancement”, and “creativity and enthusiasm” amidst proliferating, but often ambiguous or 
barely tangible, occupational and consumer opportunities for choice and desires’ satisfactions. The 
denizens of the Creative Age at which their work is aimed embrace new technologies, increased 
personal autonomy, and workplace flexibility as emancipatory gains. While, on the other hand, the 
co-authors also argue that the very structured institutionality: the relative complexity, abstractions, 
and extensity of contemporary sociality are what foil the ambitious, said to be bent on achieving 
‘success’. In this view, organizations attempt to corral subject-agents into homogenous and 
regimented workplace practices, yet “In the end, the sheer unpredictability of humans is [seen as] 
what gives business its edge”. What is elided here is the backdrop to celebrations of individual 
effort, entrepreneurial talent, ‘well-being’ initiatives, and “sheer enjoyment and fun in activities”. 
This backdrop comprises of conditions where flexibility can displace occupational security, and 
self-regulation or consumer choice can displace collective practices and appraisal of situations that 
might work to mitigate stress, fatigue, and ‘precarity’.375  
Trinca and Fox construe individual liberty, personal autonomy, and sovereign choice in 
particular ways. Arguably, they make explicit a formation of individualism that seems to be a 
partial condition of the ‘industrialization of culture’ discussed in Chapter 8. Their work helps to 
underline suggestions that, amidst ongoing neoliberalization and financialization, sociality within 
core arenas seems to go on as if personal autonomy involved all ‘stakeholders’ beneficially, 
sovereignty over choices were complete, and a kind of quasi-symbolic ‘immaterial’ existence were 
an ‘actual’ subjective possibility. Conditions in the ‘new world of work’ seem to ‘go on’ as if the 
antipathy to social norms and rejection of conformity once associated with the counterculture of 
the 1960s and 1970s were marginal to, rather than structured and institutionalized within sociality. 
Of course, the suggestion here is not that contemporary Anglo-American subject-agents have 
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themselves taken on antinomian or libertarian ‘personalities’. Rather, the suggestion is that a 
dominant subjectivity presents itself in and through relatively complex, abstract, and extended, 
market-oriented, liberal-democratic sociality, such that practices and discourses privilege 
antinomian rejections of the obligatoriness of ethical-moral norms and libertarian assertions of 
personal-will objectives as the expression of freedom within arenas of core importance to creating 
and reproducing it.376  
Discussing the practices and discourses of such an individualism in this way helps to 
partially explain normative conditions where relatively affluent, well-educated, and articulate 
milieux appear to eschew divisions between leisure and labour for well-being ‘initiatives’ and 
‘creative opportunities’, for example. In the light of these suggestions, such an apparent eschewing 
of divisions between leisure and labour is seen as a condition that arises within core societal arenas 
as Anglo-American subject-agents ‘live’ an inalienable form of life. Hence, the questioning of social 
norms and embracing of negative freedoms that ‘goes on’ in the conditions described here are not 
seen as being ‘essential’ to radical or progressive politics. Looking at things through the claim that 
a liberal individualism can be seen to work as both motor and anchor point within sociality, 
instead, implies that conditions have emerged to privilege sovereign satisfactions or dissatisfactions 
over norm-based and relational claims. As Chapter 13’s discussion of corporate ‘team-building’ 
exercises also suggests, the subjectivity that emerges in situations characterized by such an 
individualism seems to ‘go on’ as if sociality were a near-unending field of instrumental 
engagements where few, if any limits to the assuming of capacities for ever-further exertion and 
taking-on of ever-greater responsibilities present as ‘legitimate’. It is as if practices and discourses 
within core arenas for sociality privilege engagements that make maintaining and emending the self 
an almost consistent impulsion, such that a kind of dis-embodied embodiment and a strange kind 
of ‘legitimate’ normlessness pervades sociality.  
The example that Trinca and Fox’s work provides helps to highlight how offers of 
opportunities to enhance experiences, augment enjoyment, or attenuate desiring, might arise in 
conditions that make sovereign choices over desires’ satisfactions almost the only ‘legitimate’ 
avenues for self-orientation. This is where the motifs of ‘social messaging’ and ‘me-time’ that 
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frame the examples in Chapter 15 — or the increasingly prominent “day-spas” and “nutrition and 
well-being centres” that offer “relaxation and reinvigoration”, for example — represent 
opportunities for individuated desiring in conditions where stress, fatigue, overwork, and 
exploitation are distinct possibilities. These are offers of opportunities that slow-down time in 
conditions that make possible a return of the body to subject-agents as the site of authentic 
existence. Yet, this authenticity so often turns on ‘creativity and enthusiasm’ in occupational 
domains that demand “emotional labour”, which implies that embodiment on these terms ‘goes 
on’ as a near-always instrumentalized condition, as Trinca and Fox themselves concede. Similarly, 
as Chapter 15 suggests, contemporary offers to make space amenable to the ‘human-scale’, such as 
at 3rd Places, do so in ways that bring together embodied Anglo-American consumers and supplier 
communities, yet do so in conditions that make it difficult to assess whether or not ‘caring and 
sharing’ corporations exploit or pollute these and other communities. The examples discussed 
suggest a form of life that might often act out norm-based and relational claims, yet does so 
amidst relatively complex, abstract, and extended conditions that privilege self-orienting 
individual’s atomized expressions of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Sociality appears to enframe a 
dominant contemporary subjectivity that turns on a sustained deferral of worldly dilemmas 
irreconcilable with the job of creating and reproducing sociality in and through such an 
‘enlightened stakeholder’ liberal individualism.377  
 
… … … 
 
The chapter now turns to discuss two examples of practices that involve a contemporary 
subjectivity in exercising the personal autonomy, creativity and enthusiasm, and atomized 
commitment to life described by Trinca and Fox. The examples focus upon contemporary travel 
and extreme sports pursuits. Backgrounding the discussion here are brief engagements with 
contemporary debates over these aspects of leisure ‘culture’. Travel and, in particular, ‘independent 
travel’ are interesting because becoming a widely undertaken pursuit since the 1990s, even 
following the events of September 11, 2001 in New York, the ensuing ‘war on terror’, and rising 
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oil prices. Extreme sports are also interesting because, like travel, these have becoming increasingly 
popular, as well as commoditized, since the 1990s. Moreover, both examples are interesting 
because often discussed in terms of an individualism that is engaged in a ‘search for authenticity’. 
Several commentators contrast contemporary ‘independent travel’ with the ‘mass-tourism’ 
that initially became popular in the 1950s and 1960s. For John Urry, for example, tourism is 
parochial, conformist, homogeneous, passive, safe, spatially pre-defined, and temporally de-
limited; a Puritan’s rite of rationalized expenditure and redeeming of delayed gratification and 
desires through “a passive gaze” that involves recording photographic images and obtaining 
“symbolic mementos”, such as souvenirs. Urry argues, “The power of the gaze stemmed from the 
architectural geography of the panopticon. [Tourists] visually consume ‘authentic’ places and 
people [as] Others. [Tourism] has become a right of citizenship from which few in the ‘West’ are 
formally excluded”. For Urry, the “mass character of the ‘tourist gaze’” is the antithesis of “the 
individual character of ‘travel’”. Urry seems to cast travel as a rejection of (mass-)tourism; travel is 
independent, Romantic, and involves “solitary, sustained immersion, vision, awe … [and] aura” 
based in “different type of scopic regime”.378  
 Urry, like Chris Rojek, also discusses irony-laden “post-tourism”. Post-tourists embrace 
relatively abstract knowledges about the world, such that “the apparently authentic fishing village 
could not exist without the income from tourism or that the glossy brochure is a piece of pop 
culture … [For post-tourists] there is no particular problem about the inauthentic. It is merely 
another game to be played at, another pastiched surface feature of post-modern experience”. 
Implicit in this kind of claim are suggestions that post-tourism involves a generalized callousness, a 
self-based disregard for the Other, and a kind of ‘knowing’ irony that rejects, as a collectively 
understood narrative, possibilities for authenticity in a globalizing world.379  
Ian Munt’s comments are slightly different, although he too sets up a contrast between 
travel and tourism. For Munt, travel is the postmodern form that tourism takes, and is an 
expression of what Bourdieu calls the aspirational “new petit bourgeoisie”. Munt suggests 
postmodern tourism became a significant phenomenon as an array of “bespoke holiday journeys”, 
‘ethical’, ‘green’, ‘truthful’, and ‘eco-tourism’ offers, alongside a plethora of “independent travel 
guidebooks”, such as the Lonely Planet and Rough Guide series, began to emerge in the 1990s. For 
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Munt, these “culturally and environmentally sensitive forms of holiday-making” involve an 
“imaginative and independent traveler looking for an extra dimension” yet, represent an 
individualism that “experience[s] the world through a pseudo-intellectual frame”’, such that eco-
travel is no more than “a figment of wistful middle-class thinking”. Munt’s work is interesting 
because he suggests that Urry’s hermeneutics-based differentiation — between travel and tourism 
— is ‘spurious’. Instead, Munt use Bourdieu’s concept of ‘distinction’ to argue that independent 
travel is no more than “a thinly disguised expression of a sort of dream of flying, a desperate effort 
to defy the gravity of the social field”. For Munt, travel represents a Bourdieuian class tension that, 
played out in the symbolic register, “signals a cultural and social reaction of the new middle classes 
to the crassness which they perceive as tourism, and their craving for social and spatial distinction 
from the ‘golden hordes’ [of the old bourgeoisie]”.380  
These brief engagements raise two issues. First, a slight elision seems to take place in 
relation to the temporal synchrony between what these debates figure as ‘independent travel’ and 
‘mass-tourism’. Urry and Munt both see travel as a phenomenon that comes after and reacts 
against mass-tourism. Arguably, these views ignore the phenomena of ‘Hippy’ or ‘drop-out’ travel 
closely tied to the 1960s and 1970s’ counterculture. Carried on in the wake of relatively 
unprecedented affluence and access to higher education, dropping-out was ostensibly an 
eschewing of package tourism and, more importantly, the entire society seen as responsible for 
spawning package-deal ‘family holidays’ and the full-time employment that might have provided 
‘annual-leave’. In this sense, the ‘Hippy’ alternative to tourism arose contemporaneously with it. 
Dropping-out became increasingly widespread in the late 1960s, and with the arrival of the Jumbo-
Jet, became reasonably accessible to manyfrom the early 1970s. The often, but not always, 
indeterminate meander of the Hippy odyssey might be seen as a picaresque rite-of-passage, a 
creative freeing-up of the self yet, it can also be seen as a permutation of tourism, albeit, 
commensurate with increased levels of affluence, education, and worldliness.  
Second, while Munt’s questioning of Urry’s Western philosophy-based polarization of 
(Rational) tourism and (Romantic) travel seems important, his depiction of a Bourdieuian struggle 
between “new bourgeois” and “new petit bourgeois” might be somewhat unnecessarily pessimistic. 
Munt’s use of conceptual devices like “class fractions”, “struggles for distinction”, and his rather 
strongly expressed antipathy towards “soft, responsible, appropriate, or alternative travel” seems 
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to lay blame rather than explain. The contemporary ‘ethical’ travel he describes as “subsumed into 
the highest order discourse of postmodernization, sustainability, subordinating socio-cultural factors 
to environmental considerations”, seems to recognize the relatively high degrees of affluence, 
education and articulateness linked by the present thesis to engagements within core arenas and an 
liberal individualism. However, Munt seems to take on a somewhat moralizing tone, appearing to 
demand the travelers he describes understand the specific and relatively complex theoretical 
arguments that place ‘environmental considerations’ as ‘socio-cultural factors’.381  
If Urry delivers to the subjectivity that undertakes ‘independent travel’ a feeling for 
relatively arcane Western philosophical traditions, Munt seems to equate heightened reflexivity 
with greater cognizance. The present thesis avers from emphasizing a distinction between Hippy 
and mass cultures and, instead, focuses upon explaining how shifting normative conditions and 
material-physical contextuality frame the situations that mean the form of life seen as practicing 
travel is seen as an aspect of a dominant subjectivity. For the present thesis, travel involves a 
dominant subjectivity that practices relatively deep reflexivity about the self and social worlds that 
are seen as ‘tools and techniques’ which do not necessarily translate into ‘knowledges’ per se but, 
moreover, inform ‘going on’ as imagining ‘real’ worlds in space, in time, and amongst others.  
Robert Shepherd takes a slightly different approach, and compares travel with the 
powerlessness felt by Claude Lévi-Strauss in his Tristes Tropiques: “the enduring dream of a paradise 
simultaneously found and lost, a space of difference experienced under a black cloud of certainty 
that this ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ experience will soon become part of a lost (and thus nostalgic) past, 
its purity destroyed”. Sheppard also discusses eco-tourism, “authentic tribal visits”, and “safari 
tours” but sees these as part of a Western “science of remorse”, an ever-circling process of 
receding possibilities for claims to authenticity. For Shepherd, contemporary “anti-tourists delude 
themselves into believing they can transcend the boundaries of self and other with the help of a 
guidebook ‘not’ for tourists”. For Shepherd, where travelers seek new “authentic worlds”, they do 
so in the knowledge that, like Lévi-Strauss, their own sheer presence renders the authentic 
inauthentic. Shepherd, like Munt, offers incisive commentary on “independent travel” that avoids 
falling into metaphysical speculation about Romance and Reason as motivators to travel. 
However, also like Munt, Shepherd’s argument seems based in what Bourdieu elsewhere calls the 
“scholastic point of view”. Shepherd seems to claim that travel is a quest for authenticity set 
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against tourism, as primarily a (pseudo-)political act directed at tourists, or some recognized 
hegemonic cultural trope.382  
Discussing ‘backpacking’ as a form of independent travel, Fiona Allon suggests, 
“Backpackers tend to regard guidebooks as the ultimate travel accessory”. These serve as orienting 
tools for participation in a “flexible, diversified, and differentiated … worldwide community of 
global citizens consumed by the pursuit of experiences”. However, like Munt and Shepherd, Allon 
also claims that backpackers use guidebooks because they provide information that is “used as a 
means to set ‘the self’ apart from tourists”, and help to establish a particular subjective claim “on 
[backpacker’s own] authenticity of experience”.383 While such ‘self-conscious’ opposition to 
tourism, said to derive or create “authenticity of experience” through vicarious comparison with 
an objectified and sometimes despised Other, might be important to many ‘backpackers’, these 
aspects of the example travel provides is not of central importance to the present thesis’ argument. 
Rather, the emphasis here is upon what it is about contemporary travel, or extreme sports pursuits, 
for example, which suggests these offer opportunities for an authentic individualism to experience 
through heightened satisfactions. The suggestion is that, seen as phenomena that appeal to and 
animate Western individualism, independent travel and mass-tourism co-exist as phenomena that 
can be seen to address a dominant contemporary Anglo-American subjectivity. 
In such conditions, Kate Simpson’s suggestion that backpacking has “metamorphosed 
from a radical activity of a rebellious student generation into an obligation for ambitious future 
professionals”. The backpacking “gap year” that Simpson describes seems to be constituted 
through a web of small, medium, and large-scale commoditization, and traverses social, cultural, 
and civil domains. Simpson suggests that, in contemporary social and economic conditions, 
‘backpackers’ increasingly need to consider the effects that a well thought-out “gap year” might 
have on “future careers”, which is contributing to “a relationship between international travel and 
international development, a relationship that is proving economically lucrative for the booming 
‘gap year’ industry”. Simpson questions the validity of practices that mean “groups of 18 year olds 
arrive [on foreign aid projects] somewhere with no skills and set about building a bridge or school, 
often without proper consultation with the local community” and that, ultimately, are tied to 
benefits for market-based organizing institutions. What is interesting about Simpson’s suggestions 
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is that they highlight a link between contemporary individualism and conditions that make travel 
and ethical concerns “a requirement for success and as inevitable as your [university] degree”. 
Here, subjectivity presents itself through an individualism that accounts reflexively for 
instrumental actions in ethical terms that, when seen from without, might be of dubious merit. 
Again, Trinca and Fox are prescient: “corporate culture offers all of us a can-do world where 
anything seems possible”.384  
Interesting here are international newsweekly Time Magazine’s comments on the 
phenomena of ‘backpacking’ after the Bali bombing tragedy of 2002:  
 
The freedom to travel safely and cheaply is one of the greatest blessings of our time — something 
that immeasurably expands the range of human experience. That’s particularly true for one class of 
traveler; backpackers … few modern social developments are more significant and less appreciated 
than the rise of backpacker travel. The tens of thousands of young Australians, Germans, Britons, 
Americans, and others who wander the globe … are building what may be the only example of a 
truly global community.385  
 
These Time comments help to highlight a subtle tension that, for the present thesis, seems 
to characterize many contemporary leisure practices and discourses. Initially, however, Time’s 
comments raise an issue that is important but, arguably, well-covered as a sociological issue. While, 
indeed, ‘truly global’ communities may manifest in and around backpacker centres, such as Bondi 
Beach, Earl’s Court, or Khao Sahn Road, the relational bonds that ‘go on’ within them seem 
relatively fragile. On the one hand, subject-agents might ‘bond’ through comparable experiences, 
especially, where carefree attitudes and novel liberties are on offer. While chance meetings may 
lead to joy and happiness, the least importune of encounters can readily be cast off. Yet, on the 
other hand, where movement from place to place occurs within the temporal limits of the ‘gap 
year’, or under the mundane constraints of available wealth, fragility seems the defining feature of 
such communities. The backpacking community that Time lauds might be only marginally more 
enduring than those others, sometimes said to be exemplary of ‘community’ in the Creative Age, 
the internet chat-rooms and weblogs of the ‘cybersphere’.  
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In these respects, the relatively popular Lonely Planet South-East Asia on a Shoestring 
guidebook is emphatic in suggesting that travel is about self-assertion from within an authentic 
individualism: 
 
At Lonely Planet we believe the most memorable travel experiences are often those that are 
unexpected, and the finest discoveries are those that you make yourself. Guidebooks are not 
intended to be used as if they provide a detailed set of infallible instructions!386  
 
The similar Rough Guides emphasize “information about hostels and low-budget listings 
with the kind of details on restaurants and quality hotels that independent-minded visitors on any 
budget might expect, whether on business in New York or trekking in Thailand”. The Guides offer 
to reveal pathways for “independent travelers” that combines the firm’s “student origins” and 
“journalistic approach to description with a thoroughly practical approach to travelers’ needs”, 
including information about “culture, history and contemporary insights”. “Rough Guides had a 
ready market among impecunious backpackers, but soon acquired a much broader and older 
readership that relished … wit and inquisitiveness as much as an enthusiastic, critical approach”.387  
At once, travelers are offered stewardship and guidance alongside demands that personal 
sovereignty and autonomy be exercised. Such guidebooks do not pretend to offer entry to an 
untapped wilderness. The offer is intended to trigger personal achievement through the 
satisfactions might travel afford. These examples suggest a contemporary subjectivity that presents 
itself in conditions that motivate ongoing desires’ satisfactions and dissatisfactions, where almost 
consistent requirements for emendation of the self extend beyond directly instrumentalized 
occupational domains and into those of leisure and culture. While travel for some might include 
self-discovery, and for others the kind of melancholy felt by Levi-Strauss upon finding that all the 
‘discoveries’ have been made already, such insights into subject-hood do not form part of the 
present inquiry. What these examples do represent are situations in which travel is seen to appeal 
to and animate a relatively well-educated, and articulate, autonomous individualism that practices 
sovereign fulfillment in conditions that privilege the sovereign desires’ satisfactions and 
dissatisfactions of a self-asserting and orienting subjectivity.  
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Some reasons given by Samantha Selinger-Morris for travel in North Asia are helpful here. 
Selinger-Morris suggests that what is interesting about contemporary travel is that subject-agents 
bring the authentic individualism that they ‘live’ to it. Drawing somewhat ironically on writers like 
Paul Theroux, Selinger-Morris’ suggests, while “‘tourists don’t know where they’ve been [and] 
travelers don’t know where they’re going.’ I’m a member of a lesser-known third class, the one 
that knows where the Starbucks is”. Selinger-Morris derides Theroux, as well as what she sees as 
“seekers of the self in areas untouched by Western culture”: 
 
I’d have to drink piss-warm distilled goat’s milk in a Mongolian yurt to experience the ‘real China’ 
right? Traveling on the beaten path in Asia has given me the gift of hard-arse introspection. I had 
to deal with my lack of tolerance, my constant judging. And, now is the time to put up or shut 
up. I either remain an Orientalist for the rest of my life, or I learn to accept other cultures on their 
own terms.388 
  
The mode of travel that Selinger-Morris reports involves the exercise of autonomy, the 
self-development of capacities for ‘going on’, as a relatively affluent, well-educated, and articulate 
Anglo-American individualism in contemporary globalizing conditions. Making similar claims, the 
somewhat more urbane Alain de Botton recommends, “Independent travelers” should, “reflect 
upon a fundamental question prior to setting out. What excites my curiosity?” In a world replete 
with offers of opportunities for desires’ satisfactions, de Botton implores reflection about why 
travel is undertaken, and what could be fulfilling about it, “lest one slip into anxiety, boredom, 
free-floating sadness, or alarm”. For Robert Dessaix, contemporary “travel is primarily about me”: 
 
Travel is about self-discovery … saving your soul, or at least revivifying it, kaleidescoping it into 
something else is still the best reason for leaving home … it’s best to leave home unaccompanied, 
or with someone you can get rid of without too much trouble en route … It’s being on the prowl, 
beholden to nobody, for the beautiful self we’d forgotten was locked up inside us. It’s your business 
what makes you come alive – and nobody else’s. Once you get home nobody will be remotely 
interested in what you did, or what you saw. 389  
 
Like de Botton, Dessaix recommends travel as catharsis, an experiencing of the self to be 
arrived at through private immersion in social worlds: “living more intensely, freed for a short time 
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from the constraints of everyday life”. Personal authenticity and the genuineness of existence are a 
priori assumptions here. While for some, ‘the art of travel’ might involve “developing a lifelong 
interest in Gobelin tapestry … Parisian fashion, or Belgium between the wars”, Dessaix makes 
explicit a claim that the revivification of self, which he recommends, “is not impossible at [outer-
suburban] Chadstone Shopping Centre”.390  
That anxiety, boredom, or ‘free-floating alarm’ are recognizable as contemporary features 
of life within Anglo-American societies is a moot point. However, what is important here is the 
suggestion that Anglo-American conditions have emerged which seem to privilege practices and 
pursuits that work to augment and extend sovereign choices by authentic ‘identities’ through 
personal, autonomous, desires’ satisfactions, or dissatisfactions. These examples help to suggest 
what happens in contemporary leisure domains as relatively well-educated, affluent, and articulate 
milieux engage amidst conditions also demand almost consistent self-assertion and emendation of 
the self. What is interesting for the present thesis is not so much that tourism may have given way 
to travel, or that the former might express conformity and the latter liberty, but the emergence of 
conditions in which it seems independence and autonomy have become central to widely practiced 
cultural pursuits. Whether or not travel’s popularity works to undermine its authenticity for some 
travelers — as is possibly the case for many — is not as important here as the suggestion that 
travel ‘goes on’ in conditions that impel consistent emending of a ‘creative’ and ‘enthusiastic’ self-
orienting and projecting subjectivity.  
The examples discussed here are said to represent, not so much quests for authenticity but, 
quests by an inescapably authentic subjectivity through the experiences of an individualism that 
assumes personal capacities and responsibilities which satisfy, assuage, enhance, or augment, 
embodied ‘existential’ presence in particular social worlds. The directly commoditized offers of 
independent travel bureaus — Don’t go on holiday this year … get into a real life experience with 
Intrepid! — and guidebooks, like the Lonely Planet and Rough Guides, as well as the indirectly 
commoditized practices these complement, such as eco-tourism, backpacking, the “gap year”, or 
“extreme sports”, represent offers of opportunities for sovereign desires’ satisfactions. The offers 
of “memorable experiences”, and to “be all you can be”, “live close to the edge”, or to Just Do It, 
discussed here represent offers of opportunities to augment personal desiring and extend 
                                                 
 
390 Ibid. Alain de Botton’s The Art of Travel, as quoted by Dessaix.  
 265 
moments of joy in conditions that consistently impel maintenance of an authentic form of life that 
‘creatively’ self-orients and ‘pro-actively’ self-projects.391  
 
… … … 
 
Discussion now considers examples that help to examine conditions in relation to inquiry over an 
ontological register that focuses upon the social constitution of subjectivity. Discussion considers 
how particular situations within contemporary sociality appear in relation to intertwining somatic, 
practical-ethological, and reflexive layers of subjectivity. The key example here is a relatively recent 
personal-use commodity outlet design format, the ‘juice bars’ that squeeze and blend fruit juices, 
dairy-styled smoothies, and similar beverage-snacks on-site, using a relatively wide variety of 
seasonal and out-of-season fruits and vegetables, various permutations on yoghurt, milk, and soy 
products, as well as vitamin and mineral additives.  
As a retailing concept, the ‘juice’ or ‘smoothie bar’ originated in California in the early 
1990s, and spread to both Britain and Australia by the early 2000s. As a retailing format, juice bars 
are most often chains or franchises in urban and suburban shopping strips and ‘malls’, seafronts, 
and other ‘leisure’ precincts. However, ‘high-end’ and ‘boutique’ juice bars also seem common to 
Central Business Districts, ‘up-market’ shopping plazas, and financial districts. At first glance, the 
situations proffered by these juice bars might appear in some ways antithetical to the relaxing, 
comfortable, and ethical consumerism central to the 3rd Places discussed in Chapter 15. Indeed, the 
example provided by the juice bars is interesting because, while different from 3rd Places, as sites 
for personal-use commodity consumption, they can be seen to address a dominant contemporary 
subjectivity through appeals to a liberal ‘enlightened stakeholder’ individualism. 
Multinational food and beverage corporation PepsiCo opened a single Jamba Juice outlet in 
California in 1995 and had 300 stores in the United States by 2001, generating a 3 200% expansion 
in revenues. Meanwhile, the Juice & Smoothie Association of the United States estimates 2001 
sales at USD$552 million for the 2 000 outlets said to emerge there in recent years. In the United 
Kingdom, juice bars first appeared in 2000 in fashionable neighbourhoods, such as Fulham, the 
                                                 
 
391 Brown, "Mind the Gap: Why a Student' Year out May Do More Harm Than Good," 23. Anonymous, Lonely Planet Guides 
(Lonely Planet Publications, 2005 [cited Jan 12 2006]); available from http://www.lonelyplanet.com.au, Anonymous, The Rough 
Guides Home Page (Rough Guides, 2002 [cited Oct 18 2002]); available from http://www.roughguides.co.uk, Intrepid, Don't Go 
on Holiday This Year ... (Intrepid Travel Company, 2003 [cited 30 June 2003]); available from http//www.intrepidtravel.com. 
 266 
Kings Road, and Canary Wharf. Even in allegedly ‘unfashionable’ centres, such as Bristol the 
owner of one juice bar claims to “get through 150 kilos of carrots every week”. 392  
Indeed, juice bars have emerged over the same period as 3rd Places, and often appear in 
similar locations. Similarly, the juice bars hold links with the United States’ West Coast 
counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s. Like the corporatized 3rd Places, the most abundant 
contemporary manifestations of the ‘juice bar concept’ appear to be those developed by large 
corporations, such as Pepsico. They are said to have “come a long way from hippy health food 
stores. Retailers have moved well from that concept to a slicker, sophisticated urban niche where 
the juice bar experience is all about feeling good and getting a lift”. As such, the juice bar example 
is interesting because designed to cater to the same relatively affluent, well-educated, and articulate 
milieux for whom for whom engagements within core arenas are often, both sources of personal 
autonomy and individual sovereignty, as well as of irregular incomes, unpredictability, and what 
the sociologists call ‘precarity’.393  
As a ‘retailing concept’, the juice bar does not rely on what Eizenberg sees as “comfy 
chairs, tables to sit at … a policy where you do more than just purchase, [offering] people a little 
place to hang”. In contrast with 3rd Places, juice bars typically provide only benches and stools for 
in-store consumption. Sited most often in relatively compact shop-fronts, juice bars usually offer a 
well-lit and pastel-hued menagerie of squeezing, pressing, and whirring machinery. Here, potential 
customers encounter relatively loud, pulsating, beat-driven electronic music, of a kind with that 
which aerobics gymnasiums offer-up. The choice of background music also stands juice bars in 
contrast with 3rd Places, which are closely associated with relaxing jazz, folk, ambient, and ‘world’ 
music. Indeed, the Starbucks firm owns a recording label that features, amongst others, Bob Dylan, 
while various Borders’ stores periodically offer ‘live’ freestyle-jazz.394  
The juice bars’ commoditized prestations are based in claims that what is on offer are 
nutritious and flavoursome accompaniments to healthy yet busy contemporary Anglo-American 
‘lifestyles’:  
 
Boost is Smoothies: Being healthy is fun at Boost!  
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Boost Juice fruit juices and Super Juice Cocktails come with an added Super Nutritional 
Supplement of one of five specially formulated natural vitamin boosts.  
Or, if you prefer, a pure shot of liquid sunshine, better known as Wheatgrass.  
It is amazing how we have made something so healthy taste so good!  
 
Finally, fast food you can feel good about, at Viva Juice, we love fruit, and we delight in dishing it 
out in magical combinations that burst with fantastic flavours and all round goodness. 
Viva Juice – Smoothies … Good to Go, contain the recommended daily intake of fruit [and] are 
packed with vitamins, minerals and other nutrients, an extraordinary health experience.  
Each smoothie includes a FREE nutritional booster.  
On average, our juices contain approximately 2 grams of fat and 350 calories … by blending fruit to 
give you a meal-in-a-cup that conveniently fits into a day’s healthy eating plan.  
To lead a healthy life you need to be fuelled by the right stuff: 
Oranges – provides all round goodness & protection from infection.  
Apples — fights infections, keeps skin clear & strengthens eyesight. 
Blueberries — fights gastro & urinary tract infections. 
Pineapples & Raspberries — helpful for angina & arthritis. Excellent anti-oxidant. 
Enticing fruit flavours, vital nutrients, and total convenience: everything you need to live an active 
healthy life.395  
 
Such promotional information is interesting, because it allows discussion to consider the 
juice bar as a relatively recent commodity-phenomenon replete with social messaging of a 
distinctly informational nature alongside offers of opportunities for me-time. In and through juice 
bars, self-assertion coalesces around the ingestion of a beverage that is a nutritious, energizing, and 
purportedly, performance amplifying Boost! While in 3rd Places, the offer is to replenish and regain 
composure, the juice bar offers opportunities to bring the embodied self up to scratch for 
participation in sociality. The provisioning of a forum for a self-orienting and asserting subjectivity 
is a change in the syntax of the offer yet, the paradigm in which the offer appears remains 
consistent. The offers here are based in market-perceptions that subject-agents desire ‘peak-
performance’ at all times.  
What both 3rd Places and juice bars offer-up are some of the tools and techniques for 
‘going on’ in the contemporary Anglo-American West. The order of representations attaching to 
the juice bars’ exhortations — to imbibe ‘a pure shot of liquid sunshine’ — also differ from those 
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used to promote beverages in earlier decades. Briefly pausing to compare them here might offer 
further insight into how juice bars can be seen to address a dominant contemporary subjectivity. 
Juice bar promotions differ from those used by firms purveying liquor to ‘businessmen’ in the 
1950s and 1960s, for example. Promotions in these decades often represented to the busy 
professional milieux of those decades, commodities as tools that might aid relaxation and the 
carrying-on of business. Likewise, the juice bars’ references to ‘liquid sunshine’ do not resemble 
commercially bowdlerized re-presentations of countercultural psychedelia seen in beverage 
promotions of the 1970s, such as Frank suggests formed a key part of the markets’ Conquest of Cool. 
What the juice bars’ promotions seem to re-present here are conditions in which work and life are 
experienced unitarily; as aspects of an active and healthy, achievement-oriented life. Contemporary 
occupational relations are not seen to be played-out over drinks — as Trinca and Fox suggest, “By 
the 2000s, the days of the ‘liquid lunch’ were well and truly over” — nor does leisure involve 
potentially debilitating mind-altering substances, and rejection of ‘working for the man’. Offered-
up through the juice bars’ promotions are opportunities to revel in and augment an authentic 
individualism in conditions that make orienting and emending the self through the application of 
relatively high levels of education, skills, awarenesses, and ‘energy’ seem everyday requirements for 
engaging within sociality.396  
Therefore, a key similarity between 3rd Places and juice bars is that they both offer-up 
possibilities for me-time through prestations embedded with relatively complex and abstract 
information. However, while the purveyors of 3rd Places make entreaties in the form of offers of 
opportunities to slow-down time, the offers presented through juice bars are different. The juice 
bars’ offer is not to spend quality time lingering, but to orient the self, to Just Do It, ‘focus’ energy, 
and ‘get in tune’ with the ‘buzz’ of hectic, demanding, and stressful 24-7 conditions. The offer is 
premised on providing opportunities to orient and optimize the self, in relation to the relatively 
intense on-rush, or slipping-away, of contemporary temporal contextuality. At commuter hubs, 
Central Business Districts, and ‘leisure’ precincts, the appeal of juice bars turns on the provision of 
sites and situations for Energization!, to Recharge!, and opportunities to Get A Life! 397 
Because created and reproduced as part of conditions that address a self-orienting and 
projecting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ dominant subjectivity, these examples can be seen to 
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present relatively complex and abstract information as gradations of quality. Where commodities, 
amongst other things, appear to mobilize, propagate, and perpetuate such a dominant subjectivity, 
the relatively complex and abstract information on offer at juice bars seem to attach to actions, 
meanings, and things as if superlatives of ‘quality’. Relatively complex and abstract information is 
here seen to provide an aid to subjectively qualifying phenomena before an autonomous 
individualism that ‘goes on’ in conditions requiring almost consistent maintaining and emending of 
the self. These examples appeal to and animate an authentic individualism that, seen to work as 
both motor and anchor point within ongoing sociality, is also the focus for the personal-use 
commodity markets which economists see as important to ‘growth’ in recent decades. The 
purveyors of these examples are here seen as ‘building into’ actions, meanings, and things, 
representations that relatively affluent, well-educated, and articulate milieux ‘demand’ in hectic, 
stressful, and, often, precarious conditions. For the present thesis, these are some of the aids to 
self-orientation that situations which privilege an ‘enlightened stakeholder’ liberal individualism 
hold-out.  
Looking at an example of social messaging made by the purveyors of the Viva Juice 
Company is helpful for discussing subjectivity’s reflexivity in terms of its intertwining with what are 
here called its practical-ethological and somatic layers of affect: 
 
Polystyrene - What’s with that? After looking at the alternatives, we [at Viva Juice] decided that 
Polystyrene is the most practical and environmentally friendly way to provide insulated packaging. 
Polystyrene does not contain any ozone depleting chemicals (CFC’s or HFC’s). In fact since 1990, 
these chemicals have been outlawed in Australia and around the world … A paper cup is much 
more resource intensive to manufacture … requir[ing] 6 times more raw materials, 36 time more 
electricity, 33 time more water, 56 times more waste water. Whilst polystyrene is not biodegradable, 
it does make for stable and inert landfill … Australia does not currently have facilities available for 
recycling of polystyrene … [and] we hope to continue to campaign for recycling facilities to become 
available in Australia.398 
 
Not only are quasi-scientific terms used to explain — to “busy executives and trendy 
young things, people with hectic and unpredictable lives” — the nutritional benefits of juiced fruit 
but also to justify the packaging that contains it.399 Alongside information detailing the nutritional 
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value and health benefits of juice and smoothies is relatively complex and abstract information 
about the benefits of using some chemicals and processes over others in the manufacture and 
possible recycling of alimentary containers. 
 In the minutes spent waiting for a ‘team member’ to blend fruit into a juice and in its 
consumption — again, like that of the ‘3rd Place’, the ‘juice bar’ concept also emphasizes a mix of 
casual familiarity and flexibility — a particular order of conditions for subjectivity become 
apparent. The offers of opportunities for sensual gratification, such as ‘enticing flavours’ might 
provide, and prestations designed to augment existential presence, such as ‘vital nutrients’ might 
hold-out, address a subjective reflexivity attuned to sustaining and fulfilling embodied, atomized 
‘stakeholder’ capacities and responsibilities in consistently demanding environments. As in the 
example of contemporary travel, looking at these juice bars helps suggest that conditions can be 
seen to make an authentic individualism the ‘identity’ for engaging within core arenas. The relative 
societal and relational complexity that is said to bring ‘precarity’ is not here seen as posing a threat 
to ‘self-identity’. Nor is the subjectivity represented in these examples seen to be involved in “a 
frantic search for identity” or for an “‘authenticity’ which one is seeking in vain”.400 Rather, they 
imply the often-frantic search of an authentic individualism for the tools and techniques that make 
possible emendation and assuagement — boost-like energizations, or the assuagements of ‘high-
qualtiy’, for example — in conditions that frequently raise worldly dilemmas for such a form of 
life.  
In this light, the example of the juice bar helps the present thesis to move away from 
theorizing conditions in terms of hyper-reality, and to suggest that a kind of hyper-individualism 
might be said to characterize ‘going on’ within core societal arenas. In all of the examples 
discussed so far, it seems that, within contemporary core arenas, the degree of effort required for 
attaining socially valued capabilities is set quite high. These examples address a deeply 
individuated, self-asserting, and self-orienting subjectivity that ‘goes on’ in situations almost 
relentlessly impelling athlete-like performance and self-emendation. Whether through offers of 
opportunities for conserving time at 3rd Places, or in the practices of downshifting, through the 
time-optimizing on offer at juice bars, or in the athleticism afforded through the presenteeism 
initiatives discussed in Chapter 13, the examples can be seen to address a dominant subjectivity 
amidst temporal contexts that on-rushes and slips-away. That is, seen in terms of somatic 
‘sensation’ and practical-ethological ‘perception’, the examples help to suggest how ‘time’ enframes 
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subjectivity in relatively intense ways, and at a fleeting pace. The reflexivity that situates 
subjectivity in relation to temporal contextuality appears here as the job of self-orienting within 
normative conditions that impel near-continual emending of an authentic individualism.401  
 
… … … 
 
The sometimes-ambiguous sources of information that many New Age and well-being 
phenomena represent might also be discussed in terms of situations in which opportunities for 
reflexive subjective awarenesses of embodied states, or of orientations to social worlds ‘go on’. 
Looking at some examples of New Age-style phenomena allows discussion of subjective 
reflexivity in deeply individuating conditions in a way that does not necessarily see such 
information as ipso facto representing (sociological or scientific) knowledges. Moreover, the 
suggestion here is that a dominant subjectivity present itself as almost consistently thrown into a 
tense condition that demands a sustained deferral of worldly dilemmas. In these respects, 
discussion uses the concept of ‘modern artificialism’ to consider these examples, which are 
elsewhere sometimes discussed using psychology-based theories of Narcissism.  
Adam Possomaï sees the “practitioners of alternative spiritualities” as “enacting an eclectic 
and selective form of cultural consumption”. Possomaï suggests the appropriation through 
commodity-consumption in the contemporary West of historical, indigenous, and ‘Eastern’ 
cultures offers a means for creating “new ‘mythical’ realities”. For Possomaï, the “selective 
interpretation and appropriation of originary explanation” and “non-traditional foundation myths” 
in New Age practices are premised on widespread consumerism and secularizing historicity that 
constitutes a movement of quasi-religious proportions.402 Guy Redden, however, sees in New Age 
practices something more than merely “religious consumerism”. For Redden, “privatist concerns 
of personal authority and self-care [are] better understood as offering solutions to the problem of 
personal agency in a post-traditional society [that] obliges individuals to assume the burden of 
plotting their own destinies”.403  
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For the present thesis, Redden’s approach tempers Possomaï’s claims that New Age 
practices are primarily appealing because they provide for quasi-religiosity in a secular post-
Christian West. Although New Age practices might often include a religious or quasi-religious 
element, the present thesis sees them as the creations of an authentic and genuine individualism in 
situations that impel ever-greater self-assertion and emendation. These examples — and others, 
like the current “Yoga boom” that involves sporting-goods firms Puma, Adidas, and Nike in 
creating ‘lifestyle’ gear as an adjunct to existing sportswear lines — can be discussed in terms of an 
individualism that is caught between conditions that demand education and articulate dispositions 
alongside personal autonomy and ‘creativity’. New Age religion and mythic beliefs might provide 
opportunities for deeply individuated, experiential subjects to relax or regain composure and aid in 
the concentrating of personal energy. Although the ‘essence’ of an exotic ‘other’ might be a key 
feature in many New Age-styled practices, they do not of themselves necessarily serve as a vehicle 
for immersion in a transcendent faith, or an escape from the rationality of modernity. Rather, what 
the present thesis sees as appealing to and animating a contemporary enlightened liberal 
individualism here are practices that work as precursors to engagements in conditions that demand 
self-orientation and projection, and require self-emendation and ‘creativity’.404  
The suggestion here is that these examples might not be seen in ‘personal’ terms, as 
indicators of what commentators such as Lasch, or Brooks refer to as a “higher selfishness”.405 In 
some ways, and in direct contrast with what Lasch saw in the late 1970s as “the banality of 
pseudo-self awareness”, these examples maybe better described as symptomatic of social 
conditions that almost consistently impel deeply individuated emending of the self amidst a 
‘rolling-back’ of the very ‘nannying’ conditions he blames for the “culture of Narcissism”.406 
Dissolved over decades of neoliberalization and financialization, the collectively provisioned 
supports of welfare statism might be seen to normatively enframe subjectivity such that individuals 
did not need to withdraw into a compensatory “grandiose self” amidst the relative complexity, 
abstractions, and extensity of modernizing sociality. The methodological individualism Brooks or 
Lasch combine with conservative critique seemingly leads to moral argument and a conundrum 
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405 Brooks, Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There. 
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that ultimately ‘blames’ subject-agents for being weak and failing to ‘live up expectations’, or for 
being too strongly ‘individualistic’.407  
In this sense, Lasch’s perspective seems to suggest that the reflexivity afforded by 
contemporary sociality facilitates a knowing contradiction or self-deception. The present thesis suggests 
a different perspective, which is that the reflexivity afforded by sociality brings into subjectivity a 
tension that means the somatic, practical-ethological, and reflexive constitution of it — as ‘being’ in 
space, over time, and amongst others — is increasingly bound-over to defer actions and meanings 
that sociality might raise as worldly dilemmas. Here, the concept of ‘modern artificialism’ makes it 
possible to discuss ‘self-centred’ actions without recourse to intra-personal speculation about 
belief, or psychologizing theories of pan-cultural Narcissism. Rather than discuss these examples 
as projects of self-discovery, quests for authenticity, or religiosity in an ‘age’ of alleged 
‘meaninglessness’ or ‘inauthenticity’, the present thesis sees these practices as appealing to and 
animating a relatively affluent, well-educated, and articulate individualism that embraces faith and 
mysticism as acts of self-orientation and projection. New Age spirituality, notionally ‘Eastern’ 
faiths, traditional religious ‘fundamentalism’ — and indeed, the relatively complex and abstract 
‘scientific’ or ‘nutritional’ information on offer at juice bars or 3rd Places — are seen only as 
practices that a liberal individualism uses to edify the self in conditions that privilege self-
orientation and projection through expressions of desires’ satisfactions and dissatisfactions.  
Bringing in the concept of ‘modern artificialism’ here helps to suggest how such conditions 
can be seen to enframe an ‘immediate’ self-orienting and projecting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ 
dominant subjectivity in ways that make liberal individualism a relatively impervious ‘final arbiter’ 
for ‘going on’ within contemporary sociality. Through the concept of ‘modern artificialism’, the 
examples help to suggest that contemporary Anglo-American sociality might be seen to affectively 
frame a ‘stripped-back’ individualism that takes as ‘objectively true’ a reality that, in analysis, 
appears the imagining ‘real’ worlds through personal will-objectives that mean subjectively ‘going 
on’ is making reality ‘real’.408 What is seen as on offer in these examples are techniques for orienting 
an inescapably authentic individualism in conditions that mean making reality ‘real’ often involves 
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practicing a subjectivity that is, effectively, tempered to a density which makes ‘being’ relatively 
impervious to much ‘information’ and even ‘knowledge’. The imagining of ‘real’ worlds that 
implies ‘being’ involves making reality ‘real’ seems hardened by demands for consistent self-
orientation and projection, self-assertion and ‘creativity’.  
Where offers of creativity-enhancing ‘life-work’, personal autonomy, fulfilling careers, and 
well-being ‘initiatives’ arise alongside an obscuring of leisure-labour divisions that often brings 
‘precarity’, the examples discussed so far can be seen in terms of a subjectivity that, moving 
between the jouissance of heightened satisfactions and enervated dissatisfactions, defers dilemmas 
irreconcilable to the particular formation of liberal individualism central to sociality. The purveyors 
of 3rd Places and juice bars, the promoters of social messages and ethical consumerism, as well 
niche marketing campaigners that target ‘downshifters’, are seen to appeal to a liberal individualism 
through offers of opportunities for unburdening and attenuating the self, in conditions where 
stress, fatigue, overwork, and exploitation remain distinct possibilities. As the examples of travel 
and extreme sports help to suggest, sociality offers freedoms to pursue almost unbounded 
personal autonomy, yet demands consistent maintenance of personal viability in competitive 
conditions. Yet, possibilities for alleviating or reducing the extent to which conditions are stressful, 
precarious, or exploitative of the self or others seems delimited to sovereign choices and ever-
further autonomous self-assertion and ‘creativity’. Possibilities for ‘perfected’ embodied states, for 
liberated self-consciousness and, importantly, for autonomy in reflexive engagements in social 
worlds do characterize many of the examples discussed here. However, for the present thesis these 
imply conditions for a subjectivity at once empowered to realize and emend the self within an 
expansive field of desires, yet simultaneously bound almost ceaselessly to exercise desiring and 
improve selfhood. 
The ‘legitimate normlessness’ that discussing Trinca and Fox’s work helps to describe is 
here seen to envelop liberal individualism, such that situations within core arenas for sociality hold 
out little recourse to norm-framing ‘information’ or ‘knowledges’. Through the lens of ‘modern 
artificialism’, these examples can be seen to appeal to and animate an ‘experiential’ individualism 
that, making reality ‘real’, mobilizes a heightened reflexivity in conditions that mean subjective, 
‘objectively true’ reality works as the final arbiter for so much that individuals ‘do’. Hence, 
fetishistic attraction to Eastern belief systems may be said to resemble the similarly widespread, 
yet, decidedly parochial resurgence of Christian ‘fundamentalism’ in recent decades. In a similar 
way, the relatively complex and abstract information on nutrition and the environment proffered 
at juice bars might be said to contribute to reflexive awarenesses of the self, but not necessarily in 
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the terms of knowledges. Because arising as one superlative of ‘quality’ amongst a plethora of 
other, often competing sources of information, the norm-framing qualities of — sociological, or 
scientific, for example — knowledges or information seems diminished. What is important for the 
present thesis is that these examples help to describe a dominant contemporary subjectivity that, 
‘stripped-back’ to self-orientation and projection that ‘goes on’ in contexts offering few means for 
engaging within sociality on norm-based or relational terms, places subjectivity in a tension to 
defer many worldly dilemmas raised through engagements within sociality.  
While trust, angst, fear, or dread, indifference or irony, ‘narcissistic withdrawal’, the search 
for genuine situations, or authenticity, might characterize subject-hood for many in the conditions 
described here, these questions are better answered by the existential philosophies and therapeutic 
psychologies that lay beyond the ambit of the present thesis. Also, these examples mean the 
present thesis looks at what happens in practice in relation to the suggestion that ‘ontological 
inconsistencies’ enframe subjectivity, rather than that ontological insecurities characterize 
subjectivity. Looking to social conditions that enframe the constituting of subjectivity through 
layers of affect, means recognizing that deferral takes place at a pre-conscious level of ‘being-in-
the-world’, instituted as it were behind the embodied practices of reflexive subjectivity. The 
deferral of almost irreconcilable dilemmas discussed here is said to be a condition of social affect, 
of actualization in the social field, manifest at the interstices of ontic contextuality and normative 
conditions that give form and constitution to the job of ‘being’ human. The tension discussed here 
emerges as normative conditions and ontic contextuality are seen to combine within a sociality that 
at once amplifies and enervates ‘being’. The deferral that the present thesis describes is seen as a 
condition of the social enframing of a dominant subjectivity.  
 
… … … 
… … 
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16 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis’ central argument turned on the claim that in the late-twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first, one of the dominant subjectivities that has emerged in the United States’, British, and 
Australian ‘Anglo-American’ societies moves between relatively intensified desires for immediate 
satisfactions and concomitant enervated dissatisfactions. Amidst relatively high levels of affluence 
and consumption, persons were said to experience relatively heightened desires for unbounded 
lifestyles, but concomitantly we experience stress and fatigue, or the chronic instability sometimes 
labeled ‘precarity’.  
Examples drawn from contemporary Anglo-American societies in practice helped to 
illustrate how emphases upon personal capacity-building, private responsibility, ‘self-
improvement’, and ‘well-being’ seem to animate and appeal to an ‘enlightened stakeholder’ liberal 
individualism, and to make resolving ethical and existential dilemmas difficult. The examples open 
to inquiry were also used to suggest that such appeals often appear to assuage self-orienting 
individuals, because addressing a dominant subjectivity through offers of opportunities to slow-
down time, or reduce spatial and institutional abstractedness or extensity. The examples suggested 
how contemporary sociality appears to obfuscate subject-agents’ capacities to ‘go on’ in ways that 
do not involve self-orienting assessments of sovereign choices. As such, the thesis has suggested 
that an important consequence of such a subjectivity is that persons are often bound to defer 
existential and ethical dilemmas that social worlds raise for them as socialized subject-agents.  
While similar claims about the West were once associated with the ‘critique of mass 
society’, as well as conservative criticisms of ‘moral decline’, the present thesis has moved to 
develop a critical approach to contemporary theories and practices of subjectivity. Furthermore, 
motivation for the thesis arose from recognition that the Third Way debates of the 1990s — seen 
by some as a beachhead from which critical theories and practices might confront ‘neoliberal’ 
globalization — had by the 2000s, largely faltered. The thesis set out to develop an approach that 
might take a different direction, and initially reached back to discussions in the early 1980s that 
had focused upon cultural ‘materialism’ and social conditions for the ‘formation’ of liberal 
individualism. 
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Where ‘past and tradition’ could no longer be seen to anchor the job of creating and 
reproducing forms of authority and value criteria, a certain kind of subjectivity was said to arise in 
situations that humans created and reproduced in particular ways. Discussing conditions that had 
come to be conceived of as material forces, a liberal individualism that emphasized personal 
exemplarity and equalitarianism, and a peculiar modern artificialism, the thesis described 
subjectivity as an ‘immediate’, self-orienting and projecting, self-asserting and ‘creative’ form of 
life. Recognizing subjectivity on these terms meant that discussion looked at modernizing sociality 
as an unstable social world that ‘is’ what it is created and reproduced ‘as’. Subjectivity, itself, was 
said to bring into generalized contention what the world ‘is’, while also ‘concretizing’ what it can 
be.  
This meant that the approach was developed around a suggestion that subjectivity be seen 
as the source of forms of authority and value criteria that ‘go on’ in particular conditions, as well as 
the socially created and reproduced ‘limit’ of arbitrariness and contingency. Seeing modernization’s 
forms of authority and value criteria as the arbitrary and contingent effects of particular societal 
and relational dynamics — of practical and discursive normative conditions that humans create 
and reproduce — meant that sociality and subjectivity were said to endure, in space, over time, 
through institutions, and ‘in’ the bodies of subject-agents. That is, recognizing that particular 
normative conditions can be seen to predominate in particular social worlds meant that these 
could be seen to ‘go on’ amidst a material-physical ontic contextuality that is itself socially created 
and construed in relation to the socialized embodied job of ‘being’ human. Moreover, the 
discussion suggested that patterns of access to and monopolies over materials, practices, and 
discourses, manifesting amidst an ontic contextuality, could be said to frame situations in and 
through which a particular formation of liberal individualism predominates. Subject-agents might 
be said to ‘go on’ amidst certain material-physical ‘ontic’ contexts, and to create and reproduce 
practical and discursive ‘normative’ conditions that enframe a form of life ‘in-dominance’: a 
dominant subjectivity. 
Around these suggestions, the thesis set out to discuss current theories and practices of 
subjectivity. The discussion identified four key methodological points, and used them as problems 
that framed the development of an approach to making claims about the empirical world. To 
recap briefly, the first and second points implied a need for theory that avoids going ‘too deep’ or 
‘too shallow’. It meant the approach needed to account for subjectivity as the socialized embodied 
creation and creator of social worlds that always involve norm-based and relational contexts. The 
third point implied that the approach avoid transposing ‘means into ends’, by recognizing that 
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humans create and reproduce forms of authority and value criteria, as well as sustaining challenges 
to the ‘legitimacy’ of them. This meant that the approach took sociality’s normative conditions to 
be bound-up intimately with the situations that humans create and reproduce in order to ‘go on’ in 
space, over time, and amongst others. The fourth point meant that the approach would avoid 
imbricating subjectivity within sociality as if a functional unit in a system-like social complex.  
Together, these four points framed the approach in ways that meant the inquiry itself 
worked across ontological and normative registers, in relation to the claim that the job of ‘being’ 
human always and already involves socialized embodied subject-agents and norm-based and 
relational contexts. In effect, this meant that the inquiry looked at subject-agents as self-orienting 
liberal individuals as both enframed and acting to ‘materialize’ situations and, so, create and 
reproduce conditions for a dominant subjectivity. The approach was structured around the 
suggestion that social conditions — created and reproduced where subject-agents imagine ‘real’ 
worlds, and ‘materialize’ them as they ‘go on’ — can be seen to ‘normalize’ a particular form of 
life. The particular form of life that subject-agents were said to create and reproduce in and 
through market-oriented and liberal-democratic Anglo-American societies was seen as something 
‘inalienable’. That is, the source of forms of authority and value criteria, as well as challenges to 
these. The approach looked at liberal individualism as the ‘inalienable’ motor and anchor point 
within the job of creating and reproducing contemporary Anglo-American social worlds.  
 
… … … 
 
Seen in this way, a key problem that discussing subjectivity in contemporary conditions raised for 
the thesis was one of reconciling ‘strong’ empiricism — manifest where modern artificialism is 
said to obtain as a generalized condition of subjectivity — with normative claims about an 
empirical world. That subject-agents can be said to ‘live’ as an ‘immediate’ socialized embodied 
reality was taken to imply that explanations reducible to personal-will objectives were 
unsustainable. The suggestion here was that normative conditions can be seen as always and 
already co-dependent with the material-physicality of ‘being’ human. The thesis took the 
irreparably ‘broken-down’ atomization of ‘objectively true’ referents as the cue for inquiry itself to 
step-back, and link its normative claims with an ontic commitment to normativity, as the norm-
based and relational condition that ‘being’ human always and already ‘is’. Rather than specifying or 
defining the locus for normative claims about sociality and subjectivity, the thesis based its critique 
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in the suggestion that human-being ‘goes on’ as a norm-based and inter-relational condition amidst 
a problematic reality that is itself socially created.  
The thesis’ critique sprang from recognition that ‘normativity’ — socialized, embodied, 
norm-based and relational ‘going on’ — is the condition of ‘being’ human. The approach 
considered ongoing sociality to be created and reproduced by socialized embodied humans that 
imagine ‘real’ worlds, and ‘materialize’ them in order to and because they ‘go on’ in particular ways 
that have a relation to ‘normativity’. Practical and discursive normative conditions and material-
physical ontic contextuality were seen to raise problems because the job of creating and reproducing 
them works to legitimize the always difficult and problematic (Natural) ‘order of the universe’ and, 
so, creates demands and requirements for ‘legitimation’ in theory and practice. The societal and 
relational enframing of subjectivity has been seen as a norm-based and inter-relational ‘affair’ that 
involves the creating and reproducing of plastic and violable forms of authority and value criteria, 
which may include challenges to authority, resistance to hierarchies, expressions of similarity or 
difference, as well as problematic material-physical ontic contexts. These suggestions were taken to 
imply a critical method that sees the bearing of norm-based and relational claims upon structured 
and institutionalized conditions as an important potential means for constraining and for 
‘legitimating’ the exercise of constraints upon its many problematic and often destructive effects.  
As such, the thesis looked at the series of examples through an approach that recognized 
contemporary sociality enframes subjectivity in ways that do not necessarily disqualify, but 
nonetheless undermine and destabilize prior ways of understanding norm-based activity. This 
process is therefore intrinsically destabilizing, even as it might be enthralling and attractive. 
Looking at the examples through this approach meant that contemporary Anglo-American liberal-
democratic societies were seen to hold out possibilities that norm-based and relational conditions 
within core arenas might in some ways flourish. Hence, the examples focused upon practices and 
discourses that emphasized things like occupational rights, social justice, and environmental issues, 
as well as self-care and well-being. However, using the approach also meant that the examples 
highlighted ways that conditions obtaining within Anglo-America societies worked to destabilize 
possibilities that these might affect the relatively complex, abstract, and extended ways of creating 
and reproducing it. The relational contexts affecting the job of creating and reproducing sociality 
throw the normative responsibility back upon self-orienting individuals. Norm-based and 
relational contexts that almost consistently require ‘creativity’ and emendation of the self make 
achieving sovereign desires for satisfaction, or expressing their dissatisfaction central to the Anglo-
American ‘way of life’.  
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The argument has not claimed to bear witness to conditions that would see the end of the 
individual, or a generalized negation of subjectivity. Nevertheless, contemporary conditions do 
seem to frame subject-agents amidst myriad elaborations of individuated desiring, and these do 
tend to prioritize so-called immaterial goods and services, and disembodied, aestheticized modes 
of societal and inter-relational engagements. It superordinates a particular form of life. The 
examples elaborated across the thesis helped to suggest that in relatively complex, abstract, and 
extended, market-oriented and liberal-democratic Anglo-American societies, patterns of monopoly 
over and access to materials, practices, and discourses privilege situations that ‘go on’ as if 
embodied subject-agents were themselves ‘hyper-real’. Contemporary conditions that frame such a 
dominant subjectivity were said to ‘go on’ as if human-being were not anchored in space, over 
time, and amongst others, but in an immaterial world of ‘footloose’ global networks and ethereal 
cyber-spherical ‘sensations’.  
The dominant frame of Anglo-American sociality, according to this argument, effectively 
marginalizes engagements not premised upon ever-further assertions of individual autonomy and 
sovereign choices over possible satisfactions. One of the dominant modes of responding to 
sources of stress and fatigue, and the exploitation of the self, others, or the environment, was 
shown to have become largely a matter of private dissatisfactions. In such conditions, a pervasive 
kind of velveteen enveloping of Anglo-American social life was said to occur, wherein subject-
agents seem increasingly to be called-upon as self-orienting individuals to make their way in the 
world. 
 
… … … 
… … 
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Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
This brief Appendix sets out some empirical material in support of claims concerning the scope 
and reach of phenomena discussed in the examples elaborated in Part IV. 
 
Global Corporate Sustainability 
 
Evidence for the claim that corporate sustainability, social responsibility, and the triple bottom-line 
have become relatively widespread phenomena across Anglo-America in recent decades includes 
primary and secondary sources, such as company reports, government papers, business, marketing, 
and management theory journals, and news media, such as magazines, trade journals, and 
newspapers. Across the 1990s and into the 2000s, an increasing number of business concerns took 
up an array of strategies that are, more or less, commensurate with notions of ‘sustainability’. 
These may develop, produce, distribute, or manage a range of commodity goods and services, 
which include petroleum, other chemical products, biotechnologies, communications, information, 
and mass-media, personal-use consumer goods, ‘lifestyle’ and ‘leisure’, finance, logistics, banking, 
or investment services, for example.409  
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By 2001, “45% of the global ‘top 500’ corporations” had prepared and made public annual 
audits conforming to the “guiding principles of the triple bottom-line”.410 Many major global 
sustainability strategies are based upon similar ‘full-cost’ accounting or auditing packages, such as 
the AA8000 Standard International Standard.411 By 2004, the Carbon Disclosure Project annual survey 
“sponsored by several US and European foundations led by the Rockefeller philanthropic fund as 
well as 95 prominent institutions had [USD] $10 trillion invested on global markets”.412 As well as 
directly practicing sustainability, socially responsible community investment “by companies quoted 
in the FTSE 100 index increased by almost a third over 2001-02 to [USD] $1.4bn” in Britain 
alone.413  
Business and management studies courses at major Anglo-American universities, colleges, 
and management schools also research, teach, and theorize ‘sustainability’. Contemporary Masters 
of Business Administration courses have been “developed for individuals that understand the role 
business can and should play in improving the world … [and recognize] growing demand for 
business leaders to focus on the link between social, environmental and economic returns”. Major 
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business schools at universities across the United States, Britain, and Australia also offer graduate 
programs dedicated to “good corporate citizenship”.414 Research and teaching of sustainability also 
extends beyond business schools, and into the social sciences. The Institute for Applied 
Anthropology at the University of Alabama, for example, offers “research in the ethnography of 
corporate social responsibility”.415 
Because businesses that deploy such strategies are bound to maintain or enhance 
profitability within capitalistic markets, the communicating of sustainability credentials often 
involves extensive promotional and advertising campaigns. These may aim to alert governments, 
other businesses, raw materials and components, service providers and, of course, consumers, of a 
firm’s adherence to a Code of Conduct, or set of standards, for example. Corporations may deploy 
sustainability practices through such Codes, the UN Global Compact is on example, or develop 
them ‘in-house’. In 2006, General Electric (GE) — “the world’s largest maker of [nuclear] reactors” 
— launched a “new Ecomagination marketing drive, which seeks to improve the environmental 
impact of all of GE’s products, from locomotives to light bulbs, and plastics to water treatment 
plants”. Interestingly, GE’s Ecomagination coincides with suggestions by vice-president Lorraine 
Bolsinger that the firm’s key interest in nuclear power “will take a major public education 
campaign to make it acceptable”.416  
Corporate sustainability practices are also widely criticized. Challenges to sustainability 
practices include confrontations with ‘capitalism’ per se, moral-philosophical objections to market-
driven globalization, shareholder activist campaigns, and laissez-faire ‘neoliberalist’ criticisms that 
allege sustainability interferes with the natural tendency towards equilibrium said to emerge, should 
markets allowed to work solely through ‘self-interest’.417 As suggested in Chapter 13, many single 
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firms have attracted criticism. As well as Dow Chemical, General Electric, Nike, Nestlé, and Sanyo, these 
include UN Global Compact signatories such as pharmaceutical manufacturer Aventis, domestic 
commodity conglomerate Unilever, mining concerns Norsk Hydro and Rio Tinto, and major 
petroleum producers Royal Dutch/Shell and British Petroleum, for example.418 Similarly, global retailer 
Wal-Mart, accused of perpetrating both environmental pollution and social injustice, has launched 
a project to “democratize sustainability” based around a “green strategy”. Both the Sierra Club, and 
the Environmental Defense Fund, which has “an office in Bentonville with an employee wholly 
dedicated to coordinating with Wal-Mart”, publicly support the firm.419 
Sustainability also seems a pervasive theme in contemporary business, management theory, 
and scholarly journals, the reports of ‘think-tanks’, industry conferences, current-affairs 
broadcasts, popular magazines, newspapers, and other publications. These may range in scope 
from minimal and formulaic business auditing packages, to metatheoretical and philosophical 
treatises on ethics and morality, from multidisciplinary management theory guidelines to 
entrepreneur-as-hero hagiographies, and from stock market booster-ism to liberal ‘green 
consumer’ manifestoes.420  
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Management academics, corporate directors, international bureaucrats, and industry 
association leaders often link advice on relatively mundane operational matters and organizational 
strategies to comments on ‘globalization’, international politics, economic theory, public ethics, 
and moral philosophy through the discourses of sustainability. Industry leaders publicly embracing 
sustainability include Niall FitzGerald, Chair of Unilever, Helmut Panke, Chief Financial Officer of 
BMW, Robert Ingram, Chief Executive of Glaxo-Wellcome, and Lukas Mühlemann, Chief Executive 
of the Credit Suisse Group. FitzGerald, while Chief Executive of Anglo-Dutch conglomerate Unilever 
— “who does not kid himself or anyone else about the role corporations can play in policing 
global social responsibility” — expresses concern with the “precarious state of the world trade 
liberalization talks”. Fitzgerald led Unilever’s purchase of Ben & Jerry’s Ice Creamery in 2000, with the 
declared aim of making the well-known “social capitalist enterprise” the public face for the 
corporation’s “CSR efforts”. 421  
 
Social Messaging and Sustainability 
 
Indeed, business and marketing pundits increasingly recognize “ethical investment” as a 
“mainstream investment strategy”, and issue warnings to the effect that, “Financial institutions and 
businesses … need to take ethical investors seriously going forward”. From 1996 to 2002, the sum 
of amounts invested in “Ethical Managed Funds in Australia” are said to have “grown from AUD 
$216.64 million to AUD $1 761 million”, while Deutsche Bank Australia “forecasts an AUD $35-
40 billion increase in Socially Responsible Investments over the next decade”. From 1997 to 2000, 
“socially responsible investment funds under management in the United Kingdom increased 82% 
to USD $2.159 billion”. While in the United States, “socially screened funds are estimated at 
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around USD $2 trillion”, with “net inflows of USD $185.3 million … during the first quarter of 
2003”.422  
Ethical investment attracts criticism similar to those directed at sustainability practices. 
Critical media, activist, and academic critics seem to argue it is little more than a thinly veiled 
attempt to discourage environmental or social regulation, a form of Greenwash, or “corporate 
spin”, for example. Market-oriented commentators also criticize ethical investment. On the one 
hand, neoclassical economics-oriented critics argue it distorts the market while, on the other hand, 
investment ‘gurus’ criticize ethical investment ‘opportunities’ for lacking transparency. These seem 
to focus on how “[I]ncreased competition has raised concerns that some financial institutions 
might be more focused on maximizing sales rather than building investment portfolios which are 
an accurate reflection of clients’ moral beliefs” or, on the problems that arise when “Following 
your conscience could cost you investment returns”. In this sense, what is interesting here is the 
absence of a broad institutionalized platform for determining ethics in relation to market activity 
per se: “Social responsibility is how [a business] deals with community issues like occupational 
health and safety, corporate governance, environmental standards — regardless of what industry 
[it] is in”.423  
Social messaging of this order might signal what Elsie Maio calls “a business’s purity of 
intention”, and forms an important means for both attracting subject-agents as personal-use 
commodity ‘consumers’, or in many cases as an adjunct to tendering with other firms, or 
governments, which set tendering or contracting pre-requisites based in observation of 
sustainability ‘principles’.424 For example, the Victorian State government in Australia legislated in 
2003 to prompt privatized energy suppliers to “inform households and businesses how much 
greenhouse gas was produced to supply their electricity”. In 2004, the same government 
introduced a televisual and print campaign to “alert individuals of their greenhouse contributions” 
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and “remind people of how they contribute to environmental pollution”. In Britain, in 2003, the 
Department for the Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs “set out the framework for future 
action by government and business, to drive the transition towards sustainable development”. This 
includes the “Going for Green initiative and a new Green Code” that forms the basis for 
disseminating information to the public on environmental issues and sustainable living.425  
In the United States, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) attracted widespread media 
and activist condemnation in late 2004 when “issuing four directives that would have allowed 
organic farmers to use chemicals of unknown provenance on crops, to treat organic dairy cows 
with antibiotics, and to feed organic cattle with non-organic fish meal”. A number of organic, 
consumer, and farming lobby groups opposed the USDA directives, and argued “the Bush 
Administration moves to lower the threshold for organic goods are merely the prelude to a 
relaxation of standards, paving the way for agribusiness to market itself as organic” and join a 
“USD $13 billion dollar per year industry”. While in Britain, the “organic movement” split in 2006 
— between groups supporting the “industrialization of organic food production” and those 
seeking to maintain “the principles of organic production” — over “intensive lobbying by 
supermarkets … to lower standards so they can fully exploit a billion-pound industry” is also 
interesting.426  
In relation to the scope and reach of ‘ethical’ and “green consumerism”, FairTrade-certified 
goods alone reached sales of USD $1.4 billion in 2005. Meanwhile, the “trade in certified organic 
fruit and vegetables” is said to be “a USD$1.6 billion business in Britain alone” and “worth USD 
$13 billion” in North America. As Chapter 14 suggests, such public concerns draw a considerable 
amount of media attention and academic debate. Academic debates around ethical and green 
consumerism might, on the one hand, champion such activities as manifestations of “democracy 
through the wallet”, or, on the other hand, criticize these as some “of many efforts aimed at 
linking social responsibility to free market capitalism”.427  
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Several personal-use commodity producing firms began, in the 1990s and 2000s, to include 
social messages in their promotional strategies. Benetton’s controversial strategy using images of 
dying HIV/AIDS patients and Death Row prisoners in the early 1990s, Nike and Diesel, using the 
slogan “Action! This is a wake-up call for the rebel inside of you. Seize the day! If you want to live 
a successful life you have to fight for it”, have orchestrated a series of faux ‘demos’ to promote 
shoes, clothing, personal hygiene products, and sunglasses. Similarly, the Kenneth Cole clothiers 
based their promotion on images, superscripted with slogans, such as “Mid-east peace is the must-
have for fall”, “Not voting is so last season”, and “Gun safety … it’s all the rage”, over 
photographs of models wearing the firm’s latest products. Indeed, the Ralph Lauren-Polo clothing 
company has sponsored ‘volunteer’ projects, “G.I.V.E.™, Get Involved, Volunteer, Exceed; Polo Jeans 
mission is to inspire community service through volunteerism. In our search for promising leaders, 
we found dedicated young men and women who are making a difference”.428 However, like major 
corporate sustainability practitioners, clothing companies such as Benetton, Diesel, and Kenneth Cole, 
have received strong mainstream media criticism for appropriating “the politics of protest … to 
sell clothes. [T]he trend of using social messages to sell fashion … is just an empty stunt to stir up 
an empty controversy to sell an empty brand”.429 
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